Flight Safety Australia Magazine - May/ June 2010

Transcript

‘There’s a change in the air.’ 3 June 2010 airspace changes May-Jun 2010 Issue 74 ‘Safety, service and security’ The role of cabin crew ‘The wiring evolution.’ Wiring and ageing aircraft. And ... more Close calls ‘Be heard, be seen, be safe.’ Operations at non-towered aerodromes Australian Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment Conference 17-19 August 2010 at Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre (BCEC) welcoming Engineers Operators Maintainers Technicians Logisticians Managers ...from both the military and the commercial aerospace communities, to share their knowledge, experience, ideas and technologies relating to platform sustainment. The Conference covers all aspects of Sustainment, including Fleet Management, Avionics & Wiring Systems, Mechanical Systems, Structures & Corrosion, Propulsion, Publications, Software Supportability, Workforce Capability, Ageing Materials, Spares, Logistics, Supply Chain Design, Support Equipment, Crashworthiness, Condition Monitoring, Obsolescence and Knowledge Retention. Note that the Conference title has changed from its former “ageing aircraft all airworthiness and sustainability issues on platforms, both new and old. The name also matches that of the renamed US event (formerly relationship with our US colleagues. Representatives from our US fraternity will attend as guest speakers. government, defence, industry and academia alike. By becoming involved, whether as a speaker, discussion participant or simply networking with other members of the aerospace community, you are Please see website below for key dates and registration details. www.ageingaircraft.com.au/aasc Enquiries: Event Co-ordinator: Ph: 07 3299 4488 Contents Features ISSUE NO. 74, MAY-JUN 2010 DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, CASA John McCormick MANAGER, SAFETY PROMOTION Gail Sambidge-Mitchell EDITOR, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Margo Marchbank WRITER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Robert Wilson ADVERTISING SALES P: 131 757 or E: [email protected] CORRESPONDENCE Flight Safety Australia GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601 P: 131 757 F: 02 6217 1950 E: [email protected] W: www.casa.gov.au CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS? To change your address online, go to http://casa.gov.au/change For address-change enquiries, call CASA on 1300 737 032 DISTRIBUTION Bi-monthly to 87,000 aviation licence holders, cabin crew and industry personnel in Australia and internationally. CONTRIBUTIONS Stories and photos are welcome. Please discuss your ideas with editorial staff before submission. Note that CASA cannot accept responsibility for unsolicited material. All efforts are made to ensure that the correct copyright notice accompanies each published photograph. If you believe any to be in error, please notify us at [email protected] 8 ‘A change in the air’ Essential reading about the transition to Class D airspace. 20 ‘Be heard, be seen, be safe The rules have also changed for non-towered aerodromes. 24 ‘Service, safety and security’ The unspoken but vital role of alert cabin crew and check–in staff. 29 ‘The wiring evolution’ These examples of degraded aircraft electrics are Darwinian indeed. 37 ‘Don’t play it again Sam’ Aircraft defects should not be recurring nightmares. 42 ‘Part 90 and the AD General series’ Tidying up the regulation of aircraft maintenance. 58 ‘Don’t sweat and forget’ Drinking up before you take-off to make your flight safer and more fun. 62 ‘Low flight, high risk’ The dangers of low flying. 64 ‘Manning UAS’ UAVs may be unmanned, but they still need pilots.  DESIGN & PRODUCTION Spectrum Graphics – www.sg.com.au Regulars PRINTING IPMG (Independent Print Media Group) NOTICE ON ADVERTISING Advertising appearing in Flight Safety Australia does not imply endorsement by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Warning: This educational publication does not replace ERSA, AIP, airworthiness regulatory documents, manufacturers’ advice, or NOTAMs. Operational information in Flight Safety Australia should only be used in conjunction with current operational documents. Information contained herein is subject to change. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. © Copyright 2010, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia. 2 Flight Bytes–aviation safety news 16 ATC Notes– news from Airservices Australia 18 Accident reports– International 19 Accident reports– Australian 31 Airworthiness pull-out section 44 Close Calls 45 ’A brief shining moment’ 46 ‘Faith no more 48 ‘Locked into error’ 50 ‘The amazing flying bathtub’ 52 66 71 70 ATSB supplement Av Quiz Quiz answers Calendar Copyright for the ATSB and ATC supplements rests with the ATSB and Airservices Australia respectively– these supplements are written, edited and designed independently of CASA. All requests for permission to reproduce any articles should be directed to FSA editorial (see correspondence details above). Registered–Print Post: 381667-00644. ISSN 1325-5002. COVER: Spectrum Graphics Photo: Dreamstime 33.SDRs 39. Directives Flying Boats on �e Clarence ������������������ ����� ������������������������� ����� ���� ����� �������� ���������������������� �� ������������������������� 2 ���� ���������������������������� �� ������������������������� ��� ������ �������������������� ���������� ���� ������������������������ ���������������������������� ��� ����������� ��������������� � ���� ���� �������� ������������ FSA MAY–JUN10 ���������������� ����������������������� ��������� ��������������������������� ������ ���� ���� ���� ��������� ������� ��������� �������������������������� �������� ���� �� ���� ������������� ���� ������������ ������������������������� ����� ����� The last issue of Flight Safety Australia (March-April 2010, p. 4) included an item on emergency locator transmitters (ELTs). CASA would like to clarify that the terminology used in CASA regulations refers to ELTs [i.e. a fixed ELT installed in an aircraft), and portable ELTs (i.e. emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) and personal locator beacons (PLBs)]. This terminology is different to that used by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)—the term ‘portable ELT’ is unique to CASA regulations. ������� ��� ��� ����������������� ���� ���������������������������� ������������������������� ������ ����������������������� ����������������������� ��������������������������� ������������ ������������������������� ������������������������������ ������ ���� ����� ����� � �������������������� �������������������������� ��������������������������� ��������������������������� ����� ������������������������� ������������� ������������������� ����� ���������� ����������������������� ����������������������������� Correction ���������������� ��� The article stated that upon registering a 406MHz ELT with AMSA, a registration label would be sent by AMSA to fix to the beacon. CASA has been advised that AMSA only send the registered operator a label if the beacon is an EPIRB or PLB. AMSA do not send the registered operator of a fixed ELT a label. However, AMSA does send a letter  or email confirming registration of a fixed ELT. ���������� ������������������� RUNNING TIME: 74 minutes (approx) GET YOUR COPY NOW! $55.00 includes postage & handling* *within Australia A DVD for anyone who has ever been touched by the magic of flying. It is a must see journey for those interested in the history of Australian aviation. The DVD provides a fascinating account of the rise and fall of the little known flying boat airline, Trans Oceanic Airways and the ships that flew on the Clarence River at Grafton in New South Wales. TO ORDER VISIT www.flyingboatsontheclarence.com.au Produced by FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA Innovators in Professional Pilot Training 2010 Course Dates Course Price Commercial Pilot – CPL-A from $59,750* Multi Engine Command Instrument Rating (MECIR) from $12,850* Flight Instructor Course $16,850* * Visit out website www.ftaus.com for full details. Places are limited - to book phone (07) 3715 4000 or email [email protected] FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA  Queensland’s Largest Flight Training Organisation  Owned & Managed By Airline Pilots CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009 www.ftaus.com For aircraft with a fixed ELT installed, CASA recommends that the device’s registration letter or email is carried in the aircraft’s flight manual. come to be accepted as Australia’s first controlled circling powered flight when he flew near Diggers Rest, Victoria, for about a minute. ‘The heavy impact with the ground smashed the light undercarriage and splintered the propeller into hundreds of pieces.’ Over the coming months, CASA inspectors will focus on compliance with regulation 252A of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CARs), including checking that the ELT or portable ELT required under the regulation is registered with AMSA. But historians disbelieve the claim that Custance flew the Bleriot for more than five minutes and landed safely. This is for two reasons. First, the main witness, the Bleriot’s owner, Fred Jones, recanted the claim late in his life, describing Custance’s reported pre-dawn flight as a myth. Aviation historians also strongly doubt whether someone who had never flown before could have piloted the tricky Bleriot for five minutes in darkness. Fred Custance was undoubtedly a brave young man, who may not have been the first to fly, but was among the pioneers of Australian aviation. He went on to serve in the Australian Flying Corps in Palestine during World War I. First flight? Custance did fly that day, but crashed the Bleriot. The Adelaide Advertiser reported: ‘unfortunately the aviator made a mistake in manipulating the elevating lever with the result that the airship descended with great pace.’ (Stodgy language, it seems, was an immediately–established characteristic of aviation reporting) FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA Further reading: The centenary of powered flight in Australia; the Royal Aeronautical Society – Australian Division 2009 FOR SALE 2008 CESSNA CITATION MUSTANG Your Aviation Theory Specialists 2010 Course Dates Course Dates Price BAK/PPL 28th Jun, 23 Aug, 18th Oct $1320 CPL Theory 28th Jun, 16th Aug, 11th Oct $2950* IREX Theory 2nd Aug $1250 *All 7 subjects – individual subjects may be purchased, see website for details. Places are limited - to book phone (07) 3715 4000 or email [email protected] FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA  Queensland’s Largest Flight Training Organisation  Owned & Managed By Airline Pilots CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009 CALL TO ARRANGE YOUR PERSONAL VIEWING OR DEMONSTRATION FLIGHT. AS NEW AIRCRAFT  ONE OWNER  LOW HOURS Single pilot capable  Low operating costs  Simplicity of Garmin G1000 Avionics  Short field performance  Lower operating costs than a King Air Options include HF, Traffic Advisory System, Chart View, ADF, Port and antenna for Iridium sat phone, 40 cubic ft oxygen system   CONTACT Nick Jones +61 412 033 236 or [email protected] or visit www.aeromilpacific.com.au Aircraft Sales Maintenance Spare Parts Flight Operations Charter Services www.ftaus.com 3 http://www.raes.org.au /assets/Uploads/ Centenary-of-Flt-in-Aus.pdf This aircraft is offered subject to verification of the specification. Aircraft is subject to prior sale or withdrawal from sale without prior notice. Aeromil Pacific accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions. FLIGHT BYTES Who was first to fly in Australia? That depends on how you define a flight, and perhaps, on where you live. Barracking for the local team is an honoured Australian tradition and some South Australian readers have taken Flight Safety Australia to task for neglecting to mention Fred Custance’s reported flight in a Bleriot XI monoplane on March 17, 1910. That was the day before American escape artist, Harry Houdini, made what has He died in the South Australian desert in 1922, aged 33, after his car broke down. ADVERTISING [email protected] Balloon pilots gather Roger Weeks, acting manager Flying Standards Branch, said there had been an impressive turnout. CASA held its first balloon instructor seminar in March. The event took place in Canberra to coincide with the Canberra Festival and accompanying hot air ballooning events. ‘We had around 30 participants, which included commercial balloon instructors and those private instructors operating through the Australian Balloon Federation,’ he said. ‘Topics covered included principles of learning, learning styles, oral questioning, student debriefing and it culminated in a role-playing briefing workshop.’ The seminar was presented by personnel from CASA’s flying training & testing office. CASA’s balloon specialists, Don Campbell and Julian Smibert, also participated, along with Jim Coyne and Rob Glenn representing CASA’s sports aviation interface with the ballooning federation. FSA MAY–JUN10 4 Balloon festival Canberra 2010. State of the Art, Two Place, Touring and Training Aircraft – Certified IFR (FAR Part 23) • Safety – robust modular design with incredible visibility • Performance – advanced aerodynamics with high manoeuverability • Comfort – 48” wide cockpit with huge baggage space • Utility – Useful load after full fuel 192 kg • Simplicity – FADEC Engine with digital engine monitoring display • Economy – 132 knots cruise at 23 litres per hour, up to 500 nm range plus reserves • Affordability – low purchase price and low operating costs Book a demonstration flight now! Call 0419 355 303 42 FSA MAY–JUNE 08 Contact Nigel Hutchinson–Brooks Liberty Aircraft Company Pty Ltd A.C.N. 118 727 889 Tel 03 5662 5658 Fax 03 5662 5179 Email [email protected] Details at www.libertyaircraft.com FAA fines American CarrieRs American Airlines has been hit with over $US1 million of fines by the US Federal Aviation Administration for allegedly flying aircraft not in compliance with maintenance requirements. The FAA levied a $US787,500 ($A860,000) fine against American Airlines followed by another $US300,000 ($A327,000) when another series of breaches emerged. The FAA said breaches included operating a McDonnell Douglas MD82 on 10 flights before replacing a faulty air data computer. The agency said flight crews had been ‘led to believe’ that both air data computers were working properly. The FAA also proposed a $US1.5 million ($A1.64 million) fine against Northwest Airlines which admitted not inspecting the flight deck window heating wires of its Boeing 757s for 17 years, after an error was made in a company maintenance manual. Writing the book on firefighting Aerial firefighting has developed into a significant general aviation business, but until now has had no agreed set of procedures and practices. Now CASA, in conjunction with the National Aerial Firefighting Centre, is facilitating the production of an Australian Aerial Firefighting Operator’s Manual. It aims to provide industry best practice procedures that meet CASA’s regulatory requirements and those of state fire authorities. The process will help to standardise industry procedures–vital in an industry that uniquely in aviation requires disparate operators to work closely together in a high-risk environment. It will also provide a means for improving procedures as a result of lessons learned. The project plans to consult all sections of the industry to ensure that procedures are practical and that operators have a strong say. The manual will encompass fire-bombing, spotting, insertion of firefighters and incendiary dropping operations. Fire authorities will require operators to insert the manual in Part D of their operations manual in time for the 2010/2011 season. and For more fire information input into the project, email [email protected] 5 FLIGHT BYTES In a second case, the FAA said American had flown two Boeing 757s which were meant to be grounded for rudder inspections. Another MD- 82 was returned to service in May 2009 without completing a required maintenance checklist, the FAA said. A follow-up inspection of the plane’s tail found loose fasteners and other problems. Hello Sunshine On 3 June 2010, Maroochydore/Sunshine Coast Airport will change its name to Sunshine Coast Airport. HELP US to HELP YOU Changes to take effect The aerodrome name, tower callsign, meteorological products such as forecasts etc, NOTAM, Airspace and Chart titles will all change from Maroochydore to Sunshine Coast. The ICAO location identifier will change from YBMC to YBSU. FSA MAY–JUN10 6 NAVAID identifiers (VOR, DME, NDB and RNAV (GNSS)) will change from MC to SU. The IATA location identifier (MCY) will remain the same, but the name will change from Maroochydore to Sunshine Coast. What you need to do A call to the aviation industry CASA’s Safety Promotion seeks interested industry members willing to take part in research to assist in developing our aviation safety promotion products and campaigns. Please email [email protected] to register your interest, providing your contact details and area of expertise (e.g. airworthiness, human factors, flying training, safety management). This will enable us to enlist your help in developing safety promotion products that will contribute to safe skies for all. *CASA’s Safety Promotion branch develops a variety of campaign materials and products, communicating regulatory reform & safety initiatives to industry. Recent products include the Look out! DVD on situational awareness; the SMS toolkit; and the campaign surrounding the transition from GAAP to Class D. safe skies for all The data elements being changed are used in a variety of databases, documents and other information sources. You should think about how the planned changes might affect your information and data sources, and plan for their timely amendment. Further information AIP Supplement H64/09 Aerodrome Name Change Sunshine Coast Airport dated 14 Jan 10 http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/ current/sup/s9-h64.pdf Refer also to AIP documents including ERSA and DAP (or similar documents from other information providers), effective on 3 June 2010, which will be distributed in hard copy via the normal amendment service and posted on the Airservices Australia website early May 2010. Sunshine Coast Airport: Danny Eatock, Operations Manager Tel: (07) 5453 1505 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.sunshinecoastairport.com.au BA in biofuel venture British Airways is to establish Europe’s first sustainable jet-fuel plant and plans to use the low-carbon fuel to power part of its fleet from 2014. The new fuel will be derived from waste biomass and manufactured in a state-of-the-art facility that can convert a variety of waste materials, destined for landfill, into aviation fuel. to stall in a turn. He almost recovered but and crashed taillow and wings level into the river. Kindlemann, who like the rest of the race pilots had completed an his underwater evacuation training exercise the day before the crash, was pulled from the water with only minor whiplash injuries. The next race is in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on May 8 and 9. The self-contained plant, likely to be sited in east London, will convert 500,000 tonnes of waste per year into 73 million litres of green jet fuel through a process that offers lifecycle greenhouse gas savings of up to 95 per cent compared to fossil-fuel derived jet kerosene. This volume of fuel would be more than twice the amount required to make all of British Airways’ flights at nearby London City Airport carbon-neutral. BA says the fuel’s reduction in carbon emissions would be the equivalent of taking 48,000 cars off the road per year. 7 The project will also generate 20MW of electricity a year from renewable sources. HOME CROWD BOOSTS HALL Australian air racer Matt Hall came second by 0.48 of a second to Austrian Hannes Arch in the Perth round of the Red Bull Air Race last month in Perth. The result moves Hall up to fourth on the 2010 series ladder The former RAAF Williamtown F/A-18 air combat instructor said he had benefited from home crowd support. About 140,000 people watched the races over Perth’s Swan River, organisers said. ‘This is what I have been looking forward to and aiming for since I started in the Red Bull Air Race – a great performance in front of my home crowd in Australia,’ Hall said. ‘My goal is always to improve in everything I do and here at this race I improved almost every run. Hopefully when I come back to Perth next year I can improve again and go one better.’ Defending champion Englishman Paul Bonhomme placed third to retain the series lead. The Perth race will be remembered for the first crash in the series’s seven-year history. Practising in squally conditions, Brazilian pilot Adilson Kindlemann appeared FLIGHT BYTES British Airways has signed a letter of intent to purchase all the fuel produced by the plant, which will be built by the Solena Group, a US bio-energy and biofuels company. THERE’S A CHANGE IN THE AIR – 3 JUNE Once upon a time general aviation (GA) aerodromes were grassed all-over fields where Tiger Moths, Austers and Chipmunks buzzed around, taking off and landing into whatever direction the wind blew from. It was low-intensity VFR aviation on the metropolitan fringe, far from the madding urban crowds. Then came strip operation and the then radical innovation of contracircuit parallel runway operations. This was the heyday of general aviation aerodrome procedures (GAAP) and of general aviation in Cessnas and Pipers. In the twenty-first century, GAAP aerodromes have become home to an aircraft spotter’s smorgasbord, with types ranging from ultralights to executive jets. This brings challenges for pilots. The performance spectrum in the circuit is wider than ever, even before counting the helicopters and public transport aircraft that have become more common in the past 30 years at GAAP aerodromes. To complete a complex picture, there’s also the rapid growth of international flight training, with students from around the world taking their first flights at GAAP aerodromes. This is the context in which Class D airspace replaces GAAP – things have changed and it’s time for the rules to catch up. Parafield in South Australia, Camden and Bankstown in NSW, Archerfield in Queensland, Jandakot in Western Australia, Moorabbin in Victoria will go from GAAP to Class D procedures on 3 June 2010 – Australian aviation’s D-day. A minor point of housekeeping here: the changes involve adopting the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Class D airspace classification, along with procedures broadly aligned with the US Federal Aviation Administration’s Class D procedures. It’s testament to the fundamental integrity of GAAP that the changes to procedures that will come into effect on this date are relatively minor. They come after two CASA studies of GAAP: the General Aviation Aerodrome Procedures Review and the Utility of General Aviation Aerodrome Procedures, found areas where safety could be improved. Replacing the Australian-specific GAAP with the  internationally recognised Class D procedures is a step towards standardising Australian aviation procedures with international practices. Standardisation is especially important given the boom in overseas student training at GAAP aerodromes. To increase safety through standardisation, the new Class D procedures that will apply at the old GAAP aerodromes will also apply in all existing Class D airspace. This aligns with the Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle, so that new charts and aeronautical publications will reflect the changes. Australia is adopting FAA Class D procedures such as abbreviated clearances and distances from cloud, including: VMC criteria Parallel runway operations Abbreviated clearance by establishing two-way communications Maximum speeds Entry not constrained by a particular tracking point. Although the mandatory requirement for all aircraft to proceed VFR within a GAAP control zone disappears under the new rules, pilots of IFR aircraft are encouraged to advise ATC they are proceeding VFR whenever possible. Such action removes delays that may be caused by the IFR separation requirements between IFR Entering Class D Entry points One of the main changes pilots flying into former GAAP aerodromes should understand is that GAAP approach points will become VFR approach points, and will no longer be mandatory. However, using VFR approach points, marked on the visual terminal charts with a shaded diamond, is recommended because they: provide an orderly path for entering the circuit help with noise abatement, and help to keep you out of nearby controlled airspace. The VFR approach points are selected because they are prominent landmarks, which help with visual navigation, and make it easier for ATC to segregate traffic. Under the new rules, ATC will still have the right to instruct you to enter Class D airspace via a particular point. You must receive a clearance before operating in a Class D control zone. This could be clearance to take off, instructions for circuit entry, or transit. Individual clearances are required for: 1. Take-off and landing; 2. Entering, crossing or taxiing along all runways; Note: An instruction to ‘Hold short of runway … [number] left [or centre or right]’ requires you to hold at a marked holding point. 3. Turns in a direction contrary to the circuit for a particular runway; Note: An ATC circuit entry instruction acts as a clearance for a contrary turn, if required to comply with this instruction. 4. Circuits at a height other than 1,000ft; and 9 5. Operations on routes or at altitudes different from those published in ERSA. Establishing two-way communications When an aircraft contacts air traffic control at a Class D aerodrome and provides sufficient information about track or position, level, and intentions for ATC to make an informed decision, ATC may clear the aircraft to enter the airspace by simply acknowledging the transmission with the aircraft’s callsign. Alternatively, and more usually, ATC will provide brief instructions to the pilot. Such instructions include ‘join crosswind’, ‘overfly’, or ‘report at [position]’. The acknowledgment authorises the aircraft to enter the Class D airspace following the stated track and level, or alternative instruction given by ATC. Once clearance to enter the Class D airspace is given, the pilot is required to maintain two-way communications and to comply with any subsequent ATC instructions. This shortened procedure does not eliminate the availability of a ‘traditional’ airways clearance where indicated, but it provides an abbreviated clearance option for use where both pilot and ATC understand the proposed course of action. Replacing the Australianspecific GAAP with the internationally recognised Class D procedures is a step towards standardising Australian aviation procedures with international practices. TRANSITION TO CLASS D flights within the zone or adjoining airspace. Clearances Readback requirements There are no changes to readback requirements except in relation to taxi instructions. If you get a taxi instruction which includes a holding point, you must read back the name of the holding point. You must read back: Any airways clearance, in full Any clearance or instruction to hold short of, enter, land on, conditional line-up on, wait, take-off from, cross, taxi or backtrack on, any runway Assigned runway, QNH directed to a specific aircraft, SSR codes, radio frequency instructions Altitude instructions, direction of turn, heading and speed restrictions. 10 Pilot responsibilities When operating in Class D airspace, you must: Special VFR You must not conduct a VFR flight in Class D airspace when VMC do not exist. However, at your request, ATC may authorise you to operate to a special VFR clearance. A special VFR clearance only applies within the Class D control zone. When operating under a special VFR clearance, you are responsible for ensuring that: 1. The flight is conducted clear of cloud; 2. Visibility is not less than 1,600 m for fixed wing aircraft and 800m for helicopters; and 3. The flight is conducted in accordance with CAR 157 with regard to low flying. Maximum speed within a Class D control zone Unless ATC authorises otherwise, your indicated airspeed should not exceed 200kt. FSA MAY–JUN10 1. See and maintain separation from other aircraft; 2. Comply with ATC instructions while ensuring you maintain separation from other aircraft; 3. Immediately advise ATC if unable to comply with a control instruction; and Separation In Class D airspace, ATC will provide the following services to aircraft: 4. Advise ATC if unable to see, or if you lose sight of, other aircraft notified as traffic. IFR flights will be separated from IFR and special VFR flights VMC criteria in Class D airspace Special VFR flights will be separated from other special VFR flights when the visibility is less than VMC Flight visibility 5,000m Horizontal distance from cloud: 600m Vertical distance from cloud: 1,000ft above; 500ft below. visibility 5000m 1000ft 500ft 600 metres VFR flights will receive traffic information about IFR and other VFR flights Traffic avoidance advice and sequencing will be available on request. 500ft 600 metres IFR flights will receive traffic information about VFR flights visibility 5000m CONTROLLED AIRSPACE CLASS D You must keep a vigilant lookout for other aircraft even if you have received traffic information. Under the new procedures, if you’re flying VFR, you are entirely responsible for avoiding the wake turbulence from heavier aircraft ahead, including when you are landing. The same applies if you’re flying IFR and you accept responsibility to follow or maintain own separation with a heavier aircraft ahead. For these circumstances, ATC assistance will be limited to issuing a wake turbulence caution. Under Class D, surface movement control (SMC) will be re-introduced at the former GAAP aerodromes. [Callsign] ‘ready’, and The designator of the departure runway. e.g., ‘ABC, ready, runway [left/right]’. After landing On initial taxi Before taxiing or calling surface movement control, check that your radio receiver is functioning correctly and obtain the current ATIS. The preferred method for checking your radio is to monitor the ATIS. When ready, make a taxi call to SMC, giving the following details: a. aircraft type and call-sign; b. number of POB (not required for VFR flights); c. identification of ATIS code received; f. intentions (crosswind circuit training, first intended landing point, etc); and g. for training flights, whether dual or solo. h. ‘request taxi’. If an airways clearance is required you should make your request to SMC when ATC is operating, or to the appropriate ATC Centre when the control zone is deactivated. To minimise delays to your departure, you should notify flight details using the national aeronautical information processing system (NAIPS) as the preferred option. You can also telephone, fax or, as a last resort, radio SMC. Where possible, you should carry out your pre-take-off checks in a run-up bay. A taxi clearance to a particular runway holding point entitles you to conduct your pre-take-off checks using an en-route run-up bay. Never enter or cross a runway en route to the holding point or run-up bay unless specifically cleared to do so by ATC. Ready for take-off When you are ready for departure and first in line at the holding point, select the relevant tower frequency, and report: After vacating a runway, you must not enter, re-enter, cross or taxi along any runway unless ATC has cleared you to do so. Flying in the circuit ATC may issue a sequencing instruction with a take-off or touch-and-go clearance. When issued with a sequencing instruction, you must follow the aircraft you have been sequenced to follow. Unless otherwise instructed by ATC, you must report downwind when starting the downwind leg. This report should include callsign, aircraft type, ‘downwind’ and intentions [full-stop or touch-and-go]. If there is too much radio traffic for the call to be made in this position, report mid-downwind or late-downwind as appropriate. ATC will issue a sequencing instruction based on your position in the circuit. If you wish to conduct a non-standard circuit, such as a glide or flapless approach, advise the tower with your downwind report. This advice will also alert other circuit traffic. You must get tower approval before conducting simulated engine failure training (note: local aerodrome procedures may preclude such operations). In sequencing aircraft, ATC will indicate the position of the preceding aircraft by reference to a leg of the circuit or as a clock bearing, and describe it either as a specific type or in general terms (e.g., Cessna or twin). 11 TRANSITION TO CLASS D e. flight rules (not required for VFR flights); If you have landed on a runway that intersects another runway, you may cross the intersecting runway, but you must not vacate onto the intersecting runway unless ATC has cleared you to do so. THAT AIRCRAFT ON A TAXIWAY MUST GIVE WAY TO AIRCRAFT VACATING A RUNWAY. d. location on aerodrome; Before landing, plan your taxi route to your parking position. After landing, vacate the runway as soon as practicable. Remember that aircraft on a taxiway must give way to aircraft vacating a runway. REMEMBER Surface movement control ATC may issue a sequence number. Sequence numbers specify the landing sequence position of an aircraft with respect to any preceding aircraft. The instruction ‘follow’ requires you to see the preceding aircraft, and regulate your speed and approach path to achieve separation. If you cannot see and identify the preceding aircraft, you must advise the tower. A landing clearance does not diminish your responsibility to maintain sufficient separation from the preceding aircraft during landing. Inbound call You must establish and maintain two-way communications with the Class D tower before entering the control zone from Class G airspace. FSA MAY–JUN10 12 If you intend to transit the Class D control zone from Class G airspace without landing, it is recommended you plan to do so via a VFR approach point. You must establish two-way communications with ATC before reaching the control zone boundary, so you should make your call approaching the relevant VFR approach point. Alternatively, you may establish initial contact with the tower when you are around eight to 10nm miles from the aerodrome. Your call should include: callsign, type, position, level, ATIS code received and intentions (for example, ‘overflying for [next tracking point]’. Flight near Class D airspace You should make your inbound call approaching the relevant VFR approach point. Alternatively, you may establish initial contact with the tower when you are around eight to 10 miles from the airport. When you’re flying in Class G airspace near a Class D control zone boundary, you should consider monitoring the tower frequency to be aware of traffic entering and leaving the control zone. Your inbound call should include: callsign, type, position, level, ATIS code received, and intentions (for example, ‘inbound’). Licensing Departures Into Class G airspace Your call should include: callsign, type, position, level, ATIS code received and intentions Transit of a Class D control zone When departing the control zone into Class G airspace, you should do so on upwind, crosswind or downwind by extending the relevant leg of the circuit and then tracking clear of VFR approach points and associated routes. As a VFR flight, you do not need to make a departure call when departing the control zone directly into Class G airspace. Nor do you need to request approval to change frequency when transiting from the Class D control zone into Class G airspace. Into Class C airspace If you are departing directly into Class C airspace, the airways and departure clearances issued by ATC will authorise you to operate in both Class D and Class C airspace. A private pilot licence holder who has the logbook entry to fly an aircraft as pilot in command (PIC) in a control zone at a GAAP aerodrome, may, on or after 3 June 2010 fly an aircraft as PIC in Class D airspace. In addition, a licensed private pilot will be eligible for the log book entry to fly an aircraft as PIC in a control zone which has no radar service. DISCLAIMER This information is a brief outline of the practices and procedures set to be adopted at Class D aerodromes, and is designed to provide insight into the general philosophy behind the procedures. This information is not necessarily definitive and the information should not be used operationally without first cross-referencing with the appropriate documentation. Pilot information It’s vital that every pilot knows what to do in Class D airspace, so CASA has developed a comprehensive information and communication campaign about the Class D changes. We will provide information brochures to all licence holders, and instructional material will be distributed to training organisations. Safety workshops will be held around the nation. There will be two sessions at each of the venues below, each lasting three hours, with a break for refreshments. The first will run from 1-4pm, and the second from 6.30-9.30pm. Registration for these workshops is essential. Log on to www. casa.gov.au, follow the 3 June changes link on the home page, and complete the form online. 13 TRANSITION TO CLASS D Monday 10 May 2010 – Sydney Bankstown Travelodge Tuesday 11 May 2010 – Brisbane Bardon Conference Centre Thursday 13 May 2010 – Melbourne Dingley International Tuesday 18 May 2010 – Perth AFA Club, Bull Creek Thursday 20 May 2010 – Adelaide The Mawson Centre Those who attend the workshops will be given an information pack on Class D, containing printed information and a compact and useful USB memory stick. Among the USB stick’s contents are CASA’s Look Out situational awareness DVD, the Class D airspace guide, information on changes to procedures at non- Information nights at existing Class D airports 4 May Mackay Aero Club 5 May Airlie Beach Peppers Coral Coast 3 May Launceston Mercure 6 May Hobart Mercure The GAAP Q&A page, already available on the website, will 6 May Alice Springs Alice in the Territory continue to provide updated information online. 25 May Tamworth The informative and widely-used Visual Pilot Guides for each of 26 May Coffs Harbour Novotel Coffs Harbour the former GAAP locations are being updated and revised, and 12 May Maroochydore Aero Club will be released to coordinate with the Class D-day on 3 June. 13 May Rockhampton Aero Club CASA will mail a booklet, detailing the Class D changes, to all 25 May Avalon Mercure Geelong registered Australian pilots. 25 May Albury Chifley Hotel towered aerodromes and selected articles on the subject from Flight Safety Australia’s archive. CASA’s aviation safety advisors and flying operations inspectors will provide information and assistance at the information nights. All sessions 18.30 - 21.30 Wests League Club eLEARNING Pilots will also be able to familiarise themselves with all the detail on the changes online through CASA’s new eLearning program. Through the program you can complete online tutorials at your own pace, at any time, in the comfort of your home or office. This allows you to move quickly or slowly through the material according to your needs. You can repeat the tutorials as often as you like, and can assess how much you have learned by completing the occasional, anonymous multiple-choice questions. There will be two eLearning tutorials on the airspace changes: one covering the Class D changes, and the second on the changes relating to operations at non-towered aerodromes. FSA MAY–JUN10 14 Complete online tutorials at your own pace, at any time, in the comfort of your home or office. OnTrack Imagine if you could just close your eyes and rehearse your approach to an unfamiliar aerodrome. In your dream you would see what reporting points looked like from the cockpit, as video or photographs, and you would hear a friendly voice reminding you of radio frequencies and calls. Violation of controlled airspace (VCA) hotspots and safetycritical procedures would make themselves known, to keep you out of danger and all relevant documents would be easily on hand. How good would that be? Your dream will soon come true when CASA and Airservices Australia unveil their collaborative OnTrack project to coincide with the 3 June changes. OnTrack is an interactive web portal hosted on the CASA website. It will use video, audio, pop-up alerts and text to help brief pilots on how to operate in and around controlled airspace and avoid the dreaded VCA. You can navigate around airspace boundaries, VFR routes, VFR/class D reporting points and military control zones – and do so safely before you take off to fly for real. If you’re planning your first approach to Bankstown in Sydney, you can see what the 2RN tower, the R555 restricted zone at Holsworthy and the Wilton parachute drop zone look like – so you know what to avoid. If you’re planning to fly into Moorabbin in Melbourne, you can familiarise yourself with landmarks as varied as Mt Macedon, the town of Melton, Sandown racecourse and the Altona baseball stadium. If you’re planning a northern approach to Archerfield in Brisbane, you can get a feel for the rather narrow gap between the top of Mt Glorious and the lower limit of controlled airspace, and perhaps decide to approach to the east or west of this landmark (you would be well advised to). You can also get a look at the railway sheds near Goodna and the blue motorway bridge that marks the reporting point. At OnTrack’s Parafield page you can familiarise yourself with the Bolivar strobe, so that you know what to keep south of when approaching the Adelaide aerodrome from Outer Harbour. Recognising Adventure World, near Perth’s Jandakot, from OnTrack will give you a better chance of avoiding real-world navigational misadventures. 15 TRANSITION TO CLASS D OnTrack is one of several initiatives to communicate the Class D airspace changes that take effect on 3 June. The site will have interactive maps with added visual terminal chart (VTC) information, video guides on how to fly inbound and outbound tracks into newly designated class D aerodromes, podcasts and printable information. ATC Notes FSA MAY–JUN10 16 What’s your estimate? E xperience shows that in many instances the estimates provided by pilots in departure reports are inaccurate, sometimes wildly so. Estimate inaccuracy is thought to be often caused by pilots reading their estimate from their GPS and insufficiently taking into account their reduced ground-speed on climb. AIP requires an IFR departure report in a nonsurveillance environment to include an estimate for the first en route reporting point. Air traffic controllers use that estimate for calculating separation in controlled airspace and for determining conflicting traffic in uncontrolled airspace. Inaccurate estimates compromise separation and traffic information, so it’s important to get that initial estimate right. Use a pre-calculated time interval or make an allowance for increased ground speed in cruise. And remember to revise your estimate if it differs by more than two minutes from that previously advised. Speak up and squawk Hopefully most of you chose to speak, identify yourselves and follow the controller’s instructions as this is the most safe and sensible option. When an unidentified aircraft enters controlled airspace without a clearance the controller will be wondering: • What are you doing? • How are you going to affect the aircraft in my airspace? By speaking up when you hear a controller calling you these problems are alleviated. The controller can verify your altitude, provide you with instructions to exit CTA, or even give you a clearance. Speaking to ATC is the safest course of action after having infringed airspace. Airservices Australia Safety Programs & Promotions initiative For further safety information please visit our website at www.airservicesaustralia.com or email [email protected] By not communicating with ATC after an airspace infringement you are leaving the above questions unanswered. The controller has to take extra caution to make sure you don’t adversely affect any traffic with a clearance. This may require putting other aircraft into holding, discontinuing an approach or even closing an airport. It could also result in a breakdown of separation, even a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA). To make sure ATC can contact you always ensure that you are monitoring the correct ATC frequency. Some pilots in the past have turned off their transponder. This simple act breaks down the last lines of defence: TCAS and the air traffic control Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA). Make sure you are squawking the correct code with ALT selected. So remember, next time you inadvertently stray into CTA, don’t try to hide. Take the safest route for you and all the other airspace users and speak up and squawk. ATC NOTES You are cruising at 4500 ft and have just crossed into the 3500 ft step because you were distracted by your inquisitive passenger. Suddenly a call comes through on the area frequency for an aircraft at your level in your position…what do you do now? 17 International Accidents/Incidents 14 January 2010 - 22 March 2010 Date Aircraft Location Fatalities Damage Description Beagle Bay Airport, Australia 0 Substantial During cruise, the pilot received a low oil pressure indication. The pilot diverted to Beagle Bay and during the approach shut down the engine. The aircraft undershot the runway and collided with terrain. It flipped over and the engine separated from its mountings. 21 Jan Embraer ERJ- Tijuana-Rodriguez 0 145LU Airport, Mexico Substantial Passenger plane sustained substantial damage following a runway excursion on landing. The left main landing gear dug in causing the left hand wing to contact the ground. 14 Jan Cessna 208B Grand Caravan 22 Jan Beechcraft 1900C-1 2 off Sand Point Municipal Airport, USA Destroyed Cargo plane crashed into the water shortly after takeoff from Sand Point Municipal Airport. Extensive search by Coast Guard vessels and aircraft failed to find both crewmembers. 24 Jan Tupolev 154M Mashhad Airport, Iran 0 Destroyed Aircraft crash landed and caught fire at Mashhad Airport in bad weather. Some 46 passengers reported injured and hospitalised. Aircraft’s tail reportedly broke apart during the incident. 90 Destroyed Ethiopian Airlines passenger plane was destroyed when it crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Beirut Airport. The airplane crashed into the sea about 6 km past the end of runway 21, about 3.5 km offshore from the village of Naameh. 25 Jan Boeing 6km off Beirut 737-8AS(WL) International Airport, Lebanon FSA MAY–JUN10 18 25 Jan Embraer EMB-110C near Senador Jose 2 Porfirio-Wilma Rebelo Airfield, Brazil Written off Passenger plane was damaged when it crashed while on approach to the airport. The captain and one of the passenges were killed. Preliminary reports indicate that one of the engines failed during the approach. 28 Jan GAF N22B Nomad Cotabato City, Philippines 1 Destroyed Crashed in a residential area shortly after takeoff. The pilot was trying to perform an emergency landing after an engine failure. 31 Jan Yakovlev 40 Luanda, Angola 0 Substantial Three-engined small regional airliner made a belly landing after scheduled flight. 2 Feb Lockheed C130E Mazar-I-Sharif, Afghanistan 0 Substantial Polish Air Force transport made a forced landing after airframe was subjected to severe stresses in flight causing separation of both elevators and part of the right hand main gear door. The fuselage at the wing root was severely distorted on both sides. 4 Feb Antonov24 Yakutsk, Russia 0 Substantial Flight fell back on the runway on its belly when the engineer retracted undercarriage prematurely 11 Feb ATR-42 Balikpapan, Indonesia 0 Minor After engine failure, aircraft diverted to Balikpapan. En route the other engine also lost power. Crew carried out a forced landing in a rice field. 11 Feb Fokker 100 Monterrey, Mexico 0 Substantial Approaching Nuevo Laredo, main undercarriage failed to go down and lock. Aircraft diverted to Monterrey where facilities were better. Aircraft made emergency landing and came to rest on right wing. 14 Feb Cessna 550B Schona, Germany Citation Bravo 2 Destroyed CVR data showed evidence that shortly before the fatal accident, an aerobatics manoeuvre (barrel roll) was initiated. 01 Mar Airbus A300B4 Bagram, Afghanistan 0 Substantial Aircraft came to rest on runway shoulder after reported collapse of main undercarriage. 12 Mar Alenia/ Aeritalia G222 Port Harcourt, Nigeria 0 Written off Nigerian Air Force transport plane skidded off runway on landing during disaster response exercise 15 Mar BrittenNorman BN-2A-21 Islander Kodiak, Alsaka, USA 0 Written off On take-off the Islander contacted the tops of trees past the end of the runway and came to rest nose down in a stand of trees, the branches supporting the plane in a vertical position. 0 Destroyed Aircraft on ferry flight crash-landed in a forest while on approach to MoskvaDomodedovo Airport, Russia. 22 Mar Tupolev 204- Moscow, Russia 100 Notes: compiled from information supplied by the Aviation Safety Network (see www. aviation-safety.net/database/) and reproduced with permission. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, neither the Aviation Safety Network nor Flight Safety Australia make any representations about its accuracy, as information is based on preliminary reports only. For further information refer to final reports of the relevant official aircraft accident investigation organisation. Information on injuries is unavailable. Australian Accidents/Incidents 04 February 2010 - 22 March 2010 Date Aircraft 4 Feb Piper PA-31- Armidale Nil 350 Chieftain Aerodrome, NSW Serious On approach, the pilot selected the landing gear down but did not check the landing gear lights. On touchdown, the landing gear collapsed and smoke was seen coming from the throttle console area. Initial inspection revealed the landing gear had not fully extended. 7 Feb Amateur-built Augusta (ALA), Lancair IV-P WA Nil Serious During initial climb, the pilot received an unsafe landing gear indication. The aircraft continued to Jandakot where the pilot conducted a wheels-up landing. Subsequent inspection revealed that an hydraulic flare fitting had failed on the landing gear pressure line. 7 Feb American Tyabb (ALA), N M Nil Champion 11Km (Baxter), VIC 7BCM Champ Serious As the aircraft slowed during the landing roll, it encountered a wind gust. The pilot lost control and the aircraft left the runway and impacted trees. Emerald Nil Aerodrome, NE M 24Km (Braylands farm), QLD Serious Shortly after takeoff, the engine lost power. The pilot jettisoned the payload and landed the aircraft in a cotton crop. The engineering inspection revealed that the P3 line had failed. 15 Feb Robinson R22 Tindal Aerodrome, Nil Beta 258° M 91Km, NT Serious During aerial work, the pilot noticed a sudden increase in engine RPM and the rotor RPM declining. The pilot made a forced landing into trees. Inspection revealed that one drive belt had detached and one showed signs of wear. 16 Feb Grob G-115C2 Jandakot Aerodrome, WA Nil Serious While taxiing, the nose landing gear collapsed, causing the propeller to strike the ground. 18 Feb Piper PA-25235 Pawnee Nil Serious While taxiing towards the loading area, the aircraft collided with a concrete water trough. The propeller and left landing gear were seriously damaged. 18 Feb Robinson R44 near Tom Price (VFR), WA Nil Serious The helicopter landed hard, resulting in serious damage. 19 Feb Cessna 152 Geelong (ALA), VIC Minor Serious During a missed approach, the aircraft stalled and collided with terrain. The aircraft was seriously damaged. 20 Feb Bell 206L-1 Longranger Mount Hagen Airport, 297° M 25Km, Other Nil Serious During initial climb from an interim landing site, the engine compressor stalled. The power and rotor RPM reduced. The pilot landed the helicopter among trees and the helicopter came to rest on its left side. 24 Feb Cessna T188C Ag Husky Taroom Aerodrome, QLD Nil Serious During the take-off run on runway 12 with the tail raised, the aircraft encountered a strong southwesterly gust that lifted the right wing and the aircraft turned to the northeast and ran off the runway. The pilot could not turn the aircraft back toward the runway and the right main landing gear detached from the fuselage. The tail continued to rise until the left wingtip struck the ground and the aircraft nosed over. Serious On descent, the engine failed. In the subsequent forced landing, the aircraft struck trees and collided with terrain. 13 Feb PZL WarzawaOkecie M-18B Dromader Location Thorpdale (ALA), VIC Injuries A/C Damage Description 19 3 Mar Transavia PL- Leongatha 12 Airtruck Aerodrome, 090° M 15Km, VIC Nil Serious During the initial climb, the aircraft encountered turbulence and was unable to continue the climb. The aircraft was returned to Mardan after dumping the load. The aircraft landed hard. 3 Mar Cessna 172S Moorabbin Skyhawk Aerodrome, VIC Nil Serious The pilot flared the aircraft too high and reduced the power to idle. The aircraft stalled and landed hard. Serious Nil While closing the door, the cabin crew member fell from the aircraft. Investigation is continuing. 4 0Mar Boeing 717200 Ayers Rock Aerodrome, NT 6 Mar Cessna T188C/A1 Ag Husky Home Hill (ALA), Nil SW M 28Km, QLD Serious As the aircraft entered a procedure turn during aerial spraying operations, the engine lost power. The pilot force landed the aircraft in a paddock. 7 Mar Piper PA25-180/S Pawnee Cunderdin (ALA), WA Nil Serious During initial climb, the engine lost power. After the pilot released the glider which was being towed the engine failed. In the subsequent forced landing, the aircraft sustained serious damage. Engineering inspection revealed fuel filter drain had not been closed after refuelling, resulting in fuel starvation. 10 Mar Robinson R22 near Springsure BETA (ALA), QLD Nil Serious During cattle mustering, the aircraft struck a powerline and subsequently collided with terrain. 13 Mar Beech A36 Bonanza near Trangie (ALA), NSW Nil Serious During the practice forced landing, when the throttle was moved to full power, the engine did not respond. The pilot conducted a forced landing straight ahead but struck a wire fence. 22 Mar Embraer EMB-120 ER Brasilia Darwin Aerodrome, NT Fatal Written off It was reported that the aircraft collided with terrain. The investigation is continuing. Text courtesy of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Disclaimer – information on accidents is the result of a co-operative effort between the ATSB and the Australian aviation industry. Data quality and consistency depend on the efforts of industry where no follow-up action is undertaken by the ATSB. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the use of these data. Please note that descriptions are based on preliminary reports, and should not be interpreted as findings by the ATSB. The data do not include sports aviation accidents. ACCIDENT REPORT 27 Feb Amateur-built Serpentine (ALA), Serious Jabiru UL-T- SE M 6Km, WA 3300 Be heard, be seen, be safe s for e r u d e c o r p new romes d o r e a d e r e non-tow Don’t be shy about using your radio to enhance FSA MAY–JUN10 20 ‘Carrying and using radios will be mandatory for all aircraft using certified, registered or military aerodromes from 3 June 2010.’ flight safety. See and avoid is common sense, a noble aim and good advice. It’s also the guiding principle behind aircraft separation at all regional aerodromes. But it’s easier said than done. Too many diligent and safety-conscious pilots have found this out after a near miss—or worse. Haze, glare, scratched cockpit windows and the pernicious practice of a few pilots sneaking in unannounced to country airstrips to avoid paying landing fees are all stacked against simply ‘seeing and avoiding’. Simple unalerted see-and-avoid is tested to its limits when aircraft with widely differing performance share the circuit. When regular public transport (RPT) aircraft and ultralights share the same circuit, vertical and horizontal closure rates become uncomfortably high. What looks like empty sky can be filled with an approaching aircraft within seconds. You must carry & use radio There is a better way. Alerted see-and-avoid, where aircraft advise of their presence at, or approaching an aerodrome, using radio, has been found by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau to increase search effectiveness over unalerted see-and-avoid by a factor of eight. Put it another way: you’re less likely to have a collision or near miss if you use your radio. That’s the main reason why carrying radios will be mandatory for all aircraft using certified, registered or military aerodromes from 3 June 2010. It’s the key change to Civil Aviation Regulation 166, (CAR 166) which governs operations at non- towered (non-controlled) aerodromes. The changes come in on the same day the Class D airspace standard replaces general aviation aerodrome procedures (GAAP). There are four types of non-towered aerodrome: certified, registered, military and uncertified. Certified aerodromes are those with runways capable of handling aircraft with 30 seats or more. These could be RPT airliners or, as increasingly common in, for example, Western Australia’s mining areas, charter aircraft. Certified and registered aerodromes have to meet certain standards and are inspected regularly. Two new Civil Aviation Advisory Publications: (CAAP 166-1(0) and CAAP 166-2 (0) developed and linked to CAR 166, provide guidance on changes to standard traffic circuit procedures, circuit heights and procedures for arriving and departing the circuit area. Radios will also have to be carried by any aircraft using a military aerodrome from 3 June 2010. Different categories of aircraft will fly different standard circuit heights. You should note that some uncertified or non-registered aerodromes may, by direction from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) or of their owner’s initiative, require radios on any aircraft using them. This detail can be checked for any aerodrome in the En-route Supplement Australia (ERSA). However, as of 3 June 2010, CASA has not designated any additional aerodromes for compulsory carriage of radios. By definition, non-towered aerodromes are in uncontrolled Class G airspace. However, when air traffic control (ATC) is not operating, a towered aerodrome becomes ‘non-towered’ while ATC is not operating, and non-towered rules apply, regardless of what airspace it is normally in. The revised CAR 166 rules also involve changes to certain traffic circuit procedures at all non-towered aerodromes. Joining circuit on a downwind leg Crosswind leg Downwind leg Joining circuit at crosswind Descend to circuit height Joining at 45º Arriving at not less than 500ft above circuit height Arriving at not less than 500ft above circuit height Medium performance aircraft, a category which includes most piston-engined GA aircraft with circuit speeds between 55kt and 150kt will use 1000ft above the aerodrome as a standard circuit height. High performance aircraft, usually jets and turboprops, will use a 1500ft above aerodrome circuit. All aircraft after take-off should turn on to the crosswind leg at no less than 500ft above aerodrome. The turn on to final should also be made no lower than 500ft above aerodrome. There are several options for joining the circuit Pilots will be free to use their acquired airmanship skills in appropriate conditions and locations. What is asking for trouble on a busy day at Dubbo or Kalgoorlie can be acceptable on the approach to a remote outback airstrip. Standard traffic circuit Final Active side 1500 FT High performance–above 150 KT Base leg Joining circuit on a base leg Recommended circuit join 1000 FT Medium performance Joining for straight in approach not less than 3nm 500 FT Low performance–max 55 KT Non-active side 21 BE HEARD, BE SEEN... Circuit procedures Low performance aircraft, defined as having a circuit speed of 55 knots or less, will fly a standard circuit height of 500ft above the aerodrome. This category covers some sport aircraft, such as weight-shift trikes, opencockpit three-axis designs and some closedcockpit sport aircraft. Pilots should have the airmanship to realise what is appropriate, where, and when. It is expected that pilots will use their radios to announce their intentions at all nontowered aerodromes. The rule says you must broadcast to avoid a collision, or risk of a collision. Using all available equipment to enhance safety is part of airmanship. For example, you should turn your transponders on so that other aircraft fitted with a traffic collision and avoidance system (TCAS) can see you, but only if you are squawking. The recommended procedure is to join the circuit on downwind leg, either from an extension of the downwind leg, a 45 degree angle about halfway down downwind, or from a shortened crosswind leg which takes the joining aircraft over the runway. FSA MAY–JUN10 22 Pilots unsure of conditions at the aerodrome should overfly or circle the aerodrome at not less than 500ft above circuit altitude, meaning at least 2000 ft above the aerodrome. However, low performance aircraft, or rotorcraft with a circuit speed of 55kt, should overfly at 500ft above the aerodrome, to avoid conflict with higher or faster traffic. You can join the circuit on base leg or make a straight-in approach. However, pilots making these approaches are expected to use their judgment and airmanship by following the procedures in the CAAPs to ensure they don’t conflict with other traffic joining via the standard procedure. You should only commence a non-standard approach after you have announced your intention on radio. Pilots making straight-in approaches must be established on final by 3nm from the runway threshold, and should have announced their intentions on radio by then. You must give way to aircraft in the circuit. Pilots must know the wind direction and speed at the aerodrome before making a straight-in approach. And you must not make straight-in approaches when a reciprocal runway is in use, or there is the likelihood of conflict with other traffic. Pilots joining on base leg must also give way to other aircraft and ensure they can join safely on base at standard height (500ft) without potential traffic conflict. Departing the circuit area should be done by extending one of the four standard circuit legs. Only when you are well outside the circuit area and no traffic conflict exists, can you make a turn opposite to the circuit direction. This would normally be at least 3nm from the circuit, but could be less for aircraft with high climb performance. Under CAR 166C, a pilot must make a radio broadcast ‘whenever it is reasonably necessary to do so to avoid a collision, or the risk of a collision, with another aircraft’. Under the regulations, that broadcast must include the name of the aerodrome, the aircraft’s type and call sign, its position and the pilot’s intentions. There are seven situations where a pilot would be expected to broadcast their intentions, in order to ensure the minimum compliance with CAR 166C. 1. before or during taxiing; 2. immediately before entering a runway (whether active or not); 3. inbound 10nm or earlier from the aerodrome; ‘The rule says you must broadcast to avoid a collision, or risk of a collision.’ 4. immediately before joining the circuit; 5. on a straight-in approach, on final, at 3nm or more from the threshold, 6. on a base-join approach, before joining on base; and 7. on entering the aerodrome vicinity of a non-towered aerodrome, where the pilot intends to fly through the vicinity, but not land. Those are required for a minimum safety standard but CAAP 166-1 (0) explaining the changes, emphasises using the radio as often as required: ‘A pilot should not be hesitant to call and clarify the other aircraft’s position and intentions if there is any uncertainty,’ it says. If in doubt, speak out. Good radio procedure, which means standard phraseology and minimal non-essential chat, is as important as it ever was under the new rules. VFR pilots, on hearing of an IFR pilot’s intention to make an instrument approach, should make their aircraft known to the IFR pilot. IFR pilots can help their safety greatly in these situations by reporting their position and intentions in plain English, rather than using IFR approach points and jargon which VFR pilots may not know or understand. Other aspects of the CAR166 changes include aircraft size and performance, wake turbulence, windshear, maintaining separation and collision avoidance. The two CAAPs: 166-1(0) and 166-2(0) cover these topics in detail. They are a must-read for anyone who flies for work or pleasure. Pilots should use these two CAAPs, rather than the brief outline given in this article, as their authoritative guide to operating under the new rules for non-towered airports. The CAAPs boil down to a code of conduct and sound airmanship—things any reasonable, courteous and safety-conscious pilot is already doing. Follow them and you’ll fly legally and  safely. ‘A pilot should not be hesitant to call and clarify the other aircraft’s position and intentions if there is any uncertainty,’ BOB TAIT’S AVIATION THEORY SCHOOL Hangar N Wirraway Drive, Redcliffe Airport. QLD 4021 Check out our web page at www.bobtait.com.au BAK & PPL All CPL subjects plus IREX Courses available full-time or by home study PO Box 2018 Redcliffe North QLD 4020 P:07 3204 0965 F:07 3204 1902 W:www.bobtait.com.au E:[email protected] 23 BE HEARD, BE SEEN... Two points to note are the importance of communication in avoiding danger when conditions are a mix of IFR and VFR. Cloud, haze or smoke can mean IFR conditions and approaches for high-performance aircraft, usually commercial aircraft, while GA and ultra light aircraft can operate in clear conditions under the low visibility layer. The possibility of an RPT aircraft emerging from cloud to find a windscreen full of VFR planes is horrible to contemplate. ‘Diligent radio broadcasts and continuous visual scanning are essential’ CAAPs 166-1(0) and 166-2(0) emphasise. They are words of wisdom which pilots ignore at their peril. 1 SERVICE, 2 SAFETY 3 AND Flight Safety editor, Margo Marchbank, caught up with Philip Baum, director 24 FSA MAY–JUN10 of a London-based aviation security organisation, at a 4 recent conference in Sydney. SECURITY Philip Baum has a dream: an aviation industry where cabin crew are trained not only to be the safety and customer service professionals they are now, but also to be security professionals. The aviation industry is generally good at flight safety training, he argues, with considerable investment in recurrent training for emergency situations, for example, ditching at sea. However, the industry record is not as good when it comes to security training. Despite the fact that aircrew have to deal with disruptive and violent passengers each and every day, ‘the degree of training we afford aircrew, and the investment in human factors for people on the ground is woefully limited’. He cites a list of recent aviation attacks, beginning in 2001 with the Richard Reid ‘shoe bomber’ incident, and ending with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attempt to destroy a Detroit-bound airliner late last year. Between these two attacks there have been at least eight other incidents of aircraft destruction or attempted destruction, and in excess of 50 hijackings or attempted hijackings by passengers. 2 1 3 Recent aviation incidents/accidents  11 10 Richard Reid–the ‘shoe bomber’ attempted to detonate explosive on board Flight 63 from Paris to Miami May-02 A China Northern flight was destroyed in flight 16kms south west of Zhoushuizi Airport, Dalian (China), as a result of an act of sabotage. Fifty-one passengers and nine crew perished; there were no survivors. May-03 David Mark Robinson, suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia, attempted to hijack QF 1737 from Melbourne to Launceston. He attacked and injured two flight attendants with sharpened wooden stakes. Aug-04 Two flights, which departed Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport within about an hour of one another, were destroyed. Two female passengers–Chechen suicide bombers–one on each flight, possibly detonated intra-vaginal bombs, which destroyed the two aircraft, with the loss of 34 passengers and nine crew; and 38 passengers and eight crew respectively. Sep-04 Kato Air, Norway–an asylum seeker entered the cockpit of the Dornier 228, and in a suicide attempt, attacked the pilots with an axe. The aircraft missed the ground by 100m.v Oct-06 Turkish Airlines flight hijacked by Hakan Ekinci in Greek airspace, while on route from Tirana, Albania to Turkey. Ekinci forced his way into the cockpit; but the aircraft landed safely in Italy, escorted and forced down by Greek and Italian F-16s. Feb-08 A woman attempted to hijack Air New Zealand Flight 2279 from Blenheim to Christchurch. (Actually an Air National J32 on charter to replace the normal Eagle Air aircraft.) The woman threatened Air New Zealand staff, stating she had a bomb on board. Both pilots and one passenger suffered stab injuries. The aircraft landed safely and the woman was arrested. Mar-08 An attempt to destroy a China Southern flight en route to Beijing was averted when the crew found a 19-year-old Uighur woman pouring petrol in the toilet from improvised soft drink cans. The pilot made an emergency landing at Lanzhou Airport, and two passengers were arrested. Sep-09 AeroMexico B-737 from Cancun to Mexico City, hijacked by a Bolivian national, Jose Pereira, who claimed he had a bomb. Aircraft landed safely, with no injuries–Pereira arrested. Dec-09 Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a.k.a the ‘underwear bomber’, attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253. The device failed to detonate. In the majority of the cases above, passengers were the cause, but Baum says, most aircrew training does 8 Profiling: a risk analysis, of people and situations, based on perceived threat, and carried out by ‘trained, streetwise individuals’. not reflect this reality. Rather, he says, increasingly, the approach to aviation security is to apply ‘technological solutions to a very human problem’. These technological solutions–increasingly sophisticated peoplescanning devices, such as backscatter X-ray; millimetre wave imaging scanners; transmission X-ray body scanners, are appealing to the powers-that-be because they are, according to Baum, an ‘easily quantifiable fix’. However, the danger with many of these technological solutions, is that we will forever be playing catch-up, because, he says, ‘we are up against individuals who are creative, and always trying to explore and identify our Achilles’ heel.’ ‘But ... once you’re dealing with gut feeling and supposition, that’s a much bigger challenge, and regulators don’t like the fact that you can’t quantify this’. An alternative, human factors-based approach to aviation security, is profiling, which Baum describes as a risk analysis, of people and situations, based on perceived threat, and carried out by ‘trained, streetwise individuals’. 7 He can’t understand the opposition to profiling, which he argues has been proven to work. Criticism of profiling on the grounds that is politically incorrect he counters by saying that immigrations and customs officials are profiling at airports every day, when they differentiate between nationals and others, treating the two groups quite differently. A passenger risk assessment is made using baselines of behaviour; and travel patterns; identifying anyone who doesn’t meet these baseline expectations. You can look at this very positively, he explains. ‘I would imagine that there is a very big difference, for example, between a family which is travelling from Sydney to Queenstown in New Zealand in July for a skiing holiday, and a person travelling from Hobart to Melbourne on a business trip.’ With the family group you would look at ‘how the dad is interacting – focused on the travel documents, while mum is trying to keep the younger children under control. You would be looking at their appearance, their baggage labels, how long they stay, how long they 4 5 25 6 CABIN CREW-SECURITY 9 Dec-01 arrive before the flight. I’m guessing that they would not be the people who arrive 25 minutes before departure: they’ll be the ones who arrive two and a quarter hours beforehand. You’re looking at everything which screams out “family on holiday”. The person travelling early from Hobart to Melbourne, and returning nine at night–well your expectation is that they’re on business. You would expect far less interaction if they’re on their own, you’d look at the type of newspaper they’re reading, their demeanour, dress.’ FSA MAY–JUN10 26 A lot of vital and useful passenger data is gathered – through observation, booking information, but at the moment, Baum says, there is a disconnect: the information doesn’t reach the screening checkpoint, the people at the frontline. This was highlighted in the Xmas Day 2009 incident on Northwest Flight 253. Basic profiling, Baum says, would have identified Umar Abdulmutallab, the ‘underwear bomber’ as a security risk, and should have screamed out: ‘take care with this passenger. His ticket was paid for with cash; and purchased in Ghana for a journey commencing in Nigeria, altered once the ticket was purchased; he had no luggage for a two-week trip; his visa was issued in the UK but the UK was not on his itinerary; and previously, he had travelled to Yemen. The airline had this information, but it did not reach the screening checkpoint.’ In a media release not long after the failed bombing attempt, ‘President Barack Obama said U.S. intelligence agencies had enough information about Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to have discovered and possibly disrupted the plan to destroy the Detroit-bound airline but “failed to connect those dots”’. Obama said the intelligence community knew Abdulmutallab had traveled to Yemen and established contact with extremists. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has said it first learned of Abdulmutallab on 19 November 2009, when his father visited the US embassy in Abuja and sought help finding him. The plea and warning were not taken seriously by the Americans, his son came within a hairsbreadth of murdering nearly 300 people and the father’s visit to the CIA station was leaked within 24 hours of the attack on Northwest Flight 253. And Baum says, ‘the more we automate, the bigger the problem will become. Now you can make a booking online, check in online, and although you will still have to go through security, the opportunities for interaction are being reduced. So it becomes all the important for aircrew to recognise that they have to identify discrepancies in behaviour. ‘I believe that aircrew are the world’s best profilers, not only because they fly in the aeroplane in the passenger cabin, but they’re also used to thinking as the passengers board the flight “Who’s going to be my problem passenger today? Is it going to be the kid who’s going to scream all the way? Is it the businessman that’s going to be arrogant? Is it the young couple who are going to be drunk?” Now that’s all well and good, but we now need to capture that information and convert it into an effective tool, to prevent not only disruptive passenger incidents, but also other potential incidents. ‘I use two examples in training of threat analysis. Let’s say you’re the captain of airline X, and you are awaiting departure from Sydney to Bangkok. It is two minutes before slot time, the doors are closed, you’re just about to go off blocks and your flight attendant rings you, or comes to speak to you, and says, “Captain, the passenger seated in seat 27F – I’m concerned, he’s behaving a little strangely, it’s probably all right, but I just thought we ought to let you know”. What do you do? You know you’ll miss your slot time, there will be delay, and the passenger and his luggage might have to be removed from the aircraft. A lot of pilots will say–“Just keep an eye on him.” I’ve never understood that phrase–if you’ve got a problem on the ground, deal with it on the ground. Compare that with a situation where you’re five hours in to the Sydney-Bangkok flight, and the attendant tells you that the passenger in seat 11C says that on page 69 in the in-flight magazine it says there is a bomb on the plane. “Captain, I’m convinced that the passenger didn’t write it, but they found it and they’re totally spooked by it.” Some I have spoken to say, “Oh, I’d turn A lot of vital and useful passenger data is 61 62 63 gathered 60 – 59 through 58 57 56 obs55ervation, boo 54 king 53 rmation, info 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 51 12 13 14 50 49 48 47 15 46 16 45 44 17 43 18 42 19 20 41 31 32 30 21 29 22 40 39 37 38 36 33 34 35 23 24 28 27 25 26 back. You’ve got to take it seriously.” My view is that is actually poor security analysis–if you know it’s written on page 69 of the in-flight magazine, and you know it wasn’t written by that passenger, then it’s not a credible bomb threat. There’s absolutely no reason why you should divert, or land: that’s not how terrorist groups issue bomb threats. If you’re planning on blowing up a plane, you’re not going to tell anybody about it ... and, if you do decide to, it’s in order to prevent detonation and you’ll make absolutely certain that the message reaches the authorities. Who even reads inflight magazines?!’ ‘If someone is spending an inordinately long time in the restrooms, the very first thing you do is to turn security into customer service. “Sir, you’ve been there a long time, are you OK? ... Unless you come out, I will have to open the door for your safety.”’ It was this type of positive action by the crew, for example, Baum explains, which saved the passengers and aircraft in the China Southern incident. The cabin crew broke in into the restroom, and interrupted the young Uighur woman in her attempt to blow up the aircraft using petrol. Baum’s dream for the aviation security system of the future involves a better balance between the use of technology and human factors. It’s a dream where a sensor-based system means passengers are ‘sniffed and sensed’ as they move around the airport; there are no queues, because for him, they simply demonstrate inadequate security; and above all, aircrew are trained, not only to be safety and customer service professionals, but importantly, security professionals. ‘A lot of it is how you’re trained to communicate with passengers. If you see someone acting nervously, you don’t talk to them straight away, but to people either side of them, or even a row or two away, and see if the passenger’s behaviour changes the closer you get to them, when they realise you’re just the really friendly attendant who is chatting to everybody. Do they close down even more, or do they open up? If they’re someone who is frightened of flying, then they’ll probably be quite relieved; if they feel you’re asking questions, and they’re receding even more, then you absolutely need to take some action. ‘Aircrew have loads of opportunities for identifying unusual behaviours. When someone strikes you as being a little bit unusual–have a conversation with them. There are loads of reasons why people may The bomber’s underpants. ABC News photo 1 42 2 41 40 39 6 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 38 36 11 12 13 35 33 14 15 34 25 16 24 32 31 30 you do 26 n’t 27 just tra 28 in 29 staf f to report, but report and recommend 17 23 22 21 18 19 20 27 CABIN CREW-SECURITY ‘But in the first scenario–it’s very much something to act upon. It’s very much dependent on training–you don’t just train staff to report, but report and recommend. There’s a big difference between reporting, “Captain that passenger in seat 27F–I’m concerned, he’s behaving a little strangely, it’s probably all right, but I just thought we ought to let you know”, and being much more assertive, recommending “Captain, this passenger is behaving strangely we’re not happy about this situation, and we think it should be resolved before take-off.” You’re forcing the captain into a situation to act. We’ve got to build into the training programs some protection against paranoia, but I think cabin crew with experience know the difference between a nervous passenger, and someone behaving abnormally. not be happy on a flight: there might have been a death, or they might be flying back to be fired. But on long haul flights you have more opportunity to engage them in conversation, and to evaluate the situation if you have concerns. The one thing you don’t do is ignore the behaviour if you have concerns. S E R V I C E S Come and experience the difference Johnston Aviation Services continues to offer. The value-added training, professionalism, expertise and high levels of service that our students have come to expect of us. - Leaders in M/E command instrument ratings. - PPL and CPL Courses - Instructor Ratings - Initial issue & renewal - all grades of instructor ratings - Accomodation provided Multi-Engine Command Instrument Rating Course 4 week course Training on Beechcraft Baron Includes GNSS RNAV $13,990 28 For further information and pricing please contact us FSA MAY–JUN10 Phone: (02) 6584 0484 Email: [email protected] Web: www.johnstonaviation.com.au Our Reputation is your Guarantee The WIRING evolution Lance Thorogood, a CASA electrical systems specialist, discusses an often-overlooked aspect of ageing aircraft: their wiring. 1 A common perception of ageing aircraft is the obvious one: structural fatigue failures. These can come from cracks, component breakage or corrosion in its many forms. Rarely is much thought given to problems that may lurk in the less accessible areas of the aircraft–behind panels, under floors or hidden beneath cabin trim. The potential for serious problems to develop in these dim, dark and often overlooked places is high. Leaking fluid lines, abraded control cables, corrosion and fatigue failures, and chafing of wiring looms may slowly develop over time, but largely go unnoticed. 29 2 Common maintenance procedures can result in damage if particular care is not taken to minimise the risk. For example: a simple skin repair may result in the drilling through of a hidden loom beneath the area being repaired. Incorrect handling procedures such as standing on looms or hanging removed components from their connecting wires can cause damage that may be hard to see but may well make its effects felt in flight. Fuel and oil spills can occur during aircraft servicing. These spills, if not contained and cleaned, are another factor that can adversely affect aircraft wiring. Possible effects may include deterioration of the insulation material, leading to mechanical breakdown of the insulating properties. As wiring looms age their wires become brittle and are easily damaged. Incidentally, wiring looms and antennas are not handholds, ladders or tool rests. 7 3 THE WIRING EVOLUTION A major issue often overlooked (or ignored) during inspections and maintenance is that of the all-important wiring connecting aircraft equipment such as lighting, radio and navigation devices together in what is known as the ‘electrical wire interconnect system’ – or ‘wiring loom’. As an aircraft ages, so does its interconnecting wiring. Insulation breaks down or can be rubbed through due to vibration, poor alignment or incorrectly fitted clamps. The build-up of dirt and metal swarf on looms and subsequent rubbing through of the insulation is a common problem. The result can be short circuits causing further damage to looms and equipment–with potentially catastrophic effects. 4 The result of unavoidable ageing and years of non-standard or substandard maintenance can be a sort of ‘evolution’ of an aircraft wiring loom over time. It can degrade from the organised system fitted by the manufacturer, to something literally resembling a bird’s nest. Figure 1 shows a bundle of butt splices joining an old loom to new wiring to extend the reach of the old loom by an additional 280mm to fit a new location of a nav com panel. This particular repair has several major issues, notwithstanding the extension of shielded wires using unshielded wire. When splicing or performing multiple repairs on a loom good practice is to stagger the joins to reduce the cross section increase in size that result from the repair. Further, the same type of wiring originally used should be used again for the repair or modification work wherever possible. FSA MAY–JUN10 30 Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows the back of the nav comm. panel which has switches interconnected by a piece of rigid wire with standard ½ Watt resistors soldered to the wire and a 5W resistor used to even things up. There is clear evidence, in this instance, that the wire has overheated and that damage to wire insulation has occurred as a result of this distinctly dubious modification. Figure 4 shows a non-aviation part being used to connect separate sources via a relay. The relay has been sourced from a non-aviation electronics spares supplier, mounted on breadboard and a standard 5W resistor has once again been used across the contacts. Figure 5 5 shows the relay has come adrift from the mounting socket and also that silicone sealer has been used in an apparent attempt to shock mount or hold the components together. Figure 6 shows the use of a standard household wiring terminal block joining an extremely short piece of wire to another length of wire. The use of these types of components is an extremely unsafe practice and can have catastrophic consequences to the aircraft. Not only is the workmanship sub-standard, but the components also are not suitable for the environment or task they are meant to endure. 6 7 31 8 AIRWORTHINESS Wiring problems aren’t just related to repairs and modifications. There is also the case of simple neglect of the wiring system over time. Figure 10 shows a wire heavily impregnated with oil over a significant part of its length and the other end relatively clean and in good condition. Figure 11 shows the same wire rubbed through to bare copper where the mounting clip has deteriorated, causing wear on the insulation. This type of damage has the potential to cause everything from erratic electrical behaviour to complete failure of the aircraft electrical system, and could lead to an in-flight fire. Figures 12, 13 and 14 demonstrate how the neglect of a wiring system can lead to more serious conditions existing in the aircraft loom and making a catastrophic event more likely. Pull-Out Section Other examples are the incorrect use of joining two short pieces of wire with a butt splice (Figure 7), multiple use crimp connection in close proximity (Figure 8) and excess wire bundled and tied with a cable tie (Figure 9). While there may be many ways of doing something badly there are very few ways of doing the job properly. In recognition of the difficulties encountered in obtaining wiring repair and maintenance information in general aviation, CASA has released Advisory Circular 21.99 Aircraft Wiring and Bonding for use as a last resort when all other manufacturers’ information and manuals are exhausted. While the previous figures and discussion highlighted all things wrong with wiring looms. It is time to show an example of a sound and serviceable interconnecting wiring system. Figures 15 and 16 depict a well maintained wiring loom. The loom is both well supported and laced together with good bend radii and is clear of contaminants. So who is ultimately responsible for the condition of the wiring found in these examples and others that may still be operating? The Civil Aviation Regulations 42ZE clearly identify the individual who certifies the completion of maintenance as the person ultimately responsible. What can be done to improve matters? All people working in those areas that are not normally accessed during routine maintenance procedures should be ever-vigilant to all kinds of faults and damage that may be outside their normal scope of work. If there is any doubt about anything observed during the access period, these issues should be brought to the attention of a responsible person or pilot of the aircraft. 9 10 Pull-Out Section FSA MAY–JUN10 32 11 Finally, the wiring system depicted in this article would most likely have taken many years to reach its seriously degraded state. The aircraft would probably have had strange, intermittent and unexplained minor faults over a long time. However the cost of rectification to correct these issues and return the aircraft to a serviceable condition has the potential to run into many thousands of dollars, and these rectification costs do not include additional downtime. Recommended practices and materials are encouraged by manufacturers and regulatory authorities for good reason. Non-aircraft parts and wire may not necessarily have the same long term resistance to the extremes of the aircraft operating environment as aircraftapproved parts. However, work performed correctly using recommend practices and materials would have the reasonable expectation of continuing to function properly for many years to come. Proper maintenance can reduce the future cost burden to the owner over the long term and eliminate many of the minor annoyances of equipment not operating exactly as expected–and most importantly, proper maintenance won’t create unnecessary hazards. CASA has produced ‘Ageing aircraft wiring’ – a CD-ROM for maintenance engineers. It explores repair maintenance techniques as well as guidelines and best practice. Available from the online store www.casa.gov.au (Postage and handling fee of $15.00) 16 12 13 14 15 SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS 1 Feb 2010 – 31 Mar 2010 Note: Occurrence figures not included in this edition. AIRCRAFT ABOVE 5700KG Airbus A321231 Landing gear damper/torque link attachment bolt sheared. Ref 510010260 LH main landing gear damper to torque link attachment bolt sheared and hanging by lockwire. Three other attachment bolts remaining. P/No: NAS6606H38. Airbus A330203 Main landing gear hydraulic hose failed. Ref 510010044 LH main landing gear hydraulic hose sheared at landing gear/airframe interface. Loss of Green system hydraulic fluid. Investigation continuing. Airbus A330303 Air conditioning fumes during engine start. Ref 510010226 Fumes from air conditioning system during engine start. No2 air conditioning pack regulator faulty. BAC Jetstream 3107 Landing gear wheel bolt failed. Ref 510010175 RH main wheel bolt thread failed. Nut and washer missing. P/No: MS2125005018. TSO: 1,039 hours/1,507 landings. Boeing 737476 Elevator spring broken. Ref 510010255 Elevator fell and centering unit outer spring broken. Boeing 737476 Fire detection loop sensor contaminated. Ref 510010128 No1 engine fire detection system loop A disconnection plug contaminated and detector suspect faulty. P/No: 6678. TSN: 504,940 hours. TSO: 504,940 hours. Boeing 737476 Fuselage skin cracked. Ref 510009922 Fuselage skin cracked beyond limits at BS947.5 Stringer 25L. Crack length approximately 75mm(3in). Boeing 737476 Ice and rain protection systems control unit faulty. Ref 510010187 First Officer’s No2 window middle layer overheated and melted. Investigation found the window heat control unit suspect faulty. P/No: 8300005603. TSN: 42,574 hours. TSO: 42,574 hours. Boeing 737476 Stabiliser trim actuator faulty. Ref 510010002 Stabiliser trim actuator faulty. P/No: AR7077M3. TSN: 49,838 hours. TSO: 5,565 hours. Boeing 73776Q Horizontal stabiliser trim actuator bolts/washers missing. Ref 510010199 Horizontal stabiliser trim actuator failsafe strap bolts and washers missing. P/No: 251A45109. Boeing 7377BX APU bleed air suspected contaminated. Ref 510009978 APU suspect bleed air contaminated. Oil smells in cockpit. Investigation could find no fault. P/No: 1319B. TSN: 3,928 hours/5,154 cycles. Boeing 737838 Air data module faulty. Ref 510010070 First Officer’s pitot/static system Air Data Module (ADM) faulty. P/No: C17001BA01. TSN: 27,262 hours. TSO: 27,262 hours. Boeing 737838 Captain’s sliding window bumper damaged. Ref 510010054 Excessive air noise from Captain’s LH sliding window. Investigation found the forward frame structure bumper (Teflon wedge) damaged/deformed and preventing proper sealing. Boeing 737838 Emergency over-wing lighting inoperative – battery charger faulty. Ref 510009962 LH emergency over-wing lighting inoperative due to flat battery and faulty charger. P/No: D71702001. TSN: 27,739 hours. TSO: 27,739 hours. Boeing 737838 Engine spar valve actuator unserviceable. Ref 510010211 No2 engine spar valve actuator unserviceable. P/No: MA30A1001. TSN: 5,677 hours. TSO: 5,677 hours. Boeing 737838 Galley oven odour. Ref 510009947 No2 forward galley oven suspect faulty. Electrical burning smell/odour coming from under oven. P/No: 8609010000. Boeing 737838 Main fuel tank refuelling shutoff valve failed. Ref 510010052 No1 main fuel tank refuelling shutoff valve failed to close during refuelling. P/No: 2670136. TSN: 20,050 hours. TSO: 20,050 hours. Boeing 737838 Wing flap deflection control rollers seized. Ref 510010001 LH and RH outboard trailing edge flap outboard deflection control rollers seized. Damage to flap tracks. P/No: KRP177408VTZ. Boeing 737838 Wing front spar corroded. Ref 510010233 RH wing front spar corroded in area of forward boost pump bonding lead attachment. Boeing 7378BK Fuselage door sill corroded. Ref 510009923 L2 door lower auxiliary sill web located at BS991/ WL197/LBL36 severely corroded and holed. Electrical ground block PNoS280W555-16 was then left free to arc to surrounding area. Boeing 747438 Flap track transmission coupling sheared. Ref 510010039 Air turn back carried out due to ‘FLAP DRIVE STS MSG’. Investigation found RH inboard No5 flap track transmission coupling sheared at torque tube output joint. Boeing 747438 Hydraulic pipe leaking. Ref 510010173 No1 hydraulic system pipe leaking. LH body gear truck position actuator hydraulic fuse outlet attachment nut which was approximately 3/4 of a turn loose. Investigation continuing. P/No: 272U4400505. Boeing 747438 Wing flap track fuse pin lockwire broken. Ref 510010225 Inboard trailing edge flap No4 flap track forward fuse pin lockwire broken at nut. Fuse pin nut was also loose. Further investigation found the lockwire was of the incorrect gauge (0.032in instead of 0.047in) and was also orientated incorrectly as per OEM information. Boeing 767336 Brake antiskid module connector corroded. Ref 510010231 Brake antiskid system LH antiskid module connectors heavily corroded. Connectors were for No1, No2, No5 and No6 antiskid valves. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767336 Cargo compartment wiring burnt. Ref 510010241 Cargo compartment wiring loom W0704 burnt. Investigation found approximately 12 wires burnt and shorted together. Wires have burnt through the aluminiumised insulation blanket to the aircraft frame underneath. It is suspected swarf in the wiring may have caused the wires to short and burn the blanket or rub against the wires and the blanket. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767336 Galley oven smoke. Ref 510009906 Smoke coming from forward galley No1 oven. Investigation found two wires on one of the heating elements had come loose causing arcing to the plastic sleeving. The nuts attaching the lower heating element were found to be the incorrect type. P/No: 67192. Boeing 767336 Strong engine exhaust fumes in cockpit. Ref 510010227 Strong engine exhaust fumes in cabin. Suspect engine exhaust entering APU inlet or outflow valve during engine start due to strong winds. Bombardier DHC8103 Nose landing gear drag strut actuator hose split. Ref 510010073 Nose landing gear drag strut actuator pressure hose split and leaking. Loss of hydraulic fluid. Bombardier DHC8202 Landing gear alternate extension cable corroded/broken. Ref 510009968 Landing gear alternate extension cable broken around pulley located in cabin roof area. Inspection found severe corrosion at the point of failure and several other less corroded areas where the cable passes around pullies. P/No: NAS303254280. TSN: 22,420 hours/4,270 cycles. CVAC 340 Hydraulic bypass valve cracked. Ref 510010261 Hydraulic bypass valve fractured. Loss of hydraulic fluid. Investigation continuing. P/No: 110765. TSO: 2,284 hours. Embraer EMB120 Cabin pressurisation controller unserviceable. Ref 510010195 Cabin pressurisation controller faulty. Needle jamming intermittently. P/No: 22201T011400. Embraer EMB120 Main landing gear jammed. Ref 510009908 RH main landing gear failed to unlock during manual gear extension. Investigation found the free fall mechanism jammed. P/No: 12029041502. 33 AIRWORTHINESS Boeing 737376 ACARS printer overheated. Ref 510009990 ACARS printer overheated and extremely hot with acrid fumes. Investigation continuing. P/No: RDAC12022. TSN: 14,915 hours. TSO: 14,915 hours. Boeing 7377BX Main landing gear brake hose leaking. Ref 510009941 LH main landing gear upper brake hose leaking. P/No: AS154A04EN0294K. Boeing 747438 Passenger seat backrest pivot pin sheared. Ref 510010140 Passenger seat backrest RH pivot pin sheared causing seat back to collapse. Seat located at 67G. Investigation continuing. P/No: 45203015. Pull-Out Section Airbus A330202 Landing gear stop pad missing. Ref 510009949 RH main landing gear stop pad missing/ damaged. Landing gear contacted targets and associated brackets. Target and brackets missing. Investigation continuing. Boeing 7377BX Engine driven hydraulic pump failed. Ref 510010204 No1 engine driven hydraulic pump failed. Black sludge dripping from drain and case drain quick disconnect fitting adrift. P/No: 66087. TSN: 24,479 hours/14,277 cycles. Embraer ERJ170100 Pitot/static/AOA sensor unserviceable. Ref 510010230 Integrated Pitot/Static/AOA sensor unserviceable. P/No: 2015GH2H8A. Embraer ERJ190100 Pneumatic bleed pre- cooler gasket damaged. Ref 510010200 Bleed air system LH pre-cooler gasket dislodged and parts missing. P/No: 19007628003. Pull-Out Section Fokker F28MK0100 Engine emergency fuel shutoff cable broken. Ref 510009994 No2 engine LP shaft failure emergency fuel shutoff cable broken at aft pulley. Investigation found a small amount of wear on the forward and aft pulleys. P/No: JR35320A. FSA MAY–JUN10 34 Fokker F28MK0100 Flap fairing bracket broken. Ref 510010220 (photo below) LH flap fairing bracket broken. P/No: A83148005. Fokker F28MK0100 Park brake shutoff valve faulty. Ref 510010050 Park brake shutoff valve poppet dislodged from seat. Found during inspection iaw EASA AD 2009-0220. Investigation continuing. TSN: 3,813 hours/2,622 cycles. Fokker F28MK0100 Window and windshield screws incorrect parts. Ref 510010179 During an unrelated structural inspection it was noticed that numerous windscreen and windscreen surround attachment screws were of incorrect length. Many screws were too short and several were too long. ISRAEL 1124 Landing gear ground contact switch out of adjustment. Ref 510010014 Landing gear selector handle faulty. Further investigation found the ground contact switch out of adjustment which prevented the override switch from retracting and the failure of the landing gear handle to be selected to the “up” position. Saab SF340B Brake hydraulic swivel broken. Ref 510010232 No2 brake hydraulic swivel broken into two pieces due to failure of internal “C” clip. Loss of hydraulic fluid. P/No: AIR124770. AIRCRAFT BELOW 5700KG Beech 200 Air conditioning bleed check valve failed. Ref 510009928 Bleed air system check valve holed in four places due to flapper valves wearing through case. P/No: 10138417317. Beech 200 Pneumatic bleed air contaminated. Ref 510010221 Smoke/fumes in cabin following takeoff. Investigation found that a power recovery wash had been carried out on both engines. The customer bleed air lines had not been disconnected during the wash and it is believed that contamination of the bleed air system caused the smell. Beech 200 Wing bolt attachment fitting scored. Ref 510010151 Outboard upper forward wing bolt attachment fittings scored. Caused by incorrect assembly of barrel nuts following NDT inspection. P/No: 101110031. TSN: 23,978 hours/19,904 cycles/19,904 landings. Beech 300 Pressure bulkhead damaged. Ref 510009966 Rear pressure bulkhead damaged prior to leaving factory. Investigation found that when the holes were being drilled for the location and placement of the pressure bulkhead interior panel the pressure bulkhead skin had been drilled to a depth of 0.508mm (0.020in) (skin thickness 0.812mm (0.032in) totally missing the hat section that should have been drilled. TSN: 63 hours/19 cycles. Beech C90 Flight control cables rubbing. Ref 510010205 (photo below) Primary control cables (3off) fouling on aircraft structure in rear fuselage. Found during C of A inspection. Aircraft had only 68.8 hours since new. Cessna 441 Nose landing gear actuator support structure damaged. Ref 510010164 Nose landing gear actuator support structure (skin and two extrusions) pushed upwards by approximately 5mm to 10mm (0.19 to 0.39in). Suspect caused by multiple retractions over an extended time. Nil evidence of hard landing. Cessna 441 Pressure bulkhead web cracked. Ref 510010216 Aft pressure bulkhead web cracked around rivet securing interior trim attachment rail. Outboard rivet failed. P/No: 511112077. TSN: 20,254 hours/17,845 landings. Cessna TR182 Nose landin g gear collapsed. Ref 510010143 Nose landing gear collapsed during landing. Propeller contacted ground. Cirrus SR20 Alternator hold down nuts incorrect part. Ref 510010248 No2 alternator hold down nuts were incorrect part. Nuts were PNo MS21044N5 Nylock nuts instead of PNo MS21045-5 metal lock nuts. Found during inspection for C of A. P/No: MN21044N5. TSN: 2 hours/2 months. Britten Norman BN2A20 Main landing wheel bearings failed. Ref 510009977 RH main landing gear outboard wheel inner and outer bearings failed with rollers missing. Wheel axle nut and split pin were intact. Wheel bolts loose and missing with one bolt rubbing on brake torque plate. Tyre was flat. P/No: 1383620629. TSO: 320 hours. Cessna 172N Fuel shutoff selector suspect faulty. Ref 510010137 Engine stopped during takeoff. Investigation could find no faults with the fuel system except for a stiff fuel selector. Following lubrication of the selector, the engine ran normally. Suspect problem caused by stiff selector. Cessna 172RG Hydraulic power pack motor contaminated. Ref 510010000 Hydraulic power pack electric motor contaminated with hydraulic fluid. Cessna 172S Aileron crossover cable frayed. Ref 510010030 LH aileron crossover cable frayed in area where it passes through the wing aft ribs. P/No: 0510105364. TSN: 1,294 hours. Cessna 182T Nose wheel tyre tube ruptured. Ref 510010252 (photo below) Nose wheel tyre tube ruptured. P/No: 0923080. TSN: 250 hours. Diamond DA42 Aileron control horn corroded. Ref 510010008 LH and RH aileron control horns corroded in numerous areas. Corrosion was most evident at pushrod/bonding strap attachment location. P/No: DV227100103. TSN: 576 hours/36 months. Diamond DA42 Aircraft fuel pump transfer switches not connected. Ref 510009914 LH and RH auxiliary fuel pump transfer switches had not been connected. Fuel failed to transfer from auxiliary tanks to main tanks. Investigation continuing. Diamond DA42 Main landing gear actuator housing corroded. Ref 510010005 RH main landing gear actuator housing corroded externally. P/No: X1100061C. TSN: 576 hours/36 months. Gulfstream 500S Flap retraction actuator seal incorrect part. Ref 510010142 Flap retraction actuator failed to operate. Actuator disassembled and non-approved seal found fitted to piston head. Seal appeared to be quad type seal with an unknown part number. Correct seal is PNo MS-28773-214. Unapproved/incorrect part. Gulfstream 695A Starter-generator bearing failed. Ref 510010165 Starter/generator rear support bearing failed causing internal short circuit. TSO: 743 hours. Jabiru 160DLSA Main landing gear leg delaminated. Ref 510010021 (photo below) LH main landing gear leg delaminated. Investigation found resin had not fully penetrated composite layers. P/No: 6204023. TSN: 121 hours. Kavanagh G450 Balloon burner load frame cracked. Ref 510010074 Balloon burner load frame cracked. P/No: LF204. TSN: 558 hours/23 months. Piper PA31350 Main landing gear power pack heavy sludge. Ref 510010198 Main landing gear failed to extend using normal and emergency selection. Landing gear eventually extended and aircraft landed safely. Investigation found heavy sludge build-up in the power pack reservoir with the internal o-rings having gone hard. P/No: WTC21351. Piper PA31350 Main landing gear uplock hook worn. Ref 510009942 LH main landing gear uplock hook worn. The LH main wheel was stuck in the up position due to the uplock hook wedged between the roller on the lower torque link and the torque link it self. Uplock hook bracket failed. Aircraft landed with main landing gear retracted. TSN: 10,075 hours. Swearingen SA227DC Hydraulic pump drive shaft seal leaking. Ref 510009951 RH engine driven hydraulic pump leaking from drive shaft seal. Loss of hydraulic fluid. Pump was 42.4 hours out of overhaul. P/No: PV304426. TSO: 42 hours/25cycles/8 months. Swearingen SA227DC Rudder pedal cracked. Ref 510009956 Pilot’s RH rudder pedal cracked at RH web above pivot point. Found during NDT inspection following removal for refitment to another aircraft. P/No: 2672003014. TSN: 13,084 hours. ROTORCRAFT Agusta-Bell A109E Tail rotor retaining nut loose. Ref 510009999 Tail rotor retaining nut loose. Retaining nut was prevented from loosening further by the lock washer. P/No: 1090130851. Bell 206B3 Emergency floatation system incorrectly fitted. Ref 510010009 Floatation system would not operate correctly. Investigation found the system incorrectly wired and the installation not in accordance with the manual. Necessary components also missing from installation. Bell 206B3 Hydraulic pressure hose ruptured. Ref 510010096 Hydraulic pressure hose located between pump and filter ruptured in area under “P” clamp. Loss of hydraulic fluid. P/No: 70010H000A180. Bell 430 Windshield shattered. Ref 510009980 (photo below) RH pilot’s windshield shattered. Initial investigation could find no evidence of bird-strike or lightning strike or single point of impact. Investigation continuing. P/No: 222031105112B. Piper PA31 Main landing gear actuator failed. Ref 510009996 RH main landing gear actuator failed at rod end. Actuator jammed between rear spar and side brace. Skyfox CA25N Rudder cable broken. Ref 510010027 RH rudder cable failed at swaged connection to pedal. TSN: 2,400 hours. Robinson R44 Tail rotor pitch control bearing unserviceable. Ref 510010060 Tail rotor pitch control bearings running rough. P/No: C0311. Schweizer 269C Main rotor control rod worn. Ref 510010112 Centre lateral control rod located between pilot and co-pilot cyclic control worn against centre console. Wear mark is approximately 19.05mm long by 12.7mm long to a depth of 0.304mm and located approximately 19.05mm from the lower rod end. P/No: 269A9942. TSN: 437 hours/9 months. TSO: 437 hours/9 months. Sikorsky S76A Passenger window failed. Ref 510010222 LH forward cabin window failed. A section of the window which included the pop out air vent separated from the aircraft. Investigation found that the vent was tight in the window and a passenger gave it a ’light tap with the palm of my hand‘ before the window failed. P/No: CC3251. PISTON ENGINES Continental GTSIO520M Engine connecting rod failed. Ref 510009950 RH engine No6 cylinder connecting rod suspect failure. Hole in crankcase. Continental IO550B Engine crankcase cracked. Ref 510010162 Crankcase cracked in crankshaft rear journal support structure. Crack length approximately 38mm. (1.5in) TSN: 567 hours/84 months. Piper PA34200T Main landing gear trunnion attachment fitting broken. Ref 510010107 LH main landing gear forward trunnion attachment fitting broken. P/No: 67040012. TSN: 4,773 hours. Skyfox CA25N Main landing gear bungee failed. Ref 510010026 RH main landing gear bungee failed causing landing gear to collapse and RH wing tip to contact ground. Robinson R22BETA Main rotor blade spindle bearing cracked. Ref 510010212 (photo below) Main rotor blade spindle bearing cracked. Found during inspection iaw AD/R22/30. P/No: A1581. TSN: 1,620 hours. Continental O470U Engine cylinder unserviceable. Ref 510010244 No1 and No3 cylinders holed. Further examination found numerous cracks in the head. P/No: AEC631397. TSN: 1,400 hours. Eurocopter AS350B2 Tail rotor pitch control lever bushing worn. Ref 510010166 Tail rotor pitch control lever bushing loose in arm. Found during inspection iaw AD/Ecuriel/45. P/No: 350A33152600. TSO: 399 hours. Jabiru JABIRU3300 Engine failed. Ref 510010025 Engine failed with large explosion and major vibration. Inspection found massive internal damage. Unable to determine sequence of failure. 35 AIRWORTHINESS Piper PA31350 NLG steering link arm attachment bolts failed. Ref 510010003 (photo below) Nose landing gear steering link arm attachment bolts (3off) broken. Investigation found that one bolt had been broken for some time while the other two had failed recently. Suspect bolts over-torqued. TSN: 16,413 hours. Swearingen SA227DC Engine anti-ice pipe broken. Ref 510009973 LH engine inlet anti-ice air pipe cracked and broken at mounting boss on plenum. P3 air leak. P/No: 8943825. TSN: 20,309 hours/28,324 cycles. Eurocopter EC225LP Horizontal stabiliser skin cracked. Ref 510010153 Horizontal stabiliser lower skin cracked. Crack length approximately 300mm (12in). P/No: 332A1310000402. Pull-Out Section Pilatus PC12 Pilot’s instruments static system leaking. Ref 510009918 Pilot’s pressure instruments showing erroneous readings compared to co-pilot’s instruments. Investigation found a loose connection in the static system at a T piece under the instrument panel. Further investigation found the threads on the T fitting stripped causing the static line to leak. P/No: 264N04. Swearingen SA227AC Autopilot yaw damper servo seized. Ref 510010120 Autopilot system yaw damper rudder servo seized. Unit subsequently freed up but a loose object was heard moving inside the unit. Found during removal to service another aircraft. P/No: 6222366002. TSO: 5,245 hours. Pull-Out Section Lycoming HIO360A1A Engine tube broken. Ref 510010086 Engine failed due to broken tube. Limited information provided. Aircraft damaged during autorotation landing. P/No: LW120980390. TSO: 1,321 hours. Lycoming IGSO480A1E6 Engine cylinder piston ring overheated. Ref 510010207 RH engine No4 and No6 cylinder oil compression rings carboned up due to excessive heat and oil carbonisation. Investigation found that No4 and No6 cylinders run hottest due to air flow over the engine. The CHT and EGT probes are located on No5 cylinder which runs cooler. The problem was cured when the probes were relocated to the hottest running cylinders. P/No: CN203. TSN: 150 hours. TSO: 150 hours. Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine counterweight rollers incorrect part. Ref 510010068 (photo below) Major engine failure due to engine seizing in flight. Investigation found the crankshaft broken due to counterweight failure. Further investigation found the counterweight rollers were the incorrect part number for this model engine. Parts fitted were PNo 73648 and PNo 76788. Correct PNo 72967 and PNo 72797. The rollers fitted were approximately 0.254mm smaller in diameter. 36 LH engine starter motor housing and drive gear cracked. TSN: 1,890 hours. TURBINE ENGINES metal edges found around part number and serial number markings. P/No: 2A4802. TSN: 26,225 hours/10,880 cycles. TSO: 26,225 hours/10,880 cycles. GE CF680E1 Engine thrust reverser bolt missing. Ref 510009965 No2 engine inboard thrust reverser forward hinge attachment bolt missing. Bolt was found laying in the hinge beam structure. Investigation continuing. P/No: 683L249G04. PWA PT6A67B Engine failed due oil loss. Ref 510009930 Engine failed suspect due to loss of engine oil. Investigation continuing. P/No: PT6A67B. TSN: 5,618 hours/6,512 cycles. TSO: 1,120 hours/987 cycles. GE CFM563C Compressor bleed valve motor failed. Ref 510010069 No1 engine EGT exceeded during takeoff. Investigation found the variable bleed valves failed to close due to motor failure. Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine compressor blade failed. Ref 510010018 No4 engine surge. Investigation found damage to Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 Intermediate Pressure Compressor (IPC) blades. Stage 4 IPC blade (1off) fractured with damage to the other Stage 4 blades. Impact damage to blades in downstream IPC stages. Damage to High Pressure Compressor (HPC) blades from Stage 1 to stage 6. Further downstream impact damage found in High Pressure Nozzle guide Vanes (HPNGV) and turbine blades. Investigation continuing GE CFM563C Engine MEC faulty. Ref 510010167 No2 engine failed. Single engine landing carried out. Investigation found the Main Engine Control (MEC) faulty. TSN: 43,517 hours. TSO: 43,517 hours. GE CFM563C Turbine blade retainer bolt tabs broken. Ref 510010090 (photo below) High Pressure Turbine (HPT) forward blade retainer bolt retaining tabs (2off) broken away. Tabs were then trapped in the HPT disc/forward air seal cavity. Tabs eventually broke through seal arm wall. Investigation continuing. Rolls Royce TAY65015 Turbine blade damaged. Ref 510010040 No1 engine first stage high pressure turbine blade leading edges damaged. Total of 88 blades affected. Investigation continuing. P/No: 65015. TSN: 30,134 hours/25,966 cycles. TSO: 12,227 hours/6,779 cycles. FSA MAY–JUN10 PROPELLERS P/No: 7364876788. TSN: 1,019 hours. Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine crankcase cracked. Ref 510010235 Crankcase cracked under No3 cylinder. Crack length approximately 25mm. (1in) TSO: 1,535 hours. Lycoming O235L2C Engine cylinder tappet broken. Ref 510010121 No3 cylinder tappet broken and end missing. Tappet end found in crankcase in three pieces. Crankcase was found to be cracked in area adjacent to cam lobe. Damage also to connecting rods, pistons and crankshaft. Investigation continuing. P/No: 15B26091. TSN: 2 hours. Lycoming O360E1A6 Engine starter motor housing/drive gear cracked. Ref 510010218 (photo below) P/No: 1475M84P01. TSN: 45,303 hours/28,657 cycles. TSO: 5,368 hours/3,917 cycles. GE CT79B Engine failed. Ref 510010055 LH engine failed. Initial investigation found oil in the tailpipe. Engine replaced and sent for further investigation. IAE V2527A5 Engine failed. Ref 510010178 RH engine failed. Flames from engine led to fire bottle discharge although no fire warning indication was present. Maximum EGT recorded at 840 degrees C. Initial investigation found metal debris in the tailpipe and evidence of a tailpipe fire. Investigation continuing. IAE V2527A5 Engine failed to shutdown. Ref 510010174 LH engine failed to shutdown using normal means. Engine finally shutdown using the fire handle. Fault code FMU/HC/EEC1. Three ground runs carried out and engine shutdown was normal. IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine disc cracked. Ref 510010245 Stage 2 high pressure turbine hub cracked in blade slot fir trees. Cracks found in a total of 17 positions. Found during NDT inspection. Evidence of raised Hartzell HCB3TN3 Propeller link pin screw broken. Ref 510010091 During engine run following propeller change, the aircraft began to shake violently. After the engine was shut down, one propeller blade was found to be spinning loose in the propeller hub. Further investigation found the link pin screw broken off in the hub. The retaining pin was found some distance away from the aircraft and the screw head was found to be still lock-wired. Further investigation found that the counterweight had been incorrectly installed at overhaul allowing the counterweight to contact the screw head causing it to shear off. P/No: B38406. McCauley 3FF32C501 Propeller latch screw failed. Ref 510009929 RH propeller latch screws failed/worn. P/No: 84324. TSO: 586 hours. Muhlbauer MTV12BCF Propeller control cable broken. Ref 510010076 RH propeller pitch control cable failed. Investigation found cable had been installed through too tight a radius. Cable was part of STC to convert aircraft to Lycoming engines. P/No: C616126103002. TSN: 45 hours. . m a S , n i a g a t i y a l p t ’ n o D ‘Correct analysis of a defect is necessary. Taking preventive action to anticipate a problem is visionary,’ says Roger Alder, from CASA’s continuing airworthiness section. I suspect I am not alone, and I think the reason most of us simply walk over the bridge and settle in our assigned seat is that we are confident the aeroplane, along with all the rest of the business of flying is, in a word, reliable. The kind reliability that gives us confidence in flying has been achieved only after a lot of work by a great many people committed to excellence in aircraft design, manufacture, operation and maintenance. Much of it has involved learning lessons from history in order to avoid repeating mistakes. “Lets make a rule so that doesn’t happen again”, has long been the credo of regulators and manufacturers alike. Because the results of these investigations have been ploughed back into design, manufacturing, operation and maintenance of aircraft whenever possible, we have largely been able to avoid suffering the same problems over again, and flying has become safer. Despite all that effort, many aircraft still fly with potential defects that are already known about in their type, like a lurking bacterial infection. Let’s make this a little more personal. In aircraft maintenance, without memory, knowledge and context we are doomed to seeing the same errors play out again and again, with predictable and often painful results.   As the Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana said: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ I always ask ‘What has this been done to prevent o of ten happening again? ’ All to g’.  the answer is ‘Nothin This brings us to what should be the top concern and activity of everyone involved in aviation – effective preventive action.   When scanning through defect reports, I am always looking first for a good description of the defect, because if this is sound, the corrective action, and then, most importantly, the preventive action, will usually be effective. I always ask ‘What has been done to prevent this happening again?’ All too often the answer is ‘Nothing’.  For example: what would you think if you saw a report of an undercarriage collapse on a light twin? That’s likely one new propeller and an engine overhaul at least. Then a little while later, on same aeroplane, the other main undercarriage collapses for the same reason the other main undercarriage collapsed. That’s another new propeller and another engine overhaul. Then, just to finish things off, the nose 37 AIRWORTHINESS Many causes of failures and errors that have, literally, caused grief have been discovered by diligent investigation, a science whose growth in sophistication and scope parallels that of aviation itself.   Pull-Out Section and appropriate action to fix it I could not get on board an aircraft that I suspected was going to behave unpredictably or dangerously as a result of a failure in the structure, propulsion or any other system.   gear on the very same aeroplane collapses a little while later, taking out both fairly new propellers and, of course both engines will likely need to be torn down again. Oh yes, did I mention that the nose gear collapsed for the same reason that both main gears collapsed? Pull-Out Section What would you do next if you operated a fleet of these aeroplanes? FSA MAY–JUN10 38 Formulating the preventive action most likely to prevent a recurrence can be very complex and costly and may be beyond the ability of the person who discovered the true cause. But that’s no excuse for not trying. A maintenance engineer who merely replaces components in the desperate hope of fixing the same re-occurring problem without at least pondering why the problem is happening is demonstrating a lack of professionalism comparable to that of a pilot who habitually pushes back the annoying circuit breaker which pops almost every flight. Remember that solutions evolve: The initial preventive action will be based on the evidence at the time and previous experience. If it appears to address the cause then well and good. But if the same or a similar defect reoccurs prompting further investigation, so might the preventive action evolve – sometimes into something quite different from the initial fix. If the preventive action evolves correctly it corrects the problem without causing another one. In some cases the causes of a problem have been identified long before and have been addressed in the maintenance manual, a service bulletin or, if it is an unsafe condition, an airworthiness directive. Unfortunately these sources of data are often ignored. The problem is we humans. Because we are only human, and may be uninformed, tired, distracted, bored and stressed, we make mistakes. Things still go wrong even with the increasing use of machines employed to minimise human error, called computers.  They can eliminate or magnify human error with exactly the same dispassion, as the flight crew in the 2009 Tullamarine tail-strike incident discovered. There is no escape. Every aircraft, no matter how brilliantly designed, carefully operated or maintained will develop defects.  How these defects are handled will largely determine the safety of the aircraft and those on board. But humans are also the answer. Until aircraft fix themselves, only human effort and intellect can prevent isolated mechanical problems from developing into the equivalent of an epidemic that grounds the aircraft fleet – or worse. If failure is a mechanical disease then aircraft engineers are in the business of immunisation. Another quote: ‘If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants,’ Sir Isaac Newton said. What he meant was that he had benefitted from the discoveries and insights of others. They had done the hard basic work so he didn’t have to. Newton was free to build on what his predecessors had discovered. When we pay careful attention to analysing a defect, using all the available information (such manuals, bulletins and airworthiness directives) we can be like Newton. He pushed science on by formulating the laws of mechanics; our challenge is to think carefully about what went wrong, to understand why it happened and to take a few, usually simple steps to make sure it doesn’t happen again. If failure is a mechanical disease then aircraft engineers are in the business of  immunisation. APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 18-31 December 2009 AD/GAF-N22/52 Amdt 1–Stub Wing Upper Front Spar Cap (MLG)–Modification / Replacement Part 39–Turbine Engines Part 39–Rotorcraft Agusta A109 Series Helicopters 2009-0274-E–Main Rotor–Fixing Bolts of the Scissor Fitting Assembly–Inspection/Replacement Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters 2009-0271–Equipment & Furnishings–Hydraulic Hoist Cable–Limitation / Modification 2009-0275-E–Fuselage–Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Fairing Gutter–Inspection/Replacement Part 39–Above 5700kg ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0242–Time Limits / Maintenance Checks – Certification Maintenance Requirements and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (Fuel Tank Safety) Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes CF-2009-45–Aileron Terminal Quadrant Support Bracket Cracking CF-2009-46–Landing Gear Alternate Extension Access Panel–Potential Failure to Open Rolls Royce Germany Turbine Engines– BR700 Series 2009-0273-E–Engine–High Pressure Compressor/Front Drum Assembly–Reduced Life Limit/Replacement Part 39–Equipment Fire Protection Equipment 2009-0278–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification/Replacement 1–14 January 2010 Part 39–Rotorcraft Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters AD/S-PUMA/60 Amdt 1–Fuselage Inclined Gearbox Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED AD/S-PUMA/81–Fuselage–Intermediate Gearbox Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED AD/S-PUMA/82 Amdt 1–Hydraulic Hoist Cable– CANCELLED Eurocopter AS 350 (Ecureuil) Series Helicopters 2010-0006–Tail Rotor Pitch-Change Links 2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers British Aerospace BAe 3100 (Jetstream) Series Aeroplanes 2009-0267–Flight Controls–Flap Selector Switch Wiring–Modification Dornier 328 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0266–Flight Controls–Aileron Trim and Rudder Spring Tab Fittings–Replacement Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes 2009-0268–Landing Gear–Main Landing Gear (MLG) Upper Side Brace Assembly–Modification / Replacement 2009-0269–Landing Gear–Main Landing Gear Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters 2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters AD/EC 225/9 Amdt 1–Fuselage–Intermediate Gearbox Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED Part 39–Below 5700kg Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series Aeroplanes AD/TBM 700/48 Amdt 1–Main Landing Gear Wheel Axle–CANCELLED 2010-0005–Main Landing Gear Wheel Axle Beechcraft 18 Series Aeroplanes AD/BEECH 18/17 Amdt 5–Aircraft Modification, Inspection and Retirement GAF N22 and N24 Series Aeroplanes Piper PA-46 (Malibu) Series Aeroplanes AD/PA-46/19 Amdt 1–Wing and Fuselage Structural Fatigue Limitations–CANCELLED Part 39–Above 5700kg Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/8 Amdt 2–Angle of Attack Sensors Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0237-E (Correction)–Oxygen–Oxygen Containers–Inspection ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes AD/ATR 42/19 Amdt 2–Fuel Tank Safety Fuel Airworthiness Limitations–CANCELLED 2009-0276–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Boeing 717 Series Aeroplanes AD/B717/15–Flight Management System– CANCELLED Boeing 727 Series Aeroplanes AD/B727/209–Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations–CANCELLED Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/329–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED AD/B737/331–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED 2010-01-08–Wing Centre Section Lower Stringers 2008-10-10R1–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems 2008-10-09R1–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems 2009-20-11 (Correction)–Fuel System Limitations– DTSD 2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter 2009-26-04–MLG Forward Trunnion Pins 2010-01-09–Fuselage Skin at Stringers S1 and S2 right, between STA 827 and STA 847 Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes 2008-10-06R1–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems 2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter AD/B747/51–Fuselage Frames–Aft Cargo Bay– CANCELLED Service Difficulty Reports TO REPORT URGENT DEFECTS CALL: 131 757 FAX: 02 6217 1920 or contact your local CASA Airworthiness Inspector [freepost] Service Difficulty Reports, Reply Paid 2005, CASA, Canberra, ACT 2601 Online: www. casa.gov.au/airworth/sdr 39 AIRWORTHINESS Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2009-47–Air Driven Generator Electrical Harness Assembly–Potential Failure Due to Corrosion CF-2009-48–Air Driven Generator–Non-Conforming Balance Washers Screws Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series Helicopters 2010-0006–Tail Rotor Pitch-Change Links 2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers Grob G115 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0279–Canopy Jettison Pull-Out Section Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters 2009-0275-E–Fuselage–Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Fairing Gutter–Inspection/Replacement CFM International Turbine Engines–CFM56 Series 2009-0270–Engine–LPT Rotor / Stator Assembly– Replacement APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ... CONT. AD/B747/52–Lower Fuselage Frames–CANCELLED AD/B747/155 Amdt 2–Thrust Reverser Pneumatic Drive AD/B747/157 Amdt 2–P&W JT9D Aft Engine Mount Tangential Link 1–14 January 2010 (Cont.) Part 39–Above 5700kg Pull-Out Section Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes 2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter AD/B767/242–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED FSA MAY–JUN10 40 Boeing 777 Series Aeroplanes 2009-24-08–Fuselage Scribe Line Damage 2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2009-50–Air-Driven Generator (ADG)–NonConforming Balance Washer Screws British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0001-E–Nose Landing Gear AD/BAe 146/137 Amdt 1–Nose Landing Gear– CANCELLED Cessna 560 (Citation V) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 560/9–Minimum Airspeed Placards– CANCELLED AD/CESSNA 560/11–Aileron Fairlead Interference Cessna 680 (Citation Sovereign) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 680/2–Honeywell Primus Epic System Cessna 750 (Citation X) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 750/4–Elevator Inboard–Hinge Brackets–Inspection AD/CESSNA 750/5–Reset Circuit Breakers– Replacement Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes 2009-0216R1–Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit Dog- Link Attachment SAAB SF340 Series Aeroplanes AD/SF340/54 Amdt 2–Ceiling and Lavatory Lights– CANCELLED AD/SF340/83–Replacement of Hydraulic Hoses– CANCELLED AD/SF340/109–Ceiling and Lavatory Fluorescent Lights AD/SF340/110–Passenger Compartment Fluorescent Lights Part 39–Piston Engines Lycoming Piston Engines AD/LYC/119–ECi Cylinder Assemblies–CANCELLED 2009-26-12–ECi Cylinder Assemblies Part 39–Turbine Engines AlliedSignal (Garrett/AiResearch) Turbine Engines–TFE731 Series AD/TFE 731/24 Amdt 1–First and Second Stage Low Pressure Turbine Discs AD/TFE 731/26 Amdt 1–Low Pressure Turbine First and Second Stage Disc Suspect Material Properties Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines– PW4000 Series AD/PW4000/6–Inspection of Critical Life-limited Rotating Engine Components – CANCELLED AD/PW4000/10–Engine Stability Improvements– CANCELLED Turbomeca Turbine Engines–Astazou Series 2010-0004–Engine Rotating Assembly–Third Stage Turbine Wheel–Inspection / Removal Propellers–Fixed Pitch AD/PFP/19–Blade Leading Edge Protection– CANCELLED 2006-0345R1–Propeller Blade Leading Edge Inspection Part 39–Below 5700kg Propellers–Variable Pitch–MT AD/PMTV/2–Blade Leading Edge Protection– CANCELLED 2006-0345R1–Propeller Blade Leading Edge Inspection Ayres Thrush (Snow) Commander Series Aeroplanes AD/AC-SNOW/24 Amdt 5–Wing Spar–CANCELLED 2009-26-11–Wing Spar 29 January 2010 – 11 February 2010 Part 39–Above 5700kg Part 39–Rotorcraft Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes 2010-02-04–Engine Fuel Shutoff Valves–Replacement Bell Helicopter Textron 205 Series Helicopters 2010-03-03–Main Rotor Blades Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes AD/B747/340–Fuselage Main Frame–CANCELLED AD/B747/378–Airworthiness Limitations and Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED 2010-01-01–Fuselage Main Frame 2010-01-10–Engine Nacelle Front Spar Chord Assembly Bell Helicopter Textron 212 Series Helicopters 2010-03-03–Main Rotor Blades 15–28 January 2010 British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes AD/BAe 146/139–Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards–CANCELLED 2009-0205R1–Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards Cessna 550 (Citation II) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 550/2–Landing Gear–Structural Life Limitation–CANCELLED Cessna 560 (Citation V) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 560/7 Amdt 1–Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Fire Bottle Wiring Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes AD/EMB-120/11 Amdt 2–AHRS Power Interruption Part 39–Turbine Engines AlliedSignal (Lycoming) Turbine Engines– ALF502 and LF507 Series AD/ALF/15–Fuel Manifold Inspections–CANCELLED 2009-26-06–Inspection of Fuel Manifold Assemblies for Cracks CFM International Turbine Engines–CFM56 Series 2010-01-05–Low Pressure Turbine Rear Frames General Electric Turbine Engines–CF34 Series AD/CF34/5 Amdt 3–Fan Disks–CANCELLED AD/CF34/13 Amdt 1–Uncontained Fan Disk Failure– CANCELLED 2009-26-09–Fan Disk Inspection for Electrical ArcOut Indications 2010-01-04–Inspections of Fan Blades and Actuator Head Hoses Rolls Royce Germany Turbine Engines– BR700 Series AD/BR700/8–High Pressure Compressor– CANCELLED Rolls Royce Turbine Engines–RB211 Series 2010-0008–Engine Intermediate Pressure Splines Inspection Part 39–Equipment Oxygen Systems 2009-21-10R1–AVOX Systems and B/E Aerospace Oxygen Cylinder Assemblies, as Installed on Various Transport Airplanes Parachute Equipment 2010-0009-E–Emergency Parachutes Thinback T104 and Slimpack T204 Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters AD/S-PUMA/53 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–CANCELLED 2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification Eurocopter AS 350 (Ecureuil) Series Helicopters AD/ECUREUIL/101 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–CANCELLED 2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement 2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series Helicopters AD/AS 355/78 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–CANCELLED 2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement 2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters 2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters AD/DAUPHIN/71 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–CANCELLED 2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification Sikorsky S-92 Series Helicopters 2009-23-51–MGB Mounting Foot Pads and Foot Ribs Part 39–Below 5700kg Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0012–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement Pacific Aerospace Corporation Cresco Series Aeroplanes AD/CRESCO/5 Amdt 1–Aileron Control Cables Part 39–Above 5700kg Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes AD/A330/106–Rudder Side Shell Skin–CANCELLED 2010-0016R1–Navigation–Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe–Inspection / Replacement APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ... CONT. 2010-0018–Fuel–Wing Tank Fuel Pressure Switch– Replacement 2010-0021–Rudder Side Shell Skin Propellers–Variable Pitch–Hartzell AD/PHZL/86 Amdt 1–Propeller Hub Cracks– CANCELLED 11 March 2010 ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0276R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement 12–25 February 2010 Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 206 and Agusta Bell 206 Series Helicopters CF-2010-07–Non-Conforming Tail Rotor Disc Assembly Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes AD/B747/332–Fuselage Stringers at Body Station 460, 480, and 500 Frame Locations–CANCELLED 2010-01-02–Fuselage Stringers at Body Station 460, 480 and 500 Frame Locations 2010-03-05–Upper Deck Floor Beam Upper Chords Part 39–Above 5700kg Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes AD/B767/78 Amdt 1–Midspar Fuse Pins– CANCELLED AD/B767/130–Nacelle Strut and Wing Structure– CANCELLED 2010-03-08–Midspar Fuse Pins Bombardier BD-700 Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-01–Ram Air Turbine (RAT)–Non-Conforming Balance Washer Screws Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-05–Angle of Attack Vane–Heating Element Ageing and Resolver Oil Contamination Embraer ERJ-170 Series Aeroplanes 2010-01-01–Automatic Activation of Engine Inlet Ice Protection System Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-01-02–Air Management System Controller Card Part 39–Piston Engines Thielert Piston Engines 2010-0020–Engine–Blow-by Oil Separator– Replacement Part 39–Turbine Engines Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters 2010-0026-E–Main Rotor Head–Rotor Hub Inspection Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters AD/DAUPHIN/93–Fuselage–Upper Fin/Fenestron Fittings–CANCELLED Part 39–Below 5700kg Part 39–Below 5700kg Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0238R1–Towing Bar Foam Pad Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0105R2–Flight Controls–Elevator Tip Assemblies–Inspection / Replacement Columbia (formerly Lancair) LC40, LC41 and LC42 Series Aeroplanes AD/LC40/3 Amdt 1–Rudder Hinges and Hinge Brackets Part 39–Above 5700kg Part 39–Above 5700kg Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/199 Amdt 1–State of Design Airworthiness Directives 2010-0027–Fuel–Fuel Tank Harness Ring Tags– Inspection Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes AD/A330/67 Amdt 1–Keel Beam Fastener Holes at Frame 40–Inspection–CANCELLED 2010-0024–Keel Beam Fastener Holes at Frame FR40 Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/250 Amdt 3–Forward Entry Door Forward and Aft Side Intercostals Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes AD/B767/255–Nacelle Strut and Wing Structure– RR Engines British Aerospace (Scottish Aviation) Twin Pioneer Series Aeroplanes AD/SA-TP/1–Wing Bracing Strut Internal V Brace in Outer Wing–CANCELLED AD/SA-TP/2–Hydraulic Valve–Strengthened Gland– CANCELLED AD/SA-TP/3–Lift Strut Incorporating Multi Bolt Attachment for Stabilising Strut–CANCELLED AD/SA-TP/4–Stabiliser Strut SA.B3.20.334– CANCELLED AD/SA-TP/5–Throttle and CSU Controls– CANCELLED AD/SA-TP/6–Lift Strut Steel Fittings–CANCELLED Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines–PW600 Series CF-2010-02–Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) Fuel Filter Bypass Valve Wear CF-2010-03–Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) Fuel Filter Bypass Valve Wear Cessna 750 (Citation X) Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 750/3 Amdt 1–Auxiliary Power Unit Fire Bottle Wiring AD/CESSNA 750/6–Roll Feel and Centering Bungee Assembly–Replacement Part 39–Equipment Propellers–Fixed Pitch AD/PFP/17 Amdt 4–Hub Cracking–CANCELLED Fire Protection Equipment 2009-0262R1–Fire Protection–Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers–Identification/Replacement Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters 2010-0030–Pilots and Co-Pilots Floor Attachment Screws Part 39–Equipment 26 February– Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0034 (Correction)–Landing Gear–Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Main Fitting and Sliding Tube–Inspection Airbus Industrie A380 Series Aeroplanes 2009-0113R1–Wings–Movable Flap Track Fairing Number 4 (MFTF#4)–Inspection / Replacement Beechcraft 300 Series Aeroplanes 2010-05-10–Pitot Heat Annunciation 41 Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes 2010-05-13–Fuselage Skin Scribe Lines Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes 2010-05-03–Structures–Wing side of body joint, Horizontal Stabiliser side of body joint, and Fuselage circumferential splice–Inspection 2010-05-11–Installation of Closeout Panel and Moisture Curtain AIRWORTHINESS Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes AD/CL-600/54 Amdt 1–Overwing Emergency Exit Placards–CANCELLED CF-2009-49R1–Wing Leading Edge Thermal Switches and Wing Anti-Ice Duct Piccolo Tubes– Airworthiness Limitation Tasks CF-2010-04–Angle of Attack (AoA) Transducer– Resolver Oil Contamination CF-2009-02R1–Overwing Emergency Exit Placards Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series Helicopters 2010-0023–Engine and Main Gearbox Cowling Pull-Out Section 29 January 2010– 11 February 2010 (Cont.) Part 39–Rotorcraft Part 39–Rotorcraft 90 associated manual of standards (MOS) instead of an ad hoc series of ADs will allow aircraft operators to identify and comply with requirements relevant to their operation. PART and the AD General series 42 Any competent engineer keeps a tidy workshop; FSA MAY–JUN10 the best also review their toolkits from time to time, checking they have the appropriate instruments for the job. This is essentially what CASA is doing with the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Part 90. From May 1 2010, the Part 90 regulations, which govern additional airworthiness requirements will replace a number of long-standing general airworthiness directives. Specifically, Part 90 will replace the current airworthiness directives (ADs) in the AD/GENERAL series that require the incorporation of retroactive airworthiness standards. It’s a change that will streamline airworthiness regulations and harmonise them with international standards. Specifically, retroactive airworthiness standards for air transport operations are being updated to align more closely with the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Parts 121/135 and European Joint Aviation Requirement (JAR) 26. The change shifts these aspects of airworthiness from the maintenance to the safety regulation sphere. This is significant because compliance in these areas will no longer require a sign-off from a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME). Requiring a LAME to sign off periodic maintenance on aspects of airworthiness that are not strictly maintenance related is an inefficient use of the LAME’s time and the aircraft operator’s money. These aspects will now be covered, just as stringently, but with less regulatory burden, under safety regulation. Having additional airworthiness requirements in Part 90 and its While Part 90 is applicable to all aircraft, (but not gliders and balloons), in practice the burden of compliance will be borne mostly by aeroplanes engaged in air transport operations. For most of these the change in regulatory burden will be light, because the introduction of Part 90 is a transplant of requirements from airworthiness directives, which means the majority of aircraft already comply fully with the Part 90 requirements. However, in consultation with industry, CASA has taken the opportunity to align some existing requirements with international standards. Operators of some older 20-30 seat aircraft used in air transport operations will face some additional retroactive airworthiness requirements concerning floor proximity escape path marking and toilet smoke detectors. However, this rule does not become effective until March 2012. Additionally, all aircraft above 5700kg will need to meet passenger seat flammability requirements, but again, there is time to plan compliance as this requirement doesn’t become effective until 2016. The airworthiness directives being replaced by Part 90 evolved to accommodate a range of exclusions. These were based on alternate means of compliance, which involved remedying the defect in question with an approved repair different from the one specified. All exclusions issued before the effective date of Part 90 will remain in force, providing the conditions of the exclusion continue to be met and provisions have been made for a similar exclusion mechanism under Part 90. The effect of part 90 will be to make a difficult, but important task, slightly easier. 43 ADVERTISING A brief shining moment Name withheld by request A flash of light was the mysterious precursor to a horrifyingly close encounter on an isolated runway. Late afternoon light floods across the GAFA, the great Australian emptiness. I am over the Nullarbor Plain, and have just intercepted the steel radial of the Trans Continental rail line leading me at last to my destination field. I watch to see if I can see anything departing off 09, but see nothing. Making a wide downwind for 09, I check the windsock and runways, and do pre-landing checks, setting the aircraft up for touchdown. After the turn to line up, I pull on full flap and say and do my final ritual check. ‘Rich, fine, green, down. Last chance’, touching the mixture and pitch levers, and making sure there are three green lights. No worries, conditions are good and I’ve done this a thousand times before. I plan to land on the keys so I can turn down 18 for the fuel bowser. Whether it was the subconscious memory of that light flash, or just pure luck and/or outrageous fortune, I have no idea. For some unknown reason, I had eased up in the seat and pushed the nose down a tad, a little to better see my touchdown target perhaps? Slightly high for the keys and 100 metres to go, … and about 50 metres beyond, to my absolute amazement, was a person walking away from the threshold down the centreline, pushing a paint machine! A poke of power, a swerve off the centre line, and he blurred as I passed, to make a rough touchdown, near the 18 intersection. As I taxied slowly down towards the bowser, it was difficult to compose myself, with a turmoil of thoughts. What if … I had chosen 18 and a slight cross wind, easier for the bowser? What if … I had decided to use 09, and some downwind to save some time? What if … I had not had that final peek? The end result doesn’t bear thinking about. There is no doubt in my mind, that it would have been a fatal accident, with all its terrible consequences. The guy that turned up at the bowser was much more shaken than I was; he would have been the victim. 45 How did the chain of circumstances come to this? I didn’t spot him on or near the threshold during my wide circuit. He had a hand-held radio in his pocket, but the battery had gone flat, so he hadn’t heard my radio calls. CLOSE CALLS Still in the descent and about 10 miles out, I see a flash of light–from an aircraft windscreen?–that appears to be about the western end of runway 27. I haven’t heard any radio calls from any other aircraft, so I check I am on the right CTAF frequency and repeat my inbound call. No reply. ‘What if …!’ He was walking away from the threshold, and looking down at his line marking, so he couldn’t have seen me anyway. And with the racket made by the line marker’s engine, he hadn’t heard the aircraft approach from behind either. All was well that ended well, but it was as close as either of us ever want to go. For both of us it was an extremely salutary lesson. No radio calls doesn’t mean there’s nobody out there. And the impression that it’s clear to land, doesn’t always mean that it is, as others have found to dreadful cost. As flying will continue to show: be prepared to expect the unexpected. Th turn e guy tha ed b t mo owse up at rw re s the he haken as mu wo c uld than h the have I was ; b vic tim een . It still makes Bruce Ainsworth cringe to think of how he allowed assumption to override checking the facts on the ground. FSA MAY–JUN10 46 In the 1970s I was employed to secure the observance of various industrial laws – those applying to outback cattle and sheep stations in the western third of Australia included. As I had a PPL, using a light aircraft was the obvious choice. On each journey I flew accompanied by a CPL holder who had extensive aviation experience in Australia and overseas, and a non-pilot colleague. Having the extra pilot enabled me not to overburden myself with work and flying. We split the flying, usually leg by leg. The trips were lengthy, up to 14 days with a weekend break along the track. They were also extensive – up to 6,000nm. Over a five and a half year period I visited some 200 stations using mainly Cessna 210s but also Cessna 182s, a Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) and a Mooney M20E. Naturally, using aircraft landing areas there were many challenges. Short strips; rough surfaces; hot weather operations; the risk of stock on the strip; the possibility of horses pulling broken fencing wire onto the strip; willywillies in the circuit area (and on the ground after landing). As a practice, I always phoned stations on the itinerary a week or so before setting out in order to explain the nature of our business and to get the OK to use their strip. I also took the opportunity to get an update on strip condition. If there was a pilot among the staff – and there were quite a few in those days doing mill runs and some stock spotting for the muster–the advice was pretty good. Local knowledge is so important when venturing into a new area. Advice, although well-meaning, from non-pilots on the staff was inclined to be over optimistic about strip condition and hazards. As well my usual practice was to talk to a Royal Flying Doctor Service pilot who had visited dozens of stations in the area as part of her work. Her advice was very useful particularly as to likely strip condition and approach hazards. The occasion about which I write arose in the Pilbara. I had not been able to raise anyone at the station concerned – not unusual given the difficulties of contacting people in the outback. I had written to the station manager and notified the date and time of our planned arrival, but had not received a reply. This was not unusual either as quite often a station staff member would be waiting at the strip at the appointed time even when there had been no acknowledgement of my letter. On lodging our flight plan at Port Hedland – we always flew full reporting by the way – the Flight Service Officer remarked: ‘there haven’t been many movements out of this first station over the last few years’. ‘It should be OK,’ I said, knowing that an elderly relative had recently completed a five-day tour through the area (including this station) in a Baron. If a Baron could get in and out our C210 should be OK. ‘Oh well,’ said the FSO ‘look for washaways across the strip, as there has been some heavy rain in that area lately’. We departed Port Hedland at 0900 local time with three stations on our itinerary, and aiming for an overnight in Carnarvon. Before 1000hrs we had the station homestead in sight – we always navigated to homesteads, not strips, for obvious reasons. We noticed that station staff members were mustering cattle between the homestead and where we expected the strip to be. Now for the strip. It should be three nautical miles to the southwest of the homestead. After a few minutes searching we saw the white corner markers. No windsock – not at all unusual on the strips we needed to visit. Which way is the dust from the mustering blowing? Is there any smoke? Are there any active windmills? How is the wind moving over the dam? Which way are the trees moving? Which way are the birds taking off? What are the forecast local area winds? Mmm… there is a definite southerly drift of about 10kts; we will land to the north. Let’s do a practice run first just to check the surface and the length and to see if any stock are around. Steady at 120kts to the right of the strip. ‘You check the number of seconds we take from end to end and I’ll concentrate on other features.’ Nineteen seconds at 120kts–that’s just over 3800 feet. For current temperature, wind and surface we will need less than 2500 feet and with a quarter less of the strip because of the washaway we have over 2800 feet. There is only low scrub at the southern end and small trees at the northern end. We’ll land to the north of the washaway. Round out, power off, touchdown – good grief! The spinifex is as high as the underside of the wings! It’s more open a bit to the right. Cancel search and rescue, shut down. Now what do we do? I attended to the business of the visit and the others inspected the rest of the strip. Some 100 metres up the strip, camouflaged by the spinifex, was a 20cm diameter log, obviously washed there by the heavy rains spoken of by the FSO. We were going to have to use the vehicle track on the strip for take-off. But we needed to clear some encroaching spinifex first and fill in the washaway so we had a safe length. A couple of star pickets helped us to do both. The ground was so hard we had to be satisfied with patching the washaway at three points – main wheels and nose wheel. Two hours later we pushed the Centurion almost to the southern end of the strip – with the tail just near the rear fence. Run up very carefully done, brakes off, careful to guide the wheels over the repairs, 40kts, 10 degrees of flap, lift off, climb out. An uneventful flight to Carnarvon followed where regrettably we had to cancel the other two planned visits. 47 On returning to Perth I spoke to the elderly relative who had been to that station in a Baron. ‘Oh no, we didn’t fly to that one; we went by bus from the town where we stayed overnight’. ‘Assume’ in Roget’s Thesaurus refers to ‘belief’, ‘faith’, ‘hope’. None of which are a substitute for careful checking. Even though this incident was more than 30 years ago I still reflect on it and wonder how I got myself into it when my planning was routinely very thorough. There were other situations over those years which were difficult, but all their variables had been covered off and so risk was minimised. It still embarrasses me to reflect on it. ‘Assume’ in Roget’s Thesaurus refers to ‘belief’, ‘faith’, ‘hope’. None of which are a substitute for careful checking. CLOSE CALL ‘There is a washaway right across the strip about a quarter of the way down. It’s worse on the eastern side where there is evidence of station vehicles using the full length of the strip rather than the track just outside the eastern boundary. The track has much more significant washaways through it (the reason for the strip being used) but only one washaway extends to the strip. There is also some spinifex regrowth – not unusual in this area and usually only about 10cm high and fairly sparse – a little bumpy, but quite safe. We climb to circuit height do the downwind checks, report: ‘circuit area will call on the ground.’ We arrive short final for a short-field landing as a precaution, keeping a watch for stock and the washaway. r o r r e o t n i d e k c o L Sometimes it’s important to listen to your doubts, even when there seem to be perfectly good explanations for something that just doesn’t feel right. Name withheld by request FSA MAY–JUN10 48 It was a special day. I had graduated with my private pilot’s licence two weeks earlier and today I was to set off from Moorabbin for a day trip to Phillip Island with my first passengers. They were my six-year-old son Joseph and a family friend called Beth. I was aware of the possibilities for carelessness when others (particularly loved ones) were present, so I had done slow, careful nav. preparation for the trip in a Cessna 172. I also got Beth to take Joseph away for a bit while I did the walk around. Everything seemed to be in order, so we took some photos to commemorate the occasion and prepared to depart. I had done the vast majority of my training on the Cessna 152 and seen the nasty side of it (stall characteristics). I guess you could say that I therefore felt relatively relaxed in the 172. As we taxied to the run-up area the steering felt a little stiff, but I made it around the corners fine (I had always found Cessnas hard to steer). I was also remembering my instructor telling me not to put undue pressure on the 172 rudder pedals on the ground as they (unlike the 152) were connected to the nose wheel. This he said put a lot of pressure on the steering linkages, particularly at low speed. With run-ups safely done, we headed to the 35L threshold. As we were taxiing, I tested the steering again and started to feel uncomfortable with the tightness. Due to my low hours on the 172, I had earlier assumed it had to do with the greater weight, the linkages described earlier, or that was just how a 172 felt ... I may have also ignored it due to not wanting to appear incompetent in front of Joseph and Beth! By the time we reached the threshold, I had to act. Mercifully, there was no-one behind me on the taxiway (if there had been, I may have given in to temptation to take off). I idled the engine, put the park brake on, and told my passengers: ‘hold on for a second, I just have to check something’. They say in the CRM stuff that having discovered one mistake, it’s important not to make another... On exiting the aircraft (which I now know not to do when the prop is spinning), I managed to knock the park brake off with my knee. Mercifully again, I noticed the plane moving fairly quickly, so I jumped back in and secured the brake again (still not switching off though). On exiting, I discovered the problem immediately. There was a rudder lock faithfully secured to the vertical stabiliser! In the wind provided by the prop, I unwound the wing nut and brought the lock back into the cabin. With this in mind, I put the stiffness in the steering to the back of my mind. ...I put the stiffness in the steering to the back of my mind. My heart was beating hard the whole way over to Phillip Island but thankfully it was an uneventful flight and I managed quite an acceptable approach and landing. Likewise the return. In the six months since, I have gone over the events of that day a thousand times. Apart from the obvious (my complete stupidity at missing the lock in the walk-around), I think that the Swiss cheese model did explain part of my error. I certainly now know that if I’m unsure about anything whatsoever, there’s no shame in pulling off a taxiway, shutting down and getting out for a (safe) closer look. On recollection, the thing that scares me most of all (apart from trying to land in a crosswind with negligible rudder authority) was the possibility of the plane running off on me while I was outside, with Beth and my precious son in the back. It doesn’t bear thinking about. I guess that’s another reason that they get you to check the idle speed during run-ups! They say in the CRM stuff that having discovered one mistake, it’s important not to make another... 49 CLOSE CALL s a cross-hire a w ft ra c ir a t a 1 Th r hool. I had neve from another sc ck prior to that lo r e d d ru a n e se our school’s day, as none of em. Cessnas had th hite, the same w s a w k c lo e h 2 T rtical stabiliser. colour as the ve e o red tape on th n s a w re e h T 3 have caught my t h ig m h ic h w k loc xcuse though). attention (no e first d at taking my 4 I was excite was obviously d n a rs e g n e s s pa to my walk not as attentive uld have been. o h s I s a d n u ro a alerted by the 5 I should have rudder pedals stiffness of the n-up, but the on taxi to the ru rds about not instructor’s wo at low speed in turning sharply t. d my judgemen the 172 cloude FSA MAY–JUN10 50 N a m e w it h h The pilot knew the wet conditions would require additional attention. But it was the one thing he didn’t check that could have killed him and his passengers. eek The­previous w had the region had erious some fairly s av y weather, with he s over rain and storm t wo days. eld by r eque s t Flying skydivers was my first real flying job. The responsibility of getting skydivers from point A to point B and then allowing them to fall to point C was something I really enjoyed– and the tedium of going up and down to 10,000ft was yet to set in. So as I was driving to the airstrip this day I was looking forward to the challenges ahead. The­ previous week the region had had some fairly serious weather, with heavy rain and storms over two days. Before I even got to the field I knew I would have to be extra vigilant with my pre-flight checks to ensure there was no damage from the previous day’s weather. I also knew to double-check there was no water in the fuel, look for any leaks in the cockpit and ensure the runway surface had not deteriorated. Having completed my preflight, everything was looking good. I drained a small amount of water from the fuel tanks, the fuel drums were nice and dry and the runway surface was intact with just a few lumps and bumps, nothing serious. All things were pointing to a nice day of flying with clear skies and calm winds–which was good as there were several ‘loads’ ready to be taken up. As I waited at the plane, the first load of four skydivers walked over. After the jumpers did their preparations and practice exits, I strapped on my chute and conducted the pre-start checklist. Everyone boarded and sat down. There was a five knot easterly blowing, so for this first load I was going to be taking off to the east. With only a few metres from the parking bay to the runway threshold the start up, taxi and run-up went quickly and smoothly. Now lined up on the runway I instructed the jumpers that take off was imminent and they took their positions. As the speed built, we were soon flying, but because I was still below normal rotate speed I pushed the nose down to give me some more speed and keep the plane in ground effect. With trees coming up quickly at the end of the runway and my airspeed having increased sufficiently, I started my climb-out although slightly slower than usual. I still had to apply slight forward pressure to keep the plane climbing at a low enough angle, but the problem was easing and at around 1000 ft the plane was back to normal. During the climb I started to think about what had caused the sharp upward pitch. Had the jumpers shifted their weight too far aft when I applied power and changed the aircraft’s centre of gravity, or was there an elevator control problem? Either way, the plane was now handling fine and I decided to continue the flight. With the recent rains, water had leaked into the aircraft’s tail. The drain on the underside had been blocked which gave the water nowhere to go. When I applied power on take off, the water rushed back and drastically changed the aircraft’s centre of gravity, tipping it into a nose-high attitude. It’s hard to estimate exactly how much water was in the tail, but from the climb profile I know it had to be a lot, as I was having to keep constant forward control pressure to keep the nose from rising. It was a sobering lesson to remember to check the plane’s tail and the drain after any rain: something which never had occurred to me on that day. I learnt a lot from this flight. First; I should have rejected the take off as soon as the nose pitched up, as I knew there had to be something wrong for it to have done that. It was all well and good to control the plane and successfully complete the flight, but if there is a problem so early in the take-off roll, stop the plane and get it checked while still on the ground. And secondly; after any heavy rain make sure you check absolutely everything. With a lot of ageing aircraft around, water is bound to leak in somewhere. Best find it while safely on the ground and rather than worry about it when in the air. 51 CLOSE CALLS As I applied power smoothly, I was careful to watch the engine temps and pressures. I was aware that if anything was amiss it would most likely show itself on the first flight of the day, but the engine sounded perfect, as the gauges confirmed. But after just five to 10 metres of take-off roll the nose suddenly started to pitch upward; this caught me slightly off guard, as I was not near rotate speed and the wind was calm. I immediately applied forward pressure to the yoke and wound on forward trim. It eased the pitch-up but the nose wheel was still off the ground. A few minutes later, I received a radio call from the other pilot who was on the ground at the drop zone, letting me know that on take off there had been a large amount of liquid pouring out of the tail of the plane. This had only stopped when I had turned downwind at around 1000 ft. It was like a light bulb switching on–straight away I was able to piece it all together. ... on take off there had been a lar ge amount of liquid pouring ou of the tail t of the plane. The Australian Chief Commissioner’s message Over the last few issues, I have described the various elements that go to make up the independent ATSB. I am pleased to announce that we now have our full complement of commissioners, following the appointment of Carolyn Walsh as the Bureau’s second part-time Commissioner. Ms Walsh commenced her three-year term on 8 March, joining Commissioner Noel Hart and myself. Commissioner Walsh brings a wealth of experience in transport safety. Most recently she was the CEO of the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator in New South Wales. As we have reviewed the work of the ATSB, it has become clear that we need to balance two things in our investigations: ensuring we focus on what is most likely to improve safety, while covering as many occurrences as possible. In aviation, we receive about 15,000 notifications each year, of which we classify about 8,000 as safety occurrences. In recent times, we have investigated about 80 of those each year. To get as wide a coverage as possible, we have created a new investigation team to focus on what may have been previously unexamined flight safety occurrences. This team looks at less-prioritised incidents and produces short summary reports. These reports compile information on the circumstances surrounding an occurrence and what safety action may have been taken or identified as a result of it. I take great pleasure in announcing the release of the first of these investigation reports, compiled in the publication Level 5 Factual Investigations: 1 December 2009 to 30 March 2010. You can find the new publication on the ATSB website . Finally, I draw your attention to the report in this issue on a go-around occurrence AO-2007-044. This report shows that key safety issues can be identified and resolved through investigation of occurrences where there has been no accident. For this to work as it should, the ATSB needs to receive as much information as possible on safety occurrences. We would remind you all to remain alert to your reporting responsibilities so that we can all work together to improve safety. Martin Dolan Chief Commissioner Dangers of inclement weather O n 24 February 2009, at 1417 Eastern Standard Time, a Piper Aircraft PA28-180 Cherokee, registered VH-DAC, departed Normanton Airport, Queensland on a visual flight rules private flight to Mount Isa with the pilot as the sole occupant. Before departing Normanton, the pilot informed his partner by telephone of his planned arrival time for Mount Isa. When the aircraft did not arrive as advised, it was reported missing by the partner. The next evening, a search and rescue helicopter located the wreckage of the aircraft 2.5 km east of the direct track from Normanton to Mount Isa, in a Designated Remote Area. The crew of the helicopter confirmed that the pilot had received fatal injuries from the accident. The wreckage trail extended about 109 m from the aircraft’s initial impact with a tree to the main wreckage. Examination of the wreckage indicated a high-speed, approximately 20 º nose-down, right-bank collision with terrain, implying that the aircraft was not in a state of controlled flight at that time. The examination did not reveal any preexisting technical fault that may have contributed to the accident. Satellite images recorded at 1430 on 24 February 2009, indicated that showers and thunderstorms were present in the general area of the accident site. The pilot was not qualified for instrument flight, and was relatively inexperienced at flying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). That represented a number of the risk factors in the development of spatial disorientation. If the pilot inadvertently entered IMC while attempting to avoid the weather in the area, and manoeuvred at low level in those conditions in an effort to regain visual meteorological conditions, he may have either experienced spatial disorientation and then lost control of the aircraft, or inadvertently descended into terrain. A review of Airservices Australia recorded air traffic services automatic voice recording data found no record of any radio transmissions by the pilot during the flight. According to witnesses, the pilot appeared wellrested the night before the flight, and had eaten lunch while conducting business in Normanton. The investigation could not conclusively determine the reason for the collision with terrain. The aircraft wreckage trail indicated a heading away from Mount Isa, the reverse of the planned track. The lack of any apparent technical problems supported the conclusion that the pilot most likely manoeuvred the aircraft for operational reasons, such as in the case of inclement weather. Although carrying a portable 406 MHz frequency emergency locator transmitter (ELT) satisfied the regulatory requirements, the unit was not utilised as the pilot did not survive the impact. The carriage of a portable ELT may also have limitations in the event of a survivable but disabling impact. ■ ATSB investigation report AO-2009-009 released on 1 March 2010, avaliable on the website. Aviation Safety Investigator Altered procedures complicate go-around event O n 21 July 2007, an Airbus Industrie A320-232 aircraft, registered VH-VQT, was being operated by Jetstar on a scheduled international passenger service between Christchurch, New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia. Prior to their departure, the crew had been informed that weather conditions at Melbourne Airport meant that an instrument approach to the decision height for the approach was likely. The crew had planned accordingly, and were prepared to conduct a missed approach, since a number of aircraft had already done so because of the low visibility due to fog. The aircraft operator, however, had changed the go-around procedure and moved the positive confirmation of flight mode to a much later position in the procedure. The changed procedure required that a call be made after a positive rate of climb was obtained. In this instance, due to the aircraft continuing to descend, with the crew distracted by unexpected warnings and a subsequent increased workload, this call could not be made by the flight crew, and so the standard operating procedure in support of the go-around effectively paused at that point. As a result, the crew never obtained positive confirmation of the aircraft’s flight mode. The operator had not conducted a risk analysis of the change to the procedure. Nor did it comply with the incident reporting requirements of its safety management system (SMS), which was part of its operations manual, or with the reporting requirements of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. This incident highlighted the potential for unintended consequences when changes to standard operating procedures are introduced without first conducting an appropriate risk analysis. The ATSB considered this issue serious enough to issue a Safety Advisory Notice (AO-2007-044-SAN109), advising all aircraft operators to consider the safety implications of this safety issue and to take action where considered appropriate. As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator changed its go-around procedure to reflect that of the aircraft manufacturer. It also changed its SMS to require a formal risk management process in support of any proposal to change an aircraft operating procedure. The operator is in the process of reviewing its flight training requirements, has invoked a number of changes to its document control procedures, and has revised the incident reporting requirements of its SMS. In addition, the aircraft manufacturer has enhanced its published go-around procedures to emphasise the critical nature of the flight crew actions during a go-around. ■ ATSB investigation report AO-2007-044 released on 1 March 2010, avaliable on the website. 53 ATSB Upon reaching the decision height on the instrument approach into Melbourne, the crew did not have the prescribed visual reference to continue the approach to land and commenced a missed approach. During the initial part of the approach, the pilot in command had not correctly moved the thrust levers to the ‘take-off/go-around’ position and so the aircraft’s automated flight mode did not transition correctly to the go-around phase. The crew, however, were unaware that the aircraft had not transitioned to the expected flight modes. The aircraft continued to descend towards the runway, reaching a minimum recorded height of 38 ft above the runway before it responded to manual flight crew inputs and began to climb away. After a second missed approach, which was completed within expected parameters, the aircraft was diverted to Avalon Airport, where it landed uneventfully. The aircraft manufacturer had published its go-around procedure with the requirement to check and announce the aircraft’s flight mode as part of the initial actions of the go-around. That requirement was included to ensure that the crew could confirm the necessary changes to the aircraft’s flight mode. Investigation briefs FSA MAY–JUN10 54 Preliminary report on firebombing collision Main landing gear wheel failure White out conditions ATSB Investigation AO-2009-006 ATSB Investigation AO-2009-077 ATSB Investigation AO-2009-075 On 6 February 2009 at approximately 1435 Australian Eastern Daylight-saving Time, a Saab 340B aircraft, registered VH-KDQ, landed at Sydney Airport following a scheduled passenger service from Orange, NSW. On 9 December 2009, the pilot of a Bell Helicopter Co. 206L-1 Longranger, registered VH-MJO, was conducting a visual flight rules flight at Dorrigo NSW, the second such flight that day, with one passenger on board. On 8 December 2009 at about 1840 EDST, an Aerospatiale AS350-B2 helicopter, registered VH-NFO (NFO), and a Kawasaki BK117 helicopter, registered VH-LXC (LXC), were engaged in aerial firebombing operations about 20 km south-east of Orange Airport, NSW. The pilots were the only occupants of their helicopters. After the pilot of NFO landed to refuel, he noticed damage to the trailing edge of the helicopter’s vertical fin. In addition, the plastic navigation light cover on top of the vertical fin was broken. The pilot reported the damage to the pilot of LXC. Examination of LXC did not reveal any apparent damage. There were no injuries. The pilots had been flying circuits to and from two small dams, refilling at different dams. The pilot of NFO completed his refill first and informed the pilot of LXC that he was departing. The pilot of LXC subsequently reported that he was also departing. The pilot of NFO recalled that he thought LXC was at least ‘a couple of hundred metres’ behind him as he conducted his run and did not see LXC at any time. As he initiated a water drop from an altitude of about 100 ft, he felt ‘a slight jolt’ through the helicopter and immediately rolled right. In his peripheral vision, he saw a yellow object flash past the left door and initially thought it was a water bombing aeroplane that had not reported its bombing run. He believed that LXC had caught up during the run, resulting in the collision. The pilot of LXC recalled that when he departed the dam, he turned towards the fire. He did not see NFO but thought that his turn placed him ahead of NFO by about 300 m. He believed that NFO had overtaken LXC close on the right side, and that the collision occurred as NFO turned sharply away from LXC. The investigation is continuing. The flight crew reported that during the post-flight inspection, the aircraft’s left outboard main landing gear tyre was found to have deflated and the wheel assembly had sustained noticeable damage. Failure to the rim had resulted in deflation of the tyre. Further examination by the operator’s maintenance staff found that a section of the bead seat had fractured. Both the brake assembly and the wheel axle had also been damaged as a result of the failure. No other damage was sustained by the aircraft. The flight crew reported that there was no prior indication of the failure, as the aircraft had handled normally during the landing and taxiing phase of the flight. During the investigation, it was found that the particular wheel design was being phased out due to recognised fatigue problems identified at the bead seat area. Both the manufacturer and the operator were aware of the increased fatigue susceptibility of the earlier wheel design, and had established increased inspection regimes for those wheels remaining in service. In response to the occurrence, the operator advised that to enable the aircraft to be returned to service, the entire main landing gear assembly was replaced. The operator conducted a review of its current wheel inspection practices and schedules. The operator indicated that all procedures used were found satisfactory and compliant with the wheel manufacturer’s guidelines. The pilot later stated that, shortly after takeoff, at approximately 1120 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, while the helicopter was in a high hover, he looked inside the cockpit at his instruments for a few seconds. When the pilot looked outside again, the helicopter was in what he described as ‘white out conditions’. The pilot experienced a complete loss of visual orientation with the surroundings due to the helicopter being enveloped by cloud. The pilot attempted to maintain a neutral hover in the expectation of regaining adequate visibility to land, however, the helicopter was inadvertently moving to the north at a slow speed. The pilot stated that he then saw trees and a spur line through the cloud and that the helicopter appeared to be in a sideways crab motion to the left. With limited visual reference, the pilot attempted to land, however, the helicopter impacted the ground with significant vertical force and came to rest on its right side As a result, the pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was fatally injured. The helicopter was seriously damaged. The duration of the flight, not including start up and static hover, was approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds. During that time, the helicopter travelled a distance of approximately 550 m. The investigation is continuing. Dark night flight ATSB Investigation AO-2008-076 On 7 November 2008, a Piper Chieftain, registered VH-OPC, was being operated on a private flight under the instrument flight rules from Moorabbin Airport, Vic. to Port Macquarie via Bathurst, NSW. On board the aircraft were the owner-pilot and three passengers. The aircraft departed Moorabbin Airport at 1725 Eastern Daylight-saving Time and arrived at Bathurst Airport at 1930. The flight from Moorabbin to Bathurst was conducted in accordance with the pilot’s flight plan, and a review of recorded air traffic control data and communications did not reveal any problems during that flight. The aircraft descended at a steep angle before impacting the ground at high speed, consistent with uncontrolled flight into terrain. Due to fire and impact damage, and limited information about the sequence of events after take-off, the evidence available to the investigation was limited. Based on analysis of the available information, an airworthiness issue was considered unlikely to be a contributing factor to this accident. The investigation was unable to establish why the aircraft collided with terrain; however, pilot spatial disorientation or pilot incapacitation could not be discounted. Mustering helicopters collide ATSB Investigation AO-2007-070 On 5 May 2009, two Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta II helicopters, registered VH-PHT and VH-HCB collided midair about 15 km south-east of Springvale Station, WA. Both helicopters had departed the station just prior to sunrise to conduct mustering operations. On 29 December 2007, a Boeing Company 737-229 aircraft, registered VH-OBN, was being operated on a scheduled passenger service from Brisbane, Qld to Norfolk Island. At 0352 Coordinated Universal Time, due to poor weather, the flight crew conducted a missed approach. During the flap retraction, the flight crew felt a high frequency vibration through the airframe, while observing control yoke deflection to the left. Due to the vibration, the aircraft’s autopilot system could not be engaged and controlled flight was manually maintained with difficulty. The flight crew elected to continue to the designated alternate airport at Nouméa, New Caledonia. Due to reserve fuel concerns, the cabin crew prepared the passengers for a possible ditching. A post-flight engineering inspection determined that the number-4 leading edge slat, inboard main track had failed. An examination identified fatigue cracking that originated at the intersection of diverging machining marks at the fracture site. Further inspection of the number-4 slat found corrosion damage on the outboard auxiliary track, with the inboard auxiliary track adjacent to the failed main track having failed in overload at the slat attachment. The investigation also identified a number of cabin safety issues during the diversion flight, and poor passenger handling after the subsequent landing at Nouméa. As a result of this investigation, the aircraft operator advised the ATSB of the implementation of a number of safety actions, including, the revision of flight crew flight planning — alternate fuel load provisions, the revision of cabin crew equipment and procedures, a review of company emergency response procedures. Subsequent to this event, the original operator’s air operator’s certificate had been taken over by a different organisation. The new organisation does not use the aircraft type involved in this occurrence. It has, however, reviewed its operations to ensure that hazards identified in this investigation are mitigated appropriately. ATSB Investigation AO-2009-018 The first helicopter departed to the east in order to make radio contact with an adjoining station prior to heading for the mustering area. The other helicopter departed about 10 minutes later and was observed heading to the south-east, the general direction of the muster. The helicopters were due to refuel at about 0830 at a place to be arranged, depending on the progress of the mustering operation. When the pilots failed to respond to radio calls from ground personnel, a search helicopter departed a nearby station and noticed a fire while en route to Springvale Station. On arrival overhead the fire, the pilot was able to identify the remains of the two helicopters and observed that the respective pilots appeared to have sustained fatal injuries. Both helicopters were seriously damaged as a result of impact forces associated with the midair collision, the impact with terrain and post-impact fires. The wreckage was scattered over an area of about 260 m by 100 m. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with a midair collision while the pilots were positioning to commence the muster. The converging flight paths of the helicopters, pilot fatigue and sun glare from the rising sun are identified as contributing safety factors. 55 ATSB After refuelling at Bathurst Airport, the pilot departed for Port Macquarie in dark-night conditions with light rain in the area. About 2 minutes and 30 seconds after the pilot reported he was airborne, residents of Forest Grove to the north of Bathurst Airport heard a sudden loud noise from an aircraft at low altitude. Shortly after, there was the sound of an explosion and the glow of fire. The aircraft was found to have impacted terrain, resulting in serious damage to the aircraft. The four occupants were fatally injured. Leading edge device failure and cabin safety issues REPCON briefs Australia’s voluntary confidential aviation reporting scheme REPCON allows any person who has an aviation safety concern to report it to the ATSB confidentially. Unless permission is provided by the person that personal information is about (either the reporter or any person referred to in the report) that information will remain confidential. The desired outcomes of the scheme are to increase awareness of safety issues and to encourage safety action by those who are best placed to respond to safety concerns. FSA MAY–JUN10 56 Before submitting a REPCON report, take a little time to consider whether you have other available and potentially suitable options to report your safety concern. In some cases, your own organisation may have a confidential reporting system that can assist you with assessing your safety concern and taking relevant timely safety action. You may also wish to consider reporting directly to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) if you are concerned about deliberate breaches of the safety regulations, particularly those that have the potential to pose a serious and imminent risk to life or health. REPCON staff may be able to assist you in making these decisions, so please don’t hesitate to contact our staff to discuss your options. REPCON would like to hear from you if you have experienced a ‘close call’ and think others may benefit from the lessons you have learnt. These reports can serve as a powerful reminder that, despite the best of intentions, well-trained and well-meaning people are still capable of making mistakes. The stories arising from these reports may serve to reinforce the message that we must remain vigilant to ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and others. REPCON has recently received several concerns about transport security matters. These reports are best sent direct to the Office of Transport Security (OTS) who have a 24 hour, seven day a week point of contact and can respond quickly to any transport security concerns that are of a serious nature. Contact details for the OTS 1300 307 288 or www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/ security/index.aspx. If you wish to obtain advice or further information, please contact REPCON on 1800 020 505. Cabin crew duty times R200900037 Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns about the operator’s cabin crew working excessive duty times on long haul flight operations. Cabin crew are in fear of the consequences (i.e. losing their job) if they speak up and remove themselves from duty if they are fatigued. Even after exceeding 20 hours duty time, the majority of cabin crew are hopeful that adrenalin would kick in if an emergency occurred after an extreme tour of duty. Cabin crew have been observed sleeping in their seats while waiting for the aircraft to be given a taxi clearance. In some circumstances, duty times have been up to 29 hours. The reporter expressed concerns that cabin crew, by their nature, are service orientated and therefore put the passenger before their own wellbeing. Reporter comment: As the operator is not mature enough to cancel flights so that cabin crew can operate with safe duty times, there needs to be CASA regulations to remove the decision from operators and exhausted cabin crew. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report. CASA provided the following response: CASA monitors the safety implications of duty periods and does follow-up on specific events that are reported. The operator has voluntarily specified cabin crew duty times in relevant procedures. Adherence to such procedures is subject to CASA audit and surveillance activity. CASA is considering regulations for cabin crew fatigue risk management systems which will follow the introduction of fatigue risk management system regulations for flight crew. The flight crew regulations are awaiting directions from the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] group which will report in 2010. Maintenance certification R200900051 Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns about the certification of some maintenance conducted on company aircraft. The reporter believes that maintenance was certified under the direction of the maintenance contractor, when a maintenance person was not an authorised person to conduct such maintenance for the maintenance contractor. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report and CASA provided the following response: CASA has reviewed the report and contacted the operator concerned who has investigated the matter and is unable to identify any known maintenance carried out by company or contractor staff who are not authorised. Without more specific information such as a date and aircraft registration the operator and CASA is unable to investigate the matter further. Noise level within the aircraft cabin R200900065 Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns about the noise level in a certain aircraft type during takeoff and the inability to clearly hear instructions in the cabin over the intercom. On two separate flights, the reporter was seated at the rear of the aircraft and indicated that once the engines were operating only about 10 per cent of the pre-takeoff safety brief given by the flight attendant could be heard, although on both flights when the Othersb 25% (94) flight crew addressed the cabin the words were very clear and easy to understand. The reporter believed that the difference between the audibility of the flight attendant as opposed to that of the flight crew may possibly be the result of the nature of the voice pick-up systems in the two locations. Reporter comment: In an emergency situation it would almost be impossible to hear the instructions issued by the flight attendants. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied the operator with the de-identified report and the operator advised that it was not able to comment on the specific instance, but there are certain actions taken in relation to the PA (Public Address) system. These include specific maintenance tasks carried out at certain checks. The PA is checked every day, as a first flight of the day item. The operator also has not identified any PA issues during their cabin audits. REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report and a version of the operator’s response. CASA provided the following response: Charter 9% (2) All 14% (3) High capacity air transport 27% (6) Flight training 14% (3) Sports aviation 18% (4) General aviation 18% (4) Reported issues Jan/Feb 2009 Runway incursion 5% (1) Runway incursion 5% (1) Collision avoidance 5% (1) Incursion controlled airspace 5% (1) Incursion controlled airspace 5% (1) 5% (1) Procedure inaccuracies Collision avoidance 5% (1) Organisational safety culture 5% (1) Organisational safety culture 5% (1) Incorrect frequency 5% (1) Procedure inaccuracies 5% (1) Maintenance-defect rectifications and Maintenance-defect qualifications 22% (5) rectifications and qualifications 22% (5) VFR in IMC 17% (4) Incorrect frequency 5% (1) Cabin crew fatigue 9% (2) VFR in IMC 17% (4) Regulations 13% (3) Cabin crew fatigue 9% (2) Radio communicationschatter 9% (2) Radio communicationschatter 9% (2) Who is reporting to REPCON? Regulations 13% (3) a Cabin crew 3% (12) Cabin crew 3% (12) Air Traffic controller 3% (12) Air Traffic controller 3% (12) Passengers 8% (29) Passengers 8% (29) Aircraft maintenance personnel 23% (88) Aircraft maintenance personnel 23% (88) 117 Total 2008 121 Total 2009 118 Total 2010 a 38 Facilities maintenance personnel/ground crew 1% (4) Facilities maintenance personnel/ground crew 1% (4) Flight crew 37% (139) Flight crew 37% (139) Othersb 25% (94) REPCON reports received Total 2007 57 Othersb 25% (94) a. 29 January 2007 to 28 February 2010 b. examples include residents, property owners, general public. a. as of 18 March 2010 What is not a reportable safety concern? Charter 9% (2) How can I report to REPCON? Charter 9% (2) All 14% (3) High capacity air To avoid doubt, the following matters are not reportable safety concerns and Reporters can submit a REPCON report onlinetransport via the27% ATSB website. (6) All 14% (3) Reporters can also submit via a dedicated High capacitytelephone air are not guaranteed confidentiality: REPCON transport 27% (6) training 14% (3) number: 1800 020 505 (a) matters showing a serious and imminent threat to a person’sFlight health or life; by email: [email protected] Sports aviation 18% (4) (b) acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft; Flight training 14% (3) (c) industrial relations matters; General aviation 18% (4) by facsimile: 02 6274 6461 Sports aviation 18% (4) or by mail: Freepost 600, PO Box 600, Civic Square ACT 2608 (d) conduct that may constitute a serious crime. General aviation 18% (4) Note 1: REPCON is not an alternative to complying with reporting obligations under the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (see ). Note 2: Submission of a report known by the reporter to be false or misleading is an offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code. How do I get further information on REPCON? If you wish to obtain advice or further information on REPCON, please visit the ATSB website at or call REPCON on 1800 020 505. ATSB The functionality of the Public Address (PA) system forms part of the daily maintenance check. However, the maintenance check does not assess the audibility of the PA system during aircraft operations. CASA has liaised with the operator regarding the cabin crew monitoring audibility during aircraft operations in order to improve the clarity of cabin public address announcements. REPCON Operation types Jan/Feb 2009 FSA MAY–JUN10 58 Don’t sweat and forget. What you drink strongly affects how you fly, doctor and pilot, Ken Wishaw writes For the majority of Australian pilots, be they commercial or recreational, a lot of time is spent in hot conditions. Dehydration is an often forgotten factor in flight safety and performance. As a medical specialist, fluid physiology and management is a central part of my practice every day, and as a flying instructor I meet a lot of pilots who simply do not appreciate the hazards of dehydration, or how to assess and manage their fluids. Those I have taught about this matter say their performance is much better and their flying much more enjoyable. In temperate conditions a person normally loses about 500 ml to one litre of fluid per day through sweating. In hot conditions, this can rise to as much as eight litres per day. Additionally we lose water at high altitude from breathing air with a low water content. Add to this the concentration required to fly aircraft and meet schedules, diverting our attention from thinking about thirst and hydration, and the scene is set for trouble. A deficit of over one litre (or two per cent) due to failure to replace sweat losses can result in headaches, muscle cramps, dizziness and visual disturbances. But hydration is more than just taking enough water. In fact just taking water may actually be harmful. A few facts need to be understood as to why this is so. Our blood and body fluids normally contain 135-150 millimoles (mmol) of sodium and 100 mmol of chloride per litre. What we lose in sweat depends partly on our genetic makeup, but more importantly on whether we are acclimatised. The more acclimatised we are the less sodium and the more potassium we lose in our sweat. Sodium losses for a person who is well acclimatised are of the order of 5–30 mmol per litre. For someone who is not acclimatised (say an office worker who flies one or two days a week) sodium losses in sweat may be 40–100 mmol/litre. Our bodies possess a very sophisticated sodium control system. But it only works well if we are sufficiently hydrated to produce reasonable amounts of urine, and ingesting enough sodium and potassium which the kidneys can chose to retain or discard. Most of us readily excrete excess sodium and potassium in our urine. Conversely we also have a specific salt appetite. Pilots with low sodium levels often love salty foods at the end of the day! Ingestion of water to replace sweat losses will decrease the sodium concentration in our blood, as we are not replacing the sodium that we are losing. Severe acute decreases in blood sodium (say 10 per cent) may cause headaches, lethargy, apathy and confusion. Severe acute decreases (over 15 per cent) may cause convulsions. While this is extremely unlikely to occur in our situation, cases of convulsions have been documented in top athletes who only use water replacement. Suffice to say even the mild symptoms are highly undesirable for a pilot! Potassium losses may cause low blood pressure and weakness. Small amounts of sodium and potassium in rehydration fluids increase the rate at which the gut can absorb the fluid. Drinking only water, apart from leaving you still dehydrated (because you haven’t absorbed the fluid) can make you feel bloated and nauseous. Pure water ingestion tends to shut off the thirst reflex, even when we are dehydrated. 59 DON’T SWEAT & FORGET (As a crude way of appreciating of these figures, try tasting the following solution; one level teaspoon of table salt, which is sodium chloride, dissolved in a litre of water equals approximately100 mmol/litre). Drinking only water, apart from leaving you still dehydrated (because you haven’t absorbed the fluid) can make you feel bloated and nauseous. Taste is a critical factor in whether athletes drink adequately during exercise. Some people love pure water, others loathe it. High carbohydrate drinks such as energy drinks, fizzy drinks and fruit juice contain 10–30 per cent carbohydrate. Levels of carbohydrate over eight per cent inhibit intestinal absorption of the fluid. None of these are appropriate for rehydration during flight. Athletic performance is severely degraded by dehydration, and a lot of research has been done into dehydration management. From this the sports drinks have evolved. They are not just commercial fads, but scientifically validated drinks that will optimise rehydration, and minimise electrolyte disturbance. 60 ... They are not just commercial fads, but scientifically validated drinks that will optimise rehydration, and minimise electrolyte disturbance. Sports drinks are not excessively high in sodium. At recommended strengths they contain 10–25 mmol/ litre. They are also designed to replace potassium losses. They do contain carbohydrate, but this is of the order of six per cent which will not impede absorption or cause large fluctuations in blood sugar levels. FSA MAY–JUN10 Recommendations Guiding principles (on the basis that you are essentially fit and healthy) should therefore be Do not take off already dehydrated. Remember ground preparation is sweaty stuff. On short flights in temperate conditions whether we drink water or an electrolyte replacement is not critical. On longer flights (say over two hours) we should be aiming to replace what we are losing. Sports drinks are appropriate for this. The subtle differences between the brands and flavours are not as critical as what tastes good to you. The carbohydrate (sugar) content is not harmful. Carbohydrate ingestion could only lead to a problem if a large carbohydrate load is taken at widely separated intervals, with the risk of insulin over-secretion and low sugar levels occurring some hours later. Daily continuous sipping of sports drinks may theoretically lead to damage of tooth enamel. If you don’t want so much glucose, then first mix the sports drink powder in a glass, then decant into your drink container. As electrolytes dissolve faster than sugar, this technique can leave most of the sugar behind. Do not dilute the sports drink from the recommended formula. Never take salt tablets, but if you have a desire for something salty, your body is telling you something and salty food may be just what you need. Food will help contribute to electrolyte intake. If you are on medication for high blood pressure you should discuss this with your doctor; however, you are unlikely to have problems provided that your electrolyte intake is not excessive. Sports drink containers should be thoroughly cleaned every day. Heavy coffee and tea drinkers are prone to severe headaches on acute withdrawal. Recent studies have shown that caffeine is not deleterious to sport performance and a small amount on the long flying day before or after the flight is OK. For the technically minded, or if you are undertaking long flying you should meet these three criteria at the end of the flight. 1. Body weight loss should be less than two per cent. 2. Urine colour should be pale (drugs and B vitamins can alter this) 3. Urine volume should have exceeded 0.5 (ideally 1.0) ml per kilo per hour. If you fly a small aircraft, you must have a plan to handle the increased urine output. Deferring rehydration till after the flight is not an option! By way of personal research I undertook two flights on successive days in a Super Dimona motor glider. Both days were very hot and dry, and the seven hour tasks were identical. On the first day I stuck to a water regime. By the end of the day I was nauseous, bloated, had a severe headache and mild dizziness. I was so impaired that I opted to let the other pilot (and aircraft owner!) do the landing. My urine output was very poor, but I had gained weight during the flight, meaning a lot of water was just sitting in my gut. Rehydration with the correct fluids will improve your flying performance, add to your enjoyment and make you a safer pilot. For further reading on this subject there are excellent fact sheets at www.sportsdietitians.com.au About the author Ken Wishaw is an anaesthetist on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland. He was Australia’s first full-time rescue helicopter doctor, and co-founder of the CareFlight Rescue Helicopter Service in Sydney. He has been a member of the RAAF medical reserve. He is an instructor at the Kingaroy gliding club and the Pacific Soaring motorglider club at Caboolture. Heavy coffee and tea drinkers are prone to severe headaches on acute withdrawal. DON’T SWEAT & FORGET The following day was identical except that I used a sports drink. At the end of the day I had none of the effects of the previous day and a far healthier urine output. The flight was far more enjoyable (and we landed safely under my control). 61 Jeremy Clarkson, the flamboyantly controversial host of cult TV motoring show, Top Gear, may seem an unlikely source of safety advice, but he’s dead right about low flying. As Clarkson says, ‘Speed has never killed anyone. Suddenly becoming stationary ... that’s what gets you.’ Too many pilots have discovered Clarkson’s dictum to their cost. Low flying is what pilots do to show off to those unfortunates who are confined to living on the ground. It’s seductive, glamorous and, to use a euphemism, unforgiving. It’s also illegal. The regulations are unambiguous. Except for initial climb, and landing approach, you are not allowed to fly lower than 1000ft above ground level over a populated area, or 500ft above ground level over any other area, without approval from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). FSA MAY–JUN10 62 LOW FLIGHT , HIGH RISK There are a few legitimate reasons for flying at low level, such as aerial stock mustering, crop spraying and fire fighting. But CASA requires pilots doing these activities to have special training and licence endorsements. This is because of the distinct and intense hazards of low flying. Even Clarkson might think twice about driving a car that would crash if it went below a certain speed, had steering that could be affected by wind gusts, and no brakes. But that is effectively what an aeroplane flown at very low level becomes. Malcolm Wardrop, CASA’s aviation safety advisor for South Australia, is concerned by reports of low flying near Lake Eyre, which for the second year in succession is set to become an attraction to tourists and pilots as water flows create a temporary oasis. CASA has already received complaints from people in South Australia’s far north about low-flying aircraft, and the risk they pose to wildlife. The practice is also a risk to human life, Wardrop says. ‘While it is true that you are not likely to meet a powerline over Lake Eyre, there are two distinct hazards,’ he says. The particular danger of low flight around Lake Eyre is bird strike. ‘Because the lake is filling from the Cooper, Darling and Warburton Systems birds are following that water from all over northern and eastern Australia,’ Wardrop says. Many of them will be large birds, such as pelicans, cormorants and herons, sometimes flying in large flocks. ‘Individual birds or small flocks are hard to see,’ Wardrop says, ‘because that’s how they’ve evolved. If you’re doing 80 knots or more you just can’t spot them.’ ‘And if you hit a flock, you’ll kill them, but it’s likely they’ll also kill you and your passengers.’ The other hazard, in common with low flying anywhere, is the lack of reaction time it gives the pilot. Most sightseeing flights over the lake will be operating at close to maximum take-off weight because the incentive is to fill every seat, Wardrop says. But, ‘If the engine stops in a typical single with a full load of passengers you’ll soon be going down at about 1000 feet per minute, maybe more ... Low flight involves dangerous compromises in aircraft configuration. Flying at 90kt, is a relatively sedate cruise speed at altitude, but near the ground equates to about 167km/h – or 46 metres per second. Obstacles loom up quickly at that rate. To slow most aircraft below cruise speed requires trimming to fly nose high, limiting the pilot’s forward vision, making navigation difficult and potentially putting the aircraft in an unstable configuration. Australian Transport Safety Bureau reports are often dry neutral documents, appropriately so given their function to report meticulously and analyse. But the Bureau’s report on avoidable low flying accidents, issued this year, makes heartbreaking reading. The waste and sadness of the cases of the German tourists who encountered a powerline in the vast emptiness of the Northern territory, or the military helicopter pilot who swooped low while flying his sister to her wedding, leap off the page. All these people died; as did everyone on a Piper Cherokee sightseeing over Lake Eildon; the Auster pilot who hit The insidious nature of complacency is one theme of the report–in two cases, pilots were killed after hitting wires they knew about. But other factors are not as consistent. While one pilot was known for a ‘history of a variety of unsafe acts’, another’s eulogy was that ‘friends and colleagues said that he was a careful pilot’. All that can be said with any certainty is that none of the dead pilots thought it would ever happen to them. ...common with low flying any where, is the lack of reaction time it gives the pilot. 63 A recent Australian Transport Safety Bureau report gave four reasons why low flying is unsafe: There are more obstacles to avoid, many of which are hard to see until it is too late (powerlines and birds, for example) Pilots have a higher workload because there are more hazards to avoid There may be turbulence and windshear that pilots do not encounter at higher levels, and There is very little time to recover control of the aircraft if something goes wrong. The ATSB concludes the two major hazards of low flying are wirestrikes and pilots’ reduced opportunity to recover their aircraft from a stall or loss of control. ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Research and Analysis AR-2009-041 LOW FLIGHT HIGH RISK ‘Even if you’re legal, at 500ft, that gives you only 30 seconds to configure the aircraft for landing, brief your passengers and maybe make a radio call. At 250ft you have half that time and at 100ft virtually no time at all; you’re on the ground or in the water before you know what’s happening.’ powerlines on his own property; the Cessna 172 pilot who crashed on Christmas morning; and the agricultural pilot whose experience did not save him from a fatal impact while performing low-level aerobatics. ‘Manning’ UAS FSA MAY–JUN10 64 inty end of o p e th t a r o d n u eated on the gro s is r to ra e p o e r is concluding W hether th to c e s ) V A (U le ic eh manned aerial v n u e th , e g la e s ert Wilson. b o R the fu ’s ty fe a S t h lig sential, writes F s e is g in in a tr t pilo The fact that the average age of a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME) in Australia is in the mid 50s, and the average commercial pilot is in their late 40s, attests that aviation has failed to attract young people. But youth is well-represented in the newest aviation sector – unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Young people who have grown up in a world of game consoles, virtual reality, social networks, camera phones and wireless broadband take to unmanned aviation with aplomb, the organisers of Australia’s first civilian course in UAS say. The Australian Unmanned Systems Academy is an initiative of V-TOL, with partners including the Australian and International Training Institute, University of Queensland and Ipswich City Council. The course’s foundations are the existing basic aeronautical knowledge (BAK), private pilot licence (PPL) and radiotelephony requirements for private pilots. Chief executive of the Academy, Frank Martin, says UAS pilots are tending to come from a younger age group, which is more at ease with the video and computer systems used on the autonomous aircraft. Martin is also a squadron leader in the Australian Air Force cadets and he speaks enthusiastically about how UAS training opens doors for cadets into a new sector in aviation as well as offering an entry into the engineering areas of robotics and mechatronics. Qualified UAS pilots or engineers enter a small, but growing industry. The civilian UAS industry in Australia is estimated to turn over about $20 million a year and employ about 150 people. But while Martin speaks of a kind of generational leap-frog between manned and UAV aircraft pilots, he cautions that no amount of knowledge in Windows-based flight planning is a substitute for the centuryold skills of manned flight. ‘Before they can come into UAVs, we want them to have some flying behind them; we want them to have knowledge of aircraft behind them; and they also need to know about laws and licensing,’ Martin says. Around the world, UAS operators are coming to the same conclusion: some manned flight experience is essential for a UAV pilot. But … how much is that? The US Air Force initially drew its UAS pilots from the ranks of fast jet and large transport pilots, but found itself facing a shortage, and criticism that expensively-trained officers were being used for basic ‘point-and-click’ missions. It has set up a training scheme for UAS operators, and is evaluating how much aviation experience they need. We are trying to find the sweet spot, where we don’t train too much and don’t train too little,’ USAF chief of staff General Norton Schwartz told Aviation Week. The world’s first degree course in UAS believes in pilot education as a foundation. The University of North Dakota’s major in unmanned aircraft systems began teaching classes last year. It is built upon the aviation department’s commercial aviation major and includes courses in aviation safety, human factors, and crew resource management as they apply to unmanned aircraft operations. The Queensland UAS academy will soon launch an online training program, ‘Future Skies’, expanding its reach to students and Air Force cadets across Australia. It is also in talks with the University of Queensland about joint education projects. Recognition that unmanned aircraft would require skilled pilots is nothing new. The Australian developed Jindivik target drone required two pilots to land it, despite having a degree of flight autonomy (it was controlled by set commands rather than ‘stick and rudder’ radio control inputs. However, UAS such as the Warrigal used by the academy possess a degree of autonomy undreamed of by the Jindivik’s designers. Normal landing is a one-button operation and the aircraft normally follows a GPS-derived flight plan, automatically regulating its altitude and position. The alternative would have been that the Warrigal would have required inspection, at least, and could have been written off,’ he said. Managing director of UAS developer V-TOL Aerospace, Mark Xavier, says the company, a partner of the academy, emphasises the importance of broad aviation knowledge and piloting skills. ‘We want to put a case for UAVs operating amongst everyday society without endangering anyone in the air or on the ground. To fly over built-up areas or in proximity to air traffic will require a high-level of operator training to make it acceptable.’ Most UAS flying is done using GPS-created flight plans, in a process broadly similar to airline transport pilots making inputs into flight management systems. The Warrigal pilot can also temporarily override its autopilot with direct commands to turn or change altitude, operating in effect a sort of digital fly-by-wire mode. The third method of control is the most difficult – direct radio control, as used in model aircraft. Academy trainees are taught all three methods. Xavier says the pilot-centred approach to UAS is far from universal. He recently observed how a UAV operator got his aircraft into trouble. ‘He threw his hands up in the air and walked away,’ Xavier said. ‘In the eyes of a lot of militaries around the world you get a grunt to fly a UAV, but where there’s no training, there’s no ability.’ The academy takes a different approach, Xavier says. ‘If our guys are flying UAVs and something goes wrong, they’re more than capable of flicking the switch and taking control.’ Martin says UAS is a dynamic field with more than enough to intrigue the most ambitious budding aviation professional: ‘Remember the old Flight of the Phoenix movie? I love that. There’s a part where the designer [marooned in the desert in a crashed plane] talks about designing model aircraft, and the others freak out, but he says how model aircraft have to be more stringently built. That perception is exactly where we are now. This industry’s not about to take over from GA [general aviation] but it’s certainly going to extend it.’ But there’s no substitute for a pilot’s judgement. Martin recounts how a student recently aborted a landing of a Warrigal. ‘The approach was high and fast and the student looked at the aircraft, said “no”, and sent the aircraft back to its rally point.’ Gavin Broadbent in the van-mounted flight deck of a Warrigal UAV 65 MANNING UAS ‘The whole emphasis of the academy is on consistent training to a set standard. Students can do a lot of training in Broome, or Katherine, or wherever they are. But they need to come to the Academy to do their flying and gain their qualification,’ Martin says. ‘We were overjoyed because he was right, and he had obtained that knowledge from manned flying experience.’ AVQUIZ FLYING OPS 1. If, after maintaining a flight planned heading of 330(m) in order to track 322(m), you determined your position as 6 NM right of track having travelled 45NM, you have experienced (a) left drift. (b) right drift. (c) zero drift. (d) some drift but the amount can not be determined from the available information. (c) hold off bank due to the slightly smaller angle of attack of the outer wing. (d) hold off bank due to the slightly greater angle of attack and slightly higher speed of the outer wing. 2. In the above example the track error is approximately (a) 8 degrees right. (b) 8 degrees left. 7. (c) 6 degrees right. (d) 6 degrees left. 3. 66 (a) remains substantially constant until approaching supersonic speeds when it rises. At a non-towered aerodrome, listed in ERSA as having an elevation of 300FT, the QNH is given by an AWIB as 1020 HPa. When setting this QNH prior to departure, the altimeter reads 210FT. This means that the altimeter is reading (b) remains substantially constant until approaching supersonic speeds when it falls. (c) increases was the square of speed. (d) reduces with the square of speed. (a) correctly but the actual elevation is higher than published. FSA MAY–JUN10 (b) incorrectly because the QNH is incorrect. (c) low but is within VFR tolerance. 8. With regard to control of a helicopter, moving the stationary swash plate in a direction parallel to its axis (d) low but is outside VFR tolerance. (a) changes the collective pitch whereas tilting the plate via the cyclic, controls roll and pitch. 4. If, at the above aerodrome, an accurate altimeter is set to 1013 HPa prior to departure and the altimeter reads 300FT, the (b) changes the cyclic pitch whereas tilting the plate via the collective, controls roll and pitch. (a) pressure height is approximately 300FT. (c) changes the collective pitch whereas tilting the plate via the cyclic, controls roll and yaw. (b) pressure height is approximately zero. (c) the QNH is 1003 HPa. (d) changes the cyclic pitch whereas tilting the plate via the collective controls roll and pitch. (d) the QNH is 1023 HPa. 5. In a piston engine, the mixture must be leaned at increased altitude because as the aircraft climbs the For a given aerofoil at a constant angle of attack, the drag coefficient 9. Operating a diaphragm type engine-driven fuel pump with the fuel switched off (assuming upstream of the pump) will (a) throttle must be opened further to maintain the same power and this enriches the mixture. (a) not potentially overstress the pump because a bypass valve is fitted internally. (b) throttle must be closed further to compensate for the thinner air. (b) not potentially overstress the pump unless fuel lubrication is reduced. (c) mass of air entering a cylinder is reduced but the mass of fuel mixed with it increases therefore the mixture becomes richer. (c) potentially over-stresses the diaphragm which is being actuated by the engine cam during the intake stroke. (d) mass of air entering a cylinder is reduced but the mass of fuel mixed with it remains approximately the same therefore the mixture becomes richer. 6. During a climbing turn, it is theoretically necessary to (d) potentially over-stresses the diaphragm during the delivery stroke. 10. When moist air is lifted over high terrain and precipitation occurs, the cloud base in the lee of the terrain will (a) be higher and the dewpoint of the air will be higher. (a) hold on bank due to the slightly higher angle of attack of the inner wing. (b) be higher and the dewpoint of the air will be lower. (b) hold on bank due to the slightly higher angle of attack of the outer wing. (d) lower and the dewpoint of the air will be lower. (c) lower and the dewpoint of the air will be higher. MAINTENANCE 1. In a jet engine, factors likely to induce compressor stall are (a) increased temperature margin. (b) reduced temperature margin. (c) reduced rotor speed and reduced mass flow of air. (d) high rotor speed. 7. The role of a vortex generator fitted to a wing is to (a) extend the lift curve so that the stall occurs at a higher angle of attack. (b) reduce the slope of the lift curve so that an asymmetric stall is less likely. (c) reduce the parasitic drag at cruising angles of attack by energising the boundary layer. (d) increase the lift/drag ratio at cruising angles of attack. 2. The function of a compressor surge bleed valve in a jet engine is to (a) control the flow of heated compressor air to the accessories. 8. The cam follower lever on an engine-driven diaphragm fuel pump is actuated by the engine cam during the pump (b) modulate the airflow to the active clearance control. (a) intake stroke and fuel is delivered by the return action of the cam follower lever. (c) divert air from later compressor stages in order to increase airflow through preceding stages. (b) intake stroke and fuel is delivered at a pressure determined by the diaphragm return spring. (d) relieve an over-pressure situation in a compressor stage. (c) delivery stroke and the fuel is delivered at a pressure determined by the cam design. 3. A stationary plane surface which has direct or indirect contact with a rotating surface, lying in a different plane and where relative motion may occur between the two, is called (a) a swash plate. (b) a bearing support. (c) an end bell. (d) lap seal. 4. In a variable output hydraulic motor employing a swash plate, positioning the swash plate parallel to the plane of rotation of the rotor will result in (b) maximum output with minimum torque. (c) maximum output with maximum torque. (d) minimum output with maximum torque. 5. An optical flat is a device for measuring surface (a) finish by means of ultraviolet light. (b) finish by means of monochromatic light. (c) flatness by means of ultraviolet light. (d) flatness by means of monochromatic light. 6. If, during cruise in an aircraft employing a constant speed propeller, the nose is lowered and airspeed increased without resetting the engine controls, the propeller governor fly weights will tend to move (a) outwards and the blade pitch will become finer. (b) outwards and the blade pitch will become coarser. (c) inwards and the blade pitch will become finer. (d) inwards and the blade pitch will become coarser. 9. On an stabilator form of elevator, the trim surface, in addition to the trimming function, also moves as 67 (a) a servo tab which assists and stabilizes the movement of the main aerofoil. (b) a servo tab which opposes and stabilizes the movement of the main aerofoil. (c) an anti-servo which assists and stabilises the movement of the main aerofoil. (d) an anti-servo which opposes and stabilises the movement of the main aerofoil. 10. Bending a fixed rudder trim tab to the left would have the effect in flight of applying (a) left rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to the left. (b) left rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to the right. (c) right rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to the left. (d) right rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to the right. QUIZ (a) zero RPM output and torque. (d) delivery stroke and the fuel is delivered at a pressure determined by the diaphragm return spring. IFR OPERATIONS Melbourne, VIC (YMML) ILS Runway 16 You are inbound to YMML from the north tracking via CANTY and ARBEY on H119 (refer TAC 3 Melbourne) in a category B aircraft equipped with: • 2 VLOC (VOR/Localiser) receivers. Number 1 NAV can be coupled to the Autopilot and has Flight Director (FD) capability with a failure warning system. • 1 radar altimeter • 1 set of marker beacons • 1 DME • 1 enroute and approach approved GNSS • 2 ADFs 68 You are qualified and current for all this equipment for instrument approaches, but not ‘CAT II and III’. Part of the current ATIS. reads ... expect ILS approach. Runway 16 wet. Wind 160/20 visibility (RVR) 900 metres rain. Cloud overcast 700...’ The following questions relate to this approach. (Plates dated 19 Nov 2009) FSA MAY–JUN10 You select your DME to frequency 109.7, obtain a lock on and ident. 1. The correct approach plate to use is (a) ILS Z RWY 16. (b) ILS Y RWY 16. (c) ILS X RWY 16. (d) ILS Z or Y RWY 16 as the nav aids required are the same. At 14 DME and therefore approaching the Bolinda NDB, the DME on 109.7 fails. You now select 114.1, obtain a lock on and ident. 2. What DME distance do you expect to see at Bolinda (ignoring slant) and which is the correct plate to use now? (a) 11.8 DME and ILS Z RWY 16 (b) 11.8 DME and ILS Y RWY 16 (c) 12 DME and ILS Y RWY 16 (d) 11.6 DME and ILS Y RWY 16 3. If the DME were to fail completely, which of the following is correct? (a) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y, ILS Z and ILS X plates. (b) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y and ILS Z plates only. (c) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y plate alone. (d) GNSS cannot be used to replace DME for fixes on any RWY 16 ILS approach plate, so a missed approach would be required, or alternative procedure flown. You consider the minima that can be used having regard to all the aircraft’s equipment being serviceable except the DME. Assume a P.E.C. of 50’. 4. The applicable minima are (a) Category I 640’ DA./ 0.8km (b) Category I 690’ DH./0.8km (c) Category I 208’ DA./1.2km since no D.M.E. information (d) Category I 208’ DH./0.8km (e) Category I 258’ DH./0.8km 5. If the F.D. bars were to not activate and the autopilot not couple, what will the minima now become? (a) D.H. 208’/0.8km still if HIAL. operative (b) D.H. 208’/1.2.km if HIAL. operative (c) M.D.A. 690’/1.2km if HIAL. operative (d) D.A. 640’/1.2km if HIAL. operative 6. Which of the following statements is correct concerning Runway Visual Range (RVR) and Runway Visibility (RV) in Australia? (a) RVR is determined by a ground observer whereas RV is determined by electronic means. Both expressed in metres. (b) RVR and RV are interchangeable terms and expressed in feet. (c) RVR is determined by electronic means whereas RV is determined by a ground observer. Both expressed in metres. (d) RVR and RV are interchangeable terms and expressed in metres. 9. At the planning stage for this flight to YMML, if you were aware that the glideslopes on NAVS 1 and 2 were unserviceable, what alternate minima would you use? (a) 1206ft ceiling/4.4km visibility (b) 1206ft on QNH/4.4km visibility (c) 700ft ceiling/2.5km visibility (d) 700ft on QNH/2.5km visibility 10. If GNSS was being used to replace DME on a localiser approach, where is the Final Approach Fix (FAF) and what is the minima for landing RWY 16? 7. With regard to the ILS ‘X-Ray’ runway 16 approach plate, which of the following is correct? (a) 6 GNSS, MDA 1140, 2.4km (a) ILS CAT II has a DH of 100 feet, CAT IIIa has a DH of 50 feet, while CAT IIIb has a zero feet DH with an RVR of 75 metres. All of these minimas are only available to operators with suitably equipped and maintained aircraft together with pilot certification. (c) 5.7 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km (b) 5.5 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km (d) 6 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km (b) ILS CAT II and CAT IIIa and b decision heights must be adjusted by the PEC applicable to the aircraft type or the standard 50 feet. These minimas are only available to operators with suitably equipped aircraft and certified aircrew. 69 (c) ILS CAT II and CAT IIIa and b visibility minima are based on RVR’s of 350, 200 and 75 metres respectively and not RV. CHANGE ME QUIZ (d) Both (a) and (c) are correct. 8. In order to use category I minima the aircraft must have duplicated ILS receivers, marker beacon receivers (or marker/ DME) and 2 ADF’s when part of the ILS such as YMML RWY 16. True or false? (a) true (b) false Invest wisely in your CIR training with Peter BINI ADVANCED FLIGHT TRAINING When it comes time for you to invest in your Command Instrument Rating, you need to know your investment is spent wisely. Peter Bini Advanced Flight Training has been teaching and successfully producing quality pilots for over 30 years. With over 25,000 hours of flying experience, CFI Steve Pearce and his team of instructors not only teach what is required, but also ensure you benefit from their practical knowledge. Invest in pearls of wisdom, not just the basics. Call us for a tour of our facilities, aircraft, and meet our friendly staff. Phone: 03 9580 5295 Email: [email protected] Calendar 2010 May FSA MAY–JUN10 70 Jun Date Event Venue Organiser & More info 10 May 10 May 11 May 12 May 12 May 13 May 13 May 13 May 12-13 May 14 May 15 May 17 May 17 May 18 May 18 May 18 May 19 May 19 May 20 May 20 May 20 May 21 May 24 May 24 May 25 May 25 May 25 May 25 May 26 May 26 May 27 May 27 May 27 May 27 May 31 May 31 May 31 May 31 May 1 Jun 1 Jun 1 Jun 2 Jun 2 Jun 2 Jun 3 Jun 3 Jun NTA seminar GAAP-Class D workshop GAAP-Class D workshop NTA seminar Class D information night NTA seminar GAAP-Class D workshop Class D information night Professional Development Program NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar GAAP-Class D workshop NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar GAAP-Class D workshop NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar Class D information night Class D information night Class D information night Class D information night NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar NTA seminar Transition to Class D airspace Implementation of new regulations (CAR 166) regarding operations at non-towered aerodromes Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators conference Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia convention Australian Centenary of Powered Flight Albany Sydney Brisbane Karratha Sunshine Coast Port Hedland Melbourne Rockhampton Brisbane Cessnock Williamtown/Newcastle Hamilton Mildura Ballarat Perth Broken Hill Emerald Gove Jabiru Longreach Adelaide Mt Gambier Armidale Gympie Hervey Bay Geelong Tamworth Albury Coffs Harbour Bundaberg Gladstone Port Macquarie Mangalore Moree Coolangatta Horn Island Toowoomba/Oakey Wagga Wagga Ballina Bathurst Roma Dubbo Charleville Lismore Albany Golf Club Bankstown Travelodge Bardon Conference Centre All Seasons Karratha Aero Club All Seasons Port Hedland Dingley International Aero Club CASA Flight Training & Testing Office [email protected] Best Western Wine Country Motor Inn Quality Hotel Apollo International South West TAFE Quality Hotel Mildura Grand Mercure Hotel AFA Club, Bull Creek Musicians Club Meteor Motel CASA office, airport Gagadju Crocodile Holiday Inn Albert Park Motor Inn The Mawson Centre Commodore on the Park Motel Quality Hotel Powerhouse Conference Centre Mantra Mercure/TBC West Tamworth League Club Chifley Hotel Novotel Coffs Harbour Quality Hotel Burnett Riverside Rydges Rydges Moorabbin Flight Training Academy Moree Services Club Twin Towns Services Club TBA City Gold Club All Seasons Pavilion Ramada Hotel & Suites Convention & Function Centre Explorers Inn Cattleman’s Country Motor Inn RSL club Lismore Workers club www.casa.gov.au/gaap/ www.casa.gov.au Rydges Lakeside hotel Canberra Holiday Inn, Surfers Paradise, QLD Mia Mia, VIC The Australian Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment Conference Brisbane Convention & Exhibition Centre, QLD Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators www.asasi.org/anzsasi.htm Aerial Agricultural Association Australia www.aerialag.com.au Australian Centenary of Powered Flight Mia Mia Inc. Jill James secretary: M - 0418 388 919. E: jill@ colibanestate.com AASC/Ageing Aircraft - chairman Richard Gauntlett [email protected] 4-6 Jun 7-10 Jun Jul 16-18 Jul Aug 17-19 Aug Please note: NTA seminar = Non-towered aerodrome information session. For more information about the 3 June changes, go to www.casa.gov.au and click on the 3 June link on the homepage. Registration essential for workshops/seminars. Key Casa events Other organisations’ events NTA Seminar GAAP Class D information nights COMING SOON!!! Nationa Airfield l Directo ry 201 The 2010/11 AOPA National Airfield Directory is coming soon. 0 First published 20 years ago the National Airfield Directory is the only comprehensive collation of places to land an aircraft across Australia, be it your Beechcraft or your Boeing. It gives vital information to aid safe, efficient flight planning by aviators traversing the continent. Log on to www.aopa.com.au and head to the ‘Information Centre’ to download your order form and send it in to the office by post, email, or fax to secure your copy. Aircra ft RRP $6 Owners and Pilots 5 71 Assoc iation of Aus tralia QUIZ ANSWERS Flying Ops 1. (c) The planned drift was the same as the track error. IFR Operations 1 (a) YMML ILS plate ZULU 2. (a) 6 miles in 45 is approximately 8 in 60. 2 (c) YMML ILS plate YANKEE, Note: answer (D) 11.6 distance is from the threshold. 3. (c) At this level the VFR allowable error is 100FT. (ENR 1.7) 3 (c) YMML ILS plate YANKEE Data box alongside profile diagram 4. (a) The pressure height is the distance from the 1013HPa pressure level. In this example, 1013 is also the QNH. 4 (d) YMML ILS plate YANKEE. Note PEC. is only applied to a decision altitude (DA) and not a decision height (DH) using the radar altimeter. 5. (d) 6. (d) The outer wing traces a slightly shallower upward spiral than the inner wing. 7. (a) 8. (a) 9. (c) Potentially, diaphragm pumps can be damaged by switching off fuel to simulate an engine failure. 10. (b) 5 (b) AIP ENR 1.5-33 Para 8.1. YMML ILS PLATE YANKEE or ZULU. Note: M.D.A. refers to nonprecision approaches. 6 (c) AIP GEN 2.2-20. AIP ENR 1.5–26 7 (d) AIP ENR 1.5.–26 Para 4.3 AIP ENR 1.5-33 Para 9 YMML ILS PLATE X-RAY. A PEC does not apply to a decision height. 8 (b) AIP ENR 1.5-31 Para 6.2. This is a common misconception. The duplication requirement is at the planning stage to use a SPECIAL ALTN minima. 9 (a) YMML ILS plate YANKEE. or ZULU. Special alternate not applicable if a localiser only approach has to be flown. 10 (d) YMML ILS plate YANKEE only. Maintenance 1. (c). 2. (c). 3. (a). 4. (a). 5. (d). 6. (b). 7. (a). 8. (b). 9. (d). 10. (d). QUIZ ANSWERS Ph: 02 9791 9099 Email: [email protected] Web: www.aopa.com.au The EAA 58th Annual International Airshow and Convention Wittman Field, Oshkosh, U.S.A. THE OSHKOSH EXPRESS 2010 THE GREATEST AVIATION EVENT IN THE WORLD. JULY 26TH – AUGUST 1ST 2010. TRAVEL ON THE MOST EXHILARATING FLIGHT OF YOUR LIFE WITH 400 OTHER ENTHUSIASTS. THE EXPRESS takes you from Australia to Wittman Field Oshkosh USA, with only one stop for Customs and Immigration in Los Angeles, departs July 26th arrives Oshkosh the same day. THE EXPRESS is the only aircraft totally chartered by Aviation Enthusiasts to take Aviation Enthusiasts in a Boeing 747-400 directly into Oshkosh. THE EXPRESS allows you to gain attractive rates for other internal air travel within the USA, travel insurance, hotel/motel and car hire plus other tours which can be arranged by Avtours Australia. Avtours will arrange your return to Australia at your leisure from the West Coast. Onward travel can also be arranged to anywhere in the World. THE EXPRESS includes 6 nights accommodation at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Coach transfer to Chicago O’Hare Airport, shirt, cap plus in-flight magazine with important local and airshow information. Also gives the opportunity to be seated in Business or Premium Economy at a small additional charge with being one of the first in with your deposits. PRICE: from $3995.00 ex Sydney twin share. FSA MAY–JUN10 72 To secure your reservation a deposit of AUD$1500.00 per person is required payable to AVTOURS AUSTRALIA, 20 ELIZABETH PARADE, TURA BEACH. N.S.W. 2548 HURRY – BOOK NOW – DON’T LET YOURSELF “MISS THE EXPERIENCE” For more information please contact: Karene Tripodi, Marya Phillips Ph 0416 822 885 Ph. 1300 728 634 Email. [email protected] Email: [email protected] All of the above prices are subject to change. Licence No. 2TA4424 HYPOXIA ALERT! TOO LATE COMES TOO QUICKLY 110x165advertNov09.indd 1 16/10/09 7:18:31 PM Does your training comply with CAO 20.11 and CAR 253*? performance testing while monitoring physiological parameters. Fully automated and instant video and printed report for all students. Safe and efficient normobaric hypoxia training is now available at Australian centres. Individual or group sessions for all flight personnel. *knowledge of the effects of altitude The GO2Altitude® normobaric hypoxia awareness system incorporates complete educational package: theoretical and practical hypoxia knowledge, cognitive Melbourne • Perth • Adelaide flightsafety … essential aviation reading • Maroochydore • www.hypoxia-education.com Inside next issue Our Feature looks at air crash investigation, The Concorde crash­— 10 years on, Wake turbulence: A roller coaster ride you never want to take, and More of the ever-popular quiz and readers’ close calls. LEARN FROM THE ON THE WAY TO UPGRADING YOUR AVIATION CAREER. Swinburne’s Aviation courses. Brought to you in conjunction with the biggest names in aviation. If your aviation career is in a holding pattern, Swinburne’s aviation qualification is the upgrade you need. 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