`volcano Fires Debate` `aod 12 Months On`

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‘Volcano fires debate’ The fallout from Eyjafjallajökull Sept-Oct 2010 Issue 76 ‘AOD 12 months on’ Reviewing the AOD program V X X0 X01 X 01 0 1 EGRR RR 2 21 211 11458 11 45 4 58 58 VA A DV DVI V IS SOR OR O RY Y DTG DTG T G: 2 0 010 10 032 0 1/1 /1200 00 0Z VAAC: VAA VA C: LON LOND LO DON VO V OLCA OL LCA NO NO O:: EY YJ JAF A FJOL AF JO OLL OL PS P PSN PSN: SN S N: N 6 3 339 W 019 192 92 26 6 › Spanner in the works Keeping track of tools A REA A : IC ICEL CEL A AND AN ND SUMMI MMIT T ELEV LEV: EV: 100 000 0 00 0 0M A DVI DVIS SOR SO S O Y NR: OR N 201 010/0 0/0 0/ /0 06 06 INF NF NFO FO O SO SOURC UR U RCE E:: IICE CELA LAN AN A ND MET E T OF › Hear this Cockpit noise and pilots’ ears AVIA A VIATIO TIO IO ON C O OLO OUR RC COD CO ODE E:: UNK NK N K NOW NO N OW N ERUP RUP TION DETA TAILS TA ILS:: E ILS ER RUP TIO RUP ION N C ONT O IN NUES NU NUE ES OBS OB S VA DTG: TG: 21 2 /12 1 00Z Z OB OBS B VA VA CLD CL LD: D: SFC SFC/FL /FL FL0 0 50 050 05 5 0 N6 N 331 W0192 92 23 3-N --N655 6 55 5 59 W 0 022 225 › Close calls And ... more W03 W0 0 3252 03 52-N6 -N6047 047 W0 04 0 38 3823-N 382 823 3-N N6 601 017 W034 01 W 0342 4 2 -N -N63 31 31 W0 W 923 W01 923 F ST FC T VA VA CLD CL +6 + 6HR HR: 21 HR: 21/18 /1 18 1 80 00 00Z 0Z S 0Z SF FC/F FC/F C/FL05 FL05 L0 0 N W 019 1919 19-N 19 N6 N67 N6 67 705 W02 W 0 52 525 25 -N6 N6704 704 4W W0 W04 0 4 323 3 3 -N 32 -N5 N5 N 5633 6 W0 633 W 0 35 5-N614 W0354 5-N N614 4 3 W 030 030353 5 N6 35N63 3 FCST FCS T VA A CL CLD +12HR: R: 2 22 /00 00 00 00Z 0Z SF S C/ C/F / FL05 FL05 L050 0N W 01903 9 -N6 675 750 0 W0 W 0283 2833 3-N N6750 0 W039 W 955 555-N6 N61 N6 131 W04 W0 52 52 W04 W0 4 459 N550 4459-N 5501 501 W032 W 032 03 07-N59 N5954 W03 N5 W0 0 3105 10 05 0 5 -N6 N6 FCS CST CS T VA VA CLD CLD LD +18 +18 18HR: HR R 2 22 2 /06 /0 0 6 00Z 00 0 0Z 0 Z SF FC/F C/ W01 W0 1929 29--N6838 38 8 W 3232-N680 W0 6808 8 W04 W 045 45 51515 N 15 N54 N5 54 5 4 26 6W W03 03737 737 3 -N5 56 644 64 4 44 4W W0295 9 4-N 4 N614 N614 14 1 4 3 W 03247 477 RM MK : THIS S A DV IS SOR O Y SUPE SUPE PE ER RCE C DES ADVIS VISO O VOLCAN A IC C ASH A NOT NOT A BO BO BOV OV V E FL05 FL05 L 05 0, 0 ERU UPTION ON MAI AIN N NX X T A DV VIISOR ISOR S Y: Y 201 2 01 100 00321/ 003 21/180 21/ 1800Z= 80 0Z= AUSTRALIAN AIR PILOTS MUTUAL BENEFIT FUND YOUR LOSS OF LICENCE FUND PROVIDING SUPPORT AND PEACE OF MIND The Australian Air Pilots Mutual Benefit Fund is the loss of licence fund that exists solely to assist its members. For the past 49 years, we’ve been providing Australian commercial pilots with the peace of mind that they will be financially supported in the event their Australian Class One Medical Certificate is suspended or cancelled. We’re different to other loss of licence providers: • Designed for pilots and run by pilots – we understand the unique working conditions in which pilots operate. • Your level of benefit is determined by the contribution scale, not by your salary or income – the maximum level available is $550,000. • Competitive costs – most pilots can obtain reimbursement under their award or agreement from their employer. • Benefit payments to members are not reduced to a percentage of your salary, or reduced should you be capable of any employment whilst your Class One is suspended. • Cover that stays with you throughout your career – fund members can retain membership even when they change employers. Join the fund that offers competitive cover designed for Australian commercial pilots. For more information or to download an application form, visit www.aapmbf.com.au or call +61 3 9928 4500. This information is of a general nature only. It does not take into account your personal circumstances and is not intended to be relied upon as specific financial advice. You should read the Combined Financial Services Guide and Product Disclosure Statement (available at www.aapmbf.com.au) before deciding whether to become a member of the Fund. No responsibility for loss by any person acting, or not acting, as a result of this advertisement will be accepted. Trustee: Austair Pilots Pty Ltd AFSL 344259 ISSUE NO. 76, SEPT-OCT 2010 DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, CASA John McCormick MANAGER, SAFETY PROMOTION Gail Sambidge-Mitchell CONTENTS Features 8 WRITER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Robert Wilson DESIGNER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Fiona Scheidel ADVERTISING SALES P: 131 757 or E: [email protected] CORRESPONDENCE Flight Safety Australia GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601 P: 131 757 F: 02 6217 1950 E: [email protected] W: www.casa.gov.au CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS? To change your address online, go to http://casa.gov.au/change For address-change enquiries, call CASA on 1300 737 032 DISTRIBUTION Bi-monthly to 87,000 aviation licence holders, cabin crew and industry personnel in Australia and internationally. CONTRIBUTIONS Stories and photos are welcome. Please discuss your ideas with editorial staff before submission. Note that CASA cannot accept responsibility for unsolicited material. All efforts are made to ensure that the correct copyright notice accompanies each published photograph. If you believe any to be in error, please notify us at [email protected] ‘Volcano fires debate’ As close as you ever want to get to volcanic ash. EDITOR, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Margo Marchbank 14 ‘Solar max’ The sun’s rays do more than warm us. 20 ‘AOD, 12 months on’ How aviation organisations are implementing the new regulations. 26 ’Dangerous goods’ A frightening story from a CASA inspector. 31 ‘No spanner in the works’ A commercial helicopter operator leads the way in tool control. 39 ‘Composites’ New materials bring new benefi ts - and new challenges. 43 ‘Hear this’ How to protect your hearing in a noisy cockpit. 58 ’The Amana mystery’ Analysing a West Australian tragedy after 60 years. 64 ‘Monitoring flight levels' More stringent altimeter checking for jet aircraft is coming. PRINTING IPMG (Independent Print Media Group) NOTICE ON ADVERTISING Advertising appearing in Flight Safety Australia does not imply endorsement by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Warning: This educational publication does not replace ERSA, AIP, airworthiness regulatory documents, manufacturers’ advice, or NOTAMs. Operational information in Flight Safety Australia should only be used in conjunction with current operational documents. Information contained herein is subject to change. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Regulars 2 16 18 19 31 34. SDRs 41. Directives 46 Close Calls © Copyright 2010, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia. Copyright for the ATSB and ATC supplements rests with the ATSB and Airservices Australia respectively– these supplements are written, edited and designed independently of CASA. All requests for permission to reproduce any articles should be directed to FSA editorial (see correspondence details above). Registered–Print Post: 381667-00644. ISSN 1325-5002. COVER: Fiona Scheidel Flight Bytes–aviation safety news ATC Notes–news from Airservices Australia Accident reports–International Accident reports–Australian Airworthiness pull-out section 46 ‘Capless in corporate’ 48 ‘Rotors – a brutal introduction’ 50 ‘A GAAP too tight’ 52 66 70 71 ATSB supplement Av Quiz Calendar Quiz answers VALE: DAVID WARREN 1925-2010 A combination of intellect and personal interest inspired by tragedy drove David Warren, who died on 19 July aged 85, to invent the flight data recorder. In 1934, a de Havilland DH 86 airliner crashed into Bass Strait, killing all 12 on board and leaving a nine-year-old boy in a Sydney boarding school without a father. That boy was David Ronald Warren The last gift his father gave him before taking the fatal flight was a crystal radio set. It stimulated Warren’s interest in electronics and by 1948, with an honours degree in chemistry under his belt, he was principal research scientist at the government Aeronautical Research Laboratories in Melbourne. FSA SEPT-OCT10 2 Warren retired as principal research scientist at the Aeronautical Research Laboratory in 1983. He never profited from his invention, but was appointed an Officer in the General Division of the Order of Australia in 2002, and Qantas named one its new A380s after him in 2008. David Warren is survived by his wife of 62 years, Ruth; four children; eight grandchildren and one great grandchild. His coffin bore a bright orange notice declaring: ‘Flight recorder inventor - do not open.’ The misfortunes of another de Havilland type inspired Warren’s breakthrough. As a fuel specialist, he was involved in investigating the widely-publicised DH106 Comet crashes of the mid 1950s. With few clues in the wreckage, he began thinking how it would be useful to know what it was the instruments and flight crew of a crashed aircraft were saying. His solution was the first flight data recorder. He proposed the idea in 1954, and a prototype, using a steel wire to record a four-hour loop of flight deck conversation and a few instrument readings, was ready by 1957. He could find no government or commercial backing in Australia, but when a British aviation administrator saw the device he was enthusiastic enough to tempt Warren and his team to the UK with instructions to develop a recorder. On the flight over one engine failed and Warren switched on the audio recording part of his device … just in case. After a Fokker F-27 Friendship crashed mysteriously off Mackay, Queensland, in 1960, the investigating judge ordered that all Australian airliners had to carry a cockpit voice recorder from 1963. Australia was the first country to make flight recorders mandatory, although the initial contract to develop a recorder for Australian use went to an American company using magnetic tape. Modern flight recorders use digital recording, and can store more than 1000 flight parameters. But their basic concept remains as described by Warren in 1954. Although popularly known as black boxes they are in fact, high-visibility orange. FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA ,QQRYDWRUVLQ3URIHVVLRQDO3LORW7UDLQLQJ 2010 FLYING COURSES Course Price Commercial Pilot – CPL-A from '3&&
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1EV $59,750* Multi Engine Command Instrument Rating (MECIR) $12,850* Flight Instructor Course $16,850* from *Visit our website www.flyfta.com for full details PLACES ARE LIMITED – BOOK NOW ph: (07) 3715 4000 email: [email protected] FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA • Queensland’s largest flight training organisation • Proudly owned and managed by airline pilots CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009 www.flyfta.com TOOL KIT FOR TOUCHDOWNS During phase one The US Flight Safety Foundation has announced the rerelease of its Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Tool Kit with updated data and a new section on runway excursions. Since the ALAR Tool Kit was introduced ten years ago more than 40,000 copies have been distributed around the world. During phase one test flying, only the pilot is permitted to be onboard. No passengers may be carried, unless that passenger 'is essential to the safe conduct of the flight'. Therefore, the conduct of flight training is not permitted during phase one flight testing. However, if phase one is complete, then owners can undertake a variety of conversion and transition training, subject to some conditions, as below. Photo courtesy of Michael Horneman The updated version of the tool kit has been enhanced with the inclusion of the results of the Foundation's Runway Safety Initiative efforts to prevent runway excursion accidents. In addition, the tool kit contains updated data and graphic presentations on approach and landing accidents. TRAINING & EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT CASA's sport aviation office has had a number of queries relating to transition and conversion training in experimental category aircraft, from owners of experimental category aircraft asking whether they can train with an instructor in their own aircraft. The answer is: 'It depends'. FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA ,QQRYDWRUVLQ3URIHVVLRQDO3LORW7UDLQLQJ 2010/11 THEORY CLASS DATES Course Dates Price CPL Theory 11 Oct 2010, 6 Dec 2010, 21 Feb 2011, 18 Apr 2011 $2950* IREX Theory 27 Sep 2010, 22 Nov 2010, 7 Feb 2011, 28 Mar 2011 $1250 *All 7 subjects – individual subjects may be purchased, see www.flyfta.com for full details PLACES ARE LIMITED – BOOK NOW ph: (07) 3715 4000 email: [email protected] FLIGHT TRAINING AUSTRALIA • Queensland’s largest flight training organisation • Proudly owned and managed by airline pilots CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009 www.flyfta.com On completion of phase one Owners may undertake training with an authorised/ rated flight instructor, to increase their skill levels (in their own aircraft). So if you're an owner, it's permissible to polish your 'hands and feet' skills in your own aircraft, with such an instructor. Likewise, after the completion of phase one, owners may also undertake training in their own aircraft, with an authorised/rated flight instructor, to gain an aircraft feature endorsement, such as a tail-wheel endorsement. While an AOC is not required for flying training to be undertaken in the aircraft as, for example, training towards a PPL is required to be provided against a syllabus, it is preferable that training is provided by a recognised flying school. Owners of experimental aircraft wishing to take their biennial flight review (BFR/AFR) can do so in their aircraft, provided that the review is undertaken with an appropriate person (as defined in CAR 5.81(8) and the conditions of CAR 5.81(2) are met. Owners of experimental aircraft wishing to obtain a rating can do so in their aircraft, provided that a flight test is undertaken by a person authorised to conduct it. Owners of such aircraft should note that while these activities may be permitted under the regulations, other factors may come into play, such as insurance and the willingness of flying instructors to train owners in their own aircraft. FLIGHT BYTES If the aircraft is in phase one, the answer is 'No', as follows. 3 BUREAU SAYS KEEP YOUR EDGE Flight crew distraction and confusing runway entry lighting are among two of the major factors that contribute to misaligned take-offs at night according to a recent Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) research report. The report presents several national and international incidents involving misaligned take-offs. It also reveals the common factors that increase the risk of pilots takingoff on the runway edge lights, or on a wrong runway or a taxiway. The ATSB’s director of safety data, research and technical, Julian Walsh, says pilots can manage the risks by being aware of these common factors. ‘If you’re distracted or tired, then the risk of a misaligned take-off occurring is greatly increased,’ Walsh said. FSA SEPT-OCT10 4 TOP 6 RISK FACTORS contributing to misaligned take-offs at night: 1. Distraction or divided attention of the flight crew 2. Confusing runway entry markings 3. Displaced threshold or intersection departure 4. Poor visibility or weather 5. Air traffic control clearance issued during runway entry 6. Flight crew fatigue ‘Furthermore, runway entry can be confusing at night due to runway entry lights or markings, areas of additional pavement on the runway, or the absence of runway centerline lighting. ‘Other contributing factors include displaced threshold or intersection departure, poor visibility or weather, and air traffic control clearance issued during runway entry.’ You can find a copy of the report 'Factors influencing misaligned take-off occurrences at night' on the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au. State of the Art, Two Place, Touring and Training Aircraft – Certified IFR (FAR Part 23) • Safety – robust modular design with incredible visibility • Performance – advanced aerodynamics with high manoeuverability • Comfort – 48” wide cockpit with huge baggage space • Utility – Useful load after full fuel 192 kg • Simplicity – FADEC Engine with digital engine monitoring display • Economy – 132 knots cruise at 23 litres per hour, up to 500 nm range plus reserves • Affordability – low purchase price and low operating costs Book a demonstration flight now! Call 0419 355 303 Contact Nigel Hutchinson–Brooks Liberty Aircraft Company Pty Ltd A.C.N. 118 727 889 Tel 03 5662 5658 Fax 03 5662 5179 Email [email protected] Details at www.libertyaircraft.com IMPRESSIVE NEW ‘MAC’ BOOK RED BULL RUNS ITS RACE Flight Safety Australia contributor and editor of its predecessor, Aviation Safety Digest, Macarthur Job, has reinvestigated one of Australia’s most notorious aviation mysteries in his latest book Into Oblivion: the Southern Cloud Enigma. The Red Bull Air Race, which thrilled crowds this year in New York City, Abu Dhabi and Perth has been cancelled. On 21 March 1931, the airliner Southern Cloud disappeared en route from Sydney to Melbourne. No trace of it was found until 27 years later when a bushwalker discovered its remains high in the Snowy Mountains. Job has thoroughly examined the tragedy and turned up new material, including a magazine story on ‘blind flying’ by the Southern Cloud’s pilot, which sheds light on the hair-raising practices of the time and the professionalism of commercial pilots, even at that early stage of aviation. The book was launched in Tumbarumba, NSW, on 3 July at a function attended by historic aviation enthusiasts, representatives of CASA and Airservices Australia and descendants of the flight’s passengers. Into Oblivion: the Southern Cloud Enigma is available from Sierra Publishing (www.sierraaustralia.com) for $34.95, including shipping within Australia; and from bookshops by request. The organisers said in late July that ‘for the future success and development of the sport, the World Championship will take a one-year break in 2011.’ ‘The organisation will use this opportunity to fast track the technological advancements currently in the making which would further improve the already high levels of safety.’ Red Bull cited ‘a need to revise the main organisation and commercial areas to realise the full potential of the sport including the development and reinforcement of strong host city partnerships which would secure a long term race calendar.’ Media reports have spoken of a decision to reexamine safety standards for the series of time trials through inflatable obstacles after the spectacular crash of Brazilian pilot Adilson Kindlemann into the Swan River during practice for the Perth round. FLIGHT BYTES Britain's Paul Bonhomme won the 2010 Red Bull Air Race World Championship by taking second place behind Austria's Hannes Arch in the final race of the season at the EuroSpeedway Lausitz in Germany. Australian pilot Matt Hall was third. The last two rounds of the 2010 competition, which were to take place in Budapest and Lisbon were cancelled. 5 AIRSPACE RULES - OK Last year’s aviation white paper discussed, among other things, improving aviation safety through a more flexible use of airspace. A joint working group involving military, CASA, Airservices Australia, departmental and industry representatives has been looking at how airspace can be better managed, and has made a number of recommendations to maximise the use of available airspace, while keeping, for example, FA-18s, B737800s and Cessna 182s safely segregated. Flexible use of airspace optimises civil access to military airspace and vice versa. One of the results of all this work will be changes to the way charts etc portray restricted areas. These changes come into effect on 18 November, 2010. The changes more accurately depict the different ways restricted airspace is managed; and will give a better idea of who is managing the area, and your likelihood of getting a clearance through it, when it is active. FSA SEPT-OCT10 6 RA 1 This is the airspace managed like controlled airspace – typically the areas around major airfields such as Williamtown, Pearce or Amberley. When active, RAAF air traffic controllers manage the airspace. • You can plan through, and expect a clearance through, this airspace and will get a clearance if the traffic situation permits. NOTAM/message will advise if this is not the case. RA 2 Restricted areas with defence priority, without necessarily having ATC management. • You cannot plan/should not expect a clearance through when active, although ATC may offer tracking on a tactical basis. RA 3 Other restricted areas designed to protect non-participants, such as radar sites and firing areas. Over-flight of these areas not allowed because the risk is too high. • Clearance never available when active, except in emergency (most firing areas, laser, bomb dump, high powered transmitter sites and non ATCsupported flying training). There will be a further article detailing these changes in the November-December 2010 issue of Flight Safety. Australia. If you have any queries relating to these changes, you can email CASA/Defence liaison: [email protected]. LEARN FROM THE ON THE WAY TO UPGRADING YOUR AVIATION CAREER. Swinburne’s Aviation courses. Brought to you in conjunction with the biggest names in aviation. If your aviation career is in a holding pattern, Swinburne’s aviation qualification is the upgrade you need. Our courses are designed with direction from major players within the industry. This means what you learn here, is exactly what you need to further your career... POSTGRADUATE AVIATION 1300 ASK SWIN swinburne.edu.au/aviation CRICOS Provider: 00111D HYBRID CAR WINGS IT Flying cars have long been a staple of cinematic science fiction, from Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, to Back to the Future to Blade Runner. But it’s 2010, and cars are still firmly on the ground. That might change in 2011 if US start-up company, Terrafugia, fulfils its prediction of selling its first Transition Roadable Aircraft late next year. Terrafugia announced specifications, computer graphics and a scale model of the production version of the Transition at the recent Oshkosh air show in the US. A full-size, proof-of-concept vehicle flew last year. The production version of the two-seater dispenses with the concept vehicle’s canard wing and is 50kg heavier, partly to allow it to fulfil automotive crashworthiness standards. Power comes from a 100hp (75kW) Rotax 912S engine driving a pusher propeller, or the rear wheels, and control is through dual sticks in the air or a left-hand drive steering wheel on the ground. Safety features include cabin airbags and a ballistic recovery parachute. When on the ground the Transition folds its wings and can be driven in this configuration with its twin tailbooms oddly evocative of a 1950's Cadillac. 8gVh]^c\VeaVcZ^hWVYZcdj\]#CdiWZ^c\[djcY^ci^bZ XVcijgcVhjgk^kVWaZVXX^YZci^cidVigV\ZYn# >iÉhcdli^bZidhVkZa^kZh#He^YZgigVX`h]VhWZZc ^ckZciZYidÒcYndj[VhiZg#Jca^`ZigVY^i^dcVaZbZg\ZcXn adXVi^dchnhiZbh!he^YZgigVX`hldg`hWZ[dgZndjXgVh]! igVchb^ii^c\ndjgedh^i^dck^VhViZaa^iZ[gdbiV`Z"d[[id aVcY^c\#I]ZhZVgX]^hdkZg0È[djcYiZX]cdad\nÉ^h]ZgZ# JeÓdZekjceh["l_i_jekhm[Xi_j[ehYWbb'.&&*,'--,$ I>B:IDH6K :A> K : H SURVEY BACKS SCANS Australians have swept aside privacy concerns about the use of full body scanners at airports with 70 per cent of adults supporting the use of the devices, according to research released by information technology company Unisys. The results from Unisys Security Index conducted by Newspoll, show the vast majority of Australian passengers are willing to undergo a range of procedures, such as full body scans and biometric identification, to increase aviation security and enable more efficient passenger processing. The findings follow renewed debate about the introduction of full body scanners in response to recent aviation security incidents including the thwarted attack on a transatlantic jet on Christmas Day 2009 and the Federal Government announcement in February, 2010 that it would spend $200 million to boost security at Australian airports. 7 FLIGHT BYTES mmm$if_Z[hjhWYai$Yec The company website announces that owners can be trained to ‘become a sport pilot’ in 20 hours. Without wishing Terrafugia ill, we see a possible safety issue arising there; although on the bright side the aircraft would, presumably, be easy to taxi. Terrafugia is inviting deposits at $US10,000 each. AREA: ICELAND SUMMIT ELEV: 1000M ADVISORY NR: 2010/006 INFO SOURCE: ICELAND MET OFFICE AVIATION COLOUR CODE: UNKNOWN ERUPTION DETAILS: ERUPTION CONTINUES OBS VA DTG: 21/1200Z OBS VA CLD: SFC/FL050 N6331 W01923-N6559 W02252-N6559 W03252-N6047 W03823-N6017 W0342 -N6331 W01923 FCST VA CLD +6HR: 21/1800Z SFC/FL050 N6331 W01919-N6705 W02525-N6704 W03621-N5801 W04323-N5633 W03545-N6143 W03035-N6331 W01919 FCST VA CLD +12HR: 22/0000Z SFC/FL050 N6331 W01903-N6750 W02833-N6750 W03955-N6131 W04520-N5435 W04459-N5501 W03207-N5954 W03105-N6331 W01903 FCST VA CLD +18HR: 22/0600Z SFC/FL050 N6342 W01929-N6838 W03232-N6808 W04515-N5426 W04601-N5202 FSA SEPT-OCT10 8 Volcano fires DEBATE In the wake of April’s Eyjafjallajökull eruption, Flight Safety looks at the implications of volcanic ash for aviation. It was one of the great understatements in the history of aviation. On 24 June, 1982 over Java, in Indonesia, British Airways Boeing 747 captain, Eric Moody, told his passengers: ‘We have a small problem. All four engines have stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them under control. I trust you are not in too much distress.’ British Airways Flight 9 had encountered volcanic ash, which stopped its engines. Volcanic ash consists of particles of pulverised rock and glass less than 2mm in diameter that are created by volcanic eruptions. (Particles more than 2mm in diameter are classified as volcanic cinders, and particles more than 64mm in diameter are known as 'blocks' or 'bombs'.) Volcanoes create ash in three ways: gas release under decompression; thermal contraction from chilling on contact with water, and ejection of particles during steam eruptions. The principal ingredient of volcanic ash is silicon dioxide, the most common material in the earth’s crust and the major component of sand. Silica is extremely hard, and when it occurs as volcanic ash is also sharp and irregularly shaped, making it very abrasive. Volcanic ash is accompanied by gases, which in the atmosphere are converted into sulphuric acid and other corrosive and poisonous substances. Because it was a dry substance, the ash spewed from the eruption of the Mt Galunggung volcano was invisible to Flight 9’s weather radar, which detected moisture. The first sign of trouble was the glow of St Elmo’s fire flickering around the nose and leading edges, quickly followed by a sulphuric smell and dry mist in the cabin as the polluted air entered. Then, as ash coated their compressor and turbine blades and blocked their finely constructed cooling ducts, the engines failed one by one. Nineteen days after the Flight 9 incident, Galunggung’s ash also caused a Singapore Airlines 747 to lose three engines. Later in that decade, in 1989, a KLM 747 lost all four engines after flying through the ash plume of an Alaskan volcano. In 1991, the year Mt Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines, the International Civil Aviation Organization set up volcanic ash advisory centres (VAAC) attached to national weather forecasting offices, including the UK Met Office, and Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology. Darwin’s VAAC has been in operation since 1993, and issues more volcanic ash advisories than any other VAAC in the world, manager Rebecca Patrick, says. ‘In the last couple of years we've averaged around 1600 advisories per year. The vast majority of these are for low-level eruptions (below flight level 150) that will only affect local air traffic. We usually only have one or two eruptions per year that reach the cruising altitudes of international flights.’ The years since Pinatubo are less than a blink in geological time, but that period without major aircraftthreatening eruptions has seen airline traffic grow, with the introduction of low-cost carriers and the growth of Asia as an air-travel market. Volcanologist, Marianne Guffanti, has cited there are about 60 volcanic eruptions every year, and 100 aircraft encounters with volcanic ash were documented between 1973 and 2000. The cause was the eruption of the Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajökull. Although volcanic eruptions are common, this one met several conditions enabling it to cause maximum disruption. Because the eruption took place under glacial ice, with the volcanic gases condensed by the cold, there was a vigorous formation of fine ash. When the volcanic heat turned this ice into steam, the power of the steam helped carry this light ash high into the atmosphere, where it met the jet-stream wind that carried it towards Western Europe. The jet stream had adopted an unusually stable south-easterly path about the time of the eruption. The result? For nine days, from April 14 to April 23, controlled airspace over most of Western Europe was closed to IFR flights. Commercial air services in Western Europe came to a halt. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) estimated airlines around the world lost about 148 million euro ($A217 million) a day during the disruption. The alternative of flying through the ash might have cost more, in aircraft and life. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology’s Darwin Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre cites ash-related costs to aviation of over $250 million since 1982. Silica is ex tremely hard, and when it occurs as volcanic ash is also sharp and irregularly shaped, making it ver y abrasive. 9 VOLCANO FIRES DEBATE The skill of Captain Moody and his crew in restarting the engines, turning to avoid the high Javanese mountains, and making a night landing with an almost opaque windscreen (and an inoperative ILS) has passed into aviation legend. Following Flight 9’s experience, volcanic ash entered the repertoire of aviation hazards. Despite these figures, volcanic ash faded from the headlines until this year when it (or reaction to it) caused the greatest shutdown of air traffic since World War II. Civil Aviation Safety Authority manager of initial airworthiness, David Villiers, says the most damaging effect of ash occurs when it melts in the hot core of a jet engine, and fuses into a glass-like coating on engine components, causing loss of thrust, and often, engine failure. ‘It also abrades engine components, airframes, windows and components such as pitot heads,’ he says. Potentially, ash can also clog fuel, static air and cooling systems. Volcanic ash has already affected Australian airline operations. When the Chilean volcano, Cerro Hudson, erupted in 1991, its ash cloud encircled the southern hemisphere and was eventually encountered by aircraft flying over south-east Australia. FSA SEPT-OCT10 10 While Australia is geologically stable, with no active volcanoes, it is surrounded by hundreds of active volcanoes in the Pacific and south-east Asia. These make up about half the world’s total of about 530 active volcanoes. They include the still-active Tambora in Indonesia, whose eruption in 1815 was the second largest in recorded history, blowing out an estimated 160 cubic kilometres of ash into the atmosphere. (The largest was the Lake Taupo eruption in New Zealand in 180 AD/CE). According to Geoscience Australia, there are about 250 active or potentially active volcanoes in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. Volcanoes are also widespread throughout the Pacific, it says, with active or potentially active volcanoes in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. Patrick says: ‘In most cases it would be possible to divert around an ash cloud (although expensive). A cataclysmic eruption such as Tambora, in 1815; or Krakatau, in 1883, might be a different story.’ Geoscience Australia says the likelihood of a potentially ash-producing eruption is significant. ‘Research undertaken at Geoscience Australia indicates that a significant eruption, one that would inject ash into the stratosphere, occurs in Indonesia at 15-year intervals (based on records covering the last 400 years); and at 25-year intervals in Papua New Guinea. Based on these countries alone, it seems likely that a large eruption will occur in the region within the next 20 years. However, whether or not this eruption has a significant impact on air travel will depend on the location of the volcano and the prevailing wind conditions at the time of the eruption.’ Many volcanoes in the Asia-Pacific region have unknown histories. This means nobody knows if they are overdue for their next eruption. ‘Unfortunately, in many cases, very little is known about volcanoes in the Asia-Pacific, contrasting with countries such as New Zealand that have well documented histories of volcanic eruptions,’ Geoscience says. ‘It is always possible for an explosive eruption to occur at any of the volcanic centres in the Asia-Pacific.’ According to Rebecca Patrick, ‘One of the main risk areas for us is that with the huge numbers of volcanoes in the region, many remain unmonitored from the ground, which means that it could be two to three hours before an eruption from one of these volcanoes is discovered and warnings passed on to the aviation industry. ‘Volcanoes in the Asia-Pacific could erupt at any time and produce very explosive eruptions, as happened with the 1994 Rabaul volcano eruption in Papua New Guinea, and the 1991 eruption of Mt A high-speed blast of volcanic ash can erode sharp blade edges in the Pinatubo in the Philippines,’ Geoscience compressor, reducing its efficiency. Australia says. Darwin VAAC manager, Rebecca Patrick, says there is some potential for a large eruption in Indonesia or Papua New Guinea to be transported far enough south to affect far northern Australia, but thinks a significant disruption to air traffic over Australia from volcanic ash is unlikely. However, she says ash produced by volcanic eruptions in Indonesia has the potential to be carried directly across commercial flight paths from Australia to Asia and Europe. INTAKE Air Inlet COMPRESSOR Ashes melt in the heat of the combustion chamber, forming a substance like molten glass. COMBUSTOR Combustion Chambers EXHAUST Turbine Ash can solidify into a glassy solid. If it builds up on turbine blades, it can block air fl ow and make the engine stall. Therefore pilot reports of eruptions, or unusual volcanic activity, may be the first notification of an event, and are a vital part of the International Airways Volcano Watch system - as long as they are passed on to the VAAC.’ The most damaging effect of ash occurs when it melts in the hot core of a jet engine, and fuses into a glass-like coating on engine components, causing loss of thrust, and often, engine failure. And Geoscience Australia says it’s conceivable that dormant Australian volcanoes could erupt, possibly spewing ash here. The government earth sciences body, while noting that volcanoes in Australia are currently dormant says: ‘Nonetheless, there is still potential for future volcanic activity which, if it was to occur, would likely be near the South Australia/Victoria border. Ash is mainly a hazard for jet or turboprop aircraft, which fly at higher altitudes and do not have air filters on their engines. Little is known about its effect on piston-engine aircraft, but caution is the watchword. The United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) attempted to address the issue of ash and piston engine aircraft in an advisory issued during the European ash crisis. Demonstrating that the British capacity for understatement is alive and well, it stated: ‘If any ash damage becomes apparent in flight, possibly by windscreen or leading-edge impact, pilots should attempt to leave the area either horizontally or vertically, or both.’ The UK CAA concluded: ‘Engine damage is particularly concerning for turbine-engined aircraft, but probably less so for other internal combustion engines, where the combustion air can be filtered. However, in some pistonengine installations, fi xed-wing or rotary-wing, the use of carburettor hot air will bypass the air intake filter, and therefore pilots should be aware of the potential for airborne contamination to reach the engine. 11 VOLCANO FIRES DEBATE ‘Volcanic activity in Australia’s past has included explosive eruptions that produced high eruption clouds and ejected quantities of volcanic ash into the atmosphere. If such an eruption occurred today, it could pose a significant hazard to commercial aircraft and could result in closure of airports across the country, depending on wind conditions at the time of the eruption.’ FSA SEPT-OCT10 12 If possible, conditions of cloud, drizzle, mist and any other known or probable areas of high humidity requiring the extended use of carburettor hot air should be avoided.’ an easyJet Airbus A340 and should be able to spot ash clouds up to 50nm ahead at altitudes between 5000ft and 50,000ft. There is no consensus on how dangerous airborne ash is to aircraft. Despite the dramatic descent of Flight 9, no aviation death has ever been shown to have been the result of encountering ash. In a 2008 paper, atmospheric physicist, Fred Prata, sums up evidence for and against ash as a hazard. ‘The residence time of fine ash in the upper troposphere is of the order of several hours to a few days, and in a dispersed state the ash may not be a hazard to aircraft, although some case studies seem to indicate even undetected, very low concentration ash clouds may still pose a threat.’ Prata developed AVOID at the Norwegian Institute for Air Research. He told Flight Safety Australia one of the reasons he moved to Norway after his position in the CSIRO was wound up was out of frustration at not being able to get backing for his invention in Australia. Prata, who worked for Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) for 22 years, and took Australian citizenship, has since 1991, been developing an infra-red imaging system that could detect volcanic ash and indicate its presence in a similar manner to a Doppler weather radar. In June 2010, European low-cost airline, easyJet, announced it would begin a trial of the airborne volcanic object identifier and detector (AVOID) system. A pair of passive infrared cameras will be installed on the tails of Under the new system, developed by the Norwegian Institute for Air Research, the two cameras – effectively operating as heat sensors – will be able to discern particles of volcanic ash that absorb infrared radiation and would be shown as red clouds on a pilot's monitoring screen. Prata describes the system as lightweight at under 5kg, about the size of a lunchbox and with a power consumption of less than 200 watts. Images would be displayed on the flight deck and downloaded to volcanic ash and meteorology authorities. The cameras are adjusted for maximum sensitivity to the infrared frequencies emitted by volcanic ash, Prata says. ‘Since volcanic ash contains silicates, we tune the cameras to the specific absorption characteristics of this mineral. 13 Somewhat like the dispersion of visible light by raindrops that causes the colours in the rainbow, the method we use exploits the dispersion of infrared radiation by quartz crystals (essentially glass fragments thrown up in vast quantities by the volcano and so small that they are transported and spread out by the winds). The fragments are typically less than 10 microns in radius.’ Prata sees volcanic activity as a significant issue for aviation in the Asia-Pacific. ‘It has been noted that commercial and freight air traffic is growing globally and regionally, with the Asia-Pacific region experiencing one of the highest annual growth rates. The region also contains many volcanoes and is thus vulnerable to air traffic volcanic cloud encounters,’ he wrote in a 2008 journal article. A global response to volcanic ash is being prepared by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which set up a volcanic ash task force within days of the April eruption. It held its first meeting in Montreal in late July to review ash tolerance thresholds in consultation with states, operators, manufacturers and scientists. At the time of writing, Eyjafjallajökull had fallen quiet again, but history provides both context and cautionary note: the volcano’s April 2010 eruption a mere blip compared to the last time it erupted, in December 1821. On that occasion it spewed out ash for about a year. In 1783, the nearby volcano Laki erupted for nine months. The inference is clear. Volcanic ash is no temporary problem. For more information Prata. A.J. Satellite detection of hazardous volcanic clouds and the risk to global air traffic. Natural Hazards, Volume 51, Number 2 November, 2009 http://www.geo.mtu.edu/~raman/papers2/ PrataNatHaz08.pdf Guffanti M. Reducing the threat to aviation from airborne volcanic ash, Presentation to 55th Annual International Air Safety Seminar, 4-7 Nov. 2002, Dublin http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash/trans/aviation_threat.html Casadevall TJ The 1989-1990 eruption of Redoubt Volcano, Alaska: impacts on aircraft operations. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, Volume 62 August 1994. VOLCANO FIRES DEBATE The signature that we see is quite different to that of hydrometeors [water and ice] - the most common constituents in the atmosphere. CASA's Ian Mallett, on the phenomenon known as solar max, and its impact on aviation. FSA SEPT-OCT10 14 Sunspots have been known about since ancient Greek astronomers recorded them more than 300 years BC. Since Galileo made observations in the 1600s, we have been aware that the sun does not radiate in a constant manner, but has cycles in its activity. The best-known cycle averages 10-12 years, and we are now near its peak, colloquially referred to as a solar max. The sun is headed for its next solar max around 2013, which will make it the twenty-fourth recorded solar cycle. While these periods in themselves vary in intensity, they are all associated with increased solar flare activity that blasts heavily ionised particles at the Earth. These have the potential to produce geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) in most electrical systems, as well as give spectacular light shows in the form of auroras across the globe. Normally the aurora borealis (the northern lights) and aurora Australia (the southern lights) are confined to the high polar latitudes, but in the solar max of 1958 these northern and southern lights were strong enough to be seen as far south as Mexico on three occasions. Engineers have been aware of the impact of this radiation for many years, and routinely, have designed protections into electrical systems, including satellites. There are good precedents for doing so. The most severe was the solar storm of September 1859. This had a 'devastating effect on the relatively primitive communication system of the time'. There were reports of fires breaking out in telegraph offices, as sparks from telegraph wires, energised by geomagnetically-induced currents, set recording paper on fire. A century and a half later, despite the amount of science dedicated to research into the sun’s cycles, we still cannot predict the intensity of the coming peak accurately—although some researchers are predicting an intense cycle this time. NASA has predicted a moderate solar max for 2013, but says even that could cause unprecedented problems in a world dependent on computerisation and electronics. Doug Biesecker, of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space Weather Prediction Centre, and chairman of a NASA panel, pointed out that: 'Even a belowaverage cycle is capable of producing severe space weather. The great geomagnetic storm of 1859, for instance, occurred during a solar cycle of about the same size we’re predicting for 2013.’ A report by the US National Academy of Sciences found that if a similar storm to that of 1859 occurred today, it could cause up to $US2 trillion in damage to high-tech infrastructure and require as long as ten years for complete recovery. In October 2003, ionospheric disturbance from solar activity partially disabled the US wide area augmentation system (WAAS) for 30 hours. Part of the protection for GPS comes from the number of What does this mean to aviation? Depending on the severity satellites in orbit (currently around 30); plus, in the longer of the storm, potential effects range from loss of underlying term, there will be additional constellations of similar electrical supply grids, the disruption of high frequency (HF) numbers from other global navigation satellite systems such services, the diversion of polar flights, to the possible short as GLONASS and Galileo. Other aviation mitigations include or long term unserviceability the use of alternative and back-up of communication and systems such as inertial and The most severe was the solar navigation satellites. With ground-based aids, as well the stated International Civil as space weather offices storm of September 1859. This Aviation Organization (ICAO) that can give satellite had a 'devastating effect on the transition to satellite-based controllers advice on potential air traffic management, solar storms. relatively primitive communication these vulnerabilities are Australia participates actively system of the time'. being addressed. in a range of ICAO and scienceGPS satellites have integrated a based forums which include level of protection from solar radiation into their design, and consideration of solar cycle research. This work is taken into during the last solar max the provision of the basic navigation account when developing aviation infrastructure decisions. service to aviation was not compromised. However, in While the next solar cycle will undoubtedly bring surprises, December 2005, X-rays from a solar storm disrupted satellitegiven our experiences with GPS navigation in the last max, to-ground communications GPS navigation signals for about where the basic GPS service remained unaffected, the 10 minutes. best outcome would be some beautiful aurora displays, and reliable navigation. 15 SOLAR MAX S E R V I C E S Multi-Engine Command Instrument Rating Course 4 week course - accommodation included Training on Beechcraft Baron Includes GNSS RNAV $14,525.00 - Leaders in M/E command instrument ratings. - PPL and CPL Courses - Initial issue & renewal - all grades of instructor ratings - Accomodation provided Flight Instructor Rating Course 7 week course - accommodation included Maximum 3 students per course Comprehensive resources package provided $15,500.00 For further information and pricing please contact us Phone: (02) 6584 0484 Email: [email protected] Web: www.johnstonaviation.com.au View our students achievements on Facebook at Johnston Aviation FSA SEPT-OCT10 16 17 ATC NOTES International Accidents/Incidents 10 June - 16 August 2010 FSA SEPT-OCT10 18 Date Aircraft Location Fatalities Damage Description 10 Jun Cessna 208B Grand Caravan Nazca, Peru Nine on board Unknown fate unknown The aircraft failed to return from a 45-minute sightseeing flight of the Nazca lines. Authorities suspect it may have been hijacked. Some passengers used false identities. The signal of the pilot's mobile phone was traced to a part of Peru near the Bolivian border. 12 Jun PZL-Mielec M-28 Guarenas, Skytruck Venezuela 3 Destroyed Military transport plane went missing on a flight from Valle de la Pascua to Caracas. Last contact with the flight was 13 minutes before end of 50-minute flight. It was at 7000ft at the time. 14 Jun Cessna 208B Grand Caravan Near Felipe Carrillo 9 Puerto airfield, Mexico Destroyed Aircraft crashed in jungle immediately after takeoff. It carried members of the campaign team of a Mexican state governor. 19 Jun Douglas DC-3 Berlin-Schönefeld Airport 0 Substantial Aircraft had departed on sightseeing flight over Berlin when the left engine lost power. The pilot made a left hand turn but the airplane descended and landed on grassy field near the building site of new Schönefeld runway. Three crew and four passengers slightly injured. 19 Jun CASA C-212 Aviocar near Mintom, Cameroon 11 Destroyed Flight left Yaoundé at 09:13 with an estimated arrival time of 10:20. Last radio contact was at 09:51. Nine Australian mining executives were on board the plane, which was found on June 21. There were no survivors. 5 Jul Antonov 2 Tuzla airfield, Romania 12 Destroyed Single-engine biplane carrying nine paratroopers crashed on take-off and burned. 25 Jul Eurocopter AS Near Chichibu, 365N3 Dauphin II Saitama Prefecture, N-W of Tokyo 5 Written off Helicopter was carrying out a rescue for a climber when it crashed in a gully after two crew members had been lowered to ground. The climber died later. 27 Jul McDonnell Riyadh-King Khaled 0 Douglas MD-11F International Airport, Saudi Arabia Destroyed 28 Jul Mil Mi-17 Near Karbala, 5 about 110 km south of Baghdad Written off Helicopter crashed in sandstorm while escorting Shi'ite pilgrims in holy Iraqi city. 28 Jul Airbus A321231 About 14 km NW 152 of IslamabadBenazir Bhutto International Airport, Pakistan Destroyed Airliner crashed in hills on approach to destination airport. Weather was reported as rainy with low cloud. Crash is second loss of A321. 28 Jul McDonnell Douglas C-17A Globemaster III near AnchorageElmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska 4 Destroyed US Air Force cargo plane crashed and burned while on a local training mission with four on board. The plane came down in woods about 3km from runway. 9 Aug de Havilland 16km northwest Canada DHC-3T of Aleknagik, Texas Turbine Alaska Otter 5 Destroyed Aircraft crashed in VFR flight, killing pilot and four of nine passengers, including a long-serving Alaskan politician. Weather conditions were reported as deteriorating, with rain and fog forecast. 16 Aug Boeing 737-700 San Andres 1 Island-Gustavo Rojas Pinilla Airport, Colombia Destroyed Aircraft broke apart on landing, with fuselage splitting into three sections. Only death among the 127 on board was a woman passenger who had a heart attack. Landing was during storm with reports aircraft was struck by lightning on final approach. Lufthansa cargo plane was destroyed when it caught fire and crashed on landing. Both crew members survived. Notes: compiled from information supplied by the Aviation Safety Network (see www. aviation-safety.net/database/) and reproduced with permission. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, neither the Aviation Safety Network nor Flight Safety Australia make any representations about its accuracy, as information is based on preliminary reports only. For further information refer to final reports of the relevant official aircraft accident investigation organisation. Information on injuries is unavailable. Australian Accidents/Incidents 2 June - 19 July 2010 Aircraft Location Injuries Damage Description 2 Jun Hughes 269C Litchfield (ALA), 073° M 23Km, NT Nil Serious 8 Jun Robinson R22 Beta Argyle Aerodrome, Nil 293° M 93Km, WA Serious 13 Jun Robinson R22 Beta Piper PA31P-350 Mojave Derby Aerodrome, Fatal 071° T 257Km, WA Bankstown Fatal Aerodrome, 132° T 6Km, NSW Serious 21 Jun Cessna 172N Skyhawk Unknown 25 Jun Cessna 207 Broken Hill Fatal Aerodrome, S M 207Km (Lake Woolcunda), NSW Coffs Harbour Nil Aerodrome, NSW During an aerial survey, the pilot noticed smoke in the cockpit and conducted a precautionary landing in an open area with long grass. The helicopter caught fire and was seriously damaged. During the cruise, a drive belt snapped and the pilot performed an auto-rotation resulting in serious damage when the helicopter struck rocks and rolled on its side. It was reported that the helicopter collided with terrain. The pilot was killed and the helicopter was seriously damaged. The investigation is continuing. The aircraft had recently departed from Bankstown Aerodrome, NSW. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the aircraft had had an engine failure and would be returning to Bankstown. Soon after the aircraft struck the ground near Canley Vale Road and Sackville Roads, Canley Vale. Both people on board were killed. The investigation is continuing. The aircraft was reported missing and subsequently located submerged in water. The sole occupant was killed. The investigation is continuing. 26 Jun Cessna 172N Skyhawk Robinson R22 Mariner near Madura Minor (ALA), WA Delamere Range Serious Facility Aerodrome, 47° M 63Km, NT Serious Cessna 172H Skyhawk Aerospatiale AS.350BA Squirrel Cessna 172R Skyhawk Gippsland Aeronautics GA-8 Airvan Piper PA-28180 Archer Hughes 269C near Cunnamulla Aerodrome, QLD Honiara Aerodrome, E M 6Km, Other Archerfield Aerodrome, QLD Orange Aerodrome, NSW Serious Serious Nil Serious Nil Serious Minor Serious Windorah Aerodrome, QLD near Derby Aerodrome, WA Cape Leveque (ALA), WA Nil Serious Nil Serious Nil Serious 15 Jun 27 Jun 30 Jun 5 Jul 6 Jul 6 Jul 6 Jul 8 Jul Serious Serious Serious 9 Jul Cessna 210L Centurion 13 Jul Cessna 210L Centurion American Aircraft AA-5B Tiger Cessna 210M Centurion Norseman (ALA), Serious 045° M 59Km, WA Murgon (ALA), Nil QLD Mount Borradale Station (ALA), NT Nil Serious 17 Jul Cessna 172S Skyhawk Lismore (ALA), NSW Nil Serious 18 Jul Piper PA-31350 Chieftain Cessna 172S Skyhawk Amateur-Built Lancair IV Tibooburra Aerodrome, NSW Austral Downs Station (ALA), NT near Jabiru (ALA), NT Nil Serious Serious Serious Nil Serious 15 Jul 16 Jul 19 Jul 19 Jul Serious Serious During descent, the engine failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing into scrub. The subsequent engineering inspection did not find a mechanical fault with the engine. During the initial climb, the elevator stuck in the up position due to a stick lodged in the elevator control. The aircraft struck the ground. During mustering operations the helicopter progressively lost power. The pilot was unable to restore power and the helicopter descended vertically, contacted trees, then struck the ground heavily before coming to rest on its left side. The pilot suffered facial and back injuries. Post flight inspection revealed that a piece of plastic cling wrap had lodged in the engine air intake cutting off the air supply to the engine. It was reported the aircraft collided with terrain. The sole occupant sustained serious injuries. The investigation is continuing. During the initial climb, the engine failed. During the subsequent forced landing, the helicopter landed hard, causing serious damage. During final approach the pilot ballooned the aircraft before landing hard. The aircraft was seriously damaged. During the approach in heavy fog, the pilot lost sight of the runway and attempted to go around. The aircraft clipped the top of a hangar and collided with terrain onto taxiway charlie. During the landing roll, the aircraft's nose landing gear struck a wallaby. The nose landing gear collapsed causing serious damage to the aircraft. During the landing, the helicopter's tail rotor struck an ant hill. The helicopter was seriously damaged. During the landing roll, the aircraft veered off the runway after the landing gear rolled through a soft patch. The aircraft's left wing struck a tree and the nose landing gear collapsed. The aircraft was seriously damaged. The aircraft collided with terrain and came to rest inverted in shallow water. The investigation is continuing. During the landing, the wind changed from a cross wind to a tail wind. The aircraft overran the runway and subsequently impacted a fence. The sole occupant was uninjured but the aircraft was seriously damaged. During a landing, the pilot initiated a go-around and retracted the landing gear. The aircraft failed to climb, settled on the runway and came to rest before the end of the runway. The investigation is continuing. While conducting a touch and go on a wet boggy runway, the pilot mishandled the tailwind landing and the aircraft left the runway. The propeller struck the ground and the right wingtip was seriously damaged. During the landing roll, the nose landing gear collapsed. The aircraft was seriously damaged. On return from mustering operations, the aircraft collided with terrain. The sole occupant sustained serious injuries and the aircraft was seriously damaged. During cruise, the engine began running roughly and the cylinder head temperature was reducing. The pilot diverted to Jabiru. During the approach, the engine failed. The aircraft landed hard on the nose landing gear and it subsequently collapsed. The aircraft slid off the runway and came to rest on gravel. During the engineering inspection, an exhaust valve rocker arm was found broken. Text courtesy of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Disclaimer – information on accidents is the result of a co-operative effort between the ATSB and the Australian aviation industry. Data quality and consistency depend on the efforts of industry where no follow-up action is undertaken by the ATSB. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the use of these data. Please note that descriptions are based on preliminary reports, and should not be interpreted as findings by the ATSB. The data do not include sports aviation accidents. 19 ACCIDENTS Date AOD 12 N O S H T N D 12 MO O A N O S H NT 2 MON 1 D O A N O MONTHS 2 MO FSA SEPT-OCT10 20 It’s now a year since CASA introduced new regulations regarding alcohol and other drugs (AOD) and aviation. This Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Part 99, similar to what followed the introduction of random breath testing (RBT) in road transport in 1976 in Victoria, and in the eighties in other Australian states, requires significant cultural change. A year on, that cultural change is underway. According to Craig Shaw, the general manager of corporate services with Queensland Airports Ltd, the biggest single impact of the new legislation has been the cultural shift. ‘In our commercial environment, hosting functions and exposure to alcohol, were part of doing business. Almost overnight, that changed. But the bottom line is that we are a safety focused company, and we were really pleased with how quickly and seamlessly this integration occurred across all levels of our business.' For some, that cultural change has been a slower process, but all the organisations Flight Safety spoke to, which included large and small flying training schools, charter and airport operators, were positive about the change. 'The changes were not that significant', says Cherise Salmon, the safety manager at large Western Australian-based flying training organisation, China Southern. 'The pilots weren't that fussed about it,' she explains, 'they're used to medicals.' As a LAME now working in management, she feels the new rules are a good trend 'away from the old days' helping to ‘weed out problematic use of alcohol’. In road transport, widespread acceptance of RBT and alcohol legislation arguably took about a decade (from the eighties to the nineties). ‘It (the AOD program) was something new, so some people were hesitant about it, but our company made it work as part of being an aviation company with an AOC,’ explained Warren Drake, the safety manager at the Royal Aero Club of Western Australia (RACWA). Warren has a background of 22 years with the Royal Air Force, and says Australia’s aviation AOD standards are similar to those in the UK. RACWA has about 370 active flying students, with about 60 per cent of those on a career path. Early in the piece, with their AOD implementation, RACWA made the decision ‘to treat everybody the same’ so that ‘even students get drug and alcohol management plan (DAMP) training’. Bristow, one of the world’s largest providers of helicopter services, especially to the oil and gas industry, made a similar decision, says Margaret Briggs, the company’s Australian operations human resources manager. ‘Our fitness-for-work encompasses AOD, fatigue management and stress management. HS ON D 12 O NTHS ON A OD 12 A N O S H T MON So our DAMP program is for all employees, not just those performing safety-sensitive aviation activities. It’s “one-in, all-in”. Just because you’re sitting behind a desk, doesn’t mean you’re exempt – an office worker in Perth can still have an effect on safety,’ she explains. Bristow’s clients are predominantly from the resources sector, and drug and alcohol testing is and has been, very much part of the mining industry. This approach is very much in keeping with Bristow's 'Target Zero' worldwide employee safety campaign. Promoting a robust safety culture, the campaign aims for: 'Zero accidents. Zero incidents. Zero harm to people. Zero harm to the environment.' Independent research body, the Monash University Accident Research Centre, has completed by more just completed a survey sur urve vey y co comp mp personnel to seek than 2000 aviation industry per and its their feedback on the AOD program pr implementation. MO During August, the university also conducted cted a number of focus groups around the country to gather more direct and personal feedback from both individuals and organisations. This, combined with the information gathered from the interviews Flight Safety conducted during Since testing commenced July and August, will be used to develop products in April 2009, CASA has and materials to assist undertaken 10,193 alcohol with ongoing program implementation and tests and 9,484 drug tests education, especially for (as at 30 June 2010). smaller organisations. The majority of the approximately 1400 industry organisations affected by the AOD legislation are in the ‘smaller organisation’ category. Of these organisations, 104 have 30 or more employees who perform safety-sensitive aviation activities, while the remaining 1300 have 30 or fewer such employees. Apart from the obvious safety benefit, for all these organisations, the AOD program brings two other main benefits. The pre-deployment testing ensures that any prospective employees come to the organisation with the right mindset. As Craig Shaw, general manager, corporate services, with Queensland Airports explains, ‘the pre-deployment test ‘ensures anyone applying for a role in our company is fully aware of the expectations before they are even interviewed. It acts almost as a self-screening mechanism’ … when potential employees hear that they will have to undergo such testing, some make the decision not to proceed. This, combined with our training program and ongoing education to our staff has ensured a positive mindset in our business. 21 AOD 12 MONTHS ON For Samantha Hignett, who together with chief pilot and CFI, husband Stewart, operates New England Flight Training, the AOD legislation was necessary. Samantha's nursing background meant she had valuable prior knowledge of AOD, which has led to her helping other Armidale operators develop their DAMPs. Armidale's airport is relatively small, something a number of operators were able to capitalise on by jointly investing in an $800 breath-testing unit. But, Samantha says, 'like anything implemented on a national scale, there shouldn’t be a "one-size-fits-all" approach'. And that’s an area CASA is very the focus much aware of. In the first year, y the for the project team was on introducing in legislation, and getting uptake, but now CASA is reviewing what worked and an what didn’t implementation. with that initial implementation MONT 2 1 D O A N NTHS O AOD 12 N O S H T N D 12 MO O A N O S H NT 2 MON 1 D O A N O MONTHS 2 MO FSA SEPT-OCT10 22 It is not just seen as a government regulation, it has become embedded in our culture.' Queensland Airports to date has done about 100 tests, largely pre-employment testing, and has about 10 positives. These have all been ‘innocent positives’ or codeine related, with only one requiring secondary testing, which proved to be clear. The other benefit is the ongoing education. In the beginning, Craig explains, to raise awareness, all employees were provided with a single-use test kit for alcohol. ‘A lot of people didn’t appreciate the effects after a big night out, so in the early phase of training this helped to raise awareness.’ Now DAMP education is integrated as part of the induction process. With their size, Bristow was able to contract an external provider for their training, which consisted of four-hour AOD information sessions for those on the bases, and workshops for the Perth office. 'These sessions,' Margaret Briggs says, 'employees found very informative'. However, because of the 15-day on tour, and 13-day off tour rosters, getting through the initial training for these rotational workers was a bit of a challenge. Alcohol & other drugs education program The education program should give SSAA employees an awareness of the following: • the organisation's policy on drug and alcohol use • drug and alcohol testing in the workplace • support and assistance services for those who engage in problematic use of drugs and alcohol, and • information about the potential risks to aviation safety from problematic use of drugs and alcohol. Also for DAMP supervisors: training to manage people who o engage in problematic use of drugs and alcohol. The education program should also include: a schedule for refresher training to be carried out within 30 0 months of the implementation date - by 23 September 2011. Likewise, for individuals, improved safety is one of the answers to the ‘what’s in it for me?’ question. Then there’s the greater understanding some of the effects of alcohol and other drugs on your performance: the slowing down of reaction times, the extra time it takes to make decisions and process information. That's an area many people aren't aware of Samantha Hignett says. 'Australia does have a culture of "she'll be right". People may think they're alright, but don't realise the impact of alcohol.' She has done quite a bit of work training under-age students, and conducts full-day drug and alcohol talks at The Armidale School. HS ON D 12 O NTHS ON A OD 12 A N O S H T MON MONT 2 1 D O A N NTHS O MO 10 AOD facts to remember 6. Beware of codeine. 0.02 is effectively zero* 2. 7. Each standard drink you consume takes one hour to clear your system. One drink = one hour; two drinks = two hours; 8. three drinks = three hours, and so on. It all adds up. You can be tested anytime, anywhere (where safety-sensitive aviation activities take place). 3. The effects of alcohol can last up 9. to 48-hours. 4. So, you can be under 0.02, and still be disoriented and dehydrated. ‘Rebound fatigue, following lengthy periods of meth/ amphetamine use, presents a considerable risk to safety. 5. Over-the-counter does not necessarily mean safe.# * Several of the people Flight Safety spoke to queried alcohol figure. The AOD program *Severaltheof0.02 theblood people Flight Safety spoke to uses it gives scientifi certainty queriedthis thefigure 0.02 because blood alcohol figure. cThe AOD that person actually consumed This program p g the uses thishas figgure because it givesalcohol. scientifi c is distinct fromperson what can in some people, where certainty that the per hashappen actually consumed can produce of alcohol alcohol.their Thisbodies is distinct distin from small whatamounts can happen figure therefore in somenaturally. people, The where wher0.02their bodies caneffectively produce means zero consumption alcohol. The hour small amounts of alcohol alco of naturally. Theeight 0.02 fi gurebottleto-throttle rulem still remains – it’s just that there therefore ef effec effectively fectiv fec tively ely means zero consumption of is scientifi c way of confirming that thestill person has alcohol.now Theaeight hou hour bottle-to-throttle rule alcohol. remainsconsumed – it’s just th that there is now a scientific way of confirming that tha the person has consumed # alcohol.A range of over-the-counter or prescription drugs may result in a positive sample. You should always seek the advice of your doctor or pharmacist before using any medications or therapeutic substances. They can recommend alternative options. Drugs tested for are: cannabis, cocaine, meth/amphetamine and opiates. 10. www.casa.gov.au/aod has all this information and more. Some of the over-the-counter or prescription drugs which may result in a positive sample are: Positive for opiates: preparations containing codeine (e.g. Panadeine, Codis, Codral Cold and Flu, Nurofen Plus), and preparations containing morphine (e.g. MS Contin). Positive for amphetamine-type stimulants: preparations containing dexamphetamine. Cocaine: some preparations used during ear/ nose/throat surgery may contain cocaine. 23 AOD 12 MONTHS ON 1. AOD 12 N O S H T N D 12 MO O A N O S H NT 2 MON 1 D O A N O MONTHS 2 MO R E RADA I'M SAFE FSA SEPT-OCT10 24 ‘Fitness for work’ means being able to answer ‘yes’ to ALL the ‘I’m safe’ questions. I’ llness _____ Am I physically well? M edication ___ Am I free from the effects of drugs? CONSUMPTION ON TH ALWAYS 12 48 hrs 36 24 Effects can last up to 48 hrs tation i disorienta i dehydrattion d go to www.casa.gov.au/ao ALWAYS ON TH E RADAR S tress ______ Am I free from significant stress? A lcohol _____ Am I free from the effects of alcohol? F atigue _____ Have I had enough rest? E eating _____ Have I eaten properly? but Over the coun ter ≠ safe Any c o Chec deine? k firs tw or ph arma ith your docto cist. r go to www .casa .gov.a u/aod HS ON D 12 O NTHS ON A OD 12 A N O S H T MON MONT 2 1 D O A N NTHS O MO New support material is proposed, such as a kit with a simplified and detailed explanation of the DAMP template; an educational DVD with case studies showing the effects of alcohol and drugs on performance; new posters and/or screensavers; and a revised AOD website. These materials are being developed using feedback from the survey, interviews and the focus groups. While access to testing bodies is generally not an issue for aviation industry personnel in metropolitan and major regional centres, CASA realises that this is not always the case for smaller organisations in rural and/or remote areas. Consequently, CASA is working with the National Association of Testing Authorities (NATA) to come up with a more flexible testing regime which acknowledges the challenges facing operators in rural and remote areas. Research conducted ed in 2003 20 003 indicates: up to 15 per cent of all Australian tralian n workplace accidents may be assoc associated cia i te t d with alcohol use at least five per cent of all Australian tralian workplace deaths are associated d with alcohol use. In addition, studies show that lost production oduction from harmful AOD use costs Australian an industry in excess of $4.5 billion per year. ear. Where your organisation is based will also be taken into account. So even if you're a small organisation, the minimum requirements will be different if you're based in one of the designated hub ports: Adelaide, Kalgoorlie, Perth, Karratha, Port Hedland, Broome, Darwin, Ayers BOB TAIT’S AVIATION THEORY SCHOOL Hangar N Wirraway Drive, Redcliffe Airport. QLD 4021 Check out our web page at www.bobtait.com.au BAK & PPL All CPL subjects plus IREX Courses available full-time or by home study PO Box 2018 Redcliffe North QLD 4020 P:07 3204 0965 F:07 3204 1902 W:www.bobtait.com.au E:[email protected] 25 AOD 12 MONTHS ON If you're one of the 1400 or so organisations requiring a drug and alcohol management plan, AND you are operating in regional, rural or remote areas, then depending on the number of employees you have doing safety-sensitive jobs, there will be different minimum requirements for your organisation compared to an organisation with more employees. Rock, Alice Springs, Mt Isa, Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, Rockhampton, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Hobart, Launceston and Devonport, as distinct from an organisation based in Katherine. The following dangerous goods incident is based on fact, as reported by a CASA employee. In the spirit of just culture, and so that the wider Australian aviation industry might revisit some of the lessons of ValuJet 592, all names and potential methods to establish identities have been suppressed and some poetic licence taken, although not in respect of material facts. It is more important that the lessons are available for all operators to learn from. FSA JUL-AUG10 26 It was a dark, cool autumn night. I was a member of a multi-disciplinary (flight operations, airworthiness, dangerous goods and systems safety) CASA team of specialist inspectors undertaking an audit on a night freight operator. The aircraft wasn’t due for another couple of hours and I was working my way through the freight-shed processes. The flying operations inspector was due on the inbound aircraft, and the other two inspectors had completed their components for the day. ‘As I walked into the caged storage area, the hairs on the back of my neck stood up and a cold shiver rushed down my spine – this was not right! What I saw was astonishing – stacked all around me were boxes of chemical oxygen generators, many of them repackaged, all of them having belonged to another carrier. Most of them were marked up as suitable for use. Some were new, and some had been removed from aircraft. Many of these were not suitably secured in their packaging. Something about these surroundings brought visions of ValuJet and documentary footage I had seen of the SabreTech storage facility in Florida.’ Moving to another area of the compound, I asked: ‘So what happens after you fire off the oxygen generators?’ to which the storeman responded: ‘I dispose of them and put the pins in that box’. Inside the box were several hundred safety pins with attached tags, some white and some red – with the red ones outnumbering the white by 20 to one. That was a significant disparity: it meant 95 per cent of the generators – hundreds of them – were being transported with only one pin. Again, that shiver and the flashback to the forward hold of ValuJet 592: the duct-taped cargo, loose-packed, rubbing, rattling – then unleashing hell. ValuJet Flight 592 On Saturday 11 May 1996, Flight 592, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 operated by ValuJet Airlines departed from Miami International Airport in Florida. About ten minutes after takeoff, the aircraft crashed into the Florida Everglades, killing all on board: 105 passengers, the two pilots and three cabin crew. There were a number of other contributing factors, including: the contracted maintenance company using parts from three second-hand MD80s, being refurbished. These parts were removed by engineers, who did not follow the correct procedures. The stores personnel did not pack the chemical oxygen generators appropriately. The shipper made false declarations regarding the canisters (‘oxygen canister’; ‘empty’). The first officer loaded the chemical oxygen generators in the front locker with three tyres. According to investigation findings, one of these generators fired, causing ‘sympathetic initiation’ in the others, which then burnt the tyres. From that moment Valujet 592 was doomed. I’d been through the training records, manuals, documentation, dangerous goods acceptance and rejection processes; processes for ensuring new and contract staff are trained; methods for ensuring that recertification training was actively tracked, programmed and undertaken; reviewed a randomly selected sample of retained shipper’s declarations and crossmatched them with acceptance checklists and the notifications to the captain (NOTOC). Now I moved through the shed into the dangerous goods storage area. In that area, I noticed a package marked ‘Cargo Aircraft Only’. Looking at the consignment note, I saw that the item had already travelled and it had arrived at its final destination. It was a chemical oxygen generator, and the consignee was the operator’s ‘repair facility’. Warning bell number one: chemical oxygen generators are not ‘repaired’! I picked up the package and shook it. Disturbingly, it rattled. Warning bell number two: all dangerous goods, regardless of content, must be securely packaged. I rang my contact in the airline and obtained permission to open the package. 27 DANGEROUS GOODS According to the National Transportation Safety Board’s report (DCA96MA054) the probable cause/s of the accident were a fire in the aircraft’s class D cargo compartment initiated by the actuation of one or more oxygen generators being improperly carried as cargo; the failure of the contractor, SabreTech, to properly prepare, package and identify unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to the airline for carriage; and ValuJet’s failure to properly oversee its contract maintenance program. As with most freight operations, this organisation had a contract with a freight forwarder to move the cargo, invariably at night. While the freight forwarder might drive the activity, from CASA’s perspective, the operator holds the AOC and is therefore responsible both for ensuring that the forwarder’s personnel are trained and the forwarder complies with the operator’s load distribution and restraint procedures. How a chemical oxygen generator works FSA SEPT-OCT10 28 Modern oxygen canisters (also known as chemical oxygen generators) are an extremely lightweight way to store oxygen. Typically, an oxygen canister contains a sodium chlorate pellet or cylinder, and an igniter. The igniter can be triggered by friction or impact. The cabin crew instruction to ‘pull down firmly on the mask to start the flow of oxygen’ is really an instruction to trigger the igniter. It generates enough heat to start the sodium chlorate reaction, and then the heat of the reaction sustains itself. The sodium chlorate does not burn—but its decomposition gives off lots of heat and lots of oxygen. The reasons oxygen generators can cause fires are because they are hot and they generate oxygen. Anything nearby that they ignite will burn intensely because of the rich oxygen supply they provide. At first glance, the packaging appeared to be appropriate - it was in a UN specification box. However, it showed signs of having been used previously for a flammable liquid consignment from Europe. Inside the package, a re-used chemical oxygen generator fibreboard casing was wrapped in plastic bubble wrap. The reason for the rattling was soon evident - one of the fibreboard spacers used to hold the unit in place was missing. And the generator clearly showed one safety pin with the red tag instead of the required two. My first concern was whether the unit was time-expired or unserviceable; neither is permitted to be transported by air. Thankfully, this was not the case. The investigation is still underway; however, this incident highlights a number of critical issues which demand immediate communication with industry, especially since it appears that these are systemic, industry-wide issues, rather than those with a single operator. Some of the issues are: The generator was removed from the aircraft one month before expiry for return and disposal via head office. The return of the oxygen generator in this case was within the regulations; however, the person packing the item had no way of knowing when the unit was to expire. A few weeks’ delay in packing and despatch and the item would have been time- expired and therefore not allowed on the aircraft. Removal and transport of the generator. A LAME, with no knowledge of the requirements to make the unit safe for transport, removed the generator from the aircraft. As far as he knew, it was the storeman’s job to prepare it for transport. However, because of the technical nature of making the unit safe for travel, the storeman believed that the LAME had done this. The dilemma the storeman faced is such that the IATA (industry standard) and ICAO (regulatory requirement) dangerous goods regulations indicate that the unit ‘must have at least two positive means of preventing unintentional actuation’. However, there is no guidance in the regulations as to what that entails. The United States has implemented many of the recommendations made following the ValuJet accident. The US dangerous goods regulations (49CFR) are extremely descriptive and show exactly what constitutes ‘two methods of preventing accidental activation’. This incident has highlighted the disparity in regulations. After lobbying from operators, and the Australian Dangerous Goods Air Transport Council, among others, IATA undertook an email vote of board members who agreed unanimously to make changes to be incorporated in the 2011 regulations. One last word: In this day of ever-increasing returns for scrap metal, particularly stainless steel, why are such items being shipped for disposal? Perhaps it’s because, when fired off, there is a small amount of toxic residue which must be disposed of ‘in accordance with local state and council requirements’. Rather than complying with this form of disposal, some people obviously find it easier to take the potentially lethal ‘post-it back-to-headoffice’ path. Flight Safety will continue to cover this issue as the story of the investigation unfolds. Further reading 'The Lessons of Valujet 592'. William Langewiesche, The Atlantic Magazine, February 1998. www.theatlantic.com 29 DANGEROUS GOODS The aircraft manufacturers’ instructions are somewhat confusing, and to make matters worse, Airbus and Boeing have conflicting procedures. Even though both manufacturers’ units appear identical, safety pins on the respective units are placed in different positions, something an engineer moving between aircraft types could easily confuse. Furthermore, there is very little detail in the manufacturers’ instructions about inserting transport safety pins. CASA is also working with ICAO and the dangerous goods panel members to have these changes incorporated in the 2011 technical instructions for dangerous goods. CASA and the Australian Dangerous Goods Air Transport Council are talking to Australian operators who use chemical oxygen generators to ensure they are aware of these issues. 30 Alliances with leading airlines and universities worldwide help make Griffith Australia’s leading aviation university. Plus, our Bachelor of Aviation Management and Master of Aviation Management can help get your career off the tarmac and in full flight. FSA SEPT-OCT10 To find out how visit griffith.edu.au/aviation CRICOS 00233E_juniorGU25156_FSM Give your aviation career the leading edge. A working SPANNER not 'in the works' Take the case of a torch left in a Boeing 737-300’s wheel well after maintenance. It became lodged in the landing gear mechanism, preventing the pilot from raising the undercarriage. Fortunately, the flight crew were able to land safely. Then there was the Boeing 747 where the undercarriage failed to retract because a pair of cutting pliers had been left in the right body gear-up lock during maintenance. 31 AIRWORTHINESS There’s another whispered case of an airliner with a variety of defects in its fuel supply and gauges. A rag and screwdriver were found in one of the tanks. All of these were close calls, but others have not been so lucky. A bent screwdriver found in the wreckage of a Vickers Viscount that crashed in Northern Ireland in 1957 became a suspect in that accident (although the cause of the crash was not able to be determined). And while not strictly a case of tool control, the crash of Aeroperu Flight 603 in 1996 was caused by masking tape being left on the Boeing 757’s static ports, causing its instruments to give misleading readings. The same principle of tidying up after a job had been breached, with terrible consequences for 70 passengers and crew. Tools don’t have to be left inside an aircraft to damage it. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau found tools and equipment were the second most common cause of foreign object damage (FOD) reports, accounting for about 19 per cent of all FOD cases. Among the objects found on runways, taxiways, and aprons were screwdrivers, spanners, a torch, wire, a headset, a 15 litre can of paint and rags. Tool control is a tradition in military aircraft maintenance. In its simplest form it is a system that accounts for all tools at the end of a work shift. In civilian operations, engineers and technicians generally use their own tools, but in military hangars, no private tools are allowed, and everyone shares a central tool kit. There are two distinct schools of thought on tool control: the centralised military approach, which is being adopted by some civilian operators of complex aircraft, and the civilian approach in which individual engineers are responsible for their own tools, and take care of them, motivated in part by paying up to $200 for a quality spanner. PULL-OUT SECTION ‘A spanner in the works’ is a humorous saying that can hide a grim reality. TOOL CONTROL ... in its simplest form is a system that accounts for all tools at the end of a work shift. ‘In our end of the industry, tool control comes down to the guy who owns the toolbox,’ a general aviation and charter operator told Flight Safety Australia. ‘The fact that it’s their own tools seems to be a very good incentive. In 30 years I can’t recall an incident where a lost tool endangered an aircraft. But I’m convinced that if I supplied tools it would be a different story.’ PULL-OUT SECTION Military-style tool control has traditionally been by a ‘tag for tool’ system. Everyone working on aircraft in the hangar has a handful of tokens registered against their name. These are swapped for tools. The token hanging on the tool’s storage hook or cut-out spot identifies who is using it. The system works well at identifying missing tools. FSA SEPT-OCT10 32 Other tool control systems are based on brightly coloured inlays which make it easy to see if a tool is missing from its foam-lined place in the toolbox. Toolmakers such as Stahlwille of Germany and Facom of France offer this system, in either off-the shelf or customised toolkits. The system is known as tool shadowing, and can Electronic tool control systems also be done with tools are a step up in sophistication ... hanging from boards. Although the Civil Aviation Safety Authority imposes no formal requirements for tool control beyond a civil aviation advisory publication (CAAP) 30-4(0), which says, ‘Tools and equipment should be controlled so that their location is always known,’ many engineers maintain their own shadow or tag systems. cut lost tools by 99.7 per cent. Electronic tool control systems are a step up in sophistication. These are offered by companies including Coplan of Britain (using Stahlwille tools), SupplyPro, using electronically controlled tool and materials cabinets, and US tool specialist Snap-on. SupplyPro quotes case studies where its system is said to have cut lost tools by 99.7 per cent. Bristow Helicopters has recently adopted Snap-on’s Level 5 tool control system for its maintenance hangars. The Australian arm of the multinational helicopter operations company flies 31 medium and heavy turbine helicopters, mainly as transport to offshore rigs in the oil and gas industry on Western Australia’s northwest shelf and in Bass Strait. With businesses running at full capacity to keep up with Western Australia’s mining boom, tool control is an essential part of running a safe efficient helicopter operation, Bristow’s chief engineer Steve Wilson says. As with anyone involved in aircraft maintenance, Seabrook had heard of many close calls involving missing tools and machinery and knew of one incident in the North Sea where an AS 332 Super Puma operating with another company suffered an in-flight engine shut down following vibration caused by damage from a screwdriver bit left inside the high speed input casing. However, tool control is also an issue in fi xed wing aviation. A highly-regarded commercial and general aviation operator has confided to Flight Safety Australia that its technicians had lost a tool, only to find it a few days later in the aileron of one of their aircraft. As a former navy aircraft technician, Wilson had been surprised by the laissez–faire attitude to tools in civilian aviation. ‘I came from a military background where tool control was intrinsic. I was amazed when I joined the civil industry that tool control wasn’t intrinsic in that sector,’ he says. However, he knew that the military solution of appointing a tool control supervisor would not work in civilian operations. That tedious role was always the least favoured job in the military hanger, he concedes, and probably too difficult to fill in a tight civilian labour market. ‘I was looking for a computer driven system that would stop the need to have someone manning a tool store, with all the associated cost deficiencies’. The Karratha maintenance hangar in northwest WA was the first of Bristow’s facilities worldwide to adopt electronic tool control. ‘We wanted something that worked pretty much off the shelf. We didn’t want to spend years modifying it.’ ‘It’s been taken on as a group standard ... We’ve taken on level 5, and other parts of the group have adopted different levels,’ Wilson says. With that in mind he was impressed by the barcode technology of Snap-on’s Level 5 system. Bristow engineering manager, Neil Seabrook, says the move to highintegrity tool control was driven in part by a desire to match the high safety practice standards of Bristow’s oil and gas industry clients. ‘They want to drive safety forward in aviation and every other field, and they see tool control as a very positive safety measure,’ Seabrook says. ‘The Level 5 is a very simple system to use and that’s important because if you’re asking people to use a tool control system, the easier it is to use the more uptake you have. They guys don’t tend to cut corners with this system.’ ‘Even the guys who aren’t computer literate can still use the system and use it well,’ Wilson says. At the start of a job an engineer approaches the box and swipes their identity card through an electronic lock to open the box and identify them to the system. They then select an aircraft registration on the touch screen tools and scan the barcode for the required tools, as though they were buying groceries in the supermarket. This allows the system to record what tools are issued to whom, when and for which aircraft. He says Bristow no longer has to fl y these toolkits around the country if technicians transfer to a new location, potentially over a short time saving thousands of dollars in freight costs. Bristow Australia's Karratha hangar took tool control a stage further by integrating all its sixteen toolboxes on a wireless network. Wilson believes this is a world first. Because all the toolboxes are linked, any transaction from any toolbox is recorded on the server and on each toolbox. The system’s networking ability also allows an engineer to check an aircraft registration is clear of issued tools and certify tool control as closed in the aircraft technical log before releasing the aircraft for flight. Wilson is already anticipating the next version of electronic tool control in which swipe cards are replaced by proximity sensors and a digital camera in the toolbox takes 'before and after' photographs of the tool tray to determine which tools the technician has picked up or returned. It sounds futuristic, but he stresses it is to serve a simple purpose: making sure that all tools are accounted for so the maintenance job can be safely signed off. Bristow Australia’s tool control system is cutting edge and in keeping with an aviation organisation aligning itself with the high safety standards of the oil and gas industry. Its price, in the tens of thousands of dollars, while a moderate and justifiable expense to a large or even mediumsized operator, may seem beyond the reach of an individual LAME or AME. But all tool control is good. 33 AIRWORTHINESS The network allows control and flexibility by allowing technicians to take tools from any toolbox in the hangar to use on any of the aircraft registrations’, negating the need to allocate one toolbox to a particular registration. The server will record which box the tool came from and will sound an alert if it is returned to a different box. PULL-OUT SECTION On return the technician does the same process in reverse, placing the tools in each cut-out and scanning their barcode. Seabrook says the system has had an unexpected cost benefi t: ‘Yes it’s expensive, but up until we introduced this the guys had their own tools on the base … tens of thousands of dollars of investment in their own toolboxes.’ ... making sure that ALL TOOLS are accounted for so the maintenance job can be safely signed off ... SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS 15 May 2010 – 31 July 2010 Note: occurrence figures not included in this edition. AIRCRAFT ABOVE 5700KGS PULL-OUT SECTION Airbus A320232 APU exhaust clamp separated. Ref 510010590 APU exhaust clamp adrift at aft firewall. APU auto shutdown with fire warning button illuminated and fire bottle operated. Investigation found nil evidence of fire. P/No: 38007081. TSN: 1,442 hours/1,403 cycles. FSA SEPT-OCT10 34 Airbus A320232 Elevator hinge bolts/hat bushes worn. Ref 510010499 LH and RH elevator free play greater than maintenance manual limits. Investigation found hinge bolts and hat bushes 1, 2, 3 and 4 (LH) and hinge bolts and hat bushes 1, 2 and 3 (RH) replaced due to wear. Found during inspection iaw AD/A320/144. Airbus A320232 Escape slide unserviceable. Ref 510010730 Aft LH escape slide unserviceable. P/No: D30665309. TSN: 15,746 hours/10,437 cycles/10,437 landings/62 months. TSO: 9,181 hours/5,272 cycles/5,272 landings/31 months. Airbus A320232 Flap trunnion worn. Ref 510010528 LH flap inboard trunnion worn in two areas. Lower area damage approximately 6mm (0.236in) long by 4mm (0.157in) wide. Upper area damage approximately 25mm (0.984in) long by 8mm (0.314in) wide and 5mm (0.196in) deep. Found during inspection iaw AD/A320/184. LH sliding seal torn along upper edge. Found during inspection iaw Airbus SB A320-57-1133. Airbus A320232 Wing spoiler actuator casing cracked. Ref 510010737 LH wing No5 spoiler actuator casing cracked. Crack length approximately 10.16mm (0.4in). Nil evidence of fluid leakage. P/No: 31077111. TSN: 20,263 hours/13,374 cycles. TSO: 20,263 hours/13,374 cycles. Airbus A321231 Display unit blanking - relays unserviceable. Ref 510010629 Display unit blanking fault relays 4XU1 and 20XN1 failed internally. When the relays were shaken, an internal rattle could be heard. P/No: E024628A0. Airbus A330202 Emergency door cylinder percussion shear pin sheared. Ref 510010536 Door L1 aft lower edge binding on fuselage skin during opening. Investigation found the door emergency operation cylinder percussion shear pin had sheared off. Door roller guide fittings out of adjustment. Investigation continuing. Airbus A330202 Toilet smoke detector activation –refrigerant leaking from G5 chiller. Ref 510010516 Aft toilet smoke detector activated. Investigation found aft LH G5 chiller outlets emitting haze into cabin. Investigation found a leak in the chiller refrigerant line caused misting. P/No: 2368. Airbus A330203 Skybeds’ seatbelt securing bolts loose. Ref 510010612 Skybeds (14off) had seatbelt securing bolts adrift. Airbus A330303 Aircraft lightning strike. Ref 510010633 Aircraft suffered lightning strike on LH side of fuselage. Loss of primary flight control system. Further investigation found damage to LH forward fuselage and No1 engine. P/No: LA2K2KB00DC0000. Airbus A330303 APU oil cooler pressure return line seal faulty. Ref 510010755 APU oil cooler pressure return line seal faulty allowing oil to leak into APU intake and contaminate APU compartment. Investigation continuing. Airbus A330303 Nose wheel steering system failed. Ref 510010549 Nose wheel steering system failed. Steering system hydraulic block changed and system tested serviceable. Airbus A330303 Nose wheel steering system faulty. Ref 510010699 Nose wheel steering system faulty. See SDR 510010619 for further information. Airbus A330303 Rudder system suspect faulty. Ref 510010619 Rudder deflection required approximately 50.8mm (2in) of pedal input to correct. Investigation continuing. Airbus A380842 APU compressor case damaged. Ref 510010830 APU compressor case holed at 8 o'clock position (looking forward) approximately 177.8mm (7in) forward of fuel nozzle. Heat shield abraded and missing in adjacent area. Investigation continuing. P/No: 390094101. Airbus A380842 Cabin Intercommunication Data System suspect faulty. Ref 510010770 Cabin intercommunication data system (CIDS) performed an uncommanded reset. Therapeutic oxygen, which was in use at the time was switched off by the reset. Investigation continuing. Airbus A380842 First class cabin burning smell – seat 2A power supply Unit faulty. Ref 510010573 Electrical burning smell in first class cabin. Investigation found the power supply to seat 2A extremely hot to the touch with a smell coming from the unit. Investigation found the power supply unit (PSU) faulty and one of a bad batch of PSU's fitted with inferior inductors (L13). BAC Jetstm206 Main landing gear hose failed. Ref 510010885 RH main landing gear flexible ‘up’ hose ruptured due to fatigue. Loss of hydraulic fluid. P/No: 1379305A155. BAG Jetstm4101 Elevator outboard hinge bracket loose rivets. Ref 510010793 LH elevator outboard hinge attachment bracket rivets loose and working. P/No: 1415501055. TSN: 21,248 hours/25,005 cycles/25,005 landings/168 months. Beech 1900D Elevator torque tube cracked. Ref 510010866 LH elevator torque tube cracked in three places between attachment bracket rivet holes. P/No: 1016100197. Beech 1900D Nose landing gear actuator cracked. Ref 510010742 Nose landing gear actuator cracked in area of end cap. P/No: 112-380022-23. TSO: 3,182 hours/3,064 cycles. Boeing 7272J4 Auxiliary fuel tank shrouds damaged. Ref 510010512 Aft auxiliary fuel tank shrouds P/No 10-61707501, P/No 10-61707-511 and P/No 10-61707-561 damaged with numerous holes and splits allowing cabin air pressure to leak into auxiliary cavity cell and collapse the fuel cells. The shrouds were post Boeing SB 727-28A0062 Rev 5. P/No: 1061707501. Boeing 737376 Smoke detector exhaust fan seized. Ref 510010636 Smoke detector exhaust fan seized. P/No: 4100947. TSN: 4,357 hours. TSO: 4,357 hours. Boeing 737476 Aircraft fuel quantity indicator faulty. Ref 510010659 LH main fuel tank quantity indication lower than RH tank indication. Investigation found No1 fuel quantity indicator faulty. P/No: 2307041. TSN: 15,098 hours. TSO: 15,098 hours. Boeing 737476 APU fuel pipe leaking. Ref 510010705 APU fuel line from FCU to combustion chamber leaking at combustion chamber end. P/No: S9438A0419. Airbus A380842 Hydraulic ‘green’ system contaminated by engine oil. Ref 510010662 Green hydraulic system contaminated by engine oil. Engine oil was used to top up system ‘A’. Personnel/ maintenance error. Boeing 737476 Engine oil pressure indicator failed. Ref 510010919 No1 engine oil pressure indicator failed. P/No: SEL0C4AD. TSN: 60,979 hours. TSO: 60,979 hours. Airbus A380842 Nose wheel sensor water contaminated. Ref 510010725 Nose wheel steering system sensor 10GC contaminated with water. Boeing 737476 pilot and co-pilot altimeter’s different readings – suspect TAT probe faulty. Ref 510010674 Captain's and first officer's altimeters gave different readings. Suspect faulty total air temperature (TAT) probe. Probe changed and defect did not reoccur. P/No: 102AH2AG. TSN: 61,236 hours. TSO: 61,236 hours. Airbus A380842 Overhead ceiling panel dislodged. Ref 510010752 Overhead ceiling panel located at door M3L dislodged and fell onto the floor during landing. Airbus A380842 Waste servicing panel separated. Ref 510010891 Waste servicing panel missing. Minor damage to fuselage skin. P/No: L5347683100000. Boeing 73776N Electrically driven hydraulic pump overheated. Ref 510010918 System ‘B’ electrically driven hydraulic pump overheated in flight. Metal contamination of hydraulic filter. P/No: 5718610. TSN: 30,557 hours/16,568 cycles. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Boeing 737838 Air data inertial reference unit unserviceable. Ref 510010797 RH air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) unserviceable. P/No: HG2050AC07. TSN: 17,229 hours. TSO: 17,229 hours. Boeing 747438 Aircraft general systems drain blocked. Ref 510010777 Canted pressure deck trans frame drains LBL5 and RBL5 blocked with wax draining down from P88 of floorboard C38. Found during inspection iaw EI 747-051-0021R05. Boeing 767338ER APU leaking oil into load compressor ducting – odour in cabin. Ref 510010564 Fuel smell in aft cabin. Investigation found the APU leaking oil into the load compressor ducting. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 APU hard to start – after start, smoke/fumes in cockpit and cabin. Ref 510010782 APU faulty. APU was hard to start. Following a successful start, smoke and fumes were evident in cockpit and forward cabin. Investigation continuing. P/No: 38007021. Boeing 747438 Aircraft oxygen overdue hydrostatic test. Ref 510010768 Oxygen bottle fitted when overdue for hydrostatic test. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767338ER Flight control systems pin loose. Ref 510010523 Trailing edge flap LH outboard flap hinge safety pin loose and jamming on side linkage. Boeing 747438 Drip shield leaking E2 equipment water contaminated. Ref 510010701 Drip shield leaking. Water contamination of E2 equipment. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767338ER Landing gear brake unit collapsed. Ref 510010783 No. 8 brake unit collapsed. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 Cockpit windows peeling inside inner glass pane. Ref 510010764 LH and RH No5 cockpit windows P/No 5-89358-41 (LH) and P/No 5-89358-42 (RH) failed inspection due to peeling inside inner glass pane. Found during inspection iaw EI Gen-056-0103R04, SB 73753A1023 and SB 737-56A1022. P/No: 58935842. Boeing 737838 Integrated standby flight display failed. Ref 510010829 Integrated standby flight display (ISFD) failed. P/No: C16221KA02. TSN: 14,647 hours. TSO: 14,647 hours. Boeing 737838 Main battery charger failed. Ref 510010827 Main battery charger failed. Main battery P/No 024147-000 also required replacement. P/No: 893003. TSN: 4,364 hours. TSO: 4,364 hours. Boeing 737838 Rear galley ovens dirty – burning plastic smell. Ref 510010795 Burning plastic smell in rear galley. Investigation found no.3 and no.4 ovens dirty due to food spillage and a build-up of grease on the oven liners. Boeing 7378FE Aileron feel and centring spring broken. Ref 510010909 Aileron feel and centring unit lower spring broken. Boeing 7378FE APU fuel manifold leaking. Ref 510010675 APU primary fuel manifold leaking. P/No: 38838362. Boeing 7378FE Elevator control cable low tension. Ref 510010641 Excessive force needed for pitch control. Elevator control cable tension low. Elevator feel shift module replaced as a precaution. P/No: 17058001. TSN: 58 hours/28 cycles. Boeing 7378FE Flight management computer failed. Ref 510010544 RH flight management computer (FMC) failed. Boeing 747438 Flap spindle aft fi tting incorrectly secured. Ref 510010872 No. 2 flap spindle aft fitting not secured to structure. One screw found loose in compartment and both screw threads worn. Investigation continuing Boeing 747438 Fuel boost pump connector contaminated. Ref 510010800 No.1 aft fuel boost pump connector contaminated by fuel due to no. 2 main tank wiring harness conduit leaking. Boeing 767338ER Wing outboard leading edge to front spar cracked. Ref 510010678 RH wing outboard leading edge to front spar cracked in the following areas: 1. Leading edge station 502 had cracked leading edge skin splice plate. 2. Leading edge station 562 had cracked leading edge rib 3. Leading edge station 693 had cracked leading edge skin upper rib T-chord. 4. Thermal anti-ice supply ducting fairing from leading edge to no. 8 slat hinges worn. Investigation continuing. Bombardier DHC8103 Aircraft pressurisation faulty. Ref 510010653 Aircraft depressurised. Investigation continuing. Boeing 747438 Slide raft inflation bottle nil pressure. Ref 510010566 No. 4 LH slide raft inflation bottle had nil pressure. Investigation continuing. P/No: 7A146723. Bombardier DHC8103 Elevator trim system seized. Ref 510010667 Elevator trim system seized. Suspect water ingress of trim tab actuator and/or associated drive chains which then froze. Boeing 74748E Generators failed. Ref 510010673 No. 1 generator failed followed by failure of no. 2 generator. No. 2 IDG fan air cooler shutoff valve failed. Bombardier DHC8315 Landing gear selector valve faulty. Ref 510010711 Landing gear hydraulic selector valve failed. Boeing 767336 Elevator power control actuator leaking. Ref 510010698 RH elevator power control actuator (PCA) leaking. Loss of hydraulic fluid. Boeing 767336 Toilets inoperative due to overfull toilet tanks - odour. Ref 510010762 Smell/fumes from area of aft toilet/galley. Investigation found three toilets inoperative due to overfull toilet tank. Boeing 767336 Weather radar pedestal unserviceable. Ref 510010760 Weather radar failed. Mechanical noise evident when radar failed. Radar pedestal replaced. P/No: 6225136203. Boeing 767338ER Aircraft fuel systems fuel tank leaking. Ref 510010601 Fumes in cabin during engine start. Investigation found auxiliary fuel tank leaking from and external seam at butt joint stringer L-8C RH side. APU had also been recently changed due to oil leak into load compressor ducting. Bombardier DHC8315 TCAS computer failed self test. Ref 510010669 TCAS computer failed self-test. Computer was the third replacement item, the other two replacement computers also failed self-test. Investigation continuing. P/No: 8221293002. Bombardier DHC8402 Primary flight display failed. Ref 510010522 Primary Flight Display 2 (PFD2) failed. CASA C212EE Aileron hinge link cracked. Ref 510010517 (photo below) LH outboard aileron hinge link cracked. P/No: 212111407. TSN: 1,218 hours/717 cycles. 35 AIRWORTHINESS Boeing 737838 Flight control shutoff valves seized. Ref 510010664 System ‘A’ and system ‘B’ flight control shutoff valves seized in open position. Investigation continuing. P/No: AV13J5147. TSN: 8,932 hours. TSO: 8,932 hours. Boeing 747438 Flap carriage assembly spindle cracked. Ref 510010542 No. 4 flap carriage assembly spindle cracked from transition radius edge on the forward journal. Found using magnetic particle inspection (MPI) following removal of chrome and cadmium plating. Investigation continuing. P/No: 65B1018911. TSN: 79,971 hours. TSO: 26,637 hours. Boeing 767338ER Main landing gear trunnion door hinge lug cracked – aft bolt incorrectly fi tted. Ref 510010535 RH main landing gear trunnion door aft hinge fitting forward lug cracked. Investigation found the aft upper bolt incorrectly fitted with bolt head inboard. This caused contact between the bolt head and hinge fitting. Investigation continuing. PULL-OUT SECTION Boeing 737838 Centre fuel tank boost pump wiring damaged. Ref 510010756 Centre fuel tank LH boost pump wiring damaged. Investigation found pin H of connector D49996P/ D49996J wire no. W0212-3202B-18 badly burnt due to arcing which caused damage to connector and E2 shelf where the connector is mounted. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT CASA C212EE Cockpit panel wiring chafed. Ref 510010707 Cockpit overhead panel wiring chafed. Fuse XA20 blown. Embraer EMB120 Cockpit window lower beam cracked. Ref 510010605 Cockpit window lower beam cracked from rivets on LH and RH sides. PULL-OUT SECTION Embraer ERJ170100 Cabin crew oxygen dispensing unit incorrect part. Ref 510010864 Cabin crew oxygen dispensing unit fitted in R2 position has been identified as not meeting design requirements. This problem covers the entire fleet of ERJ170-100 LR and ERJ 190-100 IGW aircraft. P/No: 17045553401. FSA SEPT-OCT10 36 Embraer ERJ170100 Spoiler actuator bolts joining actuator body halves failed. Ref 510010741 L4 multifunction spoiler actuator leaking. Investigation found three of four bolts joining the actuator body halves had failed at the mid thread point. P/No: 4148001009. TSN: 6,773 hours/6,871 cycles. Embraer ERJ170100 Windshield wiper separated. Ref 510010568 RH windshield wiper blade separated during flight. P/No: 2315M2441. Embraer ERJ190100 Engine driven hydraulic pump pressure pipe holed. Ref 510010897 No. 2 engine driven pump hydraulic pressure pipe worn through and holed in area located approximately 228.6mm (9in) aft of firewall connection due to a chafing ‘P’ clip. Approximately 10 per cent of hydraulic fluid lost from No. 2 hydraulic system. P/No: 19005170401. Embraer ERJ190100 Weather radar transceiver unserviceable. Ref 510010824 Weather radar transceiver unserviceable. P/No: 7021450801. Fokker F27MK50 APU fuel manifold union cracked. Ref 510010900 APU fuel manifold union cracked and leaking. Investigation continuing. TSN: 13,556 hours. TSO: 975 hours. Fokker F28MK0100 Fire extinguisher bottle cartridge unserviceable. Ref 510010899 During scheduled servicing, fire extinguisher bottle cartridge found to have been fired. Investigation also found incorrect serial number bottle had been fitted. Suspect unserviceable cartridge had been installed at last overhaul by previous overseas operator. Investigation continuing. TSN: 8,530 hours. Israel 1124 Generators failed. Ref 510010524 LH generator dropped off line followed by RH generator approximately 20 minutes later. Aircraft returned to base on battery power. Investigation continuing. Raytheon 850XP Electric trim wiring damaged by rudder pedal adjustment lever. Ref 510010717 Electric trim wiring damaged by rudder pedal adjustment lever due to inadequate lubrication of lever. Damage occurred during rudder pedal adjustment. Overvoltage caused safety fuse P/No 5920-99-012-0075 to blow. TSN: 1,455 hours/1,122 cycles/1,122 landings/ 48 months. Saab SF340B Emergency lighting power supply – SUP. Ref 510010567 Emergency lighting power supply suspect incorrect part. Power supply serial number appears to be the same as an item fitted to another aircraft. Aircraft recently imported from USA. Investigation continuing. Saab SF340B Tail pipe overheat warning wire defective/damaged insulation. Ref 510010558 RH tailpipe overheat warning system activation. Investigation found defective/damaged insulation on wires WG510-20 and WG513-20 located approximately 50.8mm (2in) from plug P11. The wires were covered by heat shrink which had no evidence of damage and the damage to the wires appears to have occurred at initial assembly. P/No: M250383209. AIRCRAFT BELOW 5700KGS Alpha R2160 Steering system guide tube damaged. Ref 510010696 Co-pilot LH pedal steering system guide tube damaged and holed by steering spring. Investigation found that the wear washer was worn beyond limits. P/No: 472301000. TSN: 1,872 hours. Amateur Drifter MLG leg broken. Ref 510010691 LH main landing gear leg broken at axle join through bolt area. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. TSN: 5 hours. Beech 200 Air conditioning flow control valve solenoid unserviceable. Ref 510010598 Cabin pressurisation system RH flow control valve solenoid unserviceable. P/No: 1520165. TSO: 336 hours/369cycles/11 months. Beech 35B33 Wing corroded. Ref 510010816 LH wing structure corroded. Extensive corrosion found in area located between Stn 66 and Stn 80.047. The RH wing skin was then removed and the same corrosion defects were found to a lesser degree. TSN: 8,781 hours. Beech 76 Nose landing gear actuator end cap cracked. Ref 510010759 Nose landing gear actuator end cap cracked and broken into three pieces. Loss of hydraulic fluid. P/No: PAPA2176B. Beech 95C55 Aircraft fuel feed tube corroded. Ref 510010841 Fuel feed tube from RH fuel tank contained a corrosion hole at the area of entry into the fuselage. Internal trim soundproofing saturated with leaking fuel. P/No: 95920001131. TSN: 9,950 hours. Cessna 208B Nose landing gear spring sheared. Ref 510010613 (photo right) Nose landing gear spring sheared at nose gear support assembly. P/No: 26430623. TSN: 11,313 landings. Beech 200 Cargo door frame cracked. Ref 510010493 Cargo door lower frame cracked. P/No: 1014301571. TSN: 17,943 hours/21,115cycles/372 months. Cessna 208 Rudder torque tube corroded. Ref 510010670 Rudder torque tube corroded. P/No: 26330663. TSN: 2,141 hours/6,151 cycles/6,151 landings/40 months. Beech 35B33 Engine cowling incorrect repair. Ref 510010817 Engine cowling corrosion incorrectly repaired. Investigation found that corrosion damage had been filled and painted over rather than removed and repaired. P/No: 35910160616. TSN: 8,781 hours. Cessna 208 Trailing edge flap drive coupling sheared. Ref 510010571 Trailing edge flap drive coupling sheared. Investigation found wear in flap motor output shaft slot which caused excessive load on coupling causing eventual failure. P/No: C3010010211. Beech 35B33 Fuselage rear bulkhead cracked. Ref 510010875 Fuselage rear bulkhead cracked on stiffening flange between vertical fin and horizontal stabiliser. Crack length approximately 25.4mm (1in). Suspect bulkhead was a replacement item and not original fitment. P/No: 33410031603. TSN: 8,781 hours. Cessna 404 Main landing gear trunnions cracked. Ref 510010700 LH and RH main landing gear trunnions PNo 571110-11 and P/No 571110-12 cracked from strap attachment holes. Found during NDI inspection using FPI and ECT techniques iaw SID 32-10-05. P/No: 57111011. TSN: 31,699 hours/60,301 cycles. Beech 3533 Rudder control cables corroded and frayed. Ref 510010718 Both rudder control cables corroded and frayed with broken strands located in the area between the main spar and the pulley bracket aft of the main spar. Corroded area of cables did not come into contact with either pulleys or main spar. P/No: SAM211585. Cessna 404 Nose landing gear retraction actuator faulty. Ref 510010569 (photo below) Nose landing gear retraction actuator failed to lock down. Blowdown system valve stuck preventing correct operation of emergency blowdown system. Nose landing gear collapsed on landing. Beech 35B33 Vertical stabiliser rib corroded. Ref 510010818 (photo following) Vertical stabiliser top rib badly corroded. Suspect corrosion existed at time of last painting due to paint evident in countersink and on a corroded rivet. P/No: 336400009. TSN: 8,781 hours. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Cessna A152 Aileron system restriction FOD. Ref 510010859 Restriction in aileron control system. Investigation found a riveting finger dolly in the RH wing rear spar cavity restricting aileron movement. RH wing outboard flap track had been replaced at the last periodic inspection on 13 May 2010. FOD. Whittman TailwindW8 Wing rib cracked. Ref 510010651 LH wing rib cracked and bent. Rib is located outboard of main landing gear false spar. Suspect damaged rib is not original part. P/No: 78559000. TSN: 1,290 hours. TSO: 100 hours. Gippsland GA200C Engine air induction hose unserviceable. Ref 510010647 Engine air induction system hose deteriorated. Steel reinforcing spring separated from outer cover reducing the diameter of the hose by approximately one third. P/No: SCAT14. ROTORCRAFT Jabiru 160DLSA Engine air intake scat hose collapsed. Ref 510010694 Intake scat hose collapsed due to failure of internal support. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. TSN: 108 hours. Nanchang CJ6A Aileron/elevator drain holes blocked. Ref 510010811 Fabric covered control surface drain holes blocked with ailerons containing approximately one litre of water each. Both ailerons and elevators affected. Investigation found drain grommets had been fitted but the drain holes had never been opened. Robinson R22BETA Engine/transmission coupling drive belt faulty. Ref 510010597 New fit drive belts too tight. Belts were Rev Z type. Investigation continuing. P/No: A1902REVZ. Nanchang CJ6A Elevator trim cable unserviceable. Ref 510010809 (photo below) Elevator trim cable worn and strands broken. Cable had also come off guide pulley and was rubbing on axle. Cable tension loose. Robinson R44 Aft servo support bracket cracked. Ref 510010540 Aft servo support bracket cracked. Item was upgraded item (Rev G). P/No: D2022. Robinson R44 Exhaust muffler collapsed. Ref 510010640 Exhaust muffler deformed at tailpipe joint. Muffler holed at LH collector joint. P/No: C16932. TSN: 584 hours. Piper PA31350 Nose landing gear collapsed. Ref 510010895 Nose landing gear collapsed during landing. Investigation continuing. Swearingen SA227AC Engine fire detector bleed air pipe incorrect rating. Ref 510010785 RH engine fire detector located adjacent to bleed air pipe had incorrect rating. Detector had a rating of 450 deg F. Correct rating for this position 600 deg F. False fire warning indication resulted in engine shutdown and fire extinguisher activation. Incorrect part. P/No: 1734361600F. Robinson R44 Main rotor blade spindle unserviceable. Ref 510010803 Main rotor blade spindle unserviceable and bearings unserviceable. TSN: 740 hours. TSO: 740 hours. PISTON ENGINES Continental IO240B Engine starter motor damaged. Ref 510010805 Starter motor Bendix drive contacted shroud. Metal contamination of engine oil system. Starter drive gear and accessory gear damaged. P/No: 12ST2S. TSN: 78 hours. Continental TSIO520N Engine cylinder cracked. Ref 510010722 Engine cylinders (3off) cracked. See also SDR 510010539. P/No: AEC631397. TSO: 972 hours. Jabiru 2200B Engine crankcase through bolt broken. Ref 510010831 Crankcase through bolts for no. 3 and no. 4 cylinders broken. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. P/No: 42910444292044. TSN: 992 hours. Jabiru 2200B Engine failed – crankcase split. Ref 510010852 Engine lost power and stopped. Initial investigation found crankcase split. Suspect crankshaft failed. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation Australia. Jabiru 2200B Engine suspect faulty. Ref 510010857 Engine suspect faulty. Engine inspection found the following unserviceable parts: 1. camshaft P/ No 4738092. 2. hydraulic valve lifter (modified) P/ No 4A211A0D. 3. crankcase LH P/No 4A079A0D 4. crankcase RH P/No 4A078A0D. 5. stud long P/ No 4291044. 6. stud short P/No 4293044. Suspect caused by incorrect valve timing due to camshaft angle and hydraulic lifter leak rate. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. Jabiru 2200J Engine cylinder separated. Ref 510010846 Engine cylinder separated from crankcase. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. Jabiru 2200 Engine crankcase through bolt broken. Ref 510010832 Crankcase through bolts for no. 3 and no. 4 cylinders broken. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. P/No: 4291004442940044. TSN: 360 hours. Jabiru 3300 Engine failed. Ref 510010838 Engine failed. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. Lycoming IO360C1C Engine cylinder base studs broken and crankcase damaged. Ref 510010570 (photo below) Inspection of rough running engine found fi ve broken cylinder base studs on no. 1 cylinder. Following engine strip, a large amount of extruded sealant (Silastic) was found on the main bearing saddle faces and crankcase parting flanges. Severe fretting was also found on no. 2 bearing saddle faces. TSO: 601 hours/180 months. 37 AIRWORTHINESS Mooney M20J Nose wheel steering horn unserviceable. Ref 510010530 Nose wheel steering horn incorrectly fitted causing: 1. Excessive loading on the undercarriage retraction system and bending of the steering horn and shearing of the collar ‘retaining clevis bolt’. 2. Reduced right rudder travel to approx 50%. 3. Excessive free play in nose wheel steering leading to nose wheel ‘shimmy’. P/No: 720095001. Robinson R22BETA Cooling fan wheel cracked. Ref 510010583 (photo below) Cooling fan wheel cracked. P/No: B1741. TSN: 1,388 hours. Continental IO550G Magneto distributor gear stripped. Ref 510010912 LH magneto nylon distributor gear had nine stripped teeth with another fi ve teeth cracked. Suspect gear deteriorated and became brittle due to age and heat. P/No: 10357586. TSN: 2,057 hours/170 months. PULL-OUT SECTION Gippsland GA8 Aircraft doors systems cargo door separated. Ref 510010663 (photo below) Cargo door separated from aircraft. Door was being closed following photography session. Door fell into the sea and was not recovered. TSN: 1,298 hours. Bell 206B3 Tail rotor blade failed. Ref 510010591 (photo below) Tail rotor blade separated with approximately 90 per cent of the blade missing. Other blade creased in approximately same position. Tail rotor gearbox torn from mount and input spline separating from coupling. Tail rotor driveshaft twisted/sheared. Investigation found an item of clothing exited the cabin and struck the tail rotor. FOD. P/No: 206016201131. TSN: 1,532 hours. Continental IO520L Engine sudden stoppage. Ref 510010815 Engine stopped. During emergency landing on a beach, the nose wheel separated from the aircraft. Investigation continuing. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine internal oil system baffle inadequate. Ref 510010650 Following fitment of modified camshaft (firewall forward STC) the oil was found to be foaming, causing oil pressure fluctuations. A larger sump baffle P/No LW-13383 was fitted instead of baffle P/No 72958 as per Lycoming SI 1279B. P/No: 72958. PULL-OUT SECTION Lycoming IO540K1A5 Engine cylinders incorrectly fi tted. Ref 510010626 (photo below) Engine suffered from continual oil leakage/ consumption. Investigation found cylinders had been fitted using sealant under the cylinder base flange. FSA SEPT-OCT10 38 Lycoming TIO540A2C Engine fuel line bracket failed. Ref 510010916 LH engine no. 4 cylinder fuel line support bracket failed allowing manifold to vibrate and fuel line to fail. P/No: 75414. TURBINE ENGINES Garrett TPE33110511D Engine turbine rubbing. Ref 510010683 Engine difficult to pull through on heat soak. Initial investigation found turbine rubbing. Investigation continuing. GE CF348E5 Engine compressor fan blade locked. Ref 510010910 No.1 engine had several fan blades locked. GE CFM567B Engine fuel controlling system probe faulty. Ref 510010660 Unable to increase engine thrust with autothrottle disengaged. Investigation found total air temperature (TAT) probe faulty. P/No: 102LA2AG. TSN: 28,049 hours. TSO: 28,049 hours. Lycoming IO540K1A5 Engine failed due to connecting rod failure. Ref 510010798 Engine failed. Caused due to connecting rod which failed and holed crankcase. Suspect caused by lack of oil. Investigation continuing. Lycoming IO540K1C5 Engine piston oil rings worn. Ref 510010646 Engine piston oil rings on all cylinders worn. Investigation found rings had been subject to recall by manufacturer. P/No: 22578CC. TSN: 286 hours/77 months. Lycoming LTIO540J2BD Engine seized. Ref 510010893 RH engine seized. On the previous flight, the engine had low oil pressure and an oil hose fitting on the waste gate was found loose. The filters were checked and oil added to the engine. On the following flight the engine seized after approximately 20 minutes operation. Lycoming O320E3D Engine crankshaft cracked. Ref 510010643 Engine crankshaft cracked. P/No: UK. TSO: 369 hours. Lycoming O360A1G6 Engine connecting rod nut incorrectly fi tted. Ref 510010745 During bulk strip of the LH engine due to metal contamination, it was found that all the connecting rod nuts had been incorrectly installed. Inspection of the RH engine found the nuts also incorrectly installed. Engine was last overhauled in USA. P/No: LW12186. TSO: 471 hours. GE CFM567B Engine fuel/oil heat exchanger leaking. Ref 510010617 No. 2 engine fuel/oil heat exchanger leaking fuel. Investigation continuing. P/No: 118411932. TSN: 26,582 hours. TSO: 26,582 hours. GE CFM567B Engine fuel pump failed. Ref 510010806 No. 1 engine driven fuel pump internal failure. P/No: 8283005. TSN: 20,811 hours/12,998 cycles. TSO: 142 hours/100 cycles. GE CFM567B Fuel differential pressure sensor switch suspect faulty. Ref 510010687 No.1 engine fuel pressure differential switch suspect faulty. P/No: 659030588. GE CT79B Anti-ice start bleed valve actuator to inlet guide vane shaft separated at turnbuckle. Ref 510010592 (photo below) RH anti-ice start bleed valve (AISBV) actuator rodend to Inlet Guide Vane (IGV) shaft separated on upper side of turnbuckle. Jam nut lockwire still intact. Investigation found that rodend had only been installed no more than two threads (approximately fi ve threads short of witness mark). Lycoming ALF502R5 Engine hydraulic pump drive shaft seal dislodged. Ref 510010506 Engine driven hydraulic pump drive shaft seal dislodged. Loss of approximately 7.57 litres (eight quarts) of engine oil. P/No: HC291H0233000. Lycoming ALF502R5 FCU unserviceable. Ref 510010867 No. 2 engine made loud popping noise combined with a shudder through the airframe. Initial investigation found nil engine damage. Investigation found fuel control unit (FCU) unserviceable. P/No: 2-163-810-31. TSO: 5,990 hours/4,610 cycles. PWA PT6A42 Engine combustion chamber liner cracked. Ref 510010882 Engine combustion chamber outer liner cracked around circumference. Crack almost covered entire circumference of liner. P/No: 305566701. TSO: 2,074 hours/2,341 cycles. PROPELLERS Hartzell HCM2YR2 Propeller blade cracked. Ref 510010497 LH propeller blade cracked. Crack was found in the blade bore running up into the balance hole. Found during routine DPI at overhaul. Crack was verified using ECI. Blade will be sent to manufacturer for further investigation. P/No: FC7666A. TSN: 1,778 hours. Jabiru C00262D60P Propeller attachment bolt incorrect part. Ref 510010695 Propeller attachment bolts incorrect part. Bolts were approximately 6.35mm (0.25in) too long allowing propeller to be loose on flange. Bolts had been fitted at manufacture. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation - Australia. TSN: 100 hours. McCauley D3A34C402 Propeller governor fl yweight drive shaft cracked. Ref 510010642 Propeller governor fl yweight driveshaft cracked. Metal contamination of engine. Aircraft is registered in PNG. P/No: D20887. Rotol R321482F8 Propeller ground strike. Ref 510010917 Aircraft RH landing gear ran off taxiway causing RH propeller to strike the ground causing damage to the propeller blades. RH engine and propeller changed. COMPONENTS Honeywell Inc AZ810 Digital Air Data Computer failed test. Ref 510010903 Digital air data computer (DADC) failed inspection iaw AD/Rad/43 and needs recalibration. Inspection also found A6A3R1 had dry solder joints. P/No: 7000700976. Lycoming O360J2A Engine rocker arms and pushrods worn. Ref 510010553 (photo below) Engine rocker arms P/No 17F19357 and pushrods P/No 15F19957-30 contain unusual wear patterns. P/No: 15F1995730. TSN: 1,010 hours. IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine cooling tube bolt missing. Ref 510010645 Engine turbine cooling tube P/No 2A1493 flange bolt P/No MS9576-06 missing and lockwire broken. Air leakage caused significant damage to thrust reverser heat shield, distortion to the reverser ‘C’ duct and damage to the aft section of the heat shield. P/No: MS957606. Kavanagh Balloons KBS34 Burner valve leaking. Ref 510010727 Balloon burner valve block leaking. Suspect caused by deterioration of thread sealant on assembly bolt. P/No: KA4017. TSN: 1,734 hours/105 months. Kavanagh Balloons Load frame cracked. Ref 510010648 Hot air balloon burner load frame contained hairline cracks along welded joints. P/No: KLF201088. TSN: 1,734 hours/104 months. S E T I S O P COM D IT WILL NOT DAMAGE: IGNORE IT AN Composites offer these unique benefits, but there is a side to them that can catch the unwary. It is not easily noticed, even by highly experienced engineers. The issue is hidden damage and the risk that it poses to airframe integrity. Aircraft designers try to account for this type of damage in their designs, but they can only do so much. Although designers try to account for hidden damage in aircraft design, not all structures will tolerate damage if it is not reported and fixed prior to continued operation. Blunt or sharp object impact Lightning Moisture ingress (freezing at altitude causing skin delamination) Structural overstress Tyre failure and foreign object damage (FOD) Hail Modern transport aircraft employing composites are generally designed so that if there is no visible impact damage, no further action need be taken and the aircraft can continue in service. This may sound odd, but the idea behind this is that any structure that does not show evidence of damage after a general visual inspection at a viewing distance of five feet must be designed such that operation is still safe after any type of impact that may cause hidden structural damage in that area. This is known as ‘barely visible impact damage’ or BVID. Damage of this type usually appears as a small scratch or gouge in the outer gel coat or surface finish of a composite material. The structure in some parts of an aircraft may be over-designed to allow it to tolerate some level of hidden damage. However, if all structure in the aircraft were designed this way the result would be a ‘flying brick’, too heavy for any airline to be interested in buying. The nature of aircraft is that their structures must be kept lightweight and cannot be over designed to allow for the worst possible case. Not all possible ‘wide area, high energy, blunt impacts’ can be covered in damage tolerance design and accounted for in scheduled maintenance without adding significant weight. One example may be that of a ground appliance, a work gantry perhaps, that hits the side of an aircraft in a location that is not easily or often inspected, such as the upper fuselage skin. The impact may cause no visible external damage but it may have popped a co-cured stringer from the back of the skin. 39 AIRWORTHINESS Over the years, much has been made of the ability of composites to provide savings through lighter weight structures, which in turn allow aircraft to carry more of what really pays the bills – passengers and freight. The weight savings offered by modern composite structures can allow an aircraft to carry a couple more rows of passengers or a few extra tonnes of freight, whilst using less fuel per passenger-kilometre. Given this economic imperative, it is hard not to foresee that aircraft will eventually be close to 90 per cent composite by weight, perhaps even more. Engine components may remain metal (although fan blades are already composite!) and a few other structures and systems may not be able to be made from composites due to strength, durability, temperature or environmental factors. Damage to composites can be caused by many types of events, including: PULL-OUT SECTION Richard Castles, a CASA airframe specialist, with a warning – ‘Ignore composite damage at your peril ...’ GO AWAY… PULL-OUT SECTION FSA SEPT-OCT10 40 This type of impact should be reported, but often is not, sometimes out of fear, but mostly out of lack of training and awareness. Airline engineers are not able to know which areas have been overdesigned and which haven’t as they don’t have access to this information. This is why mandatory reporting is important. We also need to foster a no-blame culture, so that people are not afraid to report a seemingly benign impact. In the past, if something bumped into a metal structure and the impact was significant enough, there would always be some visual evidence of damage, so the problem of hidden damage rarely existed. Now that stiffer composite materials are being used for fuselage skins and other primary structures, after a blunt impact, the skin pops back into place after the impact, often leaving no evidence of the trauma beneath. This is why it is so important for all maintenance and other ground personnel to report any type of impact, no matter how minor it may have appeared at the time. It is not possible for anyone to make an on-the-spot judgement as to how much force was applied to the structure during the impact, and whether or not it was significant enough to cause hidden damage. Only the application of non-destructive inspection (NDI) procedures, such as ultrasound, will be able to determine the extent of hidden damage. If not reported, damage from a blunt impact may not be found until scheduled maintenance is carried out. This may be too late. Unreported impacts are a significant safety threat if the resulting hidden damage has reduced the structural strength to near or below limit load-carrying capability. Such damage cannot be allowed to fly for long periods, because if the structure encounters a load over limit load, say during an emergency manoeuvring case or a gust, then failure can occur. If the structure is a secondary one, then this damage may not be critical to safety of flight. However, if the structure is a primary structure with no fail- safe capability, then the aircraft could be lost. Another point for the maintenance engineer to remember is that the allowable damage limits in an aircraft’s structural repair manual are not intended to cover the situation of a very wide-area, blunt-object impact. These damage limits are for more discrete and obvious damage, easily detectable during a visual inspection or pre-flight walk around. When it comes to impact on a composite aircraft, no matter how insignificant it may seem, it is better to report it and get the impact damage area assessed and find it was insignificant or in need of a repair, than to just let it go with a ‘she’ll be right’ attitude. A little inconvenience at the time may just save a whole lot of grief at 35,000 feet … An example of fuselage skin hidden damage Skin Co-cured or bonded stringer External blunt object impact, ground equipment, dropped tool or other damage source. Stringer disbonded, but skin still intact. Stringer disbond not visible externally. APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 4 June - 17 June 2010 2010-0113–Time limits/maintenance checks– maintenance requirements–implementation DCA/CRESCO/5B–Rudder top hinge–inspection & modification Rotorcraft Bell Helicopter Textron 427 Series Helicopters Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes Piper PA-32 (Cherokee Six) Series Aeroplanes AD/F100/97–State of Design Airworthiness Directives 2010-0112–Oxygen system–pax oxygen masks– identification/modification/replacement 2010-13-07–Engine–V-band exhaust coupling – replacement CF-2010-17–Tail rotor driveshaft hanger bearing bracket–cacking due to tooling mark Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters Eurocopter BK 117 Series Helicopters AD/GBK 117/25 Amdt 1–Tail rotor gearbox bevel gear–CANCELLED Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters 2009-0263R1–Equipment & furnishings–emergency flotation gear–inspection/repair/replacement Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters AD/DAUPHIN/73–Main rotor drive gearbox oil pressure–CANCELLED 2010-0116-E–Main rotor drive–main gearbox oil low-pressure switch connection–inspection/ rework/operational procedure AD/BEECH 65/64 Amdt 1–Wing structural fatigue limitation Above 5700kg Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0086R1–Electric & electronic common installation–hydraulic pump electrical motor connectors–modification 2010-0103–Electric & electronic common installation–cable loom installation–modification Airbus Industrie A380 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0105–Nacelles and pylons–aft pylon fairing/ fasteners–inspection BAe Systems (Operations) Jetstream 4100 Series Aeroplanes AD/J4100/5 Amdt 2–Time limits/maintenance checks–Airworthiness limitations–CANCELLED Boeing 727 Series Aeroplanes AD/B727/74 Amdt 1–Elevator balance panel aft hinge–inspection Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes AD/CL-600/71 Amdt 1–State of Design Airworthiness Directives Embraer ERJ-170 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-01–Inspection of the lower region of the rear pressure bulkhead Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes AD/ERJ-190/15 Amdt 2–Low-pressure check valves– CANCELLED AD/ERJ-190/23–Deployment failure–escape slide– CANCELLED Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series Aeroplanes AD/F50/102–State of Design Airworthiness Directives Piston Engines Thielert Piston Engines 2010-0111-E Correction– Engine–clutch assembly –identification/replacement Turbine Engines CFM International Turbine Engines– CFM56 Series AD/CFM56/29–25-degree mid-span shroud fan blades–CANCELLED 2010-12-03–25-degree mid-span shroud fan blades General Electric Turbine Engines– CF6 Series 2010-12-10–Low-pressure turbine stage 3 disk Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines– JT3D Series AD/JT3D/2–Jet Power Inc (JPI)–CANCELLED Turbomeca Turbine Engines–Arriel Series 2010-0101-E–Engine–module M03 (gas generator)–Post-TU347 second stage turbine disc –reduced life limit 18 June - 1 July 2010 Rotorcraft Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters 2009-0263R2–Equipment & furnishings–emergency flotation gear–inspection/repair/replacement Eurocopter BO 105 Series Helicopters 2010-0128 Correction–engine–power turbine speed– operational limitation Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters 2009-0263R2–Equipment & furnishings–emergency flotation gear–inspection/repair/replacement Below 5700kg Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series Aeroplanes AD/TBM 700/50 Amdt 1–Alternator & vapour cycle cooling system pulley-drive assembly–CANCELLED 2010-0130–Airconditioning–alternator & vapour cycle cooling system compressor support & drive assembly–removal/replacement/inspection/ modification BAe (BAC 167) Strikemaster Series Aeroplanes AD/STRIKEMASTER/4–Port & starboard mainplane spar upper attachment lugs–CANCELLED 2007-002R2–Port & starboard mainplane spar upper attachment lugs Cessna 525 Series Aeroplanes 2010-12-01–Thrust attenuator paddle assemblies Pacific Aerospace Corporation Cresco Series Aeroplanes AD/CRESCO/4 Amdt 1–Rudder top hinge– CANCELLED Above 5700kg Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/168 Amdt 1–Fuel pump bonding AD/A320/229–Ram air turbine ejection jack– CANCELLED 2010-0120–Hydraulic power–Hamilton Sundstrand ram air turbine balance weight screws–inspection/ replacement 2008-0199R1–Hydraulic power–auxiliary hydraulic power–ram air turbine (RAT) ejection jack– replacement Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes AD/A330/13 Amdt 6–Life limits/monitored parts– CANCELLED AD/A330/84 Amdt 1–Flight control primary computer dispatch limitations–CANCELLED 2010-0127–Stabiliser–rudder side shell skin–inspection 2010-0109–Flight controls–flight control primary computer (FCPC)–dispatch restriction & operational test 2010-0131–Time limits/maintenance checks–safe life airworthiness limitation items–ALS Part 1 –amdt 2010-0132–Fuel–main fuel pump system–water scavenge system–deactivation/dispatch restriction Airtractor 800 Series Aeroplanes AD/AT 800/7–Wing lower spar cap–CANCELLED 2010-13-08–Wing lower spar cap Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/300 Amdt 1–Fuselage frame airconditioning bracket attachments Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-18–Rudder travel limiter–return springs failure British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0072R1–Landing gear–nose landing gear main fitting–inspection/replacement nose landing gear main fitting Dornier 328 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0134–Stabilisers–rudder tab fi xations brackets–inspection Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-02–Inspection of lower region of rear pressure bulkhead Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series Aeroplanes AD/F50/76 Amdt 1–Time Limits/Maintenance Checks–Maintenance Requirements–CANCELLED Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes 2009-0221R1–Landing gear–main landing gear (MLG) piston–inspection/replacement. 41 AIRWORTHINESS Below 5700kg Beechcraft 65 and 70 (Queen Air) Series Aeroplanes 2010-11-11–Main landing gear–tyre failures 2010-13-07–Engine–V-band exhaust coupling– replacement PULL-OUT SECTION 2009-0263R1–Equipment & furnishings–emergency flotation gear–inspection/repair/replacement 2010-0117-E–Rotors flight controls–main rotor servocontrols end fitting ball joints–inspection/ replacement Learjet 60 Series Aeroplanes Piper PA-46 (Malibu) Series Aeroplanes Tool control at a glance Organisation PULL-OUT SECTION t
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LFFQJOH Tool Control System Phone: 1800 811 480 Web: www.snapontools.com.au/industrial 43 Aircrew need good hearing for accurate communication with each other and with ATC, to avoid possible safety problems such as misunderstanding clearances. Protection of hearing against damage from excessive noise is a key issue in aircrew health and safety. The human ear converts vibrations in the air into vibrations in the liquid-filled cochlea of the inner ear. These vibrations are transformed into electrical impulses to the brain by tiny hairlike stereocilia. Hearing loss may be due to factors including damage to the middle ear by infections in childhood, obstruction of the ear canal by wax, and by chemical agents such as certain drugs. One of the most common causes of hearing loss is exposure to excessive noise. An important point about the decibel (dB) scale used to measure sound intensity is that it is logarithmic. It has to be this way to measure the ear’s very wide range of sensitivity. The faintest sound a human ear can detect is one trillionth as strong as the loudest sound it can bear before instant damage. On a decibel scale an increase of 3dB means a doubling of sound pressure: an increase of 10dB increases sound pressure by three times, another 20dB is 10 times more sound pressure and an increase of 40 decibels means a 100-fold increase in sound pressure. ost One of the m uses common ca G of HE ARIN LOSS is exposure to EXCESSIVE NOISE. PILOT HEARING CASA MEDICAL OFFICER, DR DAVID FITZGERALD, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING YOUR HEARING, ESPECIALLY IN OLDER GA AIRCRAFT. Prolonged exposure to excessive noise can damage the hair cells, the blood vessels in the inner ear and the nerve endings in the cochlea. The initial damage due to noise tends to affect the hair cells associated with perception of high frequency sound first— those capturing 4-8kHz. As further exposure occurs, and the damage to the cochlea becomes more widespread, the lower frequencies are affected. Hearing loss may be diagnosed in several ways FSA SEPT-OCT10 44 For Class 2 certificate holders, the medical standards for hearing require the holder to be able to: with or without a hearing aid, hear with both ears, an average conversational voice in a quiet room while two metres away from the examiner, and looking away from the examiner. This is a fairly simple office test that a DAME can easily make during the medical assessment. For Class 1 and 3 certificate holders, the medical standards are based on pure tone audiometry, stating that an individual fails the medical standards: If suffering from a hearing loss in either ear of more than: (a) 35dB at any of the frequencies of 500 Hz, 1000 Hz or 2000 Hz; or (b) 50dB at 3000 Hz Audiometry measures the hearing threshold (i.e. the softest sound that can be heard) at different frequencies. Typically, tone volume is increased until the person recognises the sound (and pushes a button to indicate recognition). Hearing levels at 20dB or below indicate normal hearing. If the volume needs to be turned up above 20dB, this indicates hearing loss. Because hearing loss due to noise affects the high frequencies first, it often goes unnoticed, except for difficulty such as in distinguishing speech in crowds. As the lower frequencies become affected, there is a more significant hearing impairment. It is in the mid-lower frequencies where most speech occurs, and this is why the CASA standards are weighted towards these frequencies. If the result shows hearing loss greater than the CASA standards for a Class 1 or 3 holder, or if there is evidence of difficulty with conversational voice in a Class 2 holder, CASA generally requires either a formal speech discrimination test, or an operational check, carried out by an approved person in an aircraft or situation of similar ambient noise level. In a speech discrimination test, the audiologist will play specified words through a set of headphones and have the pilot say what they hear. In an operational check, a testing officer will assess the ability of the pilot to communicate within the cockpit and will assess their radio communication performance. Hearing aids are allowed to be worn in the test: however, a condition of the medical certificate will be that hearing aids must be worn while exercising the privileges of the licence. Protecting your hearing in the cockpit National Standards for Occupational Noise set a limit of 85dB as a maximum average daily exposure level. Above this level, there is an unacceptable risk to the hearing of those exposed, based on a standard eight-hour day. For peak noise, the limit is 140dB. If the ambient noise level is likely to be above 85dB, some form of control should be instituted to limit exposure in order to protect hearing. The louder the noise, the shorter the time that it is safe to be exposed to it. For example, a noise of 97dB is only safe for about 30 minutes; and at 106dB, there is only four minutes before damage is done. As shown in the British Airways study, you should remember, however, that communications noise adds to the noise in the cockpit, so having the radio turned up too loud may mitigate some of the headset’s protection against ambient noise. Pilots are therefore recommended to reduce the headset volume as much as possible while maintaining adequate and clear communication. A 19681, 2 study examined noise levels in both single and multi-engined light aircraft. It was found that the majority of aircraft noise was in the range of 50 to 250 Hz, but eight-hour exposure levels were exceeded at various points from 100Hz to 2kHz – into the frequencies that affect speech sounds. It was also found that the loudness in single-engined aircraft slightly decreased with altitude, but no significant altitude effects were seen in multi-engined aircraft. So, hearing protection is important to help prevent hearing loss, particularly in older general aviation aircraft. As part of the regular CASA medical assessment process, your DAME will assess you for any significant hearing loss, and the medical standards incorporate safeguards to protect you against the effect of hearing loss on cockpit communication. A 2001 British Airways study3 found ambient noise levels on the flight deck of averaged between 70dB and 79dB over the flight. When the study considered additional noise, including the communications noise from headsets, it found that on 80 per cent of flights the noise level was 80dB or above, and on 40 per cent of flights the level was above 85dB. In one case, the noise level reached 89dB. 45 PILOT HEARING Crew in modern flight decks often wear lightweight headsets which provide minimal noise protection. In some aircraft, this may be sufficient to protect the aircrew from long-term hearing loss, while allowing adequate direct verbal communication. Wearing passive or active noise-attenuating headsets is a good idea for pilots of older aircraft, and general aviation aircraft. For protection against low frequency noise, the headset should make a good seal around the ear. It should, however, also be comfortable, as taking hearing protectors off even for short periods can cancel their protective effect. Most passive noise-attenuating headsets provide around 10-30dB of protection depending on the frequency. Active noise reduction (ANR) headsets detect ambient noise inside the ear cup of the headset and the headset then sends a 'mirror image' of the sound electronically – effectively cancelling out the sound. They are more effective at cancelling the noise in the lower frequencies that is more prevalent in general aviation aircraft. 1 Cockpit noise intensity: Fifteen single-engine light aircraft, Jerry V Tobias, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Aviation Medicine, 1968 http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/oamtechreports/1960s/media/AM68-21.pdf 2 Cockpit noise intensity: Eleven twin-engine light aircraft, Jerry V Tobias, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Aviation Medicine, 1968 http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/oamtechreports/1960s/media/AM68-25.pdf 3 Hearing loss on the flight deck — origin and remedy. An Investigation of Unilateral Hearing Loss amongst Professional Flight Crew. Dr Michael Bagshaw, Head of Occupational and Aviation Medicine, British Airways, April 2001 http://www.aeromedical.org/Articles/NIHL.html Prolonged exposure to oise excessive n GE can DAMA ls, the the hair cel ls in blood vesse AR E R E N N I e h t ve and the ner endings HLEA. in the COC Name withheld by request FSA SEPT-OCT10 46 Nothing bad happened on this corporate flight, but the circumstances surrounding a potentially disastrous error led to much soul-searching by this executive jet pilot. The autumn day started well; the weather would not be a problem. It was my sector as the new first officer of a Hawker 125. As a bonus, I had a captain who demonstrated good crew resource management (CRM) practice and also actively encouraged the professional development of his crew. For this trip there were just the two flight deck crew. It would be an hour and twenty minutes each way, with passengers outbound, then immediate return empty. About 40 minutes before our ATC departure slot time, the crew briefing by the captain was interrupted. The company operations director demanded I give him an immediate update on a longterm administrative project. In corporate flying multi-tasking is the norm. Unfortunately, this interruption went on for over 25 minutes and prevented me from undertaking my usual sequence of flight preparation tasks in support of the captain. He was left to pre-flight the aircraft, check and load the catering and baggage. He had to arrange the correct fuelling quantity and complete alone all the many other tasks of corporate operations flight planning and preparation. The Hawker has a pressure refuelling system. The inlet is located at the rear, right side of the fuselage below the right engine, diagonally on the other side of the aircraft to the air-stair entrance door. The inlet consists of a screwon cap, on a short retaining chain, sealing the end of the pressure refuelling connector. This is then covered by a small hatch secured with spring clips (ours had no key-lock). At our home airfield the fuel providers are excellent: highly trained, experienced and helpful. Although it was not strictly their job, they were in the habit of closing the fuelling inlets, caps and covers on all aircraft. That day, unbeknown to us, we had a new refueller just out of training who had not been told about this. Instead, he followed his training, to leave the closure of fuel hatches etc. to the operating crew, correctly, to the letter. As soon as I was able to I went straight out to the aircraft, started up the auxiliary power unit, loaded the flight plan into the navigation system and ran the pre-start checks. We called for start clearance with about one and a half minutes remaining before our ATC departure slot time expired. The rushed preparation prevented me from doing my own walk around as is my usual practice. The company's standard operating procedures (SOPs) stated that this was a pilotin-command duty; however, it was my sector and a personal walk around is a safety habit carried over from my earliest training. The outbound flight appeared routine— nobody noticed anything out of the ordinary. On landing we disembarked our passengers, immediately loaded the new flight plan for home, and called for clearance and to taxi. While the captain applied the park-brake and advised ground control, I left my seat and opened the door, intending to go and see what was going on. The man who had signalled was already at the lower step. We were only a few feet in front of the operating left engine so he shouted and gestured not to worry; a hatch had been open and that he had closed it. At this time an airline Boeing 737 was approaching us from behind and we were blocking their route. Our helper departed so I closed the door and we continued to taxi for departure. The flight home was uneventful. On the ground at home base during the post-flight inspection, minor chipping of the paint around the fuelling hatch was noted, prompting a check. This revealed that the fuel cap was missing. The consequences of any failure of this valve would have been total fuel loss ... The memory of this possibility has given me plenty of food for thought. First, interruption of the pre-flight briefing and preparations with nonoperational issues should not have been permitted. This could be considered an example of poor situational awareness. Protection of this ‘sterile period’ should be mandated by incorporation in the SOPs as stated in the company manuals. My response to the operations director should have been more assertive, to prevent the interruption of the crew pre-flight safety activities. It was assumed that the refueller would follow the local, non-standard procedure to put on the fuel line cap and close the hatch. In fact, he rightly followed his training and standard procedures in leaving them open. 47 His understanding was that the pilots would do it. Any action which does not follow standard procedures, even if wellintentioned, has an inherent, or latent, element of risk. For me, this event underlined the importance of standardised training and operations. There is nothing that replaces a personal check. The fuel cap and hatch were not checked. Remember SOPs and air law mandate only the minimum requirements. I assumed that the man on the ground in the hi-vis jacket was qualified to close the hatch. I should have checked it myself. Time pressures are common in most air operations; however, nonessential extra distractions for the crew immediately prior to flight are not the best use of time or crew and therefore are against the best interests of safety. Afterwards when the captain and I analysed that day for our report, we identified several useful learning points. How many more can you identify? The conseq uences of any failu re of this valve w ould have been T OTAL fuel loss ... CLOSE CALLS Once cleared, we turned right onto the taxiway. As we did so I saw a man on the apron to our right wearing a hi-vis jacket, and signalling for us to stop. He then made a signal with both hands flat, palms together horizontally and pivoted the upper hand at the wrist, like a duck’s bill opening. Unknown to the crew, the cap had departed the aircraft at some time after the first engine start, leaving the fuel-system integrity for both flights dependant solely on the check valve of the pressure-refuelling connector. FSA SEPT-OCT10 48 Rotors – a brutal introduction name withheld by request As a new private pilot, I was keen to practise flying around Victoria. Recently, I had conducted a very pleasant flight from Tyabb, south east of Melbourne, on a south-easterly course across Westernport Bay, over the Strzelecki Ranges and on to the lighthouse at the southern tip of Wilsons Promontory. The return trip was even more spectacular—tracking west along the southern coast of Victoria to Philip Island, and finally across Westernport Bay at Flinders, to my home airport. I had taken the opportunity to practise navigation skills using the '1-in-60' technique, and I was not disappointed at the amazingly accurate results from this fairly crude method (including estimating nautical miles to the left or right of a waypoint). On the day of the incident, I determined to take a close friend on the same flight in a hired Cessna 172, with a variation of a touchand-go landing at Leongatha to practise my approach and circuit technique at an unfamiliar airport. The flight would certainly test my drift correction skills, as there was a strong and hot north wind blowing, around 20 to 25kt. It turned out to be a very pleasant day for flying, with minimal turbulence at the cruise altitude of 5500ft. The landing at Leongatha went well and we continued towards Wilsons Promontory via Fish Creek as a waypoint. A small course correction was required, and as we continued toward our destination, I began to reduce height. That way we could enjoy the vista of rugged and steeply timbered slopes running down to pristine beaches along the southern shores of Wilsons Promontory, including the main camping ground, Tidal River, just short of our lighthouse destination. Right on time, and on course, we reached the southern shoreline of Wilsons Promontory, now flying at 1000ft, and turned to track an easterly course just out from, and parallel to, the shore. We were both admiring the scenery out of the port side of the plane when, just as we came abeam Tidal River backed by Mount Oberon (558m), all hell broke loose! As though entering a room, we went from perfectly calm air into massive turbulence, with the plane rolling and yawing wildly. It was losing height at an alarming rate one moment, then in the next moment shooting up. One of the most disturbing features of this pandemonium was how close the sea came during our downward movements. My instinctive try continually level attitude, I immediately reaction to these violent movements was to to correct the rolling and maintain wingsand at the same time, most fortuitously, and instinctively altered course out to sea. 49 With a huge amount of relief I felt the turbulence diminishing the further we got from the coast, until suddenly, we were in completely smooth air—although at around 200ft above sea level! Only at this time did it dawn on me that I had completely overlooked the effect of the strong northerly wind blowing over Mount Oberon and rotors which would be generated on southern slopes, exactly where I had run into trouble. For some time, I remained silent as I struggled to cope with my feelings of extreme embarrassment, my own stupidity, and most of all—the realisation just how lucky we both were to be still alive. Meteorological lessons came flooding back describing the formation of rotors on the lee of mountains and high hills, often signalled by tell-tale associated lenticular clouds (of which there were none today). I also vividly recalled the instructions to minimise the dangers of getting caught in rotors by approaching mountains or large hills at an oblique angle, rather than head-on, to enable a faster change of course away from the dangerous downdrafts from rotors, if any were encountered. The remainder of the flight went to plan. My passenger claimed to have thoroughly enjoyed the experience, even after I had sheepishly explained the cause of the turbulence, without dwelling on the seriousness of the risks involved. Needless to say this experience heightened my awareness of the risks of leeward turbulence and rotors when flying at lower altitude anywhere near mountains or large hills. From then on, I paid particular attention to the forecast wind direction and strength in mountainous and hilly areas, and worked hard to improve my skills at indentifying lenticular clouds as a warning signal of the presence of rotors. just as we c ame abeam Tida l River backed by M ount Oberon (55 8m), all HELL BROKE LOOSE ! CLOSE CALLS I had no chance to say much to my poor frightened passenger, but to his credit I do not recall him making any comment as I fought to control the plane. 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 2 8 2 8L 2 8 8L 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 8 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L L 2 8L 2 8L 2 L 2 8L L 2 8L L 2 8L L 8 L 2 8 2 L L 2 8L 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8 2 8 L 2 2 8L 22 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 8L 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 8L 8L 2 8 2 8L 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 8L 2 2 8L 28L 2 8L 2 8 2 8L 2 8L 2 8 8L 2 8 8L 2 8 8L 2 8 8L 2 8 L 2 8L L L L L 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 L 2 8L TR 1 2 8L 2 8 8 8 8 8 35 M L 2 8L L 2 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 2 8 8L L 2 8L 2 L 2 8L L 2 8L L 8L 2 8 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 2 8L 2 8 L 2 8L 8L 2 8 8L 2 8L 2 L 2 8L 8L 2 8 2 8L L 2 8L Nam e wi thhe 2 8L ld by requ e st o RWY 10 R 50 4R 0 WY FSA SEPT-OCT10 R RWY Nothing JOLTS the HEARTBEAT like another aircraft on a reciprocal course, coming straight at you, as this pilot can attest. 28 L In April this year I had occasion to fly to Archerfield and return the same day. The flight to Archerfield was uneventful ... the return journey was anything but. As I had not operated out of Archerfield for some time I had advised ATC on arrival earlier that morning that I was rusty with the Archerfield’s general aviation aerodrome procedures (GAAP). The controller provided good guidance on both the inbound and outbound GAAP legs. Weather conditions were perfect VMC. When I was ready to depart Archerfield, following ATC instruction, I lined up on runway 28L. I was following two Cessna 172s on take-off with no landings between the three aircraft to increase separation. Both Cessnas and my aircraft (a Glasair) were outbound to the south east via the 135 degrees track as published in the En-route Supplement Australia (ERSA) and the Archerfield Visual Pilot's Guide. Being aware of my airspeed relative to the Cessnas’, once cleared for take-off, and with no aircraft lining up behind me, I extended my takeoff leg to increase the gap between my aircraft and the two Cessnas I was following. I also throttled back once at 1000ft to 22 inches manifold pressure and 2200rpm to keep my speed down, as I did not have visual on these two aircraft as I departed Archerfield’s GAAP airspace. I also kept my landing light on during departure. I intended to keep the light on until established on climb after Logan Village. Once airborne, the Archerfield controller advised me to remain at 1000ft until clear of overflying inbound traffic from Park Ridge. Once clear of that traffic and well established on the 135-degrees track, ATC advised me that I could climb to 1500ft, but to remain outside of the overlying class C airspace. I did this and remained at this altitude as I continued to track on 135 degrees to Logan Village as per the Visual Pilot's Guide. All the time I was conscious of the two Cessnas somewhere ahead of me, but despite my careful scanning as well as that of my passenger, a friend who is also a pilot, we could not see either aircraft. 4 Y0 R I assume the Cessna pilot had seen my landing light at the last moment. If the Cessna had not banked I'm convinced I would not have seen it in time. The Cessna did not have its landing light on. If it had been on I feel sure one of us would have seen it sooner as we were scanning in front of our aircraft very closely. All of this occurred virtually over the top of Logan Village. I was stunned at the time and still remain so. As a result of the communication between ATC and me, the Cessna pilot should have been aware of at least one following aircraft on the 135-degree track, and possibly at 1500ft as cleared by Archerfield ATC. So I cannot understand why anyone would deliberately fly a reciprocal course to the outbound track with aircraft following. Even if there had been no following traffic, I still am amazed that anyone would fly back on an outbound track from a busy airfield. To this day I'm mystified why a pilot would do this, when common sense clearly says to stay clear of published outbound tracks unless also outbound. I have checked ERSA and the Visual Pilot's Guide and can find no advice to pilots to stay clear of outbound tracks unless outbound themselves. Most people would consider it common sense, but I am wondering if wording of this nature should be included in the departure procedures for busy airfields. ANALYSIS Doing a U-turn in the sky and flying back down an outbound track is the equivalent of driving the wrong way down a motorway. But the Cessna that frightened the pilot might not have been either one he was following. The southern outward and inward tracks to Archerfield are close enough to require careful flying. Under the new class D procedures, mandatory GAAP approach points have become recommended VFR approach points. The lesson is to fly accurately to your approach or departure point. Remember that the values shown on charts are tracks, not headings. Pilots must make allowance for wind to ensure that they maintain the correct track. The other safety measure you can take once clear of class D airspace is to call your friendly Radar Information Service (RIS) on the area frequency shown on the chart. As long as you have a working transponder, they are happy to help and can advise you of any traffic conflict which they should see before you do. CASA AvSafety advisors 51 CLOSE CALLS RWY As I approached Logan Village I saw a Cessna several miles 28 L ahead of me start a right turn - it appeared to turn through approximately 150 degrees. The only reason I saw the aircraft was because it turned. Our track called for me to turn right to Bromelton once over Logan To this day I'm mystified why a pilot would do this, Village. Once the Cessna had turned we when common sense clearly says to stay clear of could no longer see it, but we continued our scanning as we approached Logan Village. published outbound tracks unless also outbound. A short time later it suddenly appeared on a reciprocal course to the 135 degrees track that we were flying about 20m to our left, approximately 150m in front of our position and approximately 10m above our altitude. I only saw it at the last moment as it started to bank steeply to its right. My co-pilot did not see it. Immediately I initiated a steep descending turn to my right and I estimated that the two aircraft missed each other by no more than 300ft. We were so close that the Cessna’s registration was clearly visible. It was all over in a flash, with no time to register this detail. ;OL(\Z[YHSPHU Chief Commissioner’s message The ATSB has now completed its inaugural year as an independent agency. Thanks to a great deal of work from a great many people, we are now firmly established in our independent role. We are also well-positioned to meet international expectations about what we investigate, while still making sure that we are focused on doing things that will make a difference to future safety. Ground safety occurrences he aviation industry has been slow to acknowledge the risks associated with ground operations. While most occurrences on airport aprons and taxiways do not have consequences in terms T explored contributing factors associated with each type of occurrence to create a picture of ground occurrences which begins when an Over the next few months, you will see the ATSB place a FSA SEPT-OCT10 52 greater emphasis (including here) on communicating what we have learned from our investigations and what we have learned from research and from analysis of incident data. through a process of checks and balances. Getting to this point in addition to the continuing business of conducting transport safety investigations, some of which were complex and high profile, made this a challenging, though satisfying, year for the ATSB. 31 December 2008. About 70 per cent related to ground operations Over the year, we received notification of 14,721 aviation accidents and incidents – and that does not include the notifications that were multiple reports of the same occurrence. ATSB staff members reviewed every one of those notifications, and assessed 8,545 as transport safety matters. From those matters, we initiated 103 aviation investigations. In addition, ATSB investigators also successfully completed 68 aviation investigations. It has been a busy first year, and there is every sign that the next year will be even busier. I have confidence, however, that it is a challenge the ATSB will rise to and meet. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has done so much to help us begin a new chapter in the ATSB’s story. Not only have they helped to establish a government agency, which is no small feat, but their efforts have helped to make aviation in Australia safer. If you have any ideas or feedback on the ATSB’s performance that you would like to share, I urge you to contact us, so that we can make the next year as satisfying and productive as this past one has been. accounted for about 75 per cent of all ground operations occurrences, with failure to comply with a clearance being the most frequently reported occurrence type. Other common types of occurrences were ground equipment/obstacle clearance, near collision with vehicle, tug connection and breakage, door access and opening, and ground. equipment. In one case, the pilot of a Boeing 767 noted a series of loud engine teardown found a Phillips-head screwdriver bit in the core of . Airports are complex interfaces between the air and the ground, where Martin Dolan Chief Commissioner this report serve as a timely reminder of how ground occurrences take place, and to some degree why they occur. Q (]PH[PVU:HML[`0U]LZ[PNH[VY Tourists swim for it after helicopter joyride goes wrong O n 25 September 2008, a Bell 407 helicopter, registered VH-NSH, with a pilot and six passengers Corp model 250-C47B engine’s outer combustion case as a result of preexisting, high cycle, fatigue cracking in prior to failure. a cruise ship, True North, anchored in Talbot Bay, Western Australia, to begin a grew slowly and undetected, over a considerable period of time and was a As the pilot moved the helicopter clear of the right of the ship, and at a height of about 10m above the surface of the sea, a loud bang was heard, followed by a total loss of engine power. normal engine pressure cycles. resulted in an on-going re-design of the brazed wire mesh patch to more by the ship’s crew ensured that all of the helicopter’s occupants survived the accident. Two of the occupants, one of whom was unconscious, required assistance to exit the partially-submerged helicopter. Sometime later, the helicopter sank. been a ‘burst’ failure of the Rolls-Royce strengthened the ‘armpit’ areas of the outer combustion cases on the Worldwide by the addition of brazed wire mesh patches following a number of in-service failures. Subsequently, in 1984, that strengthening was extended to the later series of RR250 engines, such as was cracks in this occurrence had developed adjacent to those brazed wire mesh patches and had propagated through them. crack inspections that were required by the engine manufacturer to be carried out on the outer combustion case had In response to this, and a similar failure in another helicopter two weeks earlier, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority released an Airworthiness Bulletin highlighting the circumstances of the occurrence to Australian helicopter operators. combustion case crack being found on an in-service Sikorsky S76 helicopter. advised its intention to change a number of the operational procedures employed during shipborne helicopter operations operator is also installing Helicopter Emergency Air Breathing System bottles in the helicopter’s cabin area for the use of crews in a similar emergency. Q ATSB investigation report AO-2008-067 53 ATSB engine manufacturer is also re-evaluating the method of inspection used for detecting outer combustion case cracks during maintenance. with water and the helicopter rolled onto its side initially before rolling completely inverted. was free of the helicopter but had been discouraged from doing so. As a result of this occurrence, the engine manufacturer conducted a computerised analysis of the design of the combustion areas of high stress more descended to the water, impacting in a nose low, right side-down equipment, however the pilot indicated that the rapidity of the descent into the been done. However, the approved dyepenetrant detection methods used had Investigation briefs A worrying lack of comms Engine Cooling Fan Fracture Collision with terrain ATSB Investigation AO-2009-001 ATSB Investigation AO-2009-019 ATSB Investigation AO-2008-062 On 26 December 2008, a Bombardier Inc DHC-8-315 (DHC8), registered VHTQL, was conducting a regular public On 3 May 2009 at approximately 0620 EST, a Bell Helicopter 47G-2A–1 departed Rolleston landing area, Queensland, on On 14 September 2008, a Robinson Helicopter R44 Raven, registered VH-RIO, was being operated on a series Airport, New South Wales. While on the pilot heard a very loud bang and felt a instrument landing system approach, started descending and the forward/ Park, WA. At about 1230 WST, the helicopter departed with the pilot and three passengers. When it did not return, a search located the burnt wreckage of the helicopter landed heavily, resulting in the main rotor blades severing the tail boom and causing some structural damage to 54 and diminished its performance, which back injury. OGE hover performance was marginal. It is likely that the high level of engine power required to sustain a hover was not available, or not fully utilised by the pilot, resulting in an uncommanded descent, overpitching of the main rotor as a result of the pilot’s attempts to arrest that descent, and a main rotor RPM decay that FSA SEPT-OCT10 crew. In this occurrence, the crew continued the approach despite becoming aware of to avoid a stickshaker event could have been taken if the crew communicated approach. of adhering to company SOPs. Poorly managed stick shaker recovery techniques and go-around procedures increase the likelihood of inducing aerodynamic stall and stick pusher activation. As a result of this occurrence, the operator has proactively implemented changes to its DHC-8 training syllabus. It has also highlighted to its crews approach, the importance of forward planning; and the monitoring and prioritisation of tasks when conducting approaches. Finally, the operator has emphasised to crews the importance of good communication in a multi-crew environment. Q proximity to the terrain at a low airspeed Examination of the helicopter revealed that two blades had separated from the engine cooling fan as a result of fatigue for endorsement and recurrent training conducted on Robinson R22/R44 and separated from the engine and control linkages located adjacent to the determined that the fan unit had not been correctly assembled, and that this and resonance characteristics of the fan, which in turn may have increased the susceptibility of the fan to fatigue failure. As a result of this occurrence, the CASA released Airworthiness Bulletin AWB 63-007, reminding operators and maintainers of the importance of adhering to all current manufacturer’s approved data for sheet metal cooling fans and their drive assemblies, and detailing some potential contributing factors to structural fatigue fan failure. Q preconditions for, recognition of, or recovery from, low main rotor RPM. informal operator supervisory and experience-based policy, procedures and practices minimised the risk of pilots operating outside the individual pilot’s level of competence. the operating parameters applicable addition, CASA will be reviewing the Advisory Notice to encourage operators to address the risk of their pilots operating outside the individual pilot’s level of competence. Q Airframe Vibration Hard landing Collision with terrain ATSB Investigation AO-2008-039 ATSB Investigation AO-2008-007 ATSB Investigation AO-2008-069 On the morning of 11 June 2008, a Bell 412 helicopter, registered VH-UAH, was conducting training operations from Wollongong Aerodrome, NSW. Shortly On 7 February 2008, a Boeing 717-200 At about 1440 EST on 29 September 2008, operated on a scheduled passenger service from Cairns, Queensland via Nhulunbuy (Gove) to Darwin, Northern Territory with six crew and 88 passengers. Pawnee Brave, registered VH FXE, was conducting aerial baiting operations in the Pilton Valley, Queensland when the severe vertical airframe vibrations, resulting in reduced pilot control. In response to the increasing vertical airframe vibrations, and suspecting that they were related to ground resonance, the pilot raised the helicopter into the hover, however, the vibrations continued collective to set the helicopter back down landing caused serious damage to the helicopter, but the crew were not injured. was seriously damaged by impact forces and a post–impact, fuel and magnesium29 at Darwin Airport and elected to follow the instrument landing system to glideslope for the majority of its approach and temporarily exceeded the operator’s stabilised approach criteria shortly before landing resulting in structural damage. the fuselage skin above the wing area and to the underside of the fuselage behind the wing. Several longerons in the rear cargo area gear was removed and inspected in response to minor damage to the upper wing above the landing gear assembly. about 3 hours that day, conducting operations at a number of properties. He had extensive experience on a variety of large jet and air transport category 55 although he had carried out regular, recent agricultural operations. Examination of the engine indicated that onset of divergent vibrations and allowed subsequent controllability issues to develop. It is likely that free play at the bolted joint was introduced when the collective actuator was last overhauled. As a result of this occurrence, the collective actuator manufacturer revised the tensioning procedures and requirements for the pivot bolt assembly during the overhaul process. In addition, the helicopter operator changed its inspection regime of the collective servo-hydraulic actuator units in its guidance to pilots on what actions to take if they experienced unusual or excessive Q led the ATSB to classify the occurrence ATSB control system revealed an anomaly with the collective hydraulic actuator. Excessive free play had developed between the collective actuator’s pivot bolt and the pilot input linkage. It was probable that the free play within the helicopter’s the terminal without further incident. contributed to the accident. Witnesses reported wind consistent with a weather front moving through the area operator’s stabilised approach criteria and operational documentation, and the visual cues associated with runway 11/29 at Darwin Airport. observations reinforced the Bureau of Meteorology observation that mountain and breaking waves might have occurred in the area. operator implemented a number of safety actions in relation to enhancing their stabilised approach criteria and pilot training, the monitoring of third party training providers, and the amendment of relevant operational documentation. In addition, the CASA undertook to prioritise the completion of proposed legislation in relation to third party training providers. Q topography of the area in which the pilot was operating, and the strong, gusty, wind conditions at the time, probably resulted in turbulence that increased the hazardous nature of the low-level application task. It is likely that the pilot lost control of at a height from which recovery was not ground. Q REPCON briefs Australia’s voluntary confidential aviation reporting scheme REPCON allows any person who has an aviation safety concern to report it to the HF radio communications is provided by the person that personal information is about (either the reporter or any person referred to in the report) Report narrative: at the aerodromes of departure and arrival, and cruising levels that could be required for any emergency and/or abnormal operation en route. position as they were having trouble report indicates the radio equipment they R200900079 increase awareness of safety issues and to encourage safety action by those who are best placed to respond to safety concerns. FSA SEPT-OCT10 56 Before submitting a REPCON report take a little time to, consider whether you have other available and potentially suitable options to report your safety concern. In some cases, your own organisation may can assist you with assessing your safety concern and taking relevant timely safety action. You may also wish to consider reporting directly to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) if you are concerned about deliberate breaches of the safety regulations, particularly those that have the potential to pose a serious and imminent risk to life or health. in making these decisions, so please don’t your options. REPCON would like to hear from you if you have experienced a ‘close call’ and as a powerful reminder that, despite the best of intentions, well-trained and well-meaning people are still capable of these reports may serve to reinforce the message that we must remain vigilant to ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and others. If you wish to obtain advice or further information, please contact REPCON on 1800 020 505. to action the matter further. relay their position again due to HF Note: In order for REPCON to protect the personal information of the reporter and those mentioned in the report, REPCON was not able to provide more detailed information to the operator or CASA. on commercial operations, two-way communications is required and repair Control of component extensions to overhaul times R200900081 Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied the operator with the carry the necessary radios to meet the regulatory and operational requirements with two HF radio systems, whereas only one is required for international unserviceability or propagation issues that caused the events described in the is impossible to investigate further and provide additional feedback. REPCON supplied CASA with the deoperator’s response. CASA provided the following response: Information Package (AIP) General (GEN) be equipped with radio communications systems capable of continuous communicaand airspace category. AIP GEN 1.5 Paragraph 1.4 states that at least one item of the required radio equipment must be capable of maintaining Report narrative: that there are numerous instances of the operator allowing components to run to their maximum overrun for overhaul or time expired. One such incident is a brake hydraulic fuse that was granted an extension to continue in service for a further 1,000 hours beyond the manufacturer’s at 972 hours beyond the manufacturer’s requirements for overhaul. Another incident reported involved hydraulic fuses exceeding their extension. When the error was discovered, the fuses still needs to improve in the area of safety mindfulness and the use of extensive extensions on component overhauls is one area that the operator has not made any recent improvements. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied CASA with the following response: Operators can either apply to CASA for extensions to maintenance requirements, or in [this case], extensions can be internally approved as [the operator] REPCON Operation types Second quarter 2010 Military 3% (1) Regional airlines 3% (1) All 7% (2) be up to 10% of the original interval on Flight training 7% (2) done unless some form of extenuating circumstance exists. In the case of the overrun for overhauled components, when an anomaly with serial numbers of fuses was discovered General aviation 40% (12) Sports aviation 13% (4) High capacity air transport 27% (8) proceed to [location] where the part was Reported issues Second quarter 2010 concession time of 2,500 hours, but had exceeded the 25,000 hour limit by 1,500 hours. In this case, however, a concession had not been issued. Organisational safety culture 3% (1) Collision avoidance 3% (1) Aerodrome safety 3% (1) Transport security 3% (1) raised by the reporter and the total process of managing the staggering of times for components was reviewed. Data on the issue has been supplied to [the operator] and changes have been put in place to prevent this type of event happening again. In the other case reported, where a fuse which was operating under a concession failed, a search of [the operators] technical logs was made and no other Radio communications 7% (2) Unsafe operations 33% (10) Aircraft defects 7% (2) Cabin safety 7% (2) ATC operations 7% (2) Regulations 10% (3) Low flying 7% (2) was consulted, but no trends were evident. 57 Fatigue 10% (3) Who is reporting to REPCON? a Cabin crew 3% (12) Air Traffic controller 4% (16) Passengers 8% (35) Flight crew 38% (165) Aircraft maintenance personnel 22% (97) REPCON reports received Total 2007 117 Total 2008 121 Total 2009 118 Total 2010 a 80 a. as of 30 June 2010 Facilities maintenance personnel/ground crew 0% (4) Othersb 25% (107 ) a. from 29 January 2007 to 30 June 2010 b. examples include residents, property owners, general public. What is not a reportable safety concern? How can I report to REPCON? To avoid doubt, the following matters are not reportable safety concerns and are not guaranteed confidentiality: (a) matters showing a serious and imminent threat to a person’s health or life; (b) acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft; (c) industrial relations matters; (d) conduct that may constitute a serious crime. Note 1: REPCON is not an alternative to complying with reporting obligations under the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (see ). Reporters can submit a REPCON report online via the ATSB website. Reporters can also submit via a dedicated REPCON telephone number: 1800 020 505 by email: [email protected] by facsimile: 02 6274 6461 or by mail: Freepost 600, PO Box 600, Civic Square ACT 2608 Note 2: Submission of a report known by the reporter to be false or misleading is an offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code. How do I get further information on REPCON? If you wish to obtain advice or further information on REPCON, please visit the ATSB website at or call REPCON on 1800 020 505. ATSB tigated it, put in place procedures to prevent re-occurrence and are monitoring the outcome. CASA does not intend to take further action on this issue. Sixty years on, as Macarthur Job discusses, the cause of the Amana crash, one of Australia’s worst airline tragedies, remains unsolved. FSA SEPT-OCT10 58 Australian National Airways in 1959 was the nation’s major airline, with a route structure extending from far north Queensland to Hobart and across to Perth in the west. On 26 June 1950 the fleet flagship, VH-ANA Amana, was to make a return trip to Perth from the eastern states. Leaving Sydney early, it would fly to Melbourne and Adelaide, on to Perth, thence back to Melbourne. Arriving at Perth at 8.15pm in fine, clear, moonlit conditions, Amana was prepared for the return trip. The DC-4 was refuelled, and the ground crew foreman drained the fuel filters in the nacelles of all four engines, then checked the two fuel drains under the centre section of the wing. The crew for the return flight comprised Captain H J Chapple, First Officers Trevitt and Willis, and Stewardesses Graham and Britton. Two first officers were usually rostered on DC-4s operating the long Perth-AdelaideMelbourne service. There were only 24 passengers, a light loading, and the weather was expected to remain fine. All engines started normally and at 9.44pm the tower controller cleared Amana to taxi to runway 29. He also passed its airways clearance: the DC-4 was to cruise at 9000ft on the radio range track. At 10pm, Amana reported on course and ‘ascending to 9000ft’. Passengers boarding Amana in front of the ANA terminal at Essendon soon after DC-4 operations had been transferred from RAAF Laverton. Passengers, conditioned to air travel in DC-3s, were awed by the scale of the DC-4's loading arrangements. One was reported in the press as exclaiming: ‘It’s like boarding an ocean liner!’ Ten minutes later, a TAA DC-4 also took off for Adelaide on Runway 29. As it turned on its easterly heading, the TAA pilots saw a vivid flash directly ahead in the far distance. It quickly faded, leaving the horizon dark again. homestead calling to him. The two men set off on foot through the forested hills towards the crash. It was moonlight, so they were able to run for much of the time. But as the TAA DC-4 levelled out at 7000ft, the crew began to make out a line of intense fire on the darkened ground directly ahead. By the time they passed over it, they were above a thin layer of stratus, but the fire was visible through it. Back at the airport, the Aeradio operator was about to call Amana because its position report was overdue. But before he could do so, the TAA DC-4 called to ask if Amana had reported. After half an hour of hard course, we saw a brilliant going, they saw a great mass of fragmented, stillexplosion ahead, and as burning wreckage scattered we passed the spot we amongst trees on the gentle downward slope of a low saw a fire burning. ridge. They were astonished to find an elderly man, his clothes dishevelled and burnt, walking about dazed. Shocked and suffering burns, he told them he had been a passenger. Minutes earlier, a farmer had been woken by the noise of a large aeroplane, apparently in trouble. As he ran from his bedroom he heard the sound of a distant explosion, and saw a small flash in the low, timbered hills to the south-east. Seconds later a tremendous flash lit up the sky. Meanwhile, in a hut not far from the homestead, a beekeeper was also awakened by ‘a terrific roaring of a plane passing low overhead ‘with the engines cutting on and off’. Before he reached his door he ‘heard a crash’ and, on the south-eastern horizon, saw a small flash. Half a minute later there was a ‘very large fl ash which lit up the whole sky’. Shortly afterwards, the farmer ran from the ‘The first thing I noticed wrong’, the survivor told them, was that he felt himself going forward and ‘thought he was having a heart attack’. But then he saw that other passengers were also ‘leaning forward’. The next thing he remembered was having difficulty freeing one hand to beat out flames on his clothes. The 67-year-old engineer from Adelaide later died in hospital. With 28 killed, the Amana accident achieved the unenviable status of Australia’s worst airline disaster—a dubious distinction that, together with the death toll from TAA’s F-27 VH-TFB accident in the sea off Mackay 10 years later, still stands. Within ANA itself, there was at least thanksgiving that the DC-4 had half its 44 passenger seats vacant. Yet the accident dealt a savage blow. Extended, nation-wide publicity, proclaiming the glories of its great stately four-engined DC-4 Skymasters and its flagship Amana, whose registration bore the company initials, was highly successful: there was hardly a newspaper reader who did not have a mental image of VH-ANA Amana. 59 AMANA CRASH For the next four minutes, the operator called Amana without result. Then the TAA DC-4 called back: ‘At the time we set course, we saw a brilliant explosion ahead, and as we passed the spot we saw a fire burning.’ The fire was 28nm east of the airport, ‘scattered over a large area through trees’. Shocked, the senior area controller immediately instituted emergency procedures. At the time we set Accident investigators found the DC-4 had crashed in undulating, timbered country, on the direct track from Perth, but on a northwesterly heading. The crew had evidently begun a turn This was followed by loud to the left, probably with the intention of returning. engine noise ‘like a high Just clearing a ridgeline during the low level turn powered motor vehicle in the dark, the aircraft travelling over a rough had descended into trees. From close to the ridge track in low gear’. top, wreckage extended down a gentle slope for 260m. The main impact with the ground itself was violent, the fuselage ploughing a furrow for 165m as the aircraft burst into flames and broke up. FSA SEPT-OCT10 60 The four engines were scattered over the wreckage trail and the number 1 and 3 engines had broken apart. The number 1, 2 and 3 propellers were all rotating at impact, but the no. 4 propeller was feathered. Unfeathering action had been taken before the crash. Deposits of water corrosion were found in no. 4 engine's fuel feed passages. The engine was probably shut down because water-contaminated fuel caused it to run roughly. A puzzling finding in all four engines was unusual crushing damage to the vapour vent floats in the strainer chambers of their carburettors. But despite the combined expertise of Pratt & Whitney, the Australian Research Laboratories, the Department of Civil Aviation and the US Civil Aviation Authority, all efforts to explain it proved fruitless. Apart from the farmer and the beekeeper, other country people in the area of the accident described backfiring, erratic engine running, and a period of near silence shortly before the crash. The aeroplane also seemed to be unusually low, and after its engine noise quite suddenly ceased altogether, there was a sound for about 10 seconds of ‘something was rushing through the air’. This was followed by loud engine noise ‘like a high powered motor vehicle travelling over a rough track in low gear’. Then it was as though ‘the ignition was switched off’, and a moment's total silence was followed by a ‘very bright red flash in the sky’. Seconds later there was a noise described as ‘a dull thump’, ‘a loud tearing or rumbling’, ‘a big bumping noise’, and a ‘rumbling explosion which rattled the house’. These sounds of impact would have reached the witnesses after the flash lit the sky. The survivor's belief that he felt himself ‘going forward’ and saw other passengers ‘leaning forward’ suggested the aircraft was subjected to some 'g' force immediately before the crash. Together the witness evidence indicated: Shortly before the crash, one or more engines were running irregularly. Amana’s undercarriage begins retracting as the aircraft lifts off from RAAF Laverton on a revenue flight in 1946. When the aircraft first arrived from the USA, Melbourne’s Essendon Airport was still a grass aerodrome, and nearby Laverton was used for all passengers operations until the first paved runway was completed at Essendon a few months later. In this picture, lines of surplus RAAF wartime aircraft can be seen parked in the background. There was one and possibly two periods of silence, when all engines ceased running. Before the final impact, there was a highpitched surge of power, following one of the periods of silence. The investigation sought to find why all the engines failed. Fuel problems seemed most likely. Yet there was little evidence of water corrosion in the other three engines. Nor could water in the aircraft’s tanks be explained. The tanker vehicle that refuelled the DC-4 had been checked for water two hours previously, and had also supplied other aircraft from the same fuel load. It was possible that water was in one of the no. 4 fuel tanks when Amana arrived at Perth. But the ANA foreman said that when he checked the fuel filters in all four engines, together with two fuel drains in the centre section of the wing, he found no water. Even so, the investigators were convinced it was the reason for no. 4 engine having been shut down. As for the other engines, ‘The periods of silence’ was ‘suggestive of intermittent fuel starvation’, and ‘consistent with water in the fuel’. And so the mystery remained. This was mitigated in the public mind only by the fact that it had occurred months earlier, and similar flights had continued many times daily without incident. But to those in the know within ANA, there was a possible explanation. The clue to this extraordinary chain of circumstances came to light during the Inquiry’s cross-examination of ANA’s airport staff. The one-gallon can used for the fuel filter checks after Amana was refuelled was later found on the apron, well behind where the aircraft had been parked. and this publicity photograph was widely used throughout Australia in the 61 company’s advertising and sales promotion literature. AMANA CRASH The investigators’ report went on: ‘It could have been the result of a change in fuel tank selection ... it may even have resulted from water in the no. 4 tanks, and all engines being cross-fed from that tank. If water caused the loss of power on the no. 1, 2, and 3 engines, it is possible that it eventually passed through these engines, thus accounting for the burst of power just before impact, and the fact that no significant corrosion was detected in these engines’. The report concluded: ‘The cause of the accident was that the aircraft failed to maintain height, probably due to loss of engine power ... possibly due to the presence of water in the fuel supplied to all engines.’ Amana in flight over Melbourne. Amana was the first of Australian National Airways’ 44-passenger DC-4s to enter service in the early post-war years The wreckage trail at the crash site, looking in the direction of impact. A main undercarriage assembly can be seen in the foreground. In the background is the still-smouldering main wreckage. The forest in this area has since been cleared and the site is now part of a farm paddock. Left unnoticed beneath the aircraft in the dark, it had apparently been blown away when the engines started. The theory postulated that: The second of the two fuel drains which the foreman checked under the centre section happened to be the cross-feed drain cock. Without the cross-feed valves being selected during the previous flight, little fuel ran out. But just as the foreman opened this cock, he was called to the telephone -- his wife was irate over some domestic matter. Because of the distraction, he neither retrieved the can, nor closed the cross-feed drain cock. Amana started its engines, blowing away the fuel can. FSA JUL-AUG10 62 During climb, rough running developed on No 4 engine, if not from water in the fuel, then from ignition trouble—ANA was experiencing trouble with spark plugs, and the No 4 engine was fitted with earlier, more troublesome plugs. The rough running worsened, so much so that the engine was shut down. A ‘one-engine-out’ situation before reaching Kalgoorlie usually required a return to Perth. However, this would involve a long delay, so the crew continued, cruising on three engines at the altitude Amana had already reached. To attain the best aerodynamic performance with no. 4 engine shut down, they decided to trim the aircraft laterally by running all three live engines on no. 4 main tank until its fuel was consumed. No. 4 main booster pump was switched on, both cross-feed valves opened, and the no. 1, 2 and 3 main tanks turned off. The booster pump would be switched off again as soon as fuel pressures stabilised. Shortly afterwards, because air was being drawn into the fuel system through the open cross-feed drain cock, fuel pressure for no. 1 engine fell, starving the engine. The crew attempted to unfeather no. 4 engine, but while they were doing so, fuel pressure also fell on the no. 2 and 3 engines. Suddenly deprived of all engine power, the crew could only maintain airspeed by gliding while they tried to sort out the problem. Finally, as the aircraft was losing height to a dangerous extent, the truth dawned—and they quickly selected all engines to main tanks and all booster pumps on. Power was suddenly restored to engines 1, 2, and 3 with a loud, high-pitched scream as the propellers oversped into full-fine pitch. And with pronounced positive ‘g’ force, the DC-4 began to level out. But it was already too late. Before Amana could regain level flight, it struck the tops of trees—and all was lost. During a test flight in an identical DC-4, ANA Flight Superintendent P T L Taylor, together with ANA Technical Superintendent Don Stewart, a professional aeronautical engineer, simulated all these sequences at a safe height, satisfying themselves the theory offered a plausible, likely explanation. But on legal advice they never made it public. LATTER-DAY EVIDENCE Many years later, in 2001, Grahame Higgs, a retired and highly experienced RAAF officer, long intrigued by the Amana disaster, had an opportunity to visit the site of the crash. For years he had been tantalised as to how a fourengined, highly-proven aircraft could crash so suddenly in fine visibility only a few minutes after setting course. He resolved to learn more about Amana’s final moments. Australia’s only remaining DC-4, VH-PAF, was based at Brisbane’s Archerfield airport. The DC-4 airframe abounds with inspection hatches of various designs, and time spent trying to match the hatch design and double row of screws was rewarded when a match was found under each wing. But from which side had the wreckage piece come? Happily, aviation historian John Hopton was able to provide a photograph that answered the question. The picture showed the underside of Amana’s starboard wing was unpainted, while the port wing carried Amana’s registration letters—the wreckage piece was clearly from the under-surface of the port wing and the black paint part of that registration. The second piece of wreckage, clearly from the same wing area, though less impressive in appearance, proved the more revealing. During the original investigation, two witnesses reported seeing a small flash 20 to 30 seconds before the final enormous flash lit up the night sky. It thus seemed possible that Amana, with power just restored to three of its engines and recovering from its gliding descent, struck a tree with its port wing much earlier than previously determined. Had this ruptured and ignited an outboard fuel tank, causing substantial damage to the wing? The newly-found wreckage suggested this was possibly the small flash seen initially by the famer and the beekeeper. Additionally, if the damage resulted in loss of lift as well as damage to the port aileron linkage, the DC-4’s turn to the left away from its planned track, might not have been intentional. And could the shock of this explosion have triggered a momentary pulse of high pressure into the fuel lines, the effect of which caused the vapour floats to crush as over-pressurised fuel was forced through the vapour vent? Fascinating as these latter-day day findings are, thee truth of the Amana story remains a mystery. 63 AMANA CRASH Though a forested area when Amana crashed, the site was now a farm paddock. But despite years of cultivation, evidence in the form of scattered pieces of alloy skin still lay over the ground. The farmer who owned the property told Higgs he had found ‘new’ wreckage in a location seldom visited, about 1.5km from the crash site itself. Comprising five pieces of crumpled wing skin structure, it had obviously been torn from the aircraft in flight well before the final impact. Two pieces were particularly intriguing. One was of crumpled heavy gauge alloy containing a complete inspection hatch of distinctive shape and design. The hatch and the area around it bore traces of black paint. The piece also had a double row of screws along one edge. Of much lighter gauge than the wing skin, it had a pronounced scorch mark across one face. The scorching was uniform throughout the creases and wrinkles, indicating that whatever caused it, occurred before the piece was crumpled. The other face showed no sign of scorching. Near one of its edges was a screw head, the shank of which protruded through the metal on to the scorched face, indicating the scorching process took place inside the structure while still intact. The wing area from which the pieces of wing wreckage had come, housed the main fuel tank for the no. 1 engine. NEW MORE STRINGENT ICAO HEIGHT MONITORING REQUIREMENTS ARE EFFECTIVE FROM NOVEMBER 2010. It goes without saying that accurate altitude keeping is vital in commercial aviation, particularly in the thin cold air where altitudes become flight levels. FL400 FSA SEPT-OCT10 64 FL380 The reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) has been one of the success stories of international air transport since its introduction in the 1990s. It has been progressively introduced globally; nearly all the world’s airspace will be operating with RVSM by the end of 2011. With RVSM the minimum altitude gap between aircraft flying between flight levels 290 and 410 is 1000 feet. Flight level 290 is approximately 29,000 feet, based on a standardised altimeter QNH setting of 1013.25 mbar. After RVSM was introduced in Europe delays to scheduled flights fell by 40 per cent. The system frees up airspace by increasing the number of usable flight levels between FL290 and FL410 from seven to 13. It has also been found to reduce fuel consumption – and therefore greenhouse gas emission – by more than one per cent. That may not sound like much but it’s a big deal over years of operating aircraft whose fuel capacities are measured in tonnes rather than litres. But there is a cost involved. The technical requirements for operating in RVSM airspace are stringent. To conduct regular operations there an aircraft must have: FL360 1) Two independent altitude measurement systems; 2) An altitude alerting system; 3) An automatic altitude control system; and 4) A secondary surveillance radar transponder with altitude reporting system that can be connected to the altitude measurement system in use for altitude keeping. FL340 FL320 FL300 Typically, RVSM airspace is managed on an exclusive basis, with aircraft only being able to flight plan and operate in the airspace if they hold state-issued RVSM airworthiness and operational approval. Australian airspace is managed on a nonexclusive basis where the 1000ft minimum will only be applied between aircraft holding the required RVSM approvals. However, clearance at RVSM levels for nonRVSM approved aircraft is subject to disposition of traffic and RVSM aircraft priority. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has introduced a requirement that aircraft operating in RVSM airspace be monitored to ensure the continued accuracy of altimeter systems. While no accidents have been attributed to the introduction of RVSM (the system was developed to a safety standard of 2.5 accidents per billion flying hours) extensive monitoring in North America and Europe has revealed a loss of accuracy of hundreds of feet in the altimetry systems of some aircraft. In a recent example, one aircraft had a measured error of minus 800ft. Because of the nature of types of altimetry errors, pilots of these aircraft would be unaware that they were flying higher or lower than other aircraft reporting the same flight level. Additionally ATC is unable to observe the error. While it’s tempting to quip that if this aircraft were to encounter another with a comparable altimetry system error the respective crews would be close enough to wave to each other, the reality of a 900kt-plus closing speed makes this a very serious situation, with only traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) as the last line of defence. Unfortunately, the commonly-used TCAS II bases its altitude calculations on reported flight level and so would not recognise even a very large altimetry system error. To ensure accuracy of altimeters in RVSM aircraft, ICAO’s more stringent global longterm height monitoring requirements become effective from November 2010. At a minimum they require two of each aircraft type that an operator flies to have their height-keeping performance monitored, at least once every two years or every 1000 flight hours per aircraft, whichever period is longer. However, within the Asia/Pacific Region, as in other regions, some aircraft types will require up to 60 per cent of an operator’s fleet to be monitored. ICAO requirements will require monitoring of 143 aircraft on the Australian register. A third way conducted by the Australian Airspace Monitoring Agency (AAMA), an ICAO designated agency operated by Airservices Australia, monitors using automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B). The system broadcasts an aircraft's call sign, GPS-derived position and altitude, velocity and other data, more than once a second. Australia leads the world as the first country to have full ADS-B coverage for FL300 and above. The national network of ADS-B ground stations became fully operational on 23 December 2009. FL390 65 FL370 FL350 As a GNSS satellite-based system, ADS-B calculates altitude geometrically, like a GMU. The ADS-B transmissions contain aircraft flight level measured from barometric pressure. By converting the flight level to a geometric height using meteorological data, the AAMA can compare the two heights and calculate an altimetry system error. The AAMA is collaborating with the US Federal Aviation Administration to make this data processing as accurate and efficient as possible. FL330 The AAMA will be able to retrieve data for any flight of an ADS-B-approved aircraft in RVSM airspace since 23 December 2009, and derive an altimetry system error for the airframe. Aircraft not equipped with ADS-B will need to be monitored with a portable GMU. As ADS-B equipped aircraft replace older types in RVSM operations ahead of the 2013 mandate for ADS-B carriage in RVSM airspace, the ability of the AAMA to efficiently monitor altimetry systems increases. With increased data processing power the future will be a safer one of seamless and frequent checking of altimetry systems for commercial aircraft that ply their trade high in the thin cold air. FL310 For more information www.airservicesaustralia.com/.../RVSM_minimum_monitoring_requirements.pdf FL290 RVSM AIRSERVICES Monitoring can be done in three ways: aircraft can fly over a height monitoring unit (HMU, also known as an aircraft geometric measurement height measurement or AGHME) that accurately determines its height; or it can be temporarily fitted with a portable GPS monitoring unit (GMU). The main advantage of a GMU is the ability to monitor an individual aircraft during normal operations without the need to fly over a height monitoring unit. There are no height monitoring units in Australia anyway. For the small proportion of the monitored fleet that flies internationally, this is not a huge problem – they can fly over HMUs in Europe or the US and be checked by them. FL410 AV QUIZ 1. In ERSA, a latitude and longitude position is expressed in the form 6. (a) S27 30.0 E153 20.0 but in NAIPS it must be entered as 2730S15327E. (a) you can be seen on ATS primary radar above A025 in most of the country. (b) 2730S15327E but in NAIPS it must be entered as S27 30.0 E153 20.0 (b) you can be seen on a cockpit display in TCAS equipped aircraft. (c) S27 30.0 E153 20.0 and in NAIPS is entered in the same format. (c) in secondary radar areas you will be given a traffic advisory service. (d) S27 30.0 E153 20.0 and in NAIPS is entered in the same format but without the spaces. 66 2. When fl ying from a high to a low-pressure area, the altimeter will (d) in terminal radar areas you will be given a traffic advisory service. 7. FSA JUL-AUG10 (a) under-read and apparent terrain clearance will therefore be increased. (b) under-read and apparent terrain clearance will therefore be reduced. (b) ready to join the circuit, base, final and overfl ying in the vicinity. (d) over-read and apparent terrain clearance will therefore be reduced. (b) affect the result in the cases of both the VOR and ADF. (c) not affect the result in the case of an ADF but will affect that from a VOR. (d) not affect the result in the case of a VOR but will affect that from the ADF. 4. If you were off track by 6nm having travelled 45nm, your track error, using the 1:60 rule, would be approximately (a) 3 degrees (b) 4.5 degrees (c) 6 degrees (d) 8 degrees 5. (c) base, final and overfl ying in the vicinity. (d) base, final, clear of all runways and overfl ying in the vicinity. When tracking enroute to or from a navigation aid, the accuracy of the aircraft compass will (a) not affect the result in the cases of either the VOR or ADF. With reference to cloud cover, scattered means (a) 1 to 2 OKTAS. (b) 2 to 4 OKTAS. (c) 3 to 4 OKTAS and broken is 5 to 7. (d) 5 to 7 OKTAS and broken is 3 to 4. The broadcasts in the vicinity of a non-towered aerodrome that are now listed as ‘expected’ in CAAP 166-1 or as ‘recommended’ in AIP ENR 1.1 are: making a straight-in approach, joining on base, intending to taxi, intending to takeoff, inbound (a) ready to join the circuit, overfl ying in the vicinity. (c) over-read and apparent terrain clearance will therefore be increased. 3. For a VFR flight in G airspace, a safety-based reason for setting the transponder to mode C (altitude ALT) and squawking code 1200 is that 8. When taxiing with the aircraft nose wheel exactly on the yellow line you are concerned about the impact of the wheel on the taxiway lights. In such a case the appropriate action would be to (a) keep the nose wheel on the centre line but reduce the taxi speed as much as possible. (b) swerve slightly in order to miss each light. (c) move the aircraft to the right so that slightly because the yellow line is actually a pilot position line and not a nosewheel line. (d) move the aircraft to the left by the minimum amount to clear the line. 9. (d) is directionally unstable on the ground and if, on landing, the main wheels touch before the tailwheel the lift will decrease thus reducing the amplitude of a bounce. 10. The main safety concern regarding frost which has accumulated on wings overnight is that Compared to a nose-wheel aircraft a tail-wheel aircraft (a) the stall speed may be increased by as much as 20 per cent. (a) is directionally unstable on the ground because the wheels are positioned behind the centre of gravity. (b) no significant lift will be produced regardless of the angle of attack. (b) is directionally unstable on the ground and in the air because the wheels are positioned ahead of the centre of gravity. (c) the extra weight of the ice must be considered. (d) the travel of fl ying controls, such as flaps and ailerons, may be restricted. (c) is directionally unstable on the ground and if, on landing, the main wheels touch before the tailwheel the lift will increase thus increasing the amplitude of a bounce. 1. An electrodynamic type voltmeter is often used as a standard because it 6. (a) returns crankcase fumes to the exhaust manifold for mixing. (a) is not subject to changes due to permanent magnet ageing. (b) returns crankcase fumes to the induction manifold for combustion. (b) is not affected by temperature variations. (c) can employ finer pivots thus hysteresis error is reduced. 2. (d) is not influenced by outside magnetic fields. (c) returns fuel vapour to the tank via an orifice through which a small amount of fuel also continuously fl ows. Instruments which may all have an influence on a magnetic compass due to the incorporation of permanent magnets are (d) returns fuel vapour but not fuel, to the tank. (a) cylinder head temperature gauge, exhaust gas temperature gauge, accelerometer. 7. (d) exhaust gas temperature gauge, cylinder head temperature gauge, moving-iron type ammeter. Energy is transferred to a propeller for de-icing by means of (c) on both magnetos in order to achieve more reliable ignition. (a) a lapped carbon seal. (d) on both magnetos to provide a retarded spark for starting. (b) a labyrinth seal. 8. (c) slip rings and brushes. (d) a commutator and brushes. 4. (a) on the low pressure side of an o-ring to reduce the extruding effect on the o-ring. A propeller is operated in beta mode (b) on the high pressure side of the o-ring to reduce the extruding effect on the o-ring. (a) only in fl ight. (b) only on the ground. (c) on the low pressure side of the o-ring to maintain the radial pressure of the o-ring. (c) primarily in fl ight and in this mode the propeller governor usually does not control the blade angle. (d) on the high pressure side of the o-ring to spread the pressure load over a larger area of the o-ring. (d) primarily on the ground and in this mode the propeller governor usually does not control the blade angle. 9. 5. A ‘shower of sparks’ portion of an ignition system will produce a spark at the cylinders only when (a) both sets of points are open. (b) both sets of points are closed. (c) when the retarded points are open. (d) when the advanced points are open. In a high-pressure hydraulic system a back-up ring is installed Centrifugal type boost pumps are used in the fuel systems of aircraft operating at high altitude (a) in order to provide fuel at a positive pressure to the engine-driven pumps. (b) in order to provide a greater pressure drop across the engine-driven pumps. QUIZ (b) only on the impulse magneto in order to minimise the risk of kick-back initiated by the non-impulse magneto which has the more advanced timing. (c) ammeter, voltmeter, instantaneous VSI. 67 A piston engine is traditionally hand started (a) only on the impulse magneto in order to minimise the risk of kick back initiated by the non-impulse magneto which has a more retarded timing. (b) cylinder head temperature gauge, exhaust gas temperature gauge, ammeter, voltmeter, tachometer. 3. In a piston engine installation a fuel vapour return system (c) because positive displacement pumps in such applications are prone to cavitation. (d) because they are immune to the effects of fuel icing. 10. In a properly designed riveted joint the rivets only support (a) tensile loads. (b) compression loads. (c) shear loads. (d) compression and shear loads. IFR AND CLASS D AIRSPACE 68 3. Note: Questions 1 to 5 relate to operations during tower hours from Moorabbin (YMMB). Questions 6 to 10 relate to a departure and arrival at Parafield (YPPF) during tower hours. FSA JUL-AUG10 1. (a) ‘MB Tower, Romeo uniform hotel, ready Runway 35 left'. Yes, the take-off clearance is the (airways) clearance for Class D. With regard to the taxi call prior to departure from Moorabbin (YMMB), destination Launceston (LMLT), and electing to climb below CTA (Class C) steps, which of the following is correct? (b) ‘MB Tower, romeo uniform hotel, ready Runway Left’. Yes, the take-off clearance is the (airways) clearance for Class D. (a) A taxi clearance is not required either IFR or VFR. (c) ‘MB Tower, romeo uniform hotel, ready’. Yes, the take-off clearance is the (airways) clearance for Class D. (b) A taxi clearance is only required for IFR and then only if requiring an airways clearance into a CTA (Class C). (c) A taxi clearance is required for both IFR and VFR The content of the call on S.M.C 119.9 would be (for example): ‘MB Ground, Chieftain Romeo uniform hotel, received (ATIS code) run-up bays, to ‘Launy‘, request taxi.’ (d) ‘MB Tower, romeo uniform hotel, ready Runway Left’. No, a separate clearance to operate in the Class D airspace is required. 4. (d) A taxi clearance is required for both IFR and VFR The content of the call on S.M.C 119.9 would be (for example): ‘MB Ground, Chieftain romeo uniform hotel, POB 6, received (ATIS code) run-up bays, IFR to ‘Launy‘, request Taxi 35 Left.’ 2. (b) The advice of change to IFR is only required if a clearance into the Class C airspace steps is required. (c) You must advise the reversion to IFR irrespective of whether the climb is into Class C or remaining below the steps. (a) No, once advised ‘IFR’ in the taxi call, you must remain that category to keep the fl ight plan ‘active’. (c) No, once advised ‘IFR’. in the taxi call you must remain that category to retain your allocated SSR Code and IFR traffic information once in communication with Melbourne Radar 135.7. (d) Both (a) and (c) are correct. The aircraft in the previous question departs the Class D at YMMB and now elects to revert to IFR for enroute climb below the CTA steps. Which of the following is correct? (a) Since the aircraft is remaining outside Class C airspace, it is not necessary to advise of the change to IFR. If the weather conditions were VMC, can the aircraft in Question 1 elect to depart VFR and if so for what reason? (b) Yes, in order to expedite the departure you may request a visual (VFR) departure. This means you are responsible for separation from other aircraft within Class D: i.e. look out. What would be transmitted in the ‘ready’ call by the aircraft in the previous questions (1 and 2) and does the take off clearance constitute the (airways) clearance to operate within Class D airspace. (d) You must advise the reversion to IFR only if you are going to enter IMC. 5. If IMC prevails within the Class D YMMB control zone, such that an IFR departure is required, what would be the content of a departure report when given? (a) The content to contain: departure time/level/ETA next position report. (b) The content to contain: departure time/direction of turn/ track/ assigned level/ ETA first enroute reporting point. (c) The content to contain: departure time/ track/ assigned level/ ETA first enroute reporting point. (d) The content to contain: direction of turn/initial heading/ attitude passing (to nearest 100ft)/last assigned level. Refer Adelaide TAC and VTC (3.6.10). You have planned from Parafield (YPPF) on W200 to overhead Adelaide, then Kingscote (YKSC) via W411 at A060. 6. On what frequency shall you request clearance for entry into the Adelaide Class C airspace? (a) Parafield Ground on 119.9. (b) Parafield Tower on 118.7 or 124.7 as advised by ATIS. (c) Adelaide Approach on 118.2. (d) Adelaide Radar on 130.45. You are tracking along A585 from Ceduna (YCEU) inbound to YPPF. Shortly after passing ‘Hawky’ and descending through 4000 you establish VMC by day. 7. If you intend to remain outside controlled airspace until the entry point, which of the following is correct? (a) You must remain on the IFR fl ight plan to YPPF, irrespective of IMC or VMC. (b) You must remain on IFR fl ight plan but can expect a visual approach from overhead AD VOR since this is the planned waypoint on A585. (c) You may terminate your IFR fl ight plan to expedite an arrival via Hope Valley Reservoir (HPV). You call inbound at OHB and are instructed to join base for 03 left. 9. If, on final for 03 left, a go-around was necessary, which of the following is the correct action to take once the climb is stabilised? (a) Climb on runway heading to 1500ft and follow ATC instructions for the rejoin from upwind. (b) Climb to 1500ft, position to the active side and parallel to 03 left, maintaining separation, follow ATC instructions for the re-join from upwind. (c) Climb to 1000ft position to the active side and parallel to 03 left, maintaining separation, follow ATC instructions for the re-join from upwind. (d) Climb to 500ft AGL on runway heading then turn left into the circuit, continuing climb to 1000ft, and follow ATC instructions on re-sequence number. You complete your circuit and land 03 Left, vacating the runway at 'bravo 4'. You contact SMC and request taxi. You are ‘cleared taxi apron via bravo’. 10. You are required to read back taxi instructions. True or false? (a) True (b) False 69 (d) You may terminate your IFR fl ight plan to expedite arrival and track for arrival into YPPF via Outer Harbor (OHB). 8. What is the entry altitude to the YPPF Class D airspace (unless ATC instructs otherwise)? (a) The altitude for clearance will always be specified by ATC in each situation. QUIZ (b) 2000ft (c) 1500ft (d) 1000ft Invest wisely in your CIR training with Peter BINI ADVANCED FLIGHT TRAINING When it comes time for you to invest in your Command Instrument Rating, you need to know your investment is spent wisely. Peter Bini Advanced Flight Training has been teaching and successfully producing quality pilots for over 30 years. :LWKRYHUKRXUVRIÀ\LQJH[SHULHQFH&),6WHYH3HDUFH and his team of instructors not only teach what is required, but DOVRHQVXUH\RXEHQH¿WIURPWKHLUSUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJH Invest in pearls of wisdom, not just the basics. Call us for a tour of our facilities, aircraft, and meet our friendly staff. 3KRQH(PDLOLQIR#ELQLÀLJKWWUDLQLQJFRPDX CALENDAR 2010 S S T 6 7 13 14 20 21 27 28 M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 15 16 17 18 22 23 24 25 29 30 W T 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 17 18 19 20 21 24 25 26 27 28 31 F S 1 2 8 9 15 16 22 23 29 30 FSA SEPT-OCT10 70 5 12 19 26 M september  Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC) 14 RAPAC 14  AvSafety Seminar 14  AvSafety Seminar 14-15  Cabin Safety Workshop 15  AvSafety Seminar 15-16  Atlantic Conference on Eyjafjallajökull and Aviation 15-17  Regional Aviation Association Australia annual conference 21  AvSafety Seminar 23  RAPAC 27  AvSafety Seminar 28  AvSafety Seminar 29  AvSafety Seminar 30  RAPAC 9 M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 www.casa.gov.au Cairns Ayr, Qld Karratha Oklahoma City, US Townsville Keflavik,Iceland www.casa.gov.au Burdekin Aero Club Karratha Flying Club www.faa.gov Townsville Aviation Centre Keilir Aviation Academy Hyatt Regency Resert Coolum, QLD Katherine, NT Hobart Schofields Camden Wollongong Canberra RAAA Knotts Crossing resort www.casa.gov.au Schofields Flying Club Camden Valley Inn Aviator Lounge www.casa.gov.au october 7 7 12 12 12 13 13 23 24-28          AvSafety Seminar RAPAC AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar Australian Airports Association national conference 25-28  Sixth Triennial Int’l Aircraft Fire & Cabin Safety Research Conference 28 28 29 S Darwin  AvSafety Seminar  RAPAC  RAPAC Renmark Sydney Esperance Forbes Horsham Temora Swan Hill Mittagong Adelaide Convention Centre Atlantic City, New Jersey Renmark Aero Club www.casa.gov.au Esperance Aero Club Forbes Flying Club Wimmera Aero Club Temora Aero Club Swan Hill Aero Club Berrima District Aero Club http://convention.airports.asn.au/ Shepparton Adelaide Perth Register online at www.fire.tc.faa. gov/ or email april.ctr.horner@faa. gov.au for more information. Goulburn Valley Aero Club www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au Parkes Milan Marriot Hotel, Italy Parkes Aero Club http://flightsafety.org Arkaroola Mudgee Singapore TBA Mudgee Aero Club www.canso.org Brisbane Singapore Aviation Academy, Changi Village, Singapore LaTrobe Valley Bairnsdale West Sale Richmond Albany Goolwa Gloucester Scone www.casa.gov.au http://flightsafety.org november  AvSafety Seminar  Flight Safety Foundation International Air Safety Seminar 2010 3  AvSafety Seminar 3  AvSafety Seminar 7-12  Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation global safety seminar 9  RAPAC 10-11  Business Aviation Safety Seminar-Asia 2 2-5 11 12 13 13 17 18 23 24         AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar KEY: CASA events LaTrobe Valley Aero Club TBA TBA Richmond Flying club The Stirling Club Goolwa Hotel Gloucester Aero Club Scone Aero Club Other organisations' events Have you got the latest copy of the AOPA magazine? Out now! Look out for the September/October issue of Australian Pilot For pilots and aircraft owners. In this months issue: >> Piper LSA arrives >> IFR flying >> A new King Air Support AOPA - working for YOU On sale early September Ph: 02 9791 9099 Email: [email protected] au Web: www.aopa.com.au 71 QUIZ ANSWERS QUIZ ANSWERS Flying Ops IFR Operations Maintenance 1. (a) NAIPS and ERSA use different formats. 2. (d) “High to low: beware below” 3. (d) the VOR does not rely on the aircraft heading. 4. (d) 5. (c) GEN 3.5 para. 3.6 6. (b) 7. (a) 8. (c) 9. (c) 10. (b) frost on the wings has resulted in takeoff accidents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (d) (b) (b) (c) (c) (a) (d) 8 (c) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 9 (c) 10 (a) AIP GEN 3.4-47 Para 5.14.4 Item 1 AIP ENR 1.1-14 Paras 7.1, 7.2 AIP ENR 1.1-12 Para 5.1.2 AIP ENR 1.1-14 Para 7.2 AIP ENR 1.1-15 Para 8.2.1 ERSA FAC A-8 Departures Item 8.1 AIP ENR 1.1-23 Para 12.4.1 and ERSA FAC A-8 Flight Procedures Items 6b, 7 ERSA FAC A-9 Arrivals Item 9.1 Note: this height will vary for different Class D aerodromes. Check ERSA in each case. AIP ENR 1.1-31 Para 15.4 AIP GEN 3.4-13 Para 4.4.1C (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (c) (b) (a) (a) (c) FSA SEPT-OCT10 72 flightsafety safety INSIDE NEXT ISSUE … essent essential t ial aviation reading Looking back on 15 years of Flight Safety Australia For better or worse … aviation safety trends since the mid 1990s How to make a pilot … the training debate continues And … more close calls PLUS bonus special bo oklet OnTrack TRY BEFORE YOU FLY! OnTrack is the industry’s newest interactive flight planning tool available on the CASA website. Using video, audio, pop-up alerts and text, OnTrack helps brief pilots on how to operate in and around controlled airspace and avoid dreaded airspace infringements. OnTrack features interactive maps with added visual terminal chart (VTC) information, plus video guides on how to fly inbound and outbound tracks into newly-designated Class D aerodromes. You will be able to navigate around airspace boundaries, VFR routes, VFR/ Class D reporting points and military control zones – and do so safely before you take off to fly for real. REMEMBER to plan your route thoroughly, and carry current charts and documents. Always check ERSA, NOTAMs and the weather BEFORE you fly. For more information please visit our website www.casa.gov.au/ontrack There has never been a better time to be with good people. Good people to be with. QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited ABN: 78 003 191 035, AFS Licence No 239545 Contact details for you and your broker: Melbourne Ph: (03) 8602 9900 Sydney Ph: (02) 9375 4445 Brisbane Ph: (07) 3031 8588 Adelaide Ph: (08) 8202 2200