Indian Oil Corporation Limited Risk

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INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan for Expansion of Oil Terminal At Dist. Deoghar, Jharkhand 6(b) Isolated storage & handling of hazardous chemicals, Category B Prepared By ABC TECHNO LABS INDIA PVT. LTD. AN ISO ISO 9001:2008, ISO14001:2004 & OHSAS 18001:2007 certified Environmental Engineering and Consultancy Organization (NABL Accredited & MoEF Recognised Environment Laboratory) QCI NABET Accredited for Sector 5F (Certificate No. NABET / EIA / 1316 / RA001) Corporate Office: No.2, 2nd Street, Thangam Colony, Anna Nagar West, Chennai – 600040. Tamil Nadu, India. Tel: 044 – 26161123 / 24 / 25 Mumbai Office: A-355, Balaji Bhavan, Plot No. 42 A, Sector 11, CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400614. Maharashtra, India Tel: 022 27580044 www.abctechnolab.com [email protected] Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand RISK ASSESSMENT & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 1.1 Introduction Industrial plants deal with materials, which are generally hazardous in nature by virtue of their intrinsic chemical properties or their temperature or pressure of operation or a combination of these. Fire, explosion, hazardous release or a combination of these are the hazards associated with industrial plants. These have resulted in the development of more comprehensive, systematic and sophisticated methods of Safety Engineering such as Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment to improve upon the integrity, reliability and safety of industrial plants. The primary emphasis in safety engineering is to reduce risk to human life and environment. The broad tools attempt to minimize the chances of accidents occurring. There always exists, no matter how remote, that small probability of a major accident occurring. If the accident involves highly hazardous materials in sufficient large quantities, the consequences may be serious to the plant, to surrounding areas and the populations therein. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) have proposed to install additional storage tankages of MS, HSD, SKO and 4Nos. bottom filling loading bays (TLF bays) within exiting terminal at Jasidih, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Product such as MS, HSD and SKO have received through Haldia-Barauni product pipeline. Construction of additional tankages is utmost need to fulfil the need of petroleum product as per market requirement in nearby area. Since the petroleum products are highly inflammable, it is necessary to evaluate to risk from this installation. IOCL has retained ABC Techno Labs India Pvt. Ltd. as a consultant for carrying out the risk analysis study of the proposed additional tankages of MS, HSD and SKO at Jasidih terminal, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand. Scope of work includes: (i) Identify different hazard scenarios, which are likely to cause damage to the installation and other properties, operating staff as well as the surrounding communities and installations. (ii) Evaluate the damage potential of the probable hazardous events in relation to their location to assess the magnitude of the impact and the impact zones. (iii) Suggest remedial/preventive measures. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (iv) 1.2 Prepare an effective on-site disaster management plan. Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification Risk is defined as the unwanted consequences of a particular activity in relation to the likelihood that this may occur. Risk assessment thus comprises of two variables, magnitude of consequences and the probability of occurrence of accident. The first step in risk assessment is identification of hazards. Hazard is defined as a physical or chemical condition with the potential of accident which can cause damage to people, property or the environment. Hazards are identified by careful review of plant operation and nature of materials used. The various scenarios by which an accident can occur are then determined, concurrently study of both probability and the consequences of an accident is carried out and finally risk assessment is made. If this risk is acceptable then the study is complete. If the risk is unacceptable then the system must be modified and the procedure is restarted. 1.3 Scope of Risk Analysis The scope of risk analysis study includes: (i) Identify potential hazard sections of the plant, which are likely to cause damage to the plant, operating staff and the surrounding communities in case of any accident due to the proposed plant facilities. (ii) Assess overall damage potential of the hazardous events in relation to main plant and environment. (iii) Assessment of total individual risk. (iv) Recommended emergency preparedness plan to mitigate the effects of any accident. 1.4 Risk Analysis Risk Analysis of any plant / installation handling hazardous materials include – 1.4.1 Hazard Identification ● Identify potentially hazardous materials that can cause loss of human life/injury, loss of properties and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment. ● Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.4.2 Consequence Analysis ● Analysis of magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard scenarios and their effect zones. ● Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for taking precautionary measures for risk reduction as for well as mitigation of effect in case of such accidents happening. This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of risk assessment and the information provided by IOCL. Based on the Risk Assessment, Disaster Management Plan (DMP) has been prepared. 1.5 Glossary of Terms used in Risk Assessment The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are elaborated below: “Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death) occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances. “Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury, damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria. “Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment. “Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment. “Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand “Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury or property damage or both. “Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This highlights the typical nature of emergency “It will be after experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always.” “Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management. Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after an emergency. 1.6 Scope of Study The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various statutory bodies for similar type of projects: ● Identification of potential hazard areas; ● Identification of representative failure cases; ● Identification of possible initiating events; ● Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the impact zones from the accidental scenarios; ● Consequence analysis for all the possible events; ● Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster mitigation points of view; ● Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident possibilities; and ● Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP). 1.7 Approach to the Study Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various phases involved in risk analysis is detailed below: Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Phase-I: Hazard Identification The technique employs for the Hazard Identification is MCA analysis. MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice, the selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis. Process information study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Indices and following manufacture, storage and transport of hazard chemicals rules of Government of India (GOI Rules, 2000) are also the methods used in hazard identification. Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation Ranking of each unit in hazard prone sections are done based on the Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI), Toxicity Index (TI) and Inventory Analysis. Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis. A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize hazards early, thus saving time and cost, which could result from major plant redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar procedure under a different name. It is generally applied during concept or early development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to: ● Pipeline / equipment; ● Interface among system components; Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand ● Operative environment; ● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.); ● Facility; and ● Safety equipment. The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence Analysis. Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase. This helps in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of Phase-I and Phase-II would reduce risk in quantitative terms. Emergency Preparedness Plan based on the earlier studies is covered in this activity. Customarily, major industries to have their EPP‟s and therefore, there is a need to look into those details and recommend a realistic EPP based on the above studies. 1.8 Hazard Identification 1.8.1 Introduction Identification of hazards in the proposed project is of primary significance in the analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals and process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident. Typical schemes of predictive hazard evaluation and quantitative risk analysis suggest that hazard identification step plays a key role (Refer Figure - 1.1). Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures required to be taken. The following two methods for hazard identification have been employed in the study: Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand  Identification of hazardous storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz. Fire-Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI); and  Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA). 1.8.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable substances, unstable substances, and toxic substances. Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized. Under certain circumstances the vapours arising from flammable substances when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also. Unstable substances are liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence so as to give rise to blast waves. Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when released into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on flammability, reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes 49 and 345 M. 1.9 Dow Index 1.9.1 Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI) Approach Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for identifying the degree of hazard. The application of FE&TI would help to make a quick assessment of the nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas. However, this does not provide precise information. Respective Material Factor (RMF), General Hazard Factors (GHF), Special Process Hazard Factors (SPHF) are computed using standard procedure of awarding penalties based on storage handling and reaction parameters. Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in question should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In general, a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the process that takes place in it. In some cases, the unit may consist of a plant element separated from the other elements by space or by protective walls. A plant element may also be an apparatus, instrument, section or system that can cause a specific hazard. For each separate plant process, which contains flammable or toxic substances, a fire and explosion index F Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand and/or a toxicity index T may be determined in a manner derived from the method for determining a fire and explosion index developed by the Dow Chemical Company. 1.9.2 FE and TI Methodology Dow‟s Fire and Explosion Index (F and E) is a product of Material Factor (MF) and Hazard Factor (F3) while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the substances, the hazard factor (F3), is itself a product of General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). An accurate plot plan of the plant, a process flow sheet and Fire and Explosion Index and Hazard Classification Guide published by Dow Chemical Company are required to estimate the FE & TI of any process plant or a storage unit. 1.9.3 Computations and Evaluation of Fire and Explosion Index The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is calculated from the following formula: F & EI = MF x (GPH) x (SPH) The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the criteria given below: F & EI Range Degree of Hazard 0 – 60 Light 61 – 96 Moderate 97 – 127 Intermediate 128 – 158 Heavy 159 – Up Severe 1.9.4 Toxicity Index (TI) The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards established by the NFPA in Codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 345 m. However, the products handled are not toxic. 1.9.5 Classification of Hazard Categories By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of the following three categories established for the purpose (Table - 1.1). Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.1 Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index A. C B. ate gor y D. G. I J. Fire & Explosion Index (F&EI) I E. I H. 95 I II K. F & EI, 65 65 < or = F&EI < C. Toxicity Index (TI) F. I. TI < 6 6 < or = TI < 10 F&EI > or = 95 L. TI > or = 10 Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the three hazard categories. 1.9.6 The Basic Data 1.9.6.1 Basic Data for Motor Spirit (i) Substance stored-Motor Spirit (ii) Quantity stored-10694 KL (max) in three Tanks, two tanks with a Capacity of 4241KL and one Tank with a capacity of 2212 KL (iii) Quantity to be stored -10592KL (iv) Type of storage-Internal Floating Roof Vertical Storage Tanks 1.9.6.2 Basic Data for HSD (i) Substance stored-High Speed Diesel (ii) Quantity stored-15814 KL (max) in four tanks (two tanks each of capacity 5303 KL & two tanks each of capacity 2604 KL) (iii)Quantity to be stored-9025KL (iv)Type of storage- Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks 1.9.6.3 Basic Data for SKO (i) Substance stored-Superior Kerosene Oil (ii)Quantity stores-4882 KL (max) in three tanks, one with a capacity of 3006 KL & other two tanks each of capacity 938 KL (iii)Quantity to be stored-2100KL (iii)Type of storage -Conical Roof Vertical Storage Tanks 1.9.6.4 The Properties The relevant properties of the above substances are given in Table-1.2. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.9.6.5 The Results The detailed calculations are summarized in Table- 1.3. 1.9.7 Comments The recommended minimum features, according to DOW Fire and Explosion Index have been given at Table-1.3. Based on these features and the various values obtained, the following conclusions can be drawn: (i) The SKO and HSD Storage Tanks pose a “LIGHT” hazard, with an exposure radius of about 40.10 ft. and 33.59 ft. respectively. (ii) The Radii of Exposure for the MS Storage Tanks is 64.16 ft. and the hazard potential is “MODERATE”. (iii) Except the Fire Proofing for the Motor Spirit Tanks, all other “Recommended Required” as per Table - 1.3 are optional. Table 1.2 Properties of MS, SKO and HSD Sr. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. Tank No. Capacity m3 Density Kg/m3 Flash Point oC, max Boiling Point oC, max Motor Spirit 10694 730.0 <18.0 215 Superior Kerosene Oil 4882 810.0 > 35.0 300.0 High Speed Diesel Oil 15814 800.0 > 32.0 380 210 780.0 13 78.29 Stored Material T-101, T102, T-103 T-108, T109, T-110 T-104, T105, T-106, T-107 T-111, T112, T-113 Ethanol Table 1.3 Calculations for Dow Fire & Explosion Index Tank No. T-101, T-102, T-103 T-108, T-109, T-110 T-104, T-105, T-106, T-107 T-111, T-112, T-113 Stored Material Material Factor MF General Process Hazard Factor F1 Special Process Hazard Factor F2 Unit Hazard Factor F3 Fire & Explosion Index F&EI = F3xMF Exposure Radius (ft.) Degree of Hazard Motor Spirit 16.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 76.384 64.16 Moderate Superior Kerosene Oil 10.00 1.55 3.08 4.774 47.74 40.10 Light High Speed Diesel Oil 10.00 1.55 2.58 3.993 39.99 33.59 Light Ethanol 16.00 1.55 2.33 3.6115 57.78 48.5 Light Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.10 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) Approach 1.10.1 Introduction A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with a maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of probability that is still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat arbitrary. In practice, the selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-Analysis is done on the basis of engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis studies, especially accident analysis. Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. Figure3.2 depicts the flow chart for MCA analysis. As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and storage units and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level or risk for the surroundings in terms of damage distances. For this selection the following factors have been taken into account: ● ● Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic; Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and ● Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing and presence of incompatible materials. In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to adjacent activities is taken into consideration to account for the potential escalation of an accident. This phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The units and activities, which have been selected on the basis of the above factors, are summarized; Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand accident scenarios are established in hazard identification studies, while effect and damage calculations are carried out in Maximum Credible Accident Analysis Studies. 1.10.2 Methodology Following steps are employed for visualization of MCA scenarios: ● ● ● Chemical inventory analysis; Identification of chemical release and accident scenarios; Analysis of past accidents of similar nature to establish credibility to identified scenarios; and ● Short-listing of MCA scenarios. 1.10.3 Common Causes of Accidents Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents are identified as: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Poor house keeping; Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities; Unsafe or defective equipment facilities; Lack of proper procedures; Improvising unsafe procedures; Failure to follow prescribed procedures; Jobs not understood; Lack of awareness of hazards involved; Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities; Lack of guides and safety devices; and Lack of protective equipment and clothing. 1.10.4 Failures of Human Systems An assessment of past accidents reveal human factor to be the cause for over 60% of the accidents while the rest are due to other component failures. This percentage will increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis. Major causes of human failures reported are due to: ● Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavourable environmental conditions, fatigue, etc. ● Lack of training in safety and loss prevention; ● Indecision in critical situations; and ● Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situations. Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident reports only provide information about equipment and/or component failures. Hence, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human systems and consequent damages. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.10.5 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes, causing possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the question of how the consequences of the release of such substances and the damage to the surrounding area can be determined by means of models. It is intended to given an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of models and how vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of injuries and damage to exposed population and environment. A disastrous situation is general due to outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes, which eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological imbalance. Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation, toxic release, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed. The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential vulnerability. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand START PLANT VISIT DATA COLLECTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION PROCESS CONTROL LOOPS PRI/PFD OPERATING MANUAL START UP/SHUT DOWN PLOT PLAN METEOROLOGICAL DATA PAST ACCIDENTS DATA ALL RELEVANT PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL2. DATA OF CHEMICALS INVOLVED 3. SELECT THE SECTION SELECT THE UNIT CLASSIFY VESSEL/EQUIPMENT OR PIPELINE INVENTORY 4. ANALYSIS IS THE SD (EEC) APPLICABLE YES COMPARE QUANTITY - 50 NO 5.EFFECT CALCULATE IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD PRONE SECTION IS FE/FET IN SEVERITY? ADOPT CHECK LIST APPROACH YES CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION PLOT DAMAGE6.DISTANCE Fig. 1.1 Flow chart for Maximum Credible Accident Analysis Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand RELEASE 7.OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL BLEVE INSTANTANEOUS LIQUID CONTINUOUS FLASH TWO PHASE FLOW VAPOUR IGNITION NO IGNITION YES DISPERSION FIRE VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION PRESSURES WAVE HEAT RADIATION HEAT RADIATION EFFECTS Fig. 1.2 Steps in Consequence Analysis PRESSURES WAVE Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.11 Risk Analysis 1.11.1 Properties of Materials Handled Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), and High Speed Diesel (HSD) shall be handled in the Terminal. All these products are a combination of hydrocarbons and are highly inflammable. Motor Spirit is a class-A type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC), Superior Kerosene and High speed diesel are of Class B type (Flash point between 23oC and 55oC) according to convention. The products, when spilled from the containment will cause fire if they get a contact with an ignition source. Incomplete combustion of these hydrocarbons may generate carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well as explosion. However, fire is the main hazard. Lower the flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition and hazard. The light hydrocarbons will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may catch fire if they get into contact with an ignition source. Properties of the products handled are given in Table 1.4. Table 1.4 Properties of Liquid Handled Properties 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. o Boiling point, C (range) Density at 15 oC Flash point, oC Vapour press. At 38oC (Kg/Cm2 abs) Heat of combustion BTU/LB Auto ignition tempoC LFL (% V/V) UFL (% V/V) Products HSD MS (Xtra) 260-380 50-215 0.80 0.80 >32 <18 MS 50-215 0.73 <18 SKO 150-300 0.81 >35 0.73 0.2 0.1 0.73 18,800 21700 18,700 18,800 280 1.4 7.6 210 0.7 5.0 380 1.8 5.6 280 1.4 7.6 ETHANOL 78.29 0.78 <13 0.079 at 250C 26847.8 KJ/Kg 4.3 19 1.11.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products The hazard of equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire. The pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid. A rare pipeline fracture would release large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product would get collected in the neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of ignition and proper precautions are not taken. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon, which may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. However, vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through vapour seal around the shell in floating roof tanks may be ignited through lightning. However, such cases are also very rare. In such cases the whole tank may be on fire. Corrosion in the tanks may cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid from the tanks. However, in such cases the oil will be contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill collected on ground an oil pool will be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool Fire. It creates long smoky flames. The wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the plant area and near the source of generation. In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline the liquid may escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing domino effect. 1.11.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products to be handled in the installation, due care is required to be taken in the design and installation of the storage tanks, pipelines and other associated facilities e.g. i) Well established code of practice in design and installation. ii) Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118). iii) Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of pipelines, valves and equipment. iv) Provision of dykes and fire walls around storage tanks. v) Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities. vi) Well established organisation entrusted for design, inspection & erection of the facility. vii) Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.11.4 Fire Fighting Facilities (i) Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities: Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities have been considered in the installation e.g. a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors Fire Hydrants and monitors shall be provided around the dyke walls of storage tanks. They will also be provided for Pump Manifold, Pump Bay & Road Tanker Loading gantry. Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves have been made in such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any possible area. b) Spray Protection system Storage tanks containing motor spirit shall be provided with water sprinkler system. Perforated spray water pipes shall be provided around the shell of the storage tanks and shall be located at the top of the shell. Fire Fighting Systems has been designed as per guidelines of OISD-117 and TAC rules. (ii) Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus Following types of Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus shall be provided in vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative block, control Room, Fire Water Pump House. MCC etc. as per OISD guidelines. S.No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers (i) Storage of Class-A/B products 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2. In packed containers and stored In open/closed area (ii) Pump House upto 50 HP (Class - A & B) Above 50 – 100 HP pump.Beyond 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg. DCP for each pump. Pump House upto 50 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4 (Class – C) pumps upto 50 HP Above 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG DCP for 4 pumps. (iii) Tank Truck loading and unloading 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2 Bays for POL/speciality products and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile unit for each gantry. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (iv) Tank Wagon loading and unloading gantry (siding) 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile (v) Above ground Tank 1x 4 x 75 Kg. unit per Underground Tank Farms (vi) (vii) Fire Pump House Admn. Building / Store House unit in each siding. Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 25 Kg. DCP per tank and or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile installation. 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg. DCP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2 pumps. 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2. (minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on each (viii) Kg. floor) Generator Room upto 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5 Above 250 KVA CO2 for every Generator 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP (ix) m2 Main Switch Room 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25 (x) Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2 nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2 or 1 no. per Cabin whichever is higher (xi) (xii) (xiii) CO2 (xiv) DCP (xv) CO2 Security Cabin Canteen Laboratory 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg. Effluent Treatment Plant 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg. Workshop Extinguisher 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg. Extinguisher (xvi) (xvii) Transformer UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.11.5 Safety Valves To prevent building of pressure and consequent damage two numbers of pressure vacuum valves shall be provided on the roof of MS tanks to release pressure. 1.12 Risk Assessment 1.12.1 Introduction The Jasidih Terminal of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for receipt, storage and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguard is being taken in design, installation and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment. However, in the event of release of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chances of explosion are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis. Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for consequence analysis are manifolds like  Computation of risk.  Aid better plant layout.  evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties & human lives.  Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.  Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.  Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan. The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also gives the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the area an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be taken. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.11.2 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small dia pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms, leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to overpressure, pump mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage. 1.11.3 Damage Criteria The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to thermal radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released since the petroleum products are highly inflammable specially Motor Sprit oil whose flash points is low. The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally spread on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release from a pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present in the petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet as well as liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage tanks due to ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may also be regarded as pool fire. Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of burns on human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table - 1.5. Table 1.5 Damage Due to Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity Incident Thermal Radiation Intensity KW/M2 Type of Damage 37.5 Can cause heavy damage to process equipment, piping, building etc. 32.0 12.5 8.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks. Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood. Maximum heat flux for uninsulated tanks. Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 sec. (First Degree Burn). Will cause no discomfort to long exposure. Equivalent to solar radiation. 4.5 1.6 0.7 Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.6 Physiological Effects of Threshold Thermal Doses Dose Threshold KJ/M2 375 250 125 Effect 3rd Degree Burn. 2nd Degree Burn. 1st Degree Burn. Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin caused. 65 1st Degree Burn  Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example - sun burn. 2nd Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus some portion of dermis. 3rd Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous tissues may also be damaged. In case of motor spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure is given in Table 1.7. Table 1.7 Damage Effects Due to Blast over Pressure Blast Over Pressure (Bar) 0.30 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.01 Damage Type Major Damage to Structures Eardrum Rupture Repairable Damage Damage of Glass Crack of Windows 1.11.4 Dispersion and Stability Class In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapour plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion is mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. One of the characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an important role in dispersion of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature profile. Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under adiabatic, or neutral condition is approximately 1oC per 100 metres. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1oC per 100 metres. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F A = Extremely unstable B = Moderately unstable C = Slightly unstable (a) D = Neutral E = Stable F = Highly stable 1.11.5 Selected Failure Cases The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the probable failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table 1.8. Table 1.8 List of Failure Cases Sl. Failure Scenarios No. 1] Tanks on Fire i) MS Tank ii) SKO Tank iii) HSD Tank 2] Vessel connection failure for inlet / outlet lines of MS, SKO, HSD tanks 3] Gasket failure in pump discharge line SKO, MS and HSD (Road Tanker Loading Pump) 4] Failure of 3” dia loading arm (i) MS, (ii) SKO & (iii) HSD 5] Hole in pump discharge lines (25 mm) HSD, SKO & MS (Road Tanker Loading) 6] Mechanical seal failure for MS, SKO & HSD pumps for Tank truck loading Likely Consequences Thermal Radiation Thermal radiation for MS, SKO & HSD and also explosion for MS Thermal radiation - do - Credible/ Non-credible Partially-Credible Partially-Credible Credible Partially-Credible - do - Credible Thermal radiation Credible Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 7] Ethanol pump discharge line full bore failure. Thermal radiation Non-Credible It will be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered for Consequence Analysis. 1.12 Consequence Analysis Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate and identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures in operational phase to prevent and mitigate such failure events. 1.12.1 Storage Tanks on Fire Two numbers of floating roof tanks of capacity 4241 KL each and another additional one number of capacity 2212 KL for storage of Motor Spirit, 2 nos. for storage capacity of 5303 KL each and 2 nos. of 2604 KL each for H.S.D (Cone. roof) and 2 nos. of 938 KL and 1 no. 3006 KL for SKO (Cone roof). 3 nos. of Ethanol Tanks (Underground) each of capacity 70 KL will be provided. In addition to dykes the tanks of different products will also be provided with fire wall around them. A floating roof tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites the vapour being released from the rim vent, causing fire. Vapours coming out of vents of cone. roof tanks can catch fire by lightning. If the fire is not controlled at the initial stage it can lead to collapse of the roof and total liquid becomes exposed to fire. The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is intense thermal radiation. The thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire can cause damage to nearby tanks and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code, thermally protected facilities and storage tanks can withstand a thermal radiation of 32 KW/M2 while unprotected tanks and process facilities can withstand only upto 8 KW/M2. Normal persons can withstand an intensity of 1.5 KW/M2 for a long duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 KW/M2 can cause 1st degree burn if a man is exposed for more than 20 seconds. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are shown in Table 1.9. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.9 Hazard Distances Due to Storage Tanks on Fire (All distances are from edge of the tanks) Incident Thermal Radiation KW/M2 MS TANK (DIA-20 M) 37.5 32.0 12.5 8.0 4.5 HSD TANK (DIA-22.0 M) 37.5 32.0 12.5 8.0 4.5 SKO TANK (DIA-16 M) 37.5 32.0 12.5 8.0 4.5 1F Hazard distances (m) for 2B 3D 5D NR NR 13 14 15 NR NR 13 14 15 NR NR 13 14 15 NR NR 13 14 15 NR 9 13 14 15 NR 9 12 13 14 NR 9 12 13 14 NR 9 12 13 14 NR 9 9 10 11 NR 9 9 10 11 NR 9 9 10 11 NR 9 9 10 11 NR = Not Reached It is seen from the above table that in case of tank fire for MS the hazard distance for thermal radiation level for 8 KW/M2 will extend upto a distance of 14 m. In case of tank fire for HSD distances to 8 KW/M2 is 14 m and for SKO tank distances to 8 KW/M2 is 10 m. All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system. It is also seen that the distances upto 8 KW/M2 remain within the battery limit of the proposed installation. However, such tanks fires are very very rare. Also the vapour pressure of HSD and SKO being much low at atmospheric temperature, the chances of ignition of vapour are very low and practically nil. 1.12.2 Vessel connection failure for tank inlet/outlet lines All the storage tanks are having two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at bottom of the tank. Diameter of inlet/outlet lines from storage vessels are - 12"/14", 12"/10" and 12"/14" for MS Tank, SKO Tank and HSD Tank respectively. Such vessel connection failure is very rare i.e. 3x10-6. In case of failure of such nozzles liquid will spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited if the vapours come into contact with an ignition source. Hazard distances for 37.5 Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand KW/m2, 32 KW/m2, 12.5 KW/ m 2, 8 KW/ m 2 and 4.5 KW/ m 2 are calculated and presented in Table 1.10. Table 1.10 Hazard Distances Due to Pool Fire (All distances are from edge of the dyke) Incident Thermal Radiation KW/M2 1F MS TANK NOZZLE FAILURE 37.5 NR 32.0 NR 12.5 41 8.0 43 4.5 47 Incident Thermal Radiation KW/m2 1F SKO TANK NOZZLE FAILURE 37.5 NR 32.0 NR 12.5 33 8.0 35 4.5 37 HSD TANK NOZZLE FAILURE 37.5 NR 32.0 NR 12.5 45 8.0 47 4.5 50 Hazard distances (m) 2B 3D 5D NR NR NR NR 43 43 45 45 48 47 Hazard distances (m) 2B 3D NR NR 43 45 47 5D NR NR 34 35 36 NR NR 34 35 36 NR NR 36 36 37 NR NR 46 47 49 NR NR 46 47 49 NR NR 46 47 48 NR = Not Reached Ignition of the pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside the dyke and nearby equipment/pipeline. As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS tank nozzle failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along wind and may come into some ignition source causing vapour cloud explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table 1.11. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.11 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (MS) S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. Wind Speed m/sec./Stability Class 1F 2B 3D 5D Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 156 171 213 171 181 209 211 221 250 171 208 232 It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances may extend outside battery limit of the plant in the direction of wind flow. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS extend upto 211 metres. However, since the failure probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare. 1.12.3 Gasket Failure in Pump Discharge Lines Gasket failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. The pump discharge lines diameters are 8" for MS, 10" for HSD and 8" for SKO. Failure area of 25% on the perimeter of the gasket for MS & SKO and 20% for HSD and 3 minutes release is considered before ignition as it is assumed that action will be taken for stopping the leakage by that time. Hazard distances for 37.5 KW/ m 2, 32 KW/ m 2, 8 KW/ m 2, 4.5 KW/ m 2 and 1.6 KW/ m 2 are calculated and presented in Table 1.12. Table 1.12 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Failure of Gaskets In Pump Discharge Lines (All distances are from centre of the pool) Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) Radiation 1F 2B 3D KW/m2 MS PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.01 kg/sec. 37.5 12 13 13 32.0 13 14 14 12.5 31 32 32 8.0 34 34 34 4.5 37 36 36 SKO PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec. 37.5 11 11 11 32.0 13 13 13 12.5 47 47 47 8.0 49 48 48 4.5 51 51 50 HSD PUMP GASKET FAILURE - Release Rate: 4.36 kg/sec. 37.5 13 13 13 32.0 14 14 14 5D 13 14 33 34 36 11 13 48 49 50 13 14 Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 12.5 8.0 4.5 47 49 51 47 48 51 47 48 50 48 49 50 Table 1.13 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due To MS Pump Discharge Line Gasket Failure Sl. Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of Wind Speed No m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar . 1. 1F 42 45 51 2. 2B 52 53 58 3. 3D 52 63 67 4. 5D 51 53 57 It is seen that in case of failure of gaskets in pump discharge lines pool fire thermal radiation distances for 37.5/32 KW/ m 2 are 13/14 m, 11/13 & 13/14 m in case of MS, SKO and HSD respectively. For gasket failure in HSD line, the distances for target radiation of 8 KW/ m 2 and 4.5 KW/ m 2 are 49 m and 51 m respectively from pool centre and may go outside the Depot premises towards canal. In case of vapour cloud explosion for MS pump discharge lines the distances to 0.3 bar / 0.1 bar /0.03 bar extend upto a distance of 52 m / 63 m/ 67 m respectively. Hence, in case of any leakage immediate action has to be taken to prevent any fire/explosion and to put out the fire. 1.12.4 Snapping of 4 inches diameter loading arm for Tank Truck Loading Failure probability of 4 inches diameter loading arm is in the order of 3x10-8 per hour of operation. Although the probability is very low, however the failure scenario is taken for calculation of hazard distances due to failure of loading arm for different products. The consequences have been calculated for 3 minutes release as it is assumed that action will be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to snapping of loading arm for different products are presented in Table 1.14. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.14 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to Loading Arm Failure (All distances are from centre of the pool) Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) Radiation 1F 2B 3D KW/m2 MS LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 12.6 kg/sec. 37.5 NR NR NR 32.0 17 17 18 12.5 50 50 51 8.0 54 54 54 4.5 58 57 56 SKO LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 16.2 kg/sec. 37.5 NR NR NR 32.0 NR NR NR 12.5 85 86 86 8.0 88 88 88 4.5 93 91 91 HSD LOADING ARM FAILURE - Release Rate: 20.0 kg/sec. 37.5 NR NR NR 32.0 NR NR NR 12.5 94 95 95 8.0 97 97 97 4.5 102 101 100 5D NR 20 50 52 54 NR NR 85 86 88 NR NR 95 97 99 It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 4 inches diameter loading arm for Tank Truck Loading action has to be taken to stop leakage immediately as well as for prevention of fire. Table 1.15 Hazard Distances Due to Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (MS) S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. Wind Speed m/sec./Stability Class 1F 2B 3D 5D Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 77 93 104 104 85 95 108 107 105 103 120 117 1.12.5 Creation of 25 mm dia hole in Pump Discharge Line Formation of hole in a pipeline is a credible phenomenon as corrosion may occur if proper protection is not taken. 25 mm dia hole has been chosen for risk analysis. Due to formation of 25 mm dia hole in pump discharge lines the liquid at high pressure will pass through the small opening in the form of jet. The jet of liquid may be ignited if it comes into contact with any ignition source. The ignited jet may damage any object in its path causing subsequent fire and domino effect. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Jet fire is possible in case of flammable liquids with relatively high flash point i.e. MS. Even if ignition of jet does not take place, the liquid will fall on ground and may cause "pool fire". Hazard distances due to pool fire for such release and ignition of the pool is presented in Table - 1.16. Table 1.16 Hazard Distances to Pool Fire Due to 25 MM Dia Hole of Pump Discharge Lines Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) Radiation 1F 2B 3D 5D KW/M2 MS - Release Rate: 5.12 kg/sec. 37.5 12 13 13 13 32.0 13 17 17 17 12.5 35 35 36 36 8.0 37 37 38 38 4.5 41 40 40 40 SKO - Release Rate: 5.47 kg/sec. 37.5 13 16 16 16 32.0 14 17 17 17 12.5 52 52 53 53 8.0 54 54 54 54 4.5 57 56 56 55 HSD - Release Rate: 5.75 kg/sec. 37.5 19 16 16 16 32.0 20 17 17 17 12.5 53 53 54 54 8.0 55 55 55 55 4.5 58 58 57 57 Frequency of formation of 25 mm dia hole in 200 mm dia pipeline is 1.1x10-6/m/year and the same for 250 mm dia pipeline is 9.2x10-7/m/year. The distances for 8 KW/M2 for MS, SKO and HSD due to leakage through 25 mm dia hole in Road Tanker loading pump discharge lines are 38 m, 54 m and 55 m respectively. Ignition of the pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks and nearby equipment. As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Table 1.17 Hazard Distances to UVCE Due to 25 MM Dia Hole in MS Pump Discharge Line Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of S. m/sec./Stability No. 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar Class 1. 1F 52 54 59 2. 2B 51 53 57 3. 3D 62 63 68 4. 5D 61 63 67 It is evident from the above table that the distance to heavy damage (0.3 bar) extends upto 62 m. 1.12.6 Pump Mechanical Seal Failure The frequency of failure of mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling light hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to fire and explosion. Failure of seal releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the plant. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not effect their release rate or the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 1 mm for MS & SKO and 50 mm shaft diameter and 1 mm seal gap for HSD pump have been assumed for release rate calculation. The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table 1.18 below: Table 1.18 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire For Pump Mechanical Seal Failure Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) Radiation 1F 2B 3D KW/M2 MS PUMP - Release Rate: 0.72 kg/sec. 37.5 7 7 7 32.0 8 8 8 12.5 15 15 15 8.0 16 16 16 4.5 17 17 17 SKO PUMP - Release Rate: 0.74 kg/sec. 37.5 7 7 7 32.0 9 9 9 5D 7 8 15 16 12 7 9 Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 12.5 20 8.0 21 4.5 22 HSD PUMP - Release Rate: 1.06 kg/sec. 37.5 8 32.0 9 12.5 24 8.0 25 4.5 27 20 21 22 20 21 22 20 21 22 8 9 24 25 26 8 9 24 25 26 8 9 24 25 26 The above table shows that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2 may extend up to distance of 27 meters from centre of the pool for pool fire for pump mechanical seal failure. 1.12.7 Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Failure The Ethanol pump takes its suction from the Ethanol tank and pumps it for blending with MS. In case of Ethanol pump discharge line failure ethanol shall fall and spread on the ground .The spilled liquid forms liquid pool and catches fire resulting in pool fire. The results of the above consequence envisaged are presented here below in Table 1.19. Table 1.19 Hazard Distances to Thermal Radiation Due to Pool Fire (b) For Ethanol Pump Discharge Line Full Bore Failure S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Thermal Load KW/m2 37.5 32.0 12.5 8.0 4.5 1F 11 12 21 26 33 Distance (m) from centre of the pool Release Rate: 2.57 kg/sec. 2B 3D 15 16 16 17 24 24 28 28 35 34 5D 17 18 24 27 33 From the above Table - 1.19, it is evident that the distance to thermal radiation of 4.5 KW/m2 extends to a distance of 35 meter in case of full bore failure in pump discharge line. It is also evident that distance to 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m 2 remains confined within the factory boundary. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.13 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm of damage being caused to life, property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/ accidental release of any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to failure of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like: (a) Quantity and physical properties of material released. (b) Source of ignition. (c) Wind velocity and direction (d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby. Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available nor any statutory authority has tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be used under Indian condition. Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A. and European Countries are given in Table 1.20. Table 1.20 Failure Frequency Data S.No. 1] 2] 3] Item Shell Failure (a) Process/pressure vessel (b) Pressurised Storage Vessel Full Bore Vessel Connection Failure (Diameter mm) < 25 ........ 40 ........ 50 ........ 80 ........ 100 ........ >150 ……. Full Bore Process Pipeline Failure d <50 mm ........ 50 150 mm ........ Failure Frequency / 106 Years 3 1 30 10 7.5 5 4 3 0.3 * 0.09 * 0.03 * Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 4] Articulated Loading / unloading arm failure 3x10-8** * Failure frequency expressed in (/m/106 years) ** Failure frequency expressed in (/hr of operation) 1.14 Recommendations & Conclusions The recommendations and conclusions as revealed from Risk analysis Study are as follows: (i) The Individual Risk value of 1.0 E-6/year as evident from the Iso-Risk Contour (Drg. No. 2) is confined mainly within the plant premises. Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis also reveals that in most of the cases hazard is confined within the plant premises. Hence, installation of the Terminal of the place is safe from risk point of view. (ii) The fire fighting system for storage tanks shall be designed conforming to OISD norms. Fire hydrant network should be considered taking into consideration of additional cooling water required in addition to the tank on fire. (iii) Health check and maintenance of the equipment and pipelines should be done at regular intervals to avoid any major failure. (iv) Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at regular intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures. (v) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should be always kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should also be checked and kept in good working condition. (vi) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals. (vii) To reduce the failure frequency due care has been taken in design, construction, inspection and operation. Well-established codes of practices will have been followed for design, inspection and construction of the facility. (viii) The installation should be operated by experienced personnel trained for operation of such facility and also in fire fighting. (ix) Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the installation. (x) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any spark. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (xi) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Lorry Filling Shed should be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static electricity. (xii) Vents in case of cone roof tanks should be provided with wire mesh. (xiii) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area. (xiv) Good liaison should be maintained with outside organisation and District Administration, hospitals and nursing homes in the locality. (xv) A mutual aid agreement should be done with nearby industries, hospitals, nursing homes, so that help may be obtained in case of any major hazard. DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) 1.15 Introduction The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is prepared for meeting any emergency response in the event of fire accident, hazards etc., through the effective and optimum utilization of all the facilities inbuilt in the plant and available in the neighbouring areas as such. This plan has got two sub chapters, First chapter guides for meeting the „On - Site Emergency” and the Second chapter guides “Off - Site Emergency”. This off- site emergency response is prepared to ensure the participation of all the concerned civil agencies in and around this plant with a view to seek their preparedness in meeting such emergencies and to bring about a coordinated task force involving in district authorities. Fire service department, railways, factories inspectorate, electricity board and other protection forces available in similar type of industries meeting of all the above agencies is also the method of operation of „ On site Emergency Plan / Disaster Management Plan”. Disaster management plan will have necessary scope for review of its effectiveness in its working and adapting to any new systems of further improving upon the implementation of the plan itself. The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation and smooth production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and instruments for safe operation Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant by trained manpower. In spite of all precautions accidents may happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases and liquids, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc. The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for loss surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. pre-planned procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimize the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible. 1.16 Statutory Requirement Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for IOCL‟s Jasidih Terminal. The applicable regulations are: (a) Factories Act, 1948 and as amended (b) Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994. (c) Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996. (d) Stipulations of OISD-168 (e) Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of the rule, Manufacture, storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and amended in 1994. 1.17 Objective of Disaster Management Plan Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster: The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any emergency situation in order to: Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources b) Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside. c) Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment. d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties. e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions. The above objectives can be achieved by – i) Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario. ii) Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and manpower) iii) Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities as well as warning procedure. 1.18 Definitions Disaster Disaster is a general term, which implies a hazardous situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous materials, which poses threat to the safety of workers, residents in the neighbourhood, the environment or property. Emergency Emergency condition and Disaster Condition are synonymous. ON-SITE Emergency/Disaster In an On-Site Emergency the effect of any hazard (fire/explosion/release of toxic gases) are confined within the factory premises. An accident taking place inside the depot and its effects are confined within the boundary wall. OFF-SITE Emergency/Disaster In case of any hazard inside IOCL, Jasidih Terminal the effects that are also felt outside the boundary wall. 1.19 Description of Industrial Activity Name and Address of the person furnishing the information Chief Terminal Manager Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (MD) Jasidih Terminal, Jasidih Industrial Area, Jasidih, Dist: Deoghar, Jharkhand Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (a) Site Location The pipeline terminal is located in the village Badladih (Jasidih) in the district of Deoghar in Jharkhand. The Terminal is being set up on 27 acres of land owned by Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (b) Population around Site There is no any major habitation within a radius of 1.0 KM of the factory. (c) Activities & Facilities A brief description the activities in Jasidih Terminal are: i) Receipt of the petroleum products e.g. Motor Spirit, SKO, and HSD shall be received through a pipeline tap-off from Haldia - Barauni pipeline near Jasidih. ii) Existing and proposed tankages details are as follows: A. Existing Tankages SIZE DIA X HT PRODUCT 1 TAG. NO. T -101 MS NORMAL CAPACITY 4241 KL TANK TYPE FR 20m DIAx 14.5m HT 2 T-102 3 T-103 20m DIAx 14.5m HT MS 4241 KL FR A 16m DIAx 14m HT MS 2212 KL FR A 4 T-104 22m DIAx 14m HT HSD 5303 KL CR B 5 T-105 22m DIAx 14m HT HSD 5303 KL CR B 6 T-106 16m DIAx 13m HT HSD 2604 KL CR B 7 T-107 16m DIAx 13m HT HSD 2604 KL CR B 8 T-108 16m DIAx 15m HT SKO 3006 KL CR B 9 T-109 10m DIAx 12m HT SKO 938 KL CR B 10 T-110 10m DIAx 12m HT SKO 938 KL CR B 11 T-111 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A 12 T-112 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A 18 T-113 3m DIAx 10.5m LONG ETHANOL 70 KL HOR. A 13 T-116 10m DIAx9m HT MS 500 KL FR A 14 T-120 2.0m DIAx 6.0 LG HSD 20KL U/G TOTAL 32120 KLS SR.NO. CLASS A B 13 T-114 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR 14 T-115 24m DIAx 15m HT WATER 5600 KL CR SUB TOTAL 11200 KL B. Proposed Tankages & 4 bottom loading bays 15 T-116 24m DIA x20m HT HSD 9025 KL CR B 16 T-117 26m DIA x20m HT MS 10592 KL IFRVT A 17 T-118 14m DIA x 14m HT SKO 2100 KL CR B Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand SUB TOTAL 21717 KL GRAND TOTAL 53837 KL iii) Pump House 10 Nos. electrical driven centrifugal pumps have been proposed in pump house for Road Tanker filling. Details of pumps provided are as follows: Product Service Type (Capacity LPM) Head (m) No. of Pumps MS Loading 4000 42 1+1 = 2 HSD Loading 6000 40 3+1 = 4 SKO (PDS) Loading 4000 40 1+1 = 2 SKO (IND) Loading 2400 40 1+1 = 2 Ethanol Mixing 200 200 3 iv) Tank Lorry Filling / Tank Lorry Decantation Tank Lorries are filled in filling bay by pumping products from storage tank to filling bay. 12 Nos. of bays are provided. The discharge pipeline branches are connected to tank Lorries by loading arm through a flow control valve and flow meter. The tank Lorries are properly earthed before receiving the petroleum products. 1.20 Safety Related Utilities i) Water Fire water requirement is as per norms of OISD-117. Water Storage Facilities: As per OISD-117 (Two water tanks) Source of Water: Deep wells provided inside the depot. Fire hydrants/monitors shall be provided in all the vulnerable areas of the plant. All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer system & all MS tanks will be provided with sprinkler system. ii) Power Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand The terminal‟s power requirement is supplied by J.S.E.B. at 11 KV and Emergency power: DG Set. 1.21 Disaster Planning Modern approach to disaster management plan involves a) Risk analysis Study b) Action Plan Risk analysis study involves a) Risk Identification b) Risk Evaluation Risk identification involves i) Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten public health and damage to the environment. ii) Identification of risk, important processes & areas to determine effective risk reduction measures. Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards with damage distances (which is termed as consequence analysis) as well as estimation of frequencies of the events. Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with respect to fire & explosion have already been mentioned in earlier section. However, failure rate of different hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data available for similar incidents outside India. Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on – a) Wind speed b) Wind direction c) Atmospheric stability d) Source of ignition and also e) Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind. Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or more of the following: a) Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand b) Augment facilities for safety, fire fighting, medical (both equipment and manpower) as per requirements of risk analysis. c) Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site. d) Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling hazards/emergencies at any time-day or night. 1.22 Identification of Hazards 1.22.1 General Nature of Hazard In Jasidih Terminal petroleum products to be handled are highly inflammable and also have explosive properties. Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished at early stage can cause large scale damage and may have a cascading effect. Hence the terminal requires. a) A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned safety and fire fighting system. b) Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems safely. c) Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of emergency. d) Well planned Disaster Management Plan. 1.22.2 Hazardous areas of the Plant The plant activities handling petroleum products can be subdivided into the following: Activities Place a) Receipt of petroleum products i) Pipeline Manifold. b) Petroleum products storage i) Tank Farm Area c) Petroleum products pumping d) Dispatch of petroleum products 1.22.3 Hazard Scenarios and effects i) Pump House i) Road Tanker Loading Bay This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter on Risk Analysis. However, a brief outline is given in the following table: S.No. 1. Scenarios Tank on Fire. Effect/Effect Distances Fire in any one storage tank can damage the tank as well as other tanks in the immediate vicinity and may have a cascading effect. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 2. 3. Vessel connection Failure / Catastrophic Failure of Storage Tank. Gasket Failure in Pump Discharge Line. 4. Hole in Pump Discharge lines. 5. Failure of loading Arm. Mechanical seal failure of pumps. Ethanol pump discharge line FB failure. 6. 7. Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire is not tackled immediately. Explosion can occur due to failure of MS tank nozzle failure/MS tank catastrophic failure. Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion, damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other properties. Can cause pool fire/jet fire and explosion, damaging adjoining pipelines, tanks and other properties. Can cause fire/explosion damaging the trucks, pipelines and entire loading bay. Can cause fire damaging the pipelines and other pumps. Can cause pool fire/jet fire, damaging adjoining pipelines and other properties. All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum damage can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in case of tank fire. In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions may be (I) Hot work in the vicinity (ii) Smoking (iii) Lightning (iv) Generation of static electricity (v) Radiant heat from outside. (v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage. 1.23 Safety Related Components Provided in the Depot 1.23.1 Safety Measures: Jasidih Terminal is being provided with safety related measures right in the design stage, which will minimize any accident e.g. i) Layout of the plant with sufficient safety distances. ii) Use of proper material of construction for equipment and piping iii) Storage tanks provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height. iv) All MS tanks & HSD tanks of dia 22m shall be provided with foam pourer system & all MS tanks will be provided with water sprinkler system. v) Pumps shall be provided with mechanical seals to avoid spillage through gland. vi) All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/ intrinsic safety type in licensed area. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand vii) Proper earthing of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for filling/despatch of petroleum products. viii) Loading Arm shall be provided whose failure rate is much lower than loading hoses. ix) Provision of oil separation in Oil Separator for separation of oil to avoid any oily water going out of the depot or spoiling ground water. x) Arrangement of fire hydrants monitors and hose boxes have been kept in all the hazardous areas and fire water storage tanks. xi) Use of level indicators and level control measures with alarm system to ensure storage tanks are filled upto the desired level only. xii) Use of flow control devices and meters for tank truck filling to ensure that each compartment in the tank truck is filled to the desired level. xiii) Provision of portable fire extinguishers at vulnerable places to extinguish fire. xiv) The plant shall be properly guarded by a boundary wall of sufficient height. xv) Licensed area shall be properly guarded for any unauthorized entry of personnel. xvi) All areas in the depot shall be properly illuminated through lighting. Requisite numbers of High Mast Towers have been proposed around the depot for better illumination. xvii) Emergency Diesel Generator Sets are being provided to ensure operation and illumination during power failure. xviii) Emergency shutdown switch shall be provided to stop all operations. 1.23.2 Other Safety Measures Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures which are to be taken during operational phase are as follows: a) Safety measures Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the plant to avoid emergency & hazardous situation. i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down and any maintenance work. ii) Follow permit to work system. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done. iv) Isolate the part, machine properly on which work is to be done. v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be done. vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be done. vii) Use non-sparking tools. b) Plant Inspection Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to reduce failure probability of containments. i) Storage vessels and pipeline should be checked regularly during both their construction and operational phase. ii) Critical trips, interlocks & other instruments should be checked regularly to avoid fail danger situation. iii) Fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure proper functioning during emergency situation. iv) Proper lightning protection system should be provided and checked regularly to avoid lightning effect. c) Performance or Condition Monitoring A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out especially for large machines and equipment, which may be responsible for serious accidents/disaster in case the defined limits are crossed. i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pumps, DG sets etc. ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of storage vessels, Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc. Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are available. X-ray radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle testing, eddy current inspection techniques etc. are used for detection of flaws and progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipments are also there for checking vibration, speed, torque etc. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by internal/external agencies. Immediate corrective measures should be taken if any flaws are detected. d) Preventive Maintenance A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries should be prepared based on experience in other similar plants as well as instruction of the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during operation as well as planned shutdown period. e) Entry of Personnel Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises. The persons entering the plant should not carry matches, lighters etc. f) Hot work Hot work should not be permitted except in-designated areas with utmost precaution and proper work permit. 1.23.3 Details of Fire Fighting Facilities Modern fire fighting facilities shall be provided in the depot in line with norms of OISD. i] Fire Hydrant System The entire TERMINAL area shall be provided with a looped fire hydrant pipeline connected to fire engines on auto system and always kept under pressure to meet emergencies. Two numbers of fire water storage tanks (adequate capacity) shall be provided, which are kept full and take care of fire fighting requirement for four hours. The source of water shall be tube wells provided inside the depot. The fire hydrant line shall be equipped with required numbers of single/double headed hydrant valves, monitors and hoses. The system can also be connected to foam making branches for generating foam for extinguishing the fire. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand ii] Sprinkler System Water sprinkler system with spray nozzles have been proposed for three numbers of MS, SKO and HSD storage tanks for cooling the tanks if required. iii] Portable Fire Fighting Equipment Following portable fire fighting equipment have been proposed in the plant as per OISD: Sl. No. Type of Area Portable Extinguishers i] Storage of Class-A/B products In packed containers and stored In open/closed area 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2. ii] Pump House upto 50 HP (Class - A & B) Above 50 – 100 HP Beyond 100 HP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 2 pumps Pump House upto 50 HP (Class – C) Above 50 HP iii] Tank Truck loading and unloading bays for POL/speciality products unit iv] Tank Wagon loading and unloading gantry (siding) mobile v] Above ground Tank Underground Tank Farms vi] Fire Pump House vii] Admn. Building / Store House 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for each pump. 2 nos. 10 Kg. or 1 no. of 25 Kg. DCP for each pump. 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 4 pumps upto 50 HP 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 KG DCP for 4 pumps. 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2 and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP mobile for each gantry. 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 50 m length and 1 no. 75 Kg. DCP unit in each siding. Minimum 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg. DCP per tank and 4 x 75 Kg or 6 x 50 Kg. DCP mobile unit per installation. 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP or 1 x 25 Kg. DCP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for every 2 pumps. 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 200 m2. (Minimum 1 x 10 Kg. DCP on each floor) Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand viii] Generator Room upto 250 KVA CO2 for every Generator Above 250 KVA 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP and 1 no. 4.5 Kg. 2 nos. 4.5 Kg. & 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP 1 no. 4.5 Kg. CO2 for every 25 ix] m2 x] Main Switch Room Computer Room/Cabin Halon / Its proven equivalent – 2 nos. 0.6 / 1 Kg. for 50 m2 or 1 no. per Cabin whichever is higher xi] xii] xiii] Security Cabin Canteen Laboratory xiv] Effluent Treatment Plant xv] Workshop xvi] xvii] Transformer UPS / Charger Room 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP for 100 m2 1 x 10 Kg. DCP & 1 x 4.5 Kg. CO2 1 nos. 75 Kg. & 2 nos. 10 Kg. DCP Extinguisher 1 no. 10 Kg. DCP & 1 no. 2 kg. CO2 Extinguisher 1 no. 6.8 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher 1 no. 2 Kg. CO2 Extinguisher v] First Aid Jasidih Terminal have First Aid kits equipped with First Aid medicines as per factory act. 1.23.4 Emergency Control Centre & Shelter Room The emergency control centre shall be situated in the office building. The office room of Terminal In-charge shall be designated as Emergency Control Centre. P&T telephones, Alarms, Emergency Control Manual and Safety and Personal Protective Appliances have been arranged in sufficient numbers and kept in the room. Emergency Shelter The room has been proposed outside the licensed area for giving shelter to employees/other personnel who are not involved in emergency control actions. 1.23.5 Alarm and Communication System a] Alarm System i] Electrical Sirens and Hand Sirens shall be provided in office building/Emergency Control Room and other vulnerable areas like Tank Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Farm Area, Pump House, Receipt Manifold, TLF for warning the public as well as employees inside. ii] The sound of electrical siren shall be audible upto 3 KM. iii] For fire condition electrical siren will be wailing for minimum 2 minutes and for all clear signal it will be a straight run siren for 2 minutes. iv] For disaster condition the wailing sound shall be repeated with a minimum 10 seconds gap. b] Communication System For communication with officers/employees page phone services, manual call points and intercom services shall be provided with sufficient nos. of P&T telephones at different places including Sr. Depot Manager‟s room for communication with other agencies. 1.23.6 Mutual Aid It is not possible to combat large scale fire/disaster single handed effectively by any organization. Assistance of resources of fire fighting and other services are of utmost importance during the hour of crisis. Following type of mutual aids are envisaged: i] Assistance by fire fighting teams & equipment. ii] Medical and first aid assistance. iii] Assistance of vehicles for any emergency requirement. iv] Help in liaisoning with police, District Collectorate, Fire Brigade and Hospitals. 1.24 Disaster Control Plan The plan include three major plans – i] Equipment Plan ii] Organization Plan iii] Action Plan 1.24.1 Equipment Planning Equipment plan i.e. arrangement of fire fighting, safety, transport etc. has been discussed earlier. 1.24.2 Organization Plan The disaster management organization and action plan is made in such a way that it is capable of quick response at any time to meet emergency situation. The plan gives a Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand detailed chain of command, area of responsibility of each personnel involved, information flow pattern and coordination activity required to meet the emergency. A typical Disaster Management Organization Chart is given below: CHIEF EMERGENCY CONTROLLER  SITE EMERGENCY CONTROLLER  INCIDENT CONTROLLE R, FIRE FIGHTING INCIDENT CONTROLLER, SECURITY INCIDENT CONTROLLER , RESCUE, EVACUATION, TRANSPORT INCIDENT CONTROLLER , MEDICAL AID, WELFARE Chief Emergency Controller Chief Emergency Controller is the person to head the group during emergency situation. Generally chief of the installation e.g. Terminal In-charge shall be the Chief Emergency Controller. In his absence next man in the hierarchy or any designated officer shall take charge. Chief Emergency Controller is the ultimate authority in directing emergency operations. He will be assisted by other incident controllers i.e. i] Incident Controller - Fire fighting ii] Incident Controller - Security iii] Incident Controller - Medical Aid & Welfare iv] Incident Controller - Rescue, Evacuation, Transport & Welfare Main task of Chief Emergency Controller is to ensure that facilities are made available without any confusion. He also activates District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group for necessary action during Pre Emergency and during emergency period. He shall be responsible for – a] Essential communication & liaison with outside agencies. b] Fire fighting & rescue operations. c] Emergency plant shutdown and declare emergency. d] Demolition and repairs. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand e] Accident investigation. f] Ensuring safety of important records. g] Public relations for giving authoritative information to news media and others. h] Removal of casualties, giving information to their relatives & compensation i] Arranging medical aid for treatment of the injured. j] Bring back normalcy as early as possible. Site Emergency Controller He maintains close liaison between Chief Emergency Controller and other functional Incident Controllers and controls emergency at site. He coordinates with different team members to ensure that various activities are carried out promptly without any chaos. He acts as per guidance of Chief Emergency Controller and takes charge in absence of Chief Emergency Controller. The main functions of Site Emergency Controller are : i] Maintains close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller. ii] Controls operation depending on situation. Shut down loading and unloading operations and isolate storage area pipelines. iii] Give alarm siren to warn all employees and public. iv] Evacuate non essential persons to the designated place if required. v] Operate water sprinklers on storage tanks for cooling if fire is inside dyke or nearby. vi] Start fire fighting till arrival of designated fire fighting crew from inside and outside if necessary. vii] Initiate rescue operations and first aid to the injured person till the arrival of doctor and ambulance. viii] Notify adjacent factory authority and local administration. ix] Enforce entry of persons with authorized duties from outside with due care. Functions of other incident controllers are detailed below: Incident Controller – Fire Fighting He will keep close liaison with Chief Emergency Controller. His main functions are – Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand i] Arrange and keep necessary appliances and supplies to combat emergency. ii] Guide the fire fighting people under his command and render technical assistance to combat fire/emergency. iii] Establish barricade in the danger zone, if necessary. iv] Keep liaison with fire fighting team coming from outside. Incident Controller – Security His functions during emergency operation will be – i] Check entry of unauthorized personnel inside the installation. ii] Control mob and spectators. iii] Keep careful watch to prevent any further damage by sabotage. iv] Help fire fighting controller to cordon affected area/danger zone. Incident Controller – Rescue, Evacuation & Transport His functions are – i] Plan and organize rescue and evacuation services and train team members both inside and outside if necessary. ii] Arrange vehicles, ambulance etc. for transfer of injured personnel to nearby hospitals, rural health centres and nursing homes as per instruction of medical assistance coordinator/designated doctor. Incident Controller – Medical Aid & Welfare His functions are – i] Designate doctors from outside who can be available during emergency and keep liaison with them. ii] Prepare plant dispensary under readiness for emergency. iii] Call the designated doctor during emergency. iv] Provide first aid to the injured and arrange to transfer them to nearby hospitals, other designated doctors depending on the gravity of the injury. v] Arrange food and shelter to the evacuated employees. vi] Inform relatives of the victims. In Jasidih Terminal in-charge shall control all activities with the help of officers, workers, clerical staff, casual workers and security staff. All of them shall be trained in fire fighting and use of safety appliances. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand In case of any leakage of petroleum products or fire anybody witnessing the same should take immediate necessary action to stop leakage and extinguish fire with the help of fire extinguishers as well as inform Terminal In-charge through page phone or through messenger or shouting. In case of any fire or explosion Terminal In-charge takes charge of the situation and controls it with a well organized plan. If any accident e.g. fire occurs during night, security personnel shall attend it and in case of emergency Terminal In-charge and others shall be informed / called from their residence. 1.24.3 Action Plan This gives guidelines to prevent, control and terminate an emergency and consists of three parts. a) Pre-emergency action b) Action during emergency c) Post emergency actions Pre-Emergency Actions These are essentially PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE measures and are extremely important. They include mock drills, checking of fire fighting facilities, keeping personal protective equipments in good condition in proper places, medical equipments, scheduled checking of safely devices, safety audits, preventive maintenance, good house keeping, training of employees, education to the public and liaison with State Fire Services, Police and district administration etc. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Public Awareness In case of major accidents like large fire, explosion, effect of which may spread outside the plant boundary, people of the adjoining area may be panicky due to ignorance and may aggravate the problems. To avoid panic, the depot management will make easily understandable pamphlets in local language about the properties of petroleum products and actions to be taken by them during an Off-site Emergency. Training and education will also be imparted to the local public by audio-visual system with the help of local authorities. This will be done through Local Crisis Group consisting of District Administration. Mock Drills This is periodic simulation of emergency condition, sometimes in consultation with District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group. The sequence of operation undertaken by Disaster Management Team members and systems provided like alarm & communication system, information flow pattern etc. are carefully put into operation by competent officials and the deficiencies/problems are recorded. Based on this observation appropriate actions are taken to improve the efficiency of the plan. Training of Employees Regular training will be conducted to educate the employees about safely, fire fighting and Disaster Management. A selected number will be given intensive training in first aid, evacuation and rescue operation so that they can be utilized as a part of Disaster Control Team. Liaison with Police, District Administration & State Fire Services & Neighbouring Industries Help of Police and District Authorities are essential for off-site Emergency such as evacuation, transportation and treatment of individuals etc. In case of On-Site Emergency help of Police, District Administration, local hospitals and also fire services at Deoghar district headquarter may be required depending on the severity of the situation. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand Pre-Emergency functions of Site Controller are mainly a) Ensure implementation of Emergency Planning b) Ensure that all drafted for emergency are undergoing regular training. c) Ensure all disciplines are fully prepared for tackling emergency. d) Ensure that simulation of emergency condition is regularly arranged. e) Ensure preventive and pre-emptive measures. f) Keep liaison with outside agencies, police, district authorities etc. Pre-Emergency functions of other Incident Controllers and their team are a) Keep all the team members ready for tackling emergency. b) Ensure that all members understand their specific duties during emergency. c) Ensure regular participation of their team in mock drills. d) Ensure supply of adequate number of safety & fire fighting equipment in proper place and in good working condition. Actions during Emergency Actions to be taken by Chief Emergency Controller and other Incident Controller have been discussed in the Organization Plan. In short the actions are: a) Declare Emergency by electrical siren. b) Instruct total/partial shutdown. c) Arrange the team for tackling emergency. d) Ask for outside help, if necessary. e) Keep liaison with outside agencies and provide authoritative information to news media and others. Post Emergency Actions These are directed towards termination of emergency, restoration of normalcy and rehabilitation. It also includes identification of victims, information to their next of kin, notification to various government authorities, appointment of enquiry committee for identification of causes and suggestions to ensure that similar accident does not occur. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1.25 Disaster Combating Action Plan with Specific Reference to the Team As already stated number of officers and staff within plant are less and Terminal Incharge has to prepare the plan with available officers & staff only. a] During general shift on working days (Chief Emergency Controller) : Terminal In-charge Role: 1] Take overall charge of the situation. 2] Rush to the spot where fire/explosion has occurred. Issue instruction for speedy combating of the incident and preventing of damage to other areas. 3] Stop all operations locally/shut down complete plant. 4] Declare emergency and operate electrical siren to inform employees, authorities and public. 5] Inform nearby factory authorities over phone and ask for assistance. 6] Inform local Fire Brigade. 7] Inform higher authorities and seek assistance for coordination of civil authorities, Fire Tenders from State/other agencies. 8] Inform Chief Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers, Deoghar. b] Fire Combating Team In-charge : AM/DM (Operation) Assisted By : i] ii] iii] Operation Officer (Fire) Section In-charge, TLF/TLD Security Supervisor & Guards on duty. Role: On hearing Fire Alarm – 1] Rush to the disaster spot and organize the team for combating fire as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. 2] Security supervisor to ensure starting of Fire Engine and pressurization of fire hydrant. 3] Pump House Operator to stop all pumps and close all valves of the pumps as well tank body valves and join the team. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 4] Operator of TLF section to stop loading operations, remove loading arm properly and join the combating team as per directions of control room in-charge. Section In-Charge TLF/TLD to ensure the above and act for combating emergency as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. c] Emergency Rescue Team In-charge : Operation In-charge Assisted By : Security Guards on duty Role: On hearing the Fire Alarm – 1] In-charge to organize the team with office staff and other members as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. If needed the In-charge should seek assistance of outside agencies. 2] Remove the injured from the spot after taking proper safety and personal protective appliances. 3] Arrange for First Aid of the injured and hospitalization, if necessary as per instruction of Chief Emergency Controller. d] Emergency Team (Transport & Security) In-charge Assisted By : : Operation Officer (OO) Security Supervisor & Guards on duty Role: 1] Stop entry of all unauthorized personnel. 2] Arrange transport for taking the injured personnel for hospital. 3] Seek assistance for vehicles/ambulance from outside agencies & hospitals nearby as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. e] Emergency Auxiliary Team In-charge Assisted By : : Accounts Officer One Security Guard Role: On hearing Fire Alarm- Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 1] In-charge to rush to spot, coordinate with team as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller and organize the team and be ready for further instruction. 2] Get all the operations in the field stopped and all tank valves to be closed. Electric mains to be switched off. 3] The electrician to get ready with Fire Proximity Suit and other life saving equipment for any need. 4] To ensures that half-filled T/Ts do not run away with product and documents. 5] Take control of all employees in the field other than fire combating team. 6] Team In-charge to ensure uninterrupted supply of all available fire fighting equipments and materials as well as water to the combating team. 7] To supplement/replace injured or exhausted combating team persons. f] Fire during night time and on Holidays In-charge : Shift In-charge Assisted by : Security supervisor on duty Security guards on duty Role: 1] Shift In-charge Security Guard on duty seeing the fire, will shout Fire Fire and shall need assistance from other guards on duty in different pockets and shall fight the fire with nearest available fire equipments. 2] Subsequently, Shift In-charge/Security Supervisor on duty will telephone to the residence of Terminal In-charge and Asst. Manager (OPS). 3] Immediately telephone to Deoghar Fire Brigade and Police Station for assistance. 4] The Security Guards to control the gates and ensure that no unauthorized person enter the premises. 1.26 Role Orders for Disaster Combating Action Plan i] General Instructions (a) The In-charge of the section/sections (TLF) / Tank Lorry Decantation / Administrative Office etc. affected shall ensure to take immediate action Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand to isolate, close valves and mobilize enough equipment from nearby places. (b) In-charge of stores shall keep the list of equipment available at various locations and coordinate with auxiliary team in-charge who mobilises the materials. (c) Auxiliary team in-charge shall ensure replenishment of water to static water tanks from deep tube wells and nearby other sources. (d) After actions, Stores-in-charge to take inventory of all fire fighting items and to indent the shortfalls. (e) All those moving towards scene of incident shall move with fire fighting equipment available. ii] Pump House Role Orders – (a) Operator (Pump House) to stop all pumps. (b) Close all valves including those of main tanks. (c) Report combating team In-charge. iii] Administrative Block Role Orders – (a) Section officers to ensure stop all loading operations. (b) All T/Ts go out of TLF bays in orderly manner after closing T/T valves and manhole covers. (c) Closing of all valves at TLF manifold. (d) TLF officer to report to Fire Combating Team. (e) Others to report to Auxiliary Team In-charge with available fire fighting equipment. iv] Generator Room Role Orders – (a) Operator to remain in Generator House for instructions from Chief Emergency Controller. (b) To switch off unwanted electrical connections as instructed by Chief Emergency Controller. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand v] Stores Role Orders – (a) In-charge to keep ready all fire fighting/first-aid/personal protective materials and arrange speedy disbursement to the ECT/ERT crews. (b) To issue materials as per demand. (c) To liaise among Controllers / in-charges. (d) To make proper inventory of all items and shortfall to be identified as early as possible. vi] Security Guards on Duty Role Orders – (a) To control the gate by allowing contract labourers to go out, ordering, moving out of vehicles as instructed by Terminal in-charge with valid documents. (b) To prevent unauthorized entry of outsiders. (c) Security Guard posted at the main entrance gate to ensure proper control of traffic so that approach road is not blocked. Other Security Guards posted other than the gates, to report to their in-charge for further instruction. 1.27 a) Action Plan for Specific Cases Fire/Explosion in TLF Shed Facilities: 8 nos. of Filling Bays with multi-product filling points. Products handled: MS, SKO & HSD Structure: Entire TLF structure shall be of elevated iron structures with proper roof, iron platforms and movable iron ladders with chains fixed to each bay. Hazard Minimiser (a) TLF in-charge with his officers and staff (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Gel Blankets Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (g) Alarm (h) Combating as per disaster organisation chart Special References (a) Operate ESD Fire in filling shed should be attacked promptly with fire extinguishers. (b) Close all valves promptly. (c) Ensure orderly removal of TTs. (d) Stop spreading over of fire and call for help. (e) Put sand on small oil spills of fire to put off the fire by preventing source of O2. (f) Apply foam on burning oil on the floor. Apply foam gently so as not to scatter the burning oil and spread the fire. Apply foam from one side of the fire and with the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool. Remember that water destroys foam and water streams must not be turn on fire which is blanketed with foam. (g) Apply water cooling to neighbouring T/Ts. (h) Remove records/documents to safe place. (i) When oil is burning under the truck and tank is not leaking, remove the truck away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to cool the tank truck. (j) Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine, raise the hood direct the stream of fluid at the base of fire. (k) Use water or foam to fight fire in the cabin. (l) Use water to fight fire on the tires. (m) Whenever the leak is seen in the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the tank so that oil level will be above the leak. (n) In case of dome fire, close the dome cover immediately. b) Fire in Pump House Facilities: Building with sheet roof, electric power/diesel engine driven pumps. Hazard Minimiser (a) Staff members assigned to the pump house (b) Fire Extinguishers Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Gel Blankets (g) Main Switches in the Switch Room (h) Alarm (i) Fire Resistant Asbestos Suit Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart Special References(a) Operate ESD. Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading. (b) Shut down the pumps by cutting off power supply. (c) Remove any person who is working in the manifold. (d) Close all tank wagon valves and manifold valves. (e) Put foam on burning oil spills. (f) Put foam on burning oil spills. Do not splash burning oil. (g) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire. (h) Cool the manifold with water. (i) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water. (j) When burning oil is running from the pump house or out of a broken connection in the manifold, check the flow or direct it to the points where it will not endanger structures and the surrounding properties. c) Fire at small leak in pipeline 1] Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire extinguishers. 2] Shut off the flow of oil in the line by closing valves and by stopping pumping. 3] Cover the oil pool with sand and build up the sand so as to cover the leak. 4] Put foam on the burning oil pool. 5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the same in containers. 7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool. d) Bursting of Gasket / leakage through joints 1] Stop pumping. 2] Stop flow of oil through drain. Keep oil within limited area. 3] Close line valves. 4] Dig pits to collect oil. 5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. 6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the oil in containers. e) 7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool. 8] Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care. Fire in electric Sub-station / Transformer Room / Switch Room Facilities: HT OCB, HT Switch, FUSE UNIT TRANSFORMER: 450 KVA GENSETS, PANELS: 1X250 KVA, 1X75 KVA SWITCH ROOM, CONNECTION CABLES Hazard Minimisers (a) Generator operators and other employees (b) Fire extinguishers (c) Sand buckets (d) Main switches (e) Alarm (f) Earthing Action Plan as per disaster organisation chart Special Reference – (a) Cut off power supply by switching off the mains (b) Apply DCP/CO2 extinguisher or dry sand. (c) Call for outside help if required. (d) Do not allow anybody to touch any electrical appliances. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (e) Take action to prevent spreading of fire. (f) If fire is not extinguished, extinguish by spreading water with fog nozzle only after ensuring complete isolation of electrical supply. f) Fire in Tank Farm Facilities: Storage Tank: Floating Roof- 10694 KL (3 nos.) - for MS Storage Cone Roof - 4882 KL (2 nos.) - for SKO Storage Cone Roof - 15814 KL (3 nos.) - for HSD Storage Hazard Minimiser (a) All employees particularly the employees of loading/receipt section (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Sprinklers (g) Asbestos Suit (h) Alarm Disaster Combating Plan: As per Disaster Organization Chart Special Reference – (a) Operate ESD A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and explode if the tank contains product since flame arrestors are provided. (b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as well by wet jets. (c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion. (d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop loading/receipt of oil in tank. (e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire extinguishers. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (f) Call for help from outside agencies before fire is aggravated with the instruction of Chief Emergency Controller. g) Fire in Tank (a) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen inside is consumed unless temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled. Hence, care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go high by cooling with water sprinklers and jets. This also avoids possibility of tank rupture due to hydrostatic Pressure. (b) Care should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover the same. (c) In such cases, foam should be pumped inside the tank for blanketing the fire simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water and also removing the product by pumping it out to some other tank. (d) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in boil over and frothing at the surface. (e) When heavy ends like HSD burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below the surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer is of the order of 250 degree C to 300 degree C much above the boiling point of water. When water turns into steam, it expands approx. 1600 times and this result in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank resulting in spreading of fire. Hence, in case of such fires, cool down the tank by water sprinkler and also by continuous water jet on the tank shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use foam to smoothen fire. (f) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seals. Efforts should be made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank shell from outside. (g) Do not waste foam by using it for cooling. (h) Usage of water also should be in a controlled manner so that maximum benefit can be obtained. Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand h) Natural Calamities (i) High Wind Storms/Cyclones All structures/buildings in the depot have been designed to withstand cyclonic storms and hence not much of damage is anticipated. Action Plan (a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections. (b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if any tank collapse happens. (c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller. (d) Keep constant touch with local authorities – District Magistrate and Police authorities. (e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief Emergency Controller. (f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied. (g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures. (h) Avoid going on Terminal of high structures/storage tanks. (i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller. (ii) Lightning In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies may occur: (a) Fire in the tanks Action Plan: Already described under the topic of tank fire. (iii) Floods There is no river near the depot and in case of heavy rains during rainy season the rain water gets cleared through the drainage provided. Although the depot is not expected to get flooded, some precautionary measures need to be taken to avoid any situation arising out of flood. Action Plan (a) Keep in touch with District Authorities (b) Keep main gate closed (c) Keep round the clock vigil and water level inside/outside the depot Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand (iv) Earthquakes All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to (a) Fall of structures/buildings (b) Subsequent fire/explosion (c) Release of petroleum products Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various locations. k) Riots / Sabotage / War Action Plan (a) Close all gates. (b) Maintain tight security. (c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities. (d) Keep round the clock patrolling. (e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of requirement. 1.28 Important Telephone Numbers D.C. Deoghar : 232680 (O) 232720, 232967 ® 9431166999 (M) S.P. Deoghar : 232733 (O) 232777 ® 9431122777 (M) S.D.O. Deoghar : 232326 (O) 232327 ® 9431134140 (M) S.D.P.O. Deoghar : 232284 (O) Sadar Hospital, Deoghar : 222247 Fire Brigade, Deoghar 232260, 101 Deoghar Municipality : : 232786 (O) Risk Assessment &Disaster Management Plan for proposed expansion of Oil Terminal of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Jasidih, Tehsil & District-Deoghar, Jharkhand 9835354454 (M) Deoghar Thana : 100, 222304, 9431390692 (M) Jasidih Thana : 270234