Security Master Plan: Physical Security Design Criteria

Transcript

Comprehensive Master Plan Security Master Plan: Physical Security Design Criteria Final Report October 18, 2011 Prepared by: The Protection Engineering Group, Inc. 14900 Bogle Drive, Suite 200 Chantilly, VA 20151 703.488.9990 This page intentionally left blank ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Table of Contents 1. 2. Security Master Plan Overview ................................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3 2.1. Purpose ................................................................................................................ 3 2.2. Applicability.......................................................................................................... 3 2.3. Using this Document ............................................................................................ 4 2.4. Measure Substitution .......................................................................................... 4 3. Architectural ............................................................................................................... 5 3.1. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) ................................ 5 3.2. Site Planning and Design ...................................................................................... 9 3.3. Space Planning & Design.................................................................................... 15 3.4. Building Criteria ................................................................................................. 17 4. Landscape and Urban Design.................................................................................... 19 4.1. Landscape Design............................................................................................... 19 4.2. Urban Design...................................................................................................... 19 5. Mechanical ................................................................................................................ 23 5.1. General ............................................................................................................... 23 5.2. Elevators............................................................................................................. 24 6. Electrical .................................................................................................................... 25 6.1. General ............................................................................................................... 25 6.2. Lighting ............................................................................................................... 26 7. Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 29 7.1. Life Safety ........................................................................................................... 29 7.2. Fire Alarm Integration with Electronic Security System .................................... 29 8. Information Technology............................................................................................ 31 8.1. Radio Telemetry ................................................................................................. 31 8.2. Mass Notification ............................................................................................... 31 9. Electronic Security System Design and Integration .................................................. 33 9.1. Security Management System ........................................................................... 33 9.2. Physical Access Control System (PACS) ............................................................. 33 9.3. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) ....................................................................... 34 9.4. Video Assessment and Surveillance System (VASS) .......................................... 37 9.5. Security Intercommunications ........................................................................... 39 9.6. Security Closets .................................................................................................. 42 10. Abbreviations & Acronyms ....................................................................................... 45 11. References ................................................................................................................ 47 12. Security Design Criteria Matrix ................................................................................. 49 i ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 13. Preferred Equipment List (Template) ....................................................................... 51 14. ESS Configuration Template (Template) ................................................................... 55 14.1. Initial Descriptor................................................................................................. 55 14.2. Secondary Descriptor (128 character) ............................................................... 57 14.3. Linked Instruction Event .................................................................................... 57 14.4. Alarm / Event Mapping Requirements .............................................................. 58 15. Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (Template) ................................... 61 ii ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 1. Security Master Plan Overview A major focus of the Comprehensive Master Plan was to enhancing the safety and security of the University’s assets that include people, information, and facilities against security threats such as crime (traditional and non-traditional) and other hazards. The design team conducted an in-depth survey and analysis of the existing Security Program that provided recommendations on how best to improve ECU’s security posture. Overall, ECU has made a great deal of headway towards improving the safety and security of the University’s facilities in large part due to the individual efforts of staff members and departments. Many areas have implemented new procedures and equipment to mitigate potential threats, unfortunately this has not been coordinated as an overall campus effort. This has caused a duplication of effort and created a piece-meal security system with various levels of protection creating areas where security is considered insufficient. There is a significant lack of University level policies and procedures, minimal criteria for the selection and implementation of services or equipment, no University wide budget or procurement process for security related equipment or services, and the University has implemented multiple electronic security systems that are not integrated to function as a single system. Using this information the design aided ECU in developing a comprehensive University’s Strategic Security Plan and Security Master Plan as well as integrated security into the overall Campus Master Plan. The overarching concept was to establish a centralized security program that is committed to the development of a cohesive and consistent level of safety and security the University. This Strategic Security Plan has six strategic goals to facilitate progress toward meeting the vision and mission of ECU’s security program. Strategic Goal #1: Strategic Goal #2: Strategic Goal #3: Strategic Goal #4: Strategic Goal #5: Strategic Goal #6: Institute University Security Policies Establish a Centralized Security Organization Develop Security Plans Develop Security Operating Procedures and Programs Implement Physical Security Improvement Projects Establish New Police Facility The Security Design Criteria provides architectural and engineering (A/E) design teams, security consultants, and all ECU staff guidance for the designing and construction of ECU facilities. This document defines performance standards for physical security systems with information in key areas to ensure compliance with the goals and objectives stipulated in the University Strategic Security Plan and Master Plan for the University. This document defines the minimum security criteria required for ECU owned and leased facilities and the spaces and assets within those facilities. This document applies security measures consistently throughout ECU all spaces and 1 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 is an integral part of the planning, design, and construction of all projects. An objective of this manual is to provide cost effective design criteria that provides an appropriate level of protection to each facility. The most efficient way to implement security into a building and campus is through pre-design planning. ECU advocates the integration of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principals and strategies in their site planning and facility designs. CPTED focuses on the positive use of space and natural elements to maintain a desirable quality of life for intended users, while increasing the difficulty for criminal or abnormal activities. The principles focus on the positive use of space to create designs that attract users because they feel safe, while simultaneously making it unattractive and difficult for criminals and terrorists. The three main CPTED design principles are territoriality, natural surveillance, and natural access control. • • • Territoriality clearly defines an area physically or psychologically utilizing physical element to create an environment with a sense of ownership where abnormal behavior, such as unusual loitering or other unauthorized activities, is easily recognized. A major component of territoriality is wayfinding, which is a concept where architectural and landscape features are designed with visual clues and signage to direct people or allow them to easily identify where they are and where they should go. Natural Surveillance supports good visibility in and around the campus and buildings to limit concealment of criminal activities. The concept is to see and be seen; criminals do not like to be seen and guests feel safer when they are seen. Natural Access Control is about using layout and design elements to easily direct site users in an orderly fashion from one location to another while reinforcing territoriality and aiding natural surveillance. For the electronic security systems, ECU will begin to standardize on one centralized security management system that is capable of integrating and centralizing the existing disparate systems into one system, providing a cost effective system. Additional improvements will include revamping the video monitoring center, consolidating the access control systems, and building a new facility to house the Police Department and Security Operations Center. The primary intent of the Security Master Plan is to implement a proactive and cost effective set of policies, plans, and procedures that will improve the overall safety and security of the University. The plan prioritizes assets based on the actual threats and risks ECU faces. The Security Master Plan establishes a long-term approach to building a security program trailer made for ECU that matches current the planned growth of the university. It provides a best in practice approach to discourage a criminal or group of criminals from perpetrating an incident or crime. 2 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 2. Introduction The East Carolina University (ECU) Security Design Criteria provided architectural and engineering (A/E) design teams, security consultants, and all ECU staff guidance for the designing and construction of ECU facilities. Utilize these criteria when designing new facilities or major renovations of owned or leased facilities. This document defines performance standards for physical security systems with information in key areas to ensure compliance with the goals and objectives stipulated in the University Strategic Security Plan and Master Plan for the University. This document provides design guidance for limiting or mitigating the typical risks a major university like ECU may face. The guidance also provides some benefits for mitigating natural hazards. 2.1. Purpose This document defines the minimum security criteria required for ECU owned and leased facilities and the spaces and assets within those facilities. This document applies security measures consistently throughout ECU all spaces and is an integral part of the planning, design, and construction of all projects. An objective of this manual is to provide cost effective design criteria that provides an appropriate level of protection to each facility. 2.2. Applicability These standards apply to new construction and all additions, alterations, and modernizations. These standards apply to only the spaces being renovated in an existing building, and do not extend to other spaces in the same building except as may be directed by the ECU Physical Security Office. Existing facilities not undergoing any renovation will be brought into compliance through separate security projects. The criteria used in this document is based on risks common to educational facilities and are consistent with other standards developed for these types of facilities. Additionally, this document recognizes risks are unique to each facility and the assets that they may house. Therefore, the criteria developed will vary by facility type, space usage, and risk categorization. 3 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 2.3. Using this Document The protective measures in this document address general threats associated with university protection, common crime, and workplace or school violence. For threats associated with domestic or international terrorism additional security measures may be require. Space specific criteria are ECU requirements for all projects. Appendix 1 - Security Design Criteria Matrix identifies the appropriate measures for each space category. To use the matrix, select the space listed in the left-hand column of the table then locate the measures under each area. In some instances, outside factors will require the baseline criteria be augmented or supplemented. Only the ECU Physical Security Office can approve any modifications to the design criteria for a facility or space. 2.4. Measure Substitution Where possible, the criteria are performance-based to provide the designer or user the most latitude in determining the best overall solution for ECU. Where prescriptive criteria are used, the designer may recommend alternative solutions with justifications to the ECU Physical Security Office for consideration. 4 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 3. Architectural A great deal can be done architecturally to mitigate security risks a facility or site faces. These measures often cost nothing or very little if implemented early in the design process. Architectural considerations include building layout and configuration, space design, and building detailing. 3.1. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) The most efficient way to implement security into a building and campus is through predesign planning. ECU advocates the integration of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principals and strategies in their site planning and facility designs. CPTED focuses on the positive use of space and natural elements to maintain a desirable quality of life for intended users, while increasing the difficulty for criminal or abnormal activities. This is a well-founded concept dating back to the 1960s. The principles focus on the positive use of space to create designs that attract users because they feel safe, while simultaneously making it unattractive and difficult for criminals and terrorists. Various case studies document its effectiveness in reducing campus crime, street crime, burglaries, and other conventional crimes, both domestically and internationally. Incorporated throughout this document are the three main CPTED design principles; territoriality, natural surveillance, and natural access control. 3.1.1. Territoriality Territoriality clearly defines an area physically or psychologically utilizing physical element to create an environment with a sense of ownership where abnormal behavior, such as unusual loitering or other unauthorized activities, is easily recognized. For example, a clean, well-lit, attractive area will present an environment that encourages intended site users to feel safe and tolerate only acceptable behavior. This same environment has the opposite effect on criminals, as it is easy to observe, identify and report abnormal behavior. This means intended users are more likely to notice and report someone doing something inappropriate. A major component of territoriality is wayfinding, which is a concept where architectural and landscape features are designed with visual clues and signage to direct people or allow them to easily identify where they are and where they should go. Design teams shall incorporate the following items into the design or renovation of ECU facilities to support territoriality. 5 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • Provide a defined boundary around ECU campuses. A formidable barrier is not required but the boundary should provide visual cues as to what is and what is not ECU property. Select pavement patterns, vegetation, low walls, or site features to form physical or psychological separation of areas. Use signage to reinforce or establish territoriality and to support wayfinding, such as: o Provide signage to alert persons that uniformed and plain-clothes officers patrol the facility. o Provide signage to “Please report suspicious activity to (###) ###-####.” Provide trash receptacles in areas of intended pedestrian use to encourage a clean and kept environment. Apply polyurethane paints that reflect light and resistant to graffiti. Use symbolic barriers when laying out an area, to include open gateways, light standards, low walls, and plantings. Symbolic barriers inform an individual that he/she is passing from a public to private space. Symbolic barriers identified by people as boundary lines serve as defining areas of comparative safety. Many places warrant the use of symbolic barriers, including transition points between a public street and the campus grounds; an area between a building’s lobby and its corridors; or hallways on particular floors of a building. 3.1.2. Natural Surveillance Natural Surveillance supports good visibility in and around the campus and buildings to limit concealment of criminal activities. The concept is to see and be seen; criminals do not like to be seen and guests feel safer when they are seen. A compartmentalized facility with many small out-of-the-way places or obscure corners combined with a lack of windows greatly inhibits the ability for people to see and identify abnormal behavior, which increases the intended users’ sense of fear. Coordination of interior design, adjacencies, corridors, windows and doors with the layouts of walkway and parking lots can support natural surveillance. Design teams shall incorporate the following design strategies and techniques when designing or renovating a facility. • • • Orientate travel ways perpendicular to buildings. Develop pedestrian pathways and corridors with clear lines of sight. Parking lots rows should be perpendicular to buildings to maximize visibility. 6 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • • Landscape architecture that supports security requires a design that integrates natural surveillance, video surveillance, and natural access control. Plant and site furnishing selection should meet the following functional requirements: o Maintain surveillance and access control corridors. o Control access to critical and sensitive areas. o Consider the 10-year growth canopies of trees to avoid conflicts with lighting, video cameras, and emergency call boxes. o Select plantings and establish maintenance schedules to keep shrubs and other low vegetation below 3-feet in height and tree canopies higher than 7-feet to provide clear lines of sight and limit hiding places. o Sidewalks should have a clear space of 3-feet on either side to provide clear lines of sight and reaction time. o Utilize barrier plants (thorny) in areas where pedestrian traffic is undesirable. o Light colored surfaces provide better light reflection for enhanced visual and video surveillance. Avoid constructing large blank walls that limit visibility and can become targets for graffiti; instead encourage the use of walls with windows, architectural details, or foliage. Place facility personnel where they have clear lines of sight of walkways and parking lots through windows and doors. Use baffle type restroom entrances to support visual and audible surveillance and position restroom entrances to be visible from main pedestrian areas but away from outside exits and pay telephones. Avoid dead-end corridors, isolated stairwells, and open areas under stairs. Design open floor plans for offices, classrooms, and laboratories. Include intended gathering areas where practical to increase legitimate use of corridors and lobbies therefore increasing natural surveillance. Gathering Areas A concept that can decrease criminal or abnormal behavior is to provide gathering areas and other architectural features that encourage the appropriate use of a space by intended users (also known as activity support). This can deter crime because criminals do not typically intermix with intended users. These are interior and exterior features around the campuses that include features for students, faculty, and staff and may include barbeque grills, picnic tables, benches, outside eating areas, or basketball courts. Interior features could be student, staff, and faculty lounges, billiard or ping-pong tables, and TV 7 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 or game rooms. These measures can increase security by placing intended users in areas where it will increase natural surveillance and make the areas less desirable for criminal behavior. Caution: Intended users will not use poorly planned or located gathering areas, which may lead to these areas attracting crime. 3.1.3. Natural Access Control Natural Access Control is about using layout and design elements to easily direct site users in an orderly fashion from one location to another while reinforcing territoriality and aiding natural surveillance. By denying access to targets and creating a perception of risk for offenders this concept decreases the opportunity for criminal activity. The mainstay of natural access control is limiting the number of intended access points to the greatest extent possible without negatively affecting operations as well as to guide people through a space by strategic design. This aids natural surveillance by increasing traffic flow at each of those locations therefore increasing the opportunities for surveillance. Channeling all users through a limited number of entrances increases the ability to see and be seen as well as reduces the number of electronic access control and security cameras required. The number of entrances also makes it harder for criminals to avoid detection or escape. These design elements are also useful tools to clearly indicate public routes and discourage access to private areas. • • • • Limit the number of pedestrian and vehicle entrances to ECU facilities. Design these limited entrance to be symbolic as be easily recognized as the intended entrances. Develop pedestrian traffic corridors between high use areas, such as between parking lots and main building entrances. Use site features, building design, and pathways to channel pedestrians and vehicles into intended corridors. Limit the number of entrances into a building without inhibiting its functionality or operations. 3.1.4. Design Team Guidance ECU encourages design teams to explore these CPTED concepts and principles in their projects. To encourage a multi-disciplinary approach to CPTED, ‘discipline specific strategies’ are introduced in the following chapters to assist designers in addressing 8 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 security concerns. These strategies help prepare the design team in understanding CPTED and support its benefits in facility designs. 3.2. Site Planning and Design Planners, architects, and landscape designers play an important role in identifying and implementing crucial asset protection measures while considering land use, site selection, the orientation of buildings on the site, and the integration of vehicle access control points, physical barriers, landscaping, parking, and the protection of utilities to mitigate threats. To achieve the optimal balance of the above considerations the design team must work closely with ECU to integrate security requirements early in the design process when mitigation is the least costly and most effective. 3.2.1. Site Layout The layout of a site (e.g. the placement and form of its buildings, infrastructures, and amenities) is the starting point for this integration. Choices made during this stage of the design process will steer decision-making for the other elements of the site. Conflicts sometimes arise between security site design and conventional site design. To maximize safety, security, and sustainability, designers should implement a holistic approach to site design that integrates form and function to achieve a balance among the various design elements and objectives. Even if resources are limited, significant value can be added to a project by integrating security considerations into the more traditional design tasks in such a way that they complement, rather than compete with, the other elements. 3.2.2. Building Placement The ideal building placement from a security standpoint incorporates CPTED principles. • The placement of the building should provide territorial reinforcement of the ownership by creating a distinction between the public domain and that of the building. This can be accomplished through the use of clear space to separate the two entities. • Research has shown that the placement, enclosure, or routing of roadways and traffic can change the nature of a particular area and reduce wrongdoer activity. For example, a particular portion of a street might be closed to vehicular traffic, and streetscape (seats, lighting, planters, etc.) may be added. In a number of 9 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 areas where this technique has been utilized, it has been found that most people know or at least recognize other people up and down the block and suspicious activity on the street is identified. Similar approaches which involve rerouting traffic, using one-way streets, or blocking off streets has reduced wrongdoer activity. • The building should be oriented in order to eliminate or at least minimize areas that casual observers cannot see. • Provide layers of security. 3.2.3. Utility Infrastructure Providing power, gas, water, wastewater, and communications services is one of the most basic requirements of any facility. At the site scale, protect all critical lifelines to the maximum extent possible. Protect all controls, interconnections, exposed lines, and other vulnerable elements of infrastructure from access and exploitation by surveillance and/or physical countermeasures. To minimize the possibility of such hazards, apply the following measures: • • • • • • • Where possible, provide underground, concealed, and protected utilities. Locate petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage tanks and operations buildings at lower elevations from all other buildings. Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from buildings. Locate the main fuel storage away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals). Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible; trash receptacles should not be placed within 30 feet of a building. Locate utility systems at least 50 feet from loading docks, front entrances, and parking areas. Secure manhole covers 10 inches or more in diameter to prevent unauthorized opening. Secure them with locks and hasps, by welding them shut, or by bolting them to their frame. Ensure hasps, locks, and bolts are made of materials that resist corrosion. Keyed bolts (which make removal by unauthorized personnel more difficult) are also available. Locate all meters in readily accessible locations away from critical assets. 10 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 3.2.4. Circulation The circulation system determines the movement of people and materials into, through, and out of facilities and sites. Design this system to maximize efficiency while minimizing conflicts between vehicles and pedestrians. Designers should begin with an understanding of the site’s transportation requirements based on an analysis of how the planned use o the site and facility. This includes the necessary parking volume, pedestrian patterns and the modes of transportation they will use, and the number and types of access points required. The following items are aspects of transportation planning can affect security. 3.2.4.1. Vehicular Control of vehicular movement throughout the site is essential in mitigating vehicleassociated threats. Local traffic patterns, sight distances, and the vehicle type and volume entering the site influence the location of access points. Primary objectives for on-site circulation are to separate vehicles from critical assets, control vehicle speed and approach, provide wayfinding, design safe road and parking area configurations, and provide adequate emergency access. Incorporate the following performance criteria into the site design. • • Site Access: o Limit number of vehicular entrances to the campuses. o Utilize symbolic site features to distinguish entrances and establish territoriality. Internal Roads: o Ensure placement of the primary road providing access from the perimeter to employee and visitor parking does not encroach upon pedestrian circulation in and around buildings. o Parking and Roadways should maintain a minimum of 33 feet separation from all inhabited facilities. o Equip roadways with traffic calming measures and drop-off locations. o Provide parking lot access roads in a manner that minimizes the need for pedestrian crossings. 3.2.4.2. Parking All types of parking facilities have security concerns to protect both people and property. All lots require dedicated pedestrian pathways to establish natural 11 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 surveillance and access control of the parking area and prevent pedestrian traffic from intermixing with vehicular traffic. Remote or secluded parking facilities may require additional electronic security measures such as video camera coverage and emergency call boxes. Use the following criteria in designing parking areas: • • • • • Orient travel lanes perpendicular to buildings to support natural surveillance and identify crosswalks to ensure safe pedestrian linkage to buildings. Create separate visitor / short-term parking areas with appropriate signage near main building entrances. Provide parking spaces close to the buildings for faculty, staff, and students required to work late on a routine basis. Provide adequate parking spaces for service vehicles adjacent to the loading dock but a minimum of 33 feet (10 meters) from the facility. Provide parking and roadway lighting in each parking zone. o 2.8 foot-candle minimum horizontal (Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) standard) o 0.8 foot-candle minimum vertical with uniformity ratio no more than 4:1 (IESNA standard) o Investigate ways to reduce parking lot lighting during times of limited use to reduce energy consumption while maintaining a safe environment. o Avoid placing light poles within the 10-year growth canopy of trees. o Provide minimum illumination for effective operation of security cameras. 3.2.4.3. Pedestrian ECU’s safety and appeal is dependent on strategic pedestrian circulation design. The objectives are to concentrate activity to assist surveillance, minimize traffic crossings, provide Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) access, and channel movement through the campuses. The ability to identify an unauthorized person on the property is a priority for ECU. Utilize the following criteria when designing the pedestrian circulation. • • • Define linkages from the parking facilities to the campus/building main entrances that correspond to preferred pedestrian routes and minimize road crossings. Provide a drop-off area central to the main entrance to buildings. Provide unobstructed views of pedestrian travel by avoiding hiding places along pedestrian routes and around outdoor spaces intended for pedestrian use. 12 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • Provide vandal-resistant pedestrian-scale illumination as follows: o 1 foot-candle minimum horizontal (IESNA standard) o 0.8 foot-candle minimum vertical with uniformity ratio no more than 4:1 (IESNA standard) o Provide transition lighting within 15 feet of building entrance of a minimum 5 foot-candle. o Avoid placing lighting within 10-year growth canopy of trees. o Provide minimum illumination for effective operation of security cameras. Maintain a minimum of 33 feet between pedestrian traffic and sensitive areas such as the daycare’s exterior playground, generators, HVAC equipment, and loading docks. Provide appropriate signage for warnings and wayfinding (site entry, delivery traffic, visitor parking, and drop-off). Consider using specialty pavement techniques to enhance territoriality and wayfinding. Funnel pedestrian walkways to main entrances as a means of supporting natural access control. 3.2.5. Lighting Reference Electrical Section for specific lighting requirements 3.2.6. Site Furnishings Through urban design, practitioners seek to create vibrant, inviting, and functional facilities for people to live, learn, work, and play. Security considerations are a necessary aspect to achieve these types of facilities to protection people and property while reducing liability. People must feel safe when using a facility or they will not use it, which defeats the purpose of creating the facility. This failure can actually result in attracting crime. Utilize street furniture (e.g., mailboxes, bus stop shelters, light poles, street trees, planters, bicycle racks, seating, newspaper boxes, kiosks, and trash receptacles) to enhance security; for example, design bus stop shelters to allow for easy surveillance and detection of suspicious activity and objects. • Security measures must not impede access to public entrances or pedestrian flow on adjacent sidewalks. 13 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • • • • • Landscape elements in the form of grassed plinths, trees, plantings, fountains, and pools are appropriate, but must be designed as integral parts of a building and its setting as much as possible. Miscellaneous decorative elements such as flagpoles, fountains, pools, gardens, and similar features may be located within an access path to slow movement or restrict access. Trees planted along the inside edge of a public sidewalk and adjacent to pedestrian and vehicular paths can serve dual aesthetic and barrier purposes. The design of bollards, fences, light posts, and other streetscape and landscape elements should form an urban ensemble that helps to create a sense of unity and character. Design and locate security devices to establish consistent, rhythmic patterns along the street, particularly where a number of elements are used in combination to reduce visual street clutter. Provide trash receptacles in areas of intended pedestrian use. Locate bicycle parking within observation of the building entrance. Locate exterior benches and tables in observable locations. Securely anchor all site furnishings to avoid movement. Incorporate vandal-resistance in design of plinth walls to prevent skateboarding, e.g., canted or ridged wall cap. 3.2.7. Signage Wayfinding is an important function of design that illustrates the importance of coordination among practitioners and community planning, public works, transportation, law enforcement, and fire-rescue organizations. Navigating an unfamiliar environment is important for its success on a day-to-day basis, but becomes critical in an emergency. In addition to overt prompts such as landmarks, architectural elements, and clear, consistent signage and maps, users will subconsciously rely on cues from their surroundings to help them select a path to safety. Similarly, emergency responders will depend in part on these design elements in order to navigate the scene. Signs are an important element of security. Confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site security. Provide signs off site and at entrances. There should be on-site directional, parking, and cautionary signs for students, faculty, staff, and visitors. Unless required, signs should not identify sensitive areas. 14 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 ECU must approve all signage. The following guidelines are for signage: • • • • • • • 3.3. Cleary post the building address for emergency response. Along service drives, post signage designating short-term / visitor parking and employee-only parking. Post signs at campus and building entrances stating, “All persons entering this facility are subject to search”. Post signs notifying the use of video surveillance. Locate signs to provide the least obstruction to lines of sight for security personnel. Provide prominent signage that directs visitors to the Visitors Center. Avoid marking outside utilities and areas such as air intakes, fuel supply valves, gas or power distribution locations, evacuation assembly areas, etc. Space Planning & Design 3.3.1. General The protection of the building interior focuses on the functional layout of spaces. Separating public areas such as the lobby, classrooms, laboratories, loading docks, mailrooms, garages, and retail areas from the more private areas of the facility such as offices, residential areas, and utility areas enhances security by defining areas and consolidating user groups. Achieve this separation by creating internal “hard lines” or buffer zones, using secondary stairwells, elevator shafts, corridors, and storage areas between public and private areas. Consider the following design measures when laying out interior spaces: • • • • • • • • • Defined Main Entrance Limit Secondary Entrances Align interior corridors Limited recessed or hidden areas Clearly define public and private spaces Group spaces with similar activities together Provide open interior design Do not isolate common areas such as restrooms, study areas, gathering areas. Promote good natural surveillance by providing opportunities for surveillance through the positioning of windows in relation to stairs, corridors, or outside 15 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • • • areas, continual natural observation will be maintained and crime will be deterred. Locate key assets as far into the interior of a building as possible. Place areas of high visitor activity away from key assets. Locate assets in areas where they are visible to more than one person. Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security within a building. Stairwells required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas where high-risk incidents might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into lobbies, parking, or loading areas. No egress paths from public space shall pass through private areas. Clearly defined separation points between public and private areas established territoriality by defining who should be in what area of a building. Consider sheltering in place and assembly areas in space planning. 3.3.2. Adjacencies Space adjacencies play a critical role in providing effect security for a facility. Just as it is important to place a bathroom adjacent to a dormitory room, it is just a important as not to place a dormitory room next to a laboratory, as the two spaces conflict in use and user type. Consider the security implications of placing two space types adjacent to one another when designing spaces. Group spaces by similar use type, similar user groups, and by the level of security required to protect them. 3.3.3. Public and Private Separation Points Spaces can typically be defined as public areas and private areas. Public areas are those that are intended to be used by the general population of an area, at ECU this would include lobbies, classrooms, hallways, study areas, and retail spaces. Private areas are those that are intended to be used by only a select group of people, such as resident halls, office spaces, utility rooms, and some laboratories. Grouping private areas is an effective manner to reduce access control requirements, such as walls, door, or card readers. The grouping of private spaces includes both vertical and horizontal access controls to enable adequate separation. 3.3.4. Shelter-in-Place Shelter-in-Place is the process of securing and protecting people and assets in the general area in which a crisis occurs. Shelter-in-place can be in response to a natural hazard (such as a tornado, hurricane, or other severe storm), a criminal act (such as 16 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 workplace violence, active shooter, terrorist attack. Shelter-in-place locations requirements should protect individuals from potential hazards, such as flying glass from a broken window. Shelter-in-place location requirements include: • • • • • • 3.4. Gathering area that is protected from potential hazards, such as flying debris or glass from a broken window. Space is typically on the interior of a building. Avoid garages, lobbies, elevators, and stairwells Have emergency communications Space to store for first-aid equipment, food, and water Ability to lock and barricade doors in case of an active shooter incident Building Criteria 3.4.1. Windows Perimeter windows that meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 730 “Guide for Premise Security” criteria as “accessible opening” shall be non-operable or permanently closed. A window is considered permanently closed when a nondestructive mechanism has been installed which precludes opening with ordinarily obtainable tools. Additionally, provide intrusion detection of all perimeter windows if considered an “accessible opening” per NFPA 730. Where window hinges are on the exterior of the building and the hinge pins are capable of being removed, the hinge pins shall be either fixed in place with a setscrew that is inaccessible when the window is closed or welded in place. NFPS 730 – Accessible Opening An accessible opening has a clear cross-section of 96 square inches or more with the smallest dimension exceeding 6 inches that conforms to the following dimensions: • 18 ft or less from the ground or roof of an adjoining building. • 14 ft or less from a directly or diagonally opposite window, fire escape, or roof. • 3 ft or less from an opening, fire escape, ladder, and the like, that is in or projecting from the same or adjacent wall and leads to other premises. 17 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 3.4.2. Door Hardware Coordination of door hardware and security elements is typically the most overlooked area of design and results in significant costs either during construction or in retrofit. The Architect, Door Hardware Consultant, Security Consultant are responsible for coordinating door hardware schedules to ensure doors requiring special installation and devices are planned prior to purchase. Consider the following items when specifying door hardware: • • • • • • • • Access for Emergency Responders: Locate a secure house key box for emergency responders near an entrance door at a location approved by ECU. Hinges: Mount hinges so hinge pins are within the protected area, if this is not feasible, security hinges shall be provided. Security hinges shall prevent the removal of the door by removing the hinge pin. Hinge Pins: Hinge pins on perimeter doors shall be non-removable. Perimeter Door: Provide at least one perimeter door must with an exterior key lock for emergency entrance purposes. Automatic Door Openers: Non-emergency exit doors provided with automatic openers (during public hours) must be provided with a lock-down mechanism (e.g.: door deadbolt locks) for use after building close down. Mechanical Locks: All locking arrangements must meet Building Code and Life Safety Code requirements. Electric Locks: Refer to section on Electronic Security and electronic entry control systems. Additional devices will be required for these doors, which may include card readers, door contact switches, integrated request to exit devices, push to exit buttons, passive infrared request to exit devices, and conduit. Provided a key cylinders on the unprotected side of a card access controlled door to permit bypass of inoperative card readers for emergency purposes. Use of key bypass will cause a forced open alarm. They shall also be equipped with mechanical or electric door closers. 18 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 4. Landscape and Urban Design For the purposes of this document, these two domains are virtually overlapping and therefore addressed together. 4.1. Landscape Design The implications of security for landscape design affect everything from plant species and building material selection to landform construction and way finding. Elements such as landforms, water features, and vegetation are among the building blocks of attractive and welcoming spaces, and can be powerful tools for enhancing security. These features can be used to not only define or designate a space, but also to deter or prevent hostile surveillance and unauthorized access. However, landscaping can also have detrimental impacts for safety and security, and practitioners should consider the unique requirements of the project to ensure the landscape design elements they choose will be appropriate and effective. With careful selection, placement, and maintenance, landscape elements can provide visual screening which protects sensitive operations, gathering areas, and other activities from surveillance without creating concealment for covert activity. Avoid dense vegetation in close proximity to a building as it can screen illicit. Select and maintain vegetation with eliminating concealment opportunities in mind. Similarly, measures to screen visually detractive components such as transformers, trash compactors, and condensing units should be designed to minimize concealment opportunities for people and weapons. Evaluate long-term growth plan when developing landscape designs, ensure to ensure vegetation will not interfere with natural surveillance, create hiding spots, or interfere with video cameras and lighting. 4.2. Urban Design Numerous urban design elements present opportunities to provide security. The scale of the streetscape should be appropriate to its primary users, and it can be manipulated to increase the comfort level of desired users while creating a less inviting atmosphere for users with malicious intent. However, even at the pedestrian scale, certain operational requirements must be accommodated. For example, although efficient pedestrian and vehicle circulation systems are important for day-to-day living, they are also critical for emergency response, evacuation, and egress. Furthermore, despite an 19 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 emphasis on downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is critical to maintain the maximum standoff distance possible between vehicles and structures. Similarly, street furniture (e.g., mailboxes, bus stop shelters, light poles, works of art, street trees, planters, bicycle racks, seating, newspaper boxes, kiosks, and trash receptacles) can be used to enhance security. For example, design bus stop shelters to allow for easy surveillance and detection of suspicious activity and objects. A main challenge for the design community is to reach the desired level of protection without turning the building or facility into a bunker or fortress. In other words, they are required to incorporate subtle and aesthetically pleasing security measures when involved in urban design projects. Consider the following when designing an urban landscape with a security component: • • • • • • • • Security measures must not impede access to public entrances or pedestrian flow on adjacent sidewalks. Design landscape elements in the form of grassed plinths, trees, plantings, fountains, and pools are appropriate as integral parts of a building and its setting as much as possible. Miscellaneous decorative elements such as flagpoles, fountains, pools, gardens, and similar features may be located within an access path to slow movement or restrict access. Trees planted along the inside edge of a public sidewalk and adjacent to pedestrian and vehicular paths can serve dual aesthetic and barrier purposes. The design of bollards, fences, light posts, and other streetscape and landscape elements should form an urban ensemble that helps to create a sense of unity and character. Security devices must be designed and located to establish consistent, rhythmic patterns along the street, particularly where a number of elements are used in combination to reduce visual street clutter. Coordinate placement of light poles and video cameras with the 10-year tree growth canopy to avoid conflicts. Use a minimum canopy height from ground level of 7 feet to maintain line of sight corridors and 10 feet for video surveillance corridors. This can be achieved with high branching or vase-shaped trees. This is most applicable in parking zones, along pedestrian routes, in gathering areas, and within the unobstructed space. 20 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • Use shrubbery to define and separate pedestrian traffic corridors and gathering areas. Ensure 10-year growth spread of shrubbery maintains good lines of sight, does not create hiding spaces, and provides a minimum of 3 feet of standoff distance from the corridor or gathering area. Utilize barrier plants (thorny) in areas where pedestrian traffic is not desired such as along the building perimeter, around the generator, and other critical or sensitive areas. Consider substituting non-flammable or non-wood mulch near the building envelope to reduce the fire hazard. Avoid the use of landscape materials such as rocks or stones within the unobstructed zone that can be used to break windows. 21 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 22 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 5. Mechanical 5.1. General Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical infrastructure and protecting building occupants. Accomplish this by locating components in less vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable amount of redundancy. The design team is encouraged to utilize the following best practices when determining the appropriate and cost-effective measures for incorporation into the building design. • • • • • • • Locate utility systems away from likely areas of high risk, such as loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas. Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 30 pounds or more to minimize the likelihood they will fall and injure building occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward direction. This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards. Place air intakes no less than 12 feet above grade. Roof top placement is preferred. This has two main benefits. The first benefit is it provides passive security against malicious acts, which makes it more difficult to introduce hazardous material directly into the system. The second benefit is that it is less likely that high concentrations of hazardous material will enter the intakes if there is a ground-level release near the building. Many existing buildings have air intakes that are located at or below ground level. For those that have wall-mounted or below grade intakes close to the building, the intakes can be elevated by constructing a plenum or external shaft over the intake. An extension height of 12 feet will place the intake out of reach of individuals without some assistance. Cover the intakes by screens so objects cannot be tossed into the intakes or into air wells from the ground. Such screens should be sloped to allow thrown objects to roll or slide off the screen, away from the intake. Do not place intakes adjacent to the loading dock or generator to reduce the risk of inducing carbon monoxide into the system. Orient intakes away from prevailing winds to reduce exposure to chemical incidents. 23 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • 5.2. Do not recycle return air from the mailroom, lobby, and loading dock into the rest of the building. To prevent widespread dispersion of a contaminant released within lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks, their HVAC systems should be isolated and the areas maintained at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building, but at positive pressure relative to the outdoors. Locate HVAC risers away from exterior walls or walls shared with mailroom, lobby, or loading dock. Elevators The Mechanical Engineer shall coordinate with the Security Consultant for electronic security system panel assemblies where elevator access control is required. Unless otherwise required by the project, Mechanical Engineer shall provide a minimum of 4 x 8 feet of wall space for ESS panels. The wall space shall be open free and clear access by technicians. ESS panels planned in hazardous areas are not permitted. 24 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 6. Electrical 6.1. General The major security functions of the electrical system are to maintain power to essential building services, particularly those required for life safety and security; provide lighting to aid surveillance, which deters criminal activities; and provide emergency communications. Thus, the operability of electrical systems is an important element and is a critical component for life safety systems. Designers should consider the following recommendations: • • • • • • • • Do not locate main utilities, such as main distribution frame (MDF), electrical switchgear, or incoming electrical transformers, adjacent to public spaces. This requirement does not include utility closets. Locate utility systems away from likely high-risk areas, such as loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas. When feasible, locate utilities internal to the building to provide maximum protection from natural and manmade risks. When it is unfeasible for main utilities to be located internal to the building due to building codes or operational efficiencies, locate them on exterior walls or the roof of the building where exposure to natural and manmade risks are less. Where feasible, co-locate utilities in order to consolidate security protection requirements. Install emergency and commercial electric panels, conduits, and switchgear separately, at different locations, and as far apart as possible. Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 30 pounds or more to minimize the likelihood they will fall and injure building occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward direction. This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards. Locate emergency generators away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. More secure locations include the roof, protected grade level, and protected interior areas. Mount fuel tanks near the generator, given the same protection as the emergency generator, and sized to store an appropriate amount of fuel based on criticality of the asset as determined by ECU. 25 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • 6.2. Install a connection outside to allow a portable generator, equal to the building generator, to connect to the building’s electrical system. If tertiary power is required, consider other methods include generators and feeders from alternative substations. Lighting Lighting shall provide for safety and security without compromising the quality of the site, the environment (including neighboring properties), or the architectural character of the buildings. The site lighting shall provide desired illumination and enhancement of trees, landscaping, and buildings without providing dark shadowy areas compromising safety and security. Illuminate pedestrian and bicycle pathways and walks, including bike racks, gates, and other features in support of natural and video surveillance while providing safety without objectionable light trespass onto adjacent areas on and off site. Design campus lighting in accordance with Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) G-1-03, Guideline for Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public Spaces developed The following are the basic lighting design criteria. • • Objectives: o Provide a clear view of an area from a distance and enable anyone moving in or immediately around it to be easily seen o Deny potential hiding spaces adjacent to frequently traveled foot routes o Permit facial identification at distance of at least 30 feet and create the perception of being identifiable o Facilitate the proper use of other security devices available on the property (video cameras, Campus Police, and Student Patrol) o Deter crime against persons or property o Enhance the public’s feeling of comfort in accessing spaces Light Levels o Unoccupied Spaces 1 to 2 foot candela with 6:1 ratio o Building Façade: 0.5 to 2 foot candela (Vertical) with 8:1 ratio o Building Interiors: 1 foot candela with 4:1 ratio o Building Entrances: 10 foot candela with 3:1 ratio o Parking Lot: 3 to 5 foot candela with 4:1 ratio o Sidewalks, trails & walkways: 4:1 ratio  For those associated with parking: 6 foot candela 26 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011  • For those not associated with parking, but intended to be used at night: 1 foot candela Other Requirements o Color Rendering Index (CRI) of 50 or higher o Solar lights are acceptable as long as they meet other light requirements and have traditional power back-up o Photocells and Time Switches must be coordinated with ECU Security o Motion Detectors can be used, provided strike time is minimal (i.e. incandescent and fluorescent) o Locate light fixtures in association with the 10-year growth plan of the landscape. Avoid areas where the light will be obstructed by trees o Cutoff fixtures are acceptable as long as other requirements are met Incorporate the following requirements into the lighting design. • • • • Coordinate lighting with video cameras to support surveillance and prevent interference. o Site lighting shall provide video camera and other surveillance support with illumination levels and color that assists in proper identification. o Avoid “blinding” video cameras in the placement and selection of fixtures and their “cutoff” angles. Site lighting shall be uniform with no area having a light to dark ratio of equal to or greater than 4:1. o Consider types of lighting to use that does not hinder or affect video cameras. Provide emergency lighting in restrooms. Illuminate building access points to support natural surveillance. Hardwire emergency lighting in stairwells and exit signs on emergency power circuits. When unachievable, provide self-contained battery lighting in stairwells and for exit signs. 27 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 28 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 7. Fire Protection The fire protection system inside the building should maintain life safety protection after an incident and allow for safe evacuation of the building when appropriate. 7.1. Life Safety All security-locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply with requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code. 7.2. Fire Alarm Integration with Electronic Security System All electrically powered door locks at public/staff separations, fire or emergency exit doors, etc. may be designated egress routes. For this reason, the project security and fire protection consultants shall coordinate requirements for fire alarm relays to provide lock release (for those doors within the path of egress) upon fire alarm activation. As a minimum, each security power supply supporting a locking device shall be equipped with a UL approved relay. Where required electric locks shall be powered through a UL approved relay that releases power to locking devices upon activation of the local fire alarm panel. The Security Operations Center shall monitor fire alarms signal through integration with the electronic security system. 29 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 30 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 8. Information Technology The designer shall integrate the communication system where possible to reduce headend equipment and operational burden of the facility’s intercommunications system. 8.1. Radio Telemetry The design team and/or contractor shall perform a test on the facility to determine is additional devices are required to provide adequate radio coverage within the facility for First Responders. This effort shall be coordinated with the ECU Police Department. 8.2. Mass Notification The design team and/or contractor shall coordinate with ECU Information Technology Department to provide Mass Notification for the facility to notify building occupants. 31 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 32 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 9. Electronic Security System Design and Integration In order to receive a fully functional system, the design and implementation documentation must provide sufficient detail for security consultants, designers, or integrators to provide adequate security solutions. This section addresses standards associated with the selection, application, and performance of electronic security systems (ESS). The ESS includes the physical access control system (PACS); intrusion detection system (IDS); video assessment and surveillance system (VASS); and intercommunications system. Provide all ESS subsystems with a minimum of 20% expansion beyond the base project at the time of acceptance. 9.1. Security Management System Security management system (SMS) is the umbrella system that manages the building wide ESS. Integrate and synchronize all SMS subsystems with the SMS. 9.2. Physical Access Control System (PACS) The function of an access control system is to permit authorized personnel into or out of a controlled area. All access control systems control passage by using one or more of the three factors of identification (something a person knows, something a person has, or something a person is or does). Automated entry control devices based on these factors consist of three (3) categories: code, credential, and biometric devices. 9.2.1. Access Control Credential ECU utilizes a proximity chip integrated into the University Identification Card. The card contains a magnetic stripe used for the financial transactions. 9.2.2. Card Readers Equip all doors with conventional key and lock systems regardless of electronic access controls applied. The use of keys to open a door equipped with electronic access controls shall result in a force open alarm. The use of electronic access controls is for high throughput locations to reduce the issuance of conventional keys and high security areas where an audit trail of access is required. Equip all perimeter entryways with electronic access controls. Do not use electronic access controls on personnel offices unless the office is a high security area. 33 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Mount access control components in accordance with ADA height requirements, 42 in above finished floor (AFF), on the lockset side of the door. 9.2.3. Electric Locks The preferred order of use is as follows: • • • • Electrified Mortise and Cylindrical locks Electric Strikes Delayed Egress Devices Electromagnetic Locks (requires written approval from the ECU Office of Physical Security) Provide power supplies for electric locks with one (1) hour of uninterruptible power supply maintained from an emergency power generator circuit and eight (8) hours of battery back-up. Hardware shall comply with NFPA 101. Install latch guards to protect the electric strike and door bolt that are susceptible to tamper or picking from outside the protected space. 9.2.4. Request to Exit Devices Request to exit micro switches mounted in the handles of door hardware is the preferred method. Infrared exit shunts installed at card reader controlled doors will accommodate the following operations: • • • • 9.3. Infrared exit shunts shall be designed for momentary trigger action. On doors equipped with electrified locksets, the device will shunt the door position switch upon exit, but not unlock the locking device. Infrared exit shunts on doors equipped with electromagnetic locks is discouraged; however, when used it will shunt the door position switch and unlock the locking device. Door equipped with electromagnetic locks are required to have both passive infrared devices and manual push to exit buttons. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) The intrusion detection system (IDS) includes motion detection, glass break, and door contact sensors, among other devices. These devices provide alternative methods to 34 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 detect actual or attempted intrusion into protected areas through alarm components, monitoring, and reporting systems. Wire intrusion devices of like technologies together within the confines of clear physical barriers not to exceed three (3) devices. Program devices in groups as an intrusion zone when they are in the same physical location and provide the same purpose. 9.3.1. Intrusion Detection Sensors Applications The following are examples of typical application of IDS on intentional openings: • • • • Doors: Typically protected with door position switches with PIR motion sensors as a back-up system when necessary. Windows / Glazed Openings: Typically protected with glass-break sensors with PIR motion sensors as a back-up system when necessary and position switches on operable windows. Vents / Ducts: Typically protected with a PIR Curtain sensor. Video Analytics: Video analytics may be used in lieu of other identified detection technologies. Consult ECU Security when planning to use video analytics. 9.3.2. Sensor Line Supervision Configure sensors with tamper alarms to report trouble, regardless of the state of the sensor (on or active, vs. a non-reporting status). Wire tamper alarms to the SMS as a line supervision error alarm zone. In an effort to reduce the number of alarm inputs, combine tamper alarms for sensor circuits of like technologies supporting a specific purpose within defined physical boundaries. Use end-of-line resistors for the supervision of all alarm devices; locate the resistor at the first device in the circuit, and never at the data gathering panel (DGP) end of cabling. End-of-line resistors shall be a prepackaged unit and resistor networks shall meet manufacturer’s specifications. Resistor quality shall be standard tolerance of 1% or maximum of 1/4 Watt. 9.3.3. Mounting Heights Show the mounting heights of all detectors on drawings or in a detail. To minimize performance degradation through vandalism, mount motion detectors, glass break sensors and cameras above reach, no less than 9 feet above finished floor (AFF) if the ceiling height permits. 35 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 9.3.4. Intrusion Zone (Arm/Disarm) The preferred arm/disarm device for intrusion zones is keypad and LCD screen. Mount the arm/disarm device on the secured side of the zone directly adjacent to the primary entry portal. The control device shall shunt the intrusion zone trigger devices upon presentation of proper identification. Configure the entrance for an adjustable entry /exit delay. 9.3.5. Intrusion Detection Sensor Types 9.3.5.1. Position Switches Mount position switches on the latch edge of the door, window, or opening within six inches of the latch edge. With double doors, fit each door with a separate contact sensor. Doors controlled by entry control devices require coordination of intrusion detection with authorized accesses to preclude nuisance alarms for authorized entries. Surface mounted position or balanced magnetic switches shall have armored cabling from the sensor to a junction box location adjacent to or above the opening. Provide intrusion detection of all perimeter opening if considered an “accessible opening” per NFPA 730. NFPA 730 – Accessible Opening An accessible opening has a clear cross-section area of 96 square inches or more with the smallest dimension exceeding 6 inches that conforms to the following dimensions: • 18 ft or less from the ground or roof of an adjoining building. • 14 ft or less from a directly or diagonally opposite window, fire escape, or roof. • 3 ft or less from an opening, fire escape, ladder, and the like, that is in or projecting from the same or adjacent wall and leads to other premises. Card access controlled doors providing access to intrusion zones require a double-pole, double-throw (DPDT) door switch. Wire the first contact circuit to the shunt-able input associated with the card reader and the second contact circuit into a separate supervised input. This procedure supports ‘Intrusion Zone’ configuration. 36 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Provide roll-up doors and other doors not a standard size or configuration with position switches suitable for the application. Mount position switches on both the left and right of the protected side of roll-up doors wider than six feet. 9.3.5.2. Volumetric Motion Sensors Passive infrared (PIR) motion sensors detect a change in the thermal energy pattern caused by a moving intruder and initiate an alarm when the change in energy satisfies the detector’s alarm criteria. These sensors are passive devices because they do not transmit energy; they monitor the energy radiated by the surrounding environment. The different applications for PIR motion sensors include but are not limited to the following. • • • Point: PIR Sensors can be employed so the pattern is focused on a single point such as a door, window, or a fixed object. Curtain: Mount a PIR sensor so it creates a field across a path (a “Curtain”). The alarm would activate if an intruder passes through the field. 360: Ceiling mounted PIR Sensors allow a full 360 degree range of detection. 9.3.5.3. Glass-Break Sensors Provide 100% coverage of the boundary requiring protection by providing the number, spacing, and placement of devices in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications. Show the area of coverage of each device on the drawings. Provide acoustic glass break sensors or shock sensors for the protection of glass panels that meets criteria similar to an “accessible opening” per NFPA 730. Utilize seismic sensors for situations that degrade acoustic glass-break sensor performance such as blast windows, laminated glass, or glass with security or fragment retention film. 9.4. Video Assessment and Surveillance System (VASS) Use VASS to monitor building entrances, restricted areas, high volume pathways, gathering areas, and alarm conditions. This section describes the selection, application, and performance of the VASS, which includes cameras, monitors, controlling, recording, and storage equipment as well as centralized management and operations of the system. 37 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 9.4.1. Resolution The following provides the typical resolution levels to be used in the design and configuration of VASS. 9.4.1.1. General Surveillance Detail Provide a minimum of 20 pixels per foot for this video. This level of detail is often desirable for live viewing where the detail is not necessary on recorded video. For instance, looking to see what a crowd is doing or needing to detect when someone is in a restricted area without needing to recognize faces. 9.4.1.2. Forensic Detail Provide a minimum of 40 pixels per foot for this video. This level of detail is necessary when it is desirable to see, record, and recognize images like license plates and faces. This allows referencing the video after an incident to determine exactly what happened and provide forensic evidence. 9.4.1.3. High Detail Provide a minimum of 80 pixels per foot for this video. This level of detail is applicable in a retail or banking context where there is a need to clearly see the faces of customers and employees as well as identify the currency in their hands. 9.4.2. Assessment Video Trigger assessment video by either intrusion detection sensors or entry control devices. Install and configure views so when alarms present at the security console, the appropriate image displays at the console within one (1) second. 9.4.3. Video Recording and Storage At a minimum, record all camera video at 2.5 images-per-second (five frames per second) for 24 hours a day seven days a week and store the images for thirty-days, reference Appendix 1 for additional recording requirements. Record alarm actuated video at 30-ips starting 15 seconds before the alarm event occurs and lasting one minute after the alarm is cleared. 38 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 9.4.4. Cameras The design, installation, and use of cameras shall support the visual identification and surveillance of persons, vehicles, assets, incidents, and defined locations. Cameras shall meet the following requirements: • • • Specify fixed cameras for applications requiring continuous video capture. Utilize pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras for general surveillance and/or alarm actuated events in conjunction with preset positions. All cameras shall be color day/night. Provide all interior cameras with dome enclosures. Provide exterior cameras in environmentally controlled domes unless operational requirements make a dome unnecessary, in that instance, an environmentally controlled enclosure may be utilized. Cameras are preferred with built-in video motion detection that automatically monitors and processes activity. Show the mounting heights of all cameras on the drawings or in a detail. To minimize performance degradation from vandalism, mount all cameras above reach no less than 9 feet AFF, if ceiling height permits. Show the intended field of view of each camera by dashed lines (or shading) on drawings. 9.5. Security Intercommunications The intercom system provides security intercommunications for access control, emergency assistance, and identification of locations where persons under duress request a security response. The intercom system shall provide a means to document intercom activation as a PACS event and record communications. 9.5.1. Intercom Call Stations Intercom stations, or some other form of communication, are required at select staff entrances to call ECU Security. 9.5.2. Emergency Call Boxes Provide emergency call boxes (ECB) at outdoor areas such as parking lots and garages, pedestrian walkways, and gathering areas such as courtyards. ECBs have the following functional requirements: 39 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • • • • • • Equip ECB stanchions with a blue light strobe that is lit at night and will strobe when in alarm. Hardwire communication wire and cable to ECB, wireless communication is only authorized with prior approval by ECU Security. Light ECB location to provide adequate illumination at night. Coordinate with existing and planned video coverage to ensure the ECB is under video surveillance. ECBS shall be located so that they can be ADA accessible per the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities. Mounting ECB so that its easily visible (not trees or scrubs obscuring line of sight) Provide 8 hours of battery back-up. Properly grounded each unit, refer to local codes. For tall pedestal units, install a .5” x 8’ grounding rod and tie it to the steel bollard (Refer to installation instructions for each unit). Activate ECB by just the push of a button, and it immediately calls emergency responders. Coordinate with Security Management System to automatically identify location of ECB is when in alarm. Provide hands free communication on the caller’s part. The placement of ECBs will depend on several factors: • • • Distance to next closets call box: they should be no further than 250 feet apart. Line of Sight: A person should be able to reasonably see an ECB from anywhere on campus. If a call box is not in the line of sight, because of either location or visual obstruction a new call box shall be placed. A minimum of one ECB is required for each level of a parking garage 40 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 provided us with proper height specifications for our call box design. Maximum forward reach unobstructed is 48” high; minimum is 15” high. Maximum forward reach with an obstruction of width less than 20” is 48” high. When the obstruction is between 20” and 25”, maximum forward reach is 44” high. Maximum side reach unobstructed is 54” high; minimum 9” high. Over an obstruction of at most 24” wide and 34” tall, maximum side reach is 46” high. The following images are from the Americans with Disabilities Act and illustrate this information visually 41 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 9.5.3. Mass Notification All inhabited buildings should have a timely means to notify occupants of threats and emergencies and give instructions as to responses. Building communications systems should provide real-time notification of occupants and passersby in the immediate vicinity of the building during emergencies. The information relayed should be specific enough to determine the appropriate response actions. Coordinate with ECU to ensure the existing Mass Notification system is integrated into the facility. 9.5.4. Elevators Intercoms or emergency phones meeting ADA requirements are required to allow cab occupants to contact the ECU Security. 9.5.5. Area of Refuge (Rescue) Intercoms or emergency phones meeting ADA requirements are required at refuge locations to allow building occupants to contact ECU Security. 9.5.6. Duress / Panic Buttons Provide duress / panic alarms at locations where there is considerable public contact in isolated and pre-identified high-risk areas such as cash transaction points. Always we hardwire devices. Activation shall transmit a silent alarm signal to the SOC and initiate preprogrammed video coverage of the area. Mount alarms in such a manner as not to be observable and to prevent unintentional operation and false alarms. At strategic locations, configure PACS keypads to act as a duress station upon presentation of a predefined user-specific code notifying the SOC the person entering an area is under duress. 9.6. Security Closets A security closet is the location inside a facility where the security panels and other equipment are located. Either these closets can be standalone areas dedicated to only security or they can be co-located with telecommunication rooms/closets. Security equipment is typically mall mounted. Security closets have the following requirements: • • Locate Security Closets within 250 ft of all security equipment. Mount equipment on ¾-inch fire-rated plywood (or comparable material). 42 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • • • Equip entrance an electronic entry control devices. If the area contains a window, alarm with contracts, glass break sensor and motion detector. Connect all incoming and outgoing conduit metal wire troughs mounted above the security equipment cabinets. Provide all alarm equipment, DGPs, hubs, converters, and electric locks, with eight (8) hours of battery backup and emergency generator circuit to provide uninterrupted service. An independent telecommunication grounding bus bar is required in Security Closets. A sufficient level of illumination is required for close, detailed work on circuit board electronics. Fluorescent lighting is preferred. Security Equipment Room shall not be located below grade for new construction/major modernizations. For existing facilities, the Security Equipment Room shall not be located below grade when in a flood zone. Consider wall space needs for the following wall mounted equipment. One fourth of the wall space shall be dedicated for emergency power and uninterrupted power source equipment and panels. Another one fourth-wall space shall be dedicated to non-Electronic Security Systems, such as fire control and elevator control systems. The remaining wall space shall be dedicated to electronic security systems. 43 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 44 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 10. Abbreviations & Acronyms The following terms, abbreviations, and definitions relate to the design of electronic security systems as described within this document. A/E ACS ADA AHJ CBR CMU CCTV COTR CPP CPTED DBT DGP EECS EMT ENT ESS HVAC IBC IDS IESNA LEED PACS PSP SMS SOC UPS VASS Architect/Engineer Access Control System American with Disabilities Act Authority Having Jurisdiction Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Concrete Masonry Unit Closed Circuit Television Contracting Officer's Technical Representative Certified Protection Professional Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Design Basis Threat Data Gathering Panel Electronic Entry Control System Electrical Metallic Tubing Electrical Nonmetallic Tubing Electronic Security System Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning International Building Code Intrusion Detection System Illuminating Engineering Society of North America Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Physical Access Control System Physical Security Professional Security Management System Security Operations Center Uninterruptable Power Source Video Assessment and Surveillance System 45 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 46 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 11. References This section lists applicable codes and regulations, standards, design guidelines, and resources. Federal Information Processing Standards, FIPS Pub 201-1, Personal Identification Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. March 2006 Guide To Mail Center Security, U.S. Postal Inspection Service Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) G-1-03. Guideline for Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public Spaces developed International Building Code 2008, International Code Council, 2008 NFPA 70: National Electrical Code, National Fire Protection Association, 2008 NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm Code, National Fire Protection Association, 2007 NFPA 101: Life Safety Code, National Fire Protection Association, 2006 UL 294: Standard for Access Control System Units, Underwriters Laboratory UL 681: Standard for Installation and Classification of Burglar and Holdup Alarm Systems, Underwriters Laboratory UL 972: Standard for Burglary Resisting Glazing Material, Underwriters Laboratory UL 3044: Standard for Surveillance Closed Circuit Television Equipment, Underwriters Laboratory U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG) 47 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 48 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 12. Security Design Criteria Matrix This matrix identifies the appropriate measures for each space category. To use the matrix select the space listed in the left-hand column of the table then locate the measures under each area. The measures are Required (R), Optional (O), or Not Applicable (N/A). In some instances, outside factors will require the baseline criteria be augmented or supplemented. Only the ECU Physical Security Office can approve any modifications to the design criteria for a facility or space. 49 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 50 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 13. Preferred Equipment List (Template) All ESS equipment including monitoring devices, card readers, power supplies, IDS panels, recoding and storage, cameras, and related data processing equipment and computer hardware are defined in this Preferred ESS Equipment List. The list contains the following: (i) generic name of device, (ii) device description, (iii) manufacturer’s name, (iv) manufacture’s part number. The purchase of all ESS equipment will comply with this list. The compliance policy is exception based and requires clear documentation from procurement to justify any ESS purchase that deviates from the list. Approval must be obtained in writing from the Director of Physical Security. Contractors and Vendors may apply through the ECU Physical Security Office to be added to the list. Generic Name Device Description Security Management Software Data Gathering Panel Intelligent System Controller Intelligent System Controller Reader Module Dual Reader Interface Single Reader Interface Dual Reader Interface Input Module Output Module Biometric Reader Interface Gateway Proximity Card Reader 51 Manufacturer Part # ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Proximity Card Reader with Keypad Keypad Intercom Substation Master Station, Dual Display Intercom Exchange Emergency Call Box Substation Network Fixed Dome Camera (Indoor) Network Fixed Dome Camera (Vandal Proof) Indoor/Outdoor Network PTZ Dome Camera Outdoor Network PTZ Dome Camera Network Switch Recess Mounted Door Contact Surface Mounted Door Contact, Heavy Duty Overhead Door Contact Request-to-Exit, Passive Infrared 360° Motion Detector, Passive Infrared, Ceiling Mounted Long Range Motion Detector, Passive Infrared, Wall 52 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Mounted Acoustic Glass Break Sensor Duress Alarm Switches 53 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 This page intentionally left blank 54 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 14. ESS Configuration Template (Template) This provides a framework for the ECU Physical Security Office to develop a University specific configuration template to ensure the standardization of all ESS into a single user-friendly system. 14.1. Initial Descriptor The Initial Descriptor is a brief description of the event and shall be no more than 50 characters in length. 14.1.1. Building ID The Building ID is a two (2) or four (4) character identification of the building where the event is taking place. The standard format is below. Building ID Building ID 14.1.2. Monitor Point Location This is the 11-character monitor point physical location. There is no separation between the Building ID and the Monitor Point Location. 14.1.3. Area ID (Type) This is a brief description of the location of the alarm / event. There is a one (1)character space between the Monitor Point Location and the Area ID. At a minimum level of description, this follows the standard format shown below. Confirm areas and identifications with the owner. Description Perimeter Door, Glass Break, Motion Staff Cafeteria Public Access Cafeteria Public Staff Separation Door Cash Processing Areas Area ID PERIMETER STAFF CAFE PUBLIC CAFE STAFF DOOR CASH ROOM 55 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 Description Automated Teller Machines Executive Office Space Support Staff Office Space Loading Dock Areas Security Operations Center Security Wire Closet Computer Center Rooms Mechanical Room Electrical Room Communication Closet Support Staff Storage Area Warehouse Storage Area Shipping and Receiving Area Security Officer Kiosks / Posts Information Booths Locker Rooms Laboratories Child Care Centers Area ID ATM EXECUTIVE OFFICE STAFF OFFICE LOADING DOCK SOC SEC CLOSET COMPUTER ROOM MECHANICAL ROOM ELECTRICAL ROOM COMM CLOSET STAFF STORAGE WAREHOUSE SHIPPING RECEIVING SECURITY POST INFO BOOTH LOCKER ROOM LABORATORIES CHILD CARE 14.1.4. Device / Condition Type This is a two (2)-digit descriptor of the type of device / condition that initiated the alarm / event. There is a one (1)-character space between the Area ID and the Device / Condition Type. This follows the standard format as shown below. Type of Device / Condition Door Contact Motion Detector Vibration Detector Glass Break Detector Hold Up / Duress Button Bill Trap (Last Bill Detector) Door Held Open Door Forced Open Power Failure Tamper Alarm Delayed Egress Pre Alarm Temperature Alarm ID DC MD VD GB HU BT HO FO PF TP DE TA 56 Type of Device / Condition Window Contact Hazard Alarm Case / Display Alarm Low / Missing Battery Communication Failure Security Fault UPS / Power Supply Trouble Restore / Reset Proximity Alarm Pressure Mat HVAC Duct Alarm ID WC HZ CA LB CF SF PT RS PA PM DA ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 14.1.5. Examples for the Initial Descriptor Building monitor point location DGP chain 1 DGP number 2 first I-8 input 4, Security Operations Center motion detector in alarm. • ID1:2 8:1:4 SOC MD Building monitor point location DGP chain 3 DGP number 4 main panel input 6, public staff separation door forced open. • ID3:4 M:6 STAFF DOOR FO 14.2. Secondary Descriptor (128 character) This is an in-depth description for the location of the alarm / event. If multiple devices are connected to the same monitor point, the number of devices should be indicated. 14.2.1. Examples for the Secondary Descriptor Building monitor point location DGP chain 1 DGP number 6, I-32 board input 31, Security Operations Center motion detector in alarm. • ID1:6 32:31 SOC MD: ID 5th Fl East Wing Rm. 5210 Motion Detectors (3). Building monitor point location DGP chain 1 DGP number 2, third I-8 board input 5, public-staff separation door forced open. • ID1:2 8:3:5 STAFF DOOR FO: ID 1st Fl East Hall Card Access Door Forced Open. 14.3. Linked Instruction Event 14.3.1. Description This is a full instructional description for the processing of the alarm / event and follows the standard format of: • • • • Repeat 50 character descriptor In-depth description of location Response instructions Logging instructions 57 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • Reset instructions Nearest camera location (if multiple views are available list all). DGP that input is connected to 14.3.2. Examples for the Linked Instructional Event Building monitor point location DGP chain 1, DGP number 3, I-32 board input 31, Security Operations Center motion detector in alarm. Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Display ID 1:3 32:3 1 SOC MD 5th fl east wing Rm. 5210 motion detectors (3) Dispatch officer to investigate and report findings Log officer’s name and actions into computer log Device resets automatically when motion has stopped Nearest camera is No. (camera Nos. provides other views) Device connected to DGP 14.4. Alarm / Event Mapping Requirements 14.4.1. General All maps associated with alarm / event call-ups have a black foreground on a white background. 14.4.2. Map Information Screen The map information screen provides access to three different map levels for each event. • • Building Floor Map: This map has the quadrant where the event is taking place line colored blue or the colored event icon in place. Identify this map with the building name and floor at the bottom of the map. Quadrant Map: This is the map called up by the system automatically upon event activation. Identify this map with the building name, floor number, and quadrant at the bottom of the map. This map has the icon representing the event shown upon call up. Clicking on the icon or a map “zoom in” icon at this map level calls up the Area Map. 58 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • Area Map: This map represents the local area of the building where the event is taking place. This map contains all icons associated with this area. These icons are “living”, changing colors as the associated devices change state. Identify this map with the building name, floor number, quadrant, and area name at the bottom of the map. 14.4.3. Mapping Icons Mapping icons change color as the associated devices change state. • • • Red = alarm / activated state Green = secure / normal state Yellow = masked, shunted, accessed, or other altered state Group and position Mapping Icons represented on the Area Map as described below: • • • • • • Motion detectors providing back up to perimeter door(s) / window(s). o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the protected door(s) or window(s), to represent all devices in that zone or group. Motion detectors providing back up to public staff separation doors and other internal doors. o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the protected door. Motion detectors providing volumetric protection of a room. o A single icon placed in the center of the room to represent all devices in that zone or group. Glass-break detectors protecting perimeter windows. o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the center of the window or group of windows to represent all devices in that zone or group. Door contacts protecting individual perimeter doors or logical groups of perimeter doors. o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the center of the door or group of doors to represent all devices in that zone or group. Delayed egress pre-alarm contacts protecting individual doors or logical groups of doors. o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the center of the door or group of doors to represent all devices in that zone or group. 59 ECU Physical Security Design Criteria October 18, 2011 • • • • • Window contacts protecting individual perimeter windows or logical groups of perimeter windows. o A single icon placed in a close geographical position to the center of the window or group of windows to represent all devices in that zone or group. Card reader events to include door forced open and door held open alarms. o A single icon the same as the door contact protecting the door. Icon descriptor identifies the appropriate event taking place. Tamper alarms protecting panels in security closets. o A single icon placed in the center of the room to represent all devices in that zone or group. Tamper alarms protecting individual devices or logical groups of devices. o A single icon placed in close geographical position to the device or group of devices to represent all devices in that zone or group. Vibration detectors protecting any physical barrier or point of entry. o A single icon placed in close geographical position to the physical barrier/point of entry or group of devices to represent all devices in that zone or group. 60 15. Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (Template) ACCESS CONTROL INSPECTION AND TESTING REPORT COMPONENTS Quantity Type of Components Controller Power supply Reader Key Magnetic stripe RFID card Biometric Position sensor Electric latch Electromagnetic lock Request to exit Manual Motion Other: Device Type or Model ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ NOTIFICATION OF TESTING Notify party responsible for the protected premises: Name: Date: Monitoring station: Name: Date: Component SYSTEM INSPECTION AND TEST Visual Functional Check Test Yes No Pass Fail Time: Time: Comments ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ Control unit Primary power circuit disconnect Secondary power Batteries Voltage at end of test Generator records Power Supply 61 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ ACCESS CONTROL INSPECTION AND TESTING REPORT (continued) Location/Address Visual Check Yes No Functional Test Pass Fail Results/Explanation ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ (Attach additional sheets as necessary to list all devices.) Signal/Component Alarm signal Trouble signal Yes No TRANSMISSION TEST Time 62 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ Comments FINAL TEST REPORT The following did not operate properly: 63 INTRUSION DETECTION OR HOLDUP AND DURESS SYSTEMS INSPECTION & TESTING REPORT SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Type of System: (Check only one; use additional forms for other systems at same premises) Exterior intrusion detection Interior intrusion detection Holdup system Duress system Ambush system Control Unit: Mfr: Model: ____ Type of Circuit: End of line Number of circuits: Addressable Number of addresses: Wireless Number of transmitters: DETECTION DEVICES Quantity Type of Detection Audio sensors Contacts – door Contacts – window Exterior buried detectors Motion detectors Photoelectric detection Pressure & stress sensors Protective cable Protective wiring Proximity sensors Shock sensors Sound detection Holdup devices – portable Holdup devices – fixed in place Duress devices – portable Duress devices- fixed in place Ambush devices Other: Device Type or Model ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ SIGNALING DEVICES Location None Interior Exterior Quantity Type Bell Bell Siren Siren 64 Horn Horn Other Other NOTIFICATION OF TESTING Notify party responsible for the protected premises: Name: Date: Monitoring station: Name: Date: Time: Time: SYSTEM INSPECTION AND TEST Component Visual Check Yes No Functional Test Pass Fail Comments Control unit Arming means Primary power circuit disconnect Secondary power Batteries Voltage at end of test Generator records Signaling device(s) Protective circuit supervision DETECTION DEVICE INSPECTION AND TEST Location/Address Visual Check Yes No Functional Test Pass Fail Results/Explanation (Attach additional sheets as necessary to list all devices.) 65 Signal/Component Yes No Yes No TRANSMISSION TEST Time Comments Alarm signal Trouble signal Signal/Component Line security Alarm signal Supervisory signal Trouble signal Other: Time Comments FINAL TEST REPORT The following did not operate properly: NOTIFICATION OF END OF TESTING Notify party responsible for the protected premises: Name: Date: Monitoring station: Name: Date: System restored to normal operation: Date: Time: Time: Testing was performed in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. Name of inspector: Signature: Party responsible for the protected premises: Signature: Date: Time: Date: Time: 66 Time: VIDEO SURVEILLANCE INSPECTION AND TESTING REPORT Quantity COMPONENTS Type of Components Video controller Video switcher Video multiplexer Monitor (monochrome or color) Recorder (Tape or DVR) Camera Enclosure Pan tilt zoom (PTZ) Alarming inputs Other: Device Type or Model NOTIFICATION OF TESTING Notify party responsible for the protected premises: Name: Date: Monitoring station: Name: Date: Time: Time: SYSTEM INSPECTION AND TEST Visual Functional Check Test Yes No Pass Fail Component Comments Control unit Primary power circuit disconnect Secondary power Batteries Voltage at end of test Generator test records Remote controls Variable lenses Location/Address COMPONENT INSPECTION AND TEST Visual Functional Check Test Yes No Pass Fail Results/Explanation (Attach additional sheets as necessary to list all devices.) 67 TRANSMISSION TEST Signal/Component Yes No Time Comments Digital signal FINAL TEST REPORT The following did not operate properly: NOTIFICATION OF END OF TESTING Notify party responsible for the protected premises: Name: Date: Monitoring station: Name: Date: System restored to normal operation: Date: Time: Time: Time: Testing was performed in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. Name of inspector: Date: Signature: Time: Party responsible for the protected premises: Signature: Date: Time: 68 ADDITIONAL DEVICES INSPECTION AND TESTING REPORT COMPONENT INSPECTION AND TEST Type/Location/Address Visual Check Yes No Functional Test Pass Fail Results/Explanation (Attach additional sheets as necessary to list all devices.) Additional devices System type: 69