What Can Iran Gain By Having A Nuclear Weapons Program That

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BRIEF What can Iran gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilize security in the Middle East? By Major Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Institute for Strategy and Danish Institute for International Studies RDDC PUBLISHING HOUSE BRIEF What can Iran gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilize security in the Middle East? By Major Thomas Galasz Nielsen, Institute for Strategy and Danish Institute for International Studies The Royal Danish Defence College is the Danish armed forces’ powerhouse for education, training and research-generated consultancy. Our research is conducted within a broad range of military-related topics. Our research priorities, such as topics and resource allocation are determined by the Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College, who is aided by a research council. Research at the Royal Danish Defence College should enlighten and challenge the reader, whether they are in the armed forces or in the surrounding environment. This is only achievable if the employees have the freedom to administer their own research projects and draw their own conclusions. This is a principle, which is honoured at the Royal Danish Defence College. We hope you enjoy reading the Royal Danish Defence College’s publications! © Royal Danish Defence College All rights reserved. Mechanical, photographic or other reproduction or photocopying from this book or parts thereof is only allowed according to agreements between The Danish Defence and CopyDan. Any other use without written consent from the Royal Danish Defence College is illegal according to Danish law on intellectual property right. Excepted are short extracts for reviews in newspapers or the like. Copenhagen June 2015 Royal Danish Defence College Ryvangs Allé 1 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark Phone: +45 3915 1515 Editor: Dean Ole Kværnø Layout by B-O. Kure ISBN: 978-87-7147-106-9 Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House Royal Danish Defence College Table of Contents Resume (Danish)................................................................................... 4 Executive summary............................................................................... 5 Introduction........................................................................................... 6 Study design.......................................................................................... 7 Why Iran wants nuclear weapons........................................................ 8 The security model................................................................................ 9 The norms model................................................................................11 The domestic politics model .............................................................12 Conclusion...........................................................................................15 Bibliography......................................................................................... 17 3 Resume (Danish) Dette brief analyserer Irans interesse i at have et nukleart program, idet programmet truer med destabilisere den i forvejen skrøbelige sikkerhedssituation i Mellemøsten. Iran søger at have et atomprogram og måske endda et atomvåbenprogram selvom det sidste nægtes af den iranske regering. Skulle Iran få adgang til atomvåben, så vil det betyde en stor ændring af sikkerhedssituationen i regionen, og flere iranske naboer frygter en sådan udvikling. Men hvorfor forfølger Iran et nukleart spor, der truer med at forværre sikkerhedssituationen? Det har baggrund i Irans opfattelse af eksterne militære trusler, Irans interesse i at blive en lokal stormagt og indenrigspolitiske magtkampe, der til dels skyldes de Forenede Nationers sanktioner og mangel på udvikling. Iran balancerer intelligent på kanten af yderligere international isolation for at blive en lokal stormagt ved at udnytte den uudtalte trussel om at udvikle atomvåben støttet af Irans hjælp til forskellige grupperinger i og omkring Syrien og i Irak samt Irans vigtige strategiske placering ved Hormuzstrædet. Det har allerede tiltrukket USA’s interesse og dermed begyndende anerkendelse som en indflydelsesrig stat. Skulle Iran få succes med balancekunsten, er det ikke nødvendigt for Iran at udvikle et atomvåben. Truslen er nok til på lang sigt at kunne få hævet de Forenede Nationers sanktioner, blive internationalt anerkendt som en stormagt, forøge sikkerheden for landet og endda få afsluttet de interne magtkampe gennem økonomiske reformer, hvis sanktionerne hæves. Meget er på spil for Iran, men hvis Iran har succes, så vil det i det lange løb kunne betyde en ændret iransk sikkerhedspolitik med en mindre konfronterende linje til gavn for sikkerheden i Mellemøsten - hvis landet anerkendes som en regional stormagt og får mulighed for en udvikling gennem afskaffelse af sanktionerne. 4 Royal Danish Defence College Executive summary In this paper, Iran’s nuclear aspiration to destabilise power in the Middle East is analysed. Iran is [purportedly] attempting to develop a nuclear energy program, and perhaps even a nuclear weapons program, despite assurances of the opposite. An Iranian nuclear weapon would be a game changer in the region and a lot of neighbouring countries fear such a development for security reasons. But why is Iran following a nuclear path that may further destabilise the fragile security situation in the Middle East? It is to do with Iran’s own perception of security risks, its desire for greatness in the region, and domestic challenges, caused in part by United Nations’ sanctions, lack of development and internal political power struggles. Iran balances cleverly on the edge of either further international isolation or becoming a significant local power. It uses the threat of developing nuclear weapons, in combination with its important strategic location by the Strait of Hormuz, and supports various political groupings in and around Syria and Iraq to attract the attention of the United States of American in an attempt to become recognised as the most important player in the Middle East. Should Iran succeed in its brinkmanship and the outcome could be the lifting of the UN sanctions, international recognition, improved security, and even a possible end to internal political power struggles due to likely economic reforms post-sanctions. Much is at stake for Iran, but, if it succeeds, it could shift the political path in Iran to a less confrontational one, which, in the long run, could enhance security in the region. This would, however, be at the cost of recognising Iran as a true power in the Middle East and endingthe sanctions regime in order to support Iranian development. 5 Introduction Since 1989, Iran has become a major destabilising factor in the Middle East because the Iranian Government wants - or at least gives the impression of wanting - a nuclear weapons program.1 A nuclear weapons program may seem attractive to states with ambitions for power; it can substitute the lack of sufficient conventional forces at a fraction of the cost, strengthen national pride and self-esteem, and, perhaps most importantly, it can mean that other states have to listen in security discussions, something that is not easily achieved by other means.2 The Iranian Government wants nuclear weapons in its arsenal for exactly these reasons. The Iranian conventional forces are relatively weak and it is difficult for them to be enhanced because of the sanctions that Iran faces from the outside world. By developing nuclear weapons, Iran can circumvent the sanctions and substitute the lack of sufficient conventional forces if threatened. At the same time, a nuclear weapons program would give the Iranian population self-esteem as a country with a high level of technology that can achieve anything at a time where they otherwise feel isolated from the outside world, particularly given the heavy sanctions limiting the opportunities for buying desired goods. Finally, it will give the Iranian Government a major voice in all security issues regarding the Middle East, especially regarding Israel and the USA’s influence. If used carefully, this voice could advocate for the lifting of sanctions and thereby allow Iran to take its place as the local power in the Middle East and thus become a country whose views that especially the USA must take into account – in other words: Recognition. However, the Iranian desire for a nuclear weapons program has, in a negative way, severely influenced the security environment in the Middle East. While the Iranian Government emphasises its right to develop its military capacity to counteract any possible attack on Iranian forces or its interests in the Middle East, the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon terrifies most other countries in the region as it would have such far-reaching consequences from a security perspective. This is called ‘the security dilemma’, where one country’s attempt to enhance its security can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing conversely increased insecurity for all.3 Should Iran develop a nuclear weapon, nobody really knows what the response would be from Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA. This uncertainty fuels the destabilisation of an already fragile security situation in the Middle East. Much depends on the Iranian Government. If Iran persists in pursuing a nuclear weapons program agenda and at some time in the future actually develops a nuclear weapon, this will alter the security situation in the Middle East and potentially fuel an escalation of arms reminiscent of the Cold War between the major states in the region. This will, in the long run, be counterproductive to the Iranian Government’s desire to be recognised as the dominant regional power and will perhaps lead to yet more sanctions and further international isolation. (1)  (2)  (3)  Young (2013), pp. 592-594. Sagan (1996), p. 55. Jervis (2001), p. 36. 6 Royal Danish Defence College This paper concludes that Iran has cleverly played the nuclear card by arguing that it follows a peaceful path toward civil use of nuclear energy but at the same time casting doubt on a secret nuclear weapons program. Already Iran has become a state whose position must be taken into account because of its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, supported by its strategic location on the Strait of Hormuz. In this way Iran has succeeded in getting especially the USA’s attention while managing to avoid the security dilemma. Should Iran develop a nuclear weapon, the country risks further isolation and the start a regional Cold War in which other states invest in military capacities and worse: it may throw them into the arms of the USA for security reasons. That would really be counterproductive for the sought-after Iranian influence. If, on the other hand, Iran only threatens to develop nuclear weapons, other countries will use diplomacy in order to dissuade the Iranian Government from going further down the nuclear path. In that case, the threat of a nuclear program could in fact be used by other powers in the region to influence and moderate Iran’s security politics, as a stepping stone toward the Iranians hoped-for recognition and perhaps even lead to the lifting of sanctions. In other words, Iran has already achieved a great deal from the current political situation in the Middle East, by combining the threat of a nuclear weapons program with its geopolitical influence. The actual development of a nuclear weapon would jeopardise all of that. Study design This paper analyses what Iran can gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilise the Middle East. Iran has nuclear aspirations, not because of its support for Hezbollah and other militant organisations in the Middle East, but because it is the biggest single source for the further destabilisation of what is already a fragile security situation. It has the power to become a game changer for the security environment in the Middle East, and could further fuel a local version of the Cold War with a massive military build-up by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA in defence of their own interests. It is my intention to explain why Iran is seen as a destabilising factor in the Middle East and why the Iranian Government has chosen the nuclear path. This is done by analysing why Iran has nuclear aspirations using Scott Sagan’s three models; ‘the security model’ where states attempt to maximize their level of security against threats - especially nuclear threats, ‘the norms model’ or the prestige model where nuclear technology is used as a symbol of the state’s identity and power, and ‘the domestic politics model’ where politicians use nuclear weapons as a means to secure domestic interests.4 Sagan’s three models are chosen because it is difficult to gain access to the Iranian Government’s internal decision-making processes. The secret nature of the country’s nuclear program also makes it difficult to know precisely why Iran wants nuclear weapons, but Sagan’s three models have the ability to catch the known main incentives. The conclusion revisits what Iran can gain by having a nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilise security in the Middle East. (4)  Sagan (1996), p. 55. 7 Why Iran wants nuclear weapons Nuclear aspirations in the Middle East have existed since the 60’s, with currently Israel being the only state with nuclear weapons - although this has never been admitted officially. The classical explanation for a state seeking to develop nuclear weapons is that they do so when they are under, or feel they are under, a significant military threat that they cannot deter by any other means.5 Iraq tried to develop nuclear knowledge because of the military standoff with Iran and the perceived threat from Israel supported by USA. For a long time, Iraq played ‘cat and mouse’ with the UN over sites which were suspected of housing nuclear facilities. But Iraq’s dreams were detrimentally affected by first the Iranians in 1980 and later the Israelis in 1981 as they both carried out aerial attacks on Iraq’s nuclear facilities at Osirak, forcing the nuclear facilities under ground.6 Iraq never actually managed to make nuclear weapons and the two Gulf Wars finally ended Iraq’s aspirations in that direction. Syria and Libya also had, and still have, nuclear aspirations, but Libya’s earlier leader Mu’ammar Gadhafi gave up his nuclear program because of heavy outside pressure, international isolation and sanctions supported by most other states in the UN, including Russia and China. In 2004, the USA and the United Kingdom dismantled Libya’s nuclear weapons infrastructure under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).7 Israel bombed Syria’s nuclear facilities near Deir al-Zor in 2007 in an aerial attack to prevent Syria from having future nuclear weapons, although the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s nuclear aspirations are apparently on-going, with support from North Korea. The facilities are now hidden in several places near the border with Lebanon, where the IAEA have no means of verifying their status or purpose.8 1988, the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq ended in a stalemate. Neither of the two countries gained any geopolitical advantage, as the borders between the two states were the same as before. The war was also about regional dominance and who was the most influential state in the Middle East. After the war, Iran was left without any powerful friends and that motivated it to look at its own military forces and modernise in order to become so powerful that external threats could be deterred. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 also meant that resistance against nuclear weapons had disappeared.9 Iran therefore chose to pursue a nuclear option and, combined with its support for terrorism and its tense relationships with other states in the region, the Iranian nuclear program had - and still has - the potential to alter the balance of power in the region. It is not only potentially the most important destabilising factor in the Middle East, but could enhance Iranian security and allow Iran to be recognised as a dominant local power, with important influence in the region. (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  Ibid, p. 54. United States of America’s Directorate of Intelligence (1983), p. 13. International Atomic Energy Agency (2004), pp. 1-3. International Atomic Energy Agency (2014), p. 3. IISS (2005), p. 12. 8 Royal Danish Defence College Iran’s nuclear energy aspirations were built with help from the USA, help that ended because of the Iranian Revolution. Thereafter, Iran relied on assistance from Russia and China and, in 2011; the first Iranian civilian reactor was officially opened. Even though Ayatollah Khomeini had banned nuclear weapons as ‘sinful’, Iran, according to the US National Intelligence Council, has had a nuclear weapons design program in progress since – even though it is suspected of have being on hold since 2003.10 In 2014, the IAEA stated that Iran now fully cooperates with the agency for peaceful development of its nuclear power plants, but also stated that it ‘is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran’.11 Iran - like Iraq before it in 2003 - sees an opportunity for political gain by playing on the uncertainty about their real nuclear intentions.12 To understand why Iran follows this ambiguous path, we have to look at the likely gains to Iran, which have a lot to do with security. Mearsheimer argues that, in an anarchic world, a state will seek to gain an advantage in order to increase its own security.13 This argument is derived from a particular way of looking at international politics, namely realism, where the international system is seen as an arena of chaos and anarchy and every state must protect its own interests to survive. Unfortunately, the struggle for security leads to a model where one state’s maximised security decreases the security of other states – the so-called security dilemma.14 If we apply this logic to Iran, we can establish some possible reasons why Iran acts in this way and even analyse whether these actions, deliberately or not, are destabilising the Middle East using Scott Sagan’s three models; ‘the security model’, ‘the norms model’ or the prestige model, and ‘the domestic politics model’.15 The security model The security model is the model where states decide to build nuclear weapons to increase their security against external military threats, real or perceived, especially nuclear threats. Several other Middle Eastern countries have had access to nuclear weapons, either via domestic programs which have been undisclosed or not or via the support of international allies with access to them, such as the USA. For this reason alone - according to this model – Iran has had to, logically and with reason, develop a nuclear weapons program to deter threats. The aftermath of the first Gulf War improved Iran’s military situation. Iraq’s known nuclear installations were dismantled and the USA reduced its military presence in the region. Saddam Hussein stayed in power though, and Iraq’s conventional military capabilities were still perceived as better than Iran’s. But not all was well: After the Cold War, many of the unstable states along Iran’s northern border, such (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  National Intelligence Council (2007), p. 4. Amano (2014), pp. 5-6. Best (2008), p. 531. Mearsheimer (1995), pp. 11-12. Jervis (1978), pp. 169-170. Sagan (1996), p. 55. 9 as Afghanistan, posed a risk in that they could affect Iran’s stability, or at least affect governmental control in the more remote provinces. This initiated cooperation with Russia, where Iran restrained its involvement in Central Asia in return for Russia securing the northern regions and Iran was thus able to buy arms and even nuclear technology from Russia in return.16 Also, the West - including the USA via the UN ‘Six plus two’ group and the United Kingdom - cooperated with Iran from 1999 onwards in fighting narcotics going through Iran via the so called “Northern Route” to Europe. This cooperation has resulted in millions of dollars for Iran to buy bulletproof vests and other security equipment.17 But Iran could not significantly enhance its military expenditure because of its difficult economic situation being solely reliant on the export of oil and faced with sanctions. Iran’s military expenditure actually fell from 6% to 3% of its Gross National Product between 1989 and 1999, less than half of that which was estimated to be necessary to maintain the military forces in 1989.18 As a result, Iran saw developing a nuclear program as compensation for the lack of conventional forces inspired by neighbouring Pakistan.19 Since the early 70’s Pakistan has been working on and successfully developed a nuclear weapons program to protect itself against India and has consequently received further attention from the United States of America and thus, influence in the region. Furthermore, Iran faced the USA’s Dual Containment strategy from 1994 onwards, which aimed to stop Iraqi and Iranian influence in the Middle East through political isolation and limitations on trade.20 President Bush also labelled Iran a member of the ‘axis of evil’ in a speech in 2002.21 This label came after a period of relative peace during which the relationship between Iran and the USA had improved somewhat owing to the more moderate Khatami being elected President in 1997.22 Still, Iran felt surrounded by threats and, with no strong allies in the region, the Iranian Government was motivated to carry on its development of missile technology and secretly conducted nuclear experiments while arguing that the country only wanted to build a peaceful civilian nuclear power industry.23 The second Gulf War demonstrated once again the USA’s conventional military superiority and showed that a weak conventional force could not deter it. But Iraq was able to use missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia with some effect, including increased support among some parts of the population in the Middle East due to anti-American sentiment. Even more interesting for Iran was the example set by Pakistan, India and North Korea: nuclear weapons gave a unique level of military status that could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the USA and, (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  Haass (2000), p. 40. Barton (2006), p. 115. Cordesman (2005), pp. 2-9. Brzezinski (2004), p. 23. Haass (2000), p. 33. Best (2008), p. 525. Young (2013), p. 592. Salehzadeh (2013), p. 15. 10 Royal Danish Defence College importantly, intimidate other regional powers.24 Interestingly enough, the bargaining chip has been shown to be useful by simply the mere threat of having a nuclear program. The threat of having a nuclear weapons program seemed enough to attract much wanted attention from the USA that could lead to recognition and further stabilise Iranian security; in 2013, it was still considered that Iran did not in fact have any nuclear weapons.25 The norms model The norms model explains that nuclear weapons provide an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity. By having a nuclear weapons program, a state will automatically be in a higher league internationally. The possession of nuclear weapons secures international recognition signalling a powerful state that must be negotiated with by other powerful states like the USA, so it can be a way of obtaining recognition and prestige not easily gained by other means. Iran is the largest state in the Gulf and - as Iran displayed during the Tanker War – it can control the Gulf by denying other states access to the Gulf and in this way defend Iran’s interests. Even though Iran could not defeat Iraq militarily, the country has still tried to become the most significant regional power in competition with Saudi Arabia. The competition with Iraq vanished as the USA degraded Iraq’s military capabilities and Iran was able to influence the government in Bagdad through support of the Shia population. But there is a gap between Iran’s aspirations and its military capacity, which Iran has to close by either enhancing military expenditure or by following other paths.26 Working under severe sanctions from the UN and the West, Iran chose to maximise its influence in the region by supporting countries and groupings, which were responsive to Iranian politics. That included Syria, Yemen and Hezbollah, all of which could intimidate Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel as well as undermining their confidence in the USA’s security guarantees.27 But rivalry with other states in the region is not only about hard power but also about soft power, and Iran’s political and religious rhetoric has often placed it in ideological competition with other Middle Eastern states, especially Saudi Arabia, which feels threatened by Iran’s attempt to speak to its population and not its leaders.28 This creates an external security dilemma driven by Iran’s attempt to provoke unrest in various other states, as they must focus on domestic problems, a situation which Iran exploits. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran faces similar challenges because as Saudi Arabia tries to deter Iran’s growing power by exporting its own ideology: Wahhabism. Given both Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s desire to export their ideologies, they have both supported organisations across the region, which has developed into a geopolitical competition. With their own populations under relative control, most (24)  Cordesman (2005), p. 84. (25)  Salehzadeh (2013), pp. 15-16. (26)  Cordesman (2005), p. 2. (27)  Brzezinski (2004), p. 17. (28)  Mabon (2013), p. 200. 11 of the two-state competition is carried out in other Middle Eastern states, to a large extent as a zero-sum game – one’s loss is another’s gain.29 This stalemate may be resolved if Iran developed nuclear weapons, as it is likely to win more worldwide attention than its competitor Saudi Arabia, and therefore win the regional power struggle – a situation that would be counterproductive to Saudi Arabia’s political goal of being the most important regional power. The domestic politics model The domestic politics model explains how nuclear weapons can be used as a political tool to advance narrow-minded domestic and bureaucratic interests. In this model, nuclear weapons are used domestically as a mean of obtaining influence in the government, both on security issues but also on issues important for internal political reasons. In the Iranian case, the UN sanctions and their devastating influence on Iran’s development plays an important part in the model. Iran is subject to severe economic sanctions because of its nuclear aspirations. USA, the European Union (EU), and the UN Security Council have created an almost impenetrable sanction regime towards Iran.30 The sanctions work but perhaps not as intended. The sanctions started in 1979 and were targeted against Iran’s military capacity and its apparent support for terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. From 2006, several sanctions emanating from the UN Security Council were directed against Iran’s nuclear program and were in 2010 topped by the USA and the EU, which implemented sanctions on Iran’s economy in order to force it to the negotiating table on nuclear weapons.31 But the sanctions are creating tensions inside Iran, between hawks and doves in the Government, and are pushing Iran from the West to the East, while at the same time creating a humanitarian crisis. The political will of pursuing a nuclear program is apparently not affected, at least judging by rhetoric used, and despite the sanctions, the regime strongly believes it is entitled to have a nuclear program as long as it is peaceful.32 The sanctions have, however, made their mark on development opportunities for Iranian society because of import and export limitations that influence Iran’s access to financial markets and much wanted goods. The sanctions are viewed with ingrained distrust, as many Iranians believe that they were created not to stop the nuclear program but by the USA in order to isolate and overthrow the government, with the support of Saudi Arabia and the EU.33 And, as long as the Iranian government is convinced of the secret USA strategy, its response will be resistance. In 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei implemented a ‘resistance economy’ against Western tyranny emphasising that Iran would never surrender and that worse things have happened to Iran.34 The ‘resistance economy’ is supposed to make Iran less dependent on oil exports and (29)  Ibid, p. 205. (30)  United States of America’s Department of the Treasury (2015). (31)  IISS (2005), p. 110. (32)  Salehzadeh (2013), p. 15. (33)  Bloomberg (2012). (34)  Farhi (2012). 12 Royal Danish Defence College counteract economic sanctions.35 Khamenei perceives the sanctions as economic warfare in an undeclared war, which includes the much-debated killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and attacks by computer viruses.36 To counteract domestic trouble because of the sanctions, Iranian leaders have emphasised that the Qur’an allows a country to prepare itself for defence with its utmost powers, even though this might be counterproductive to normalisation with the rest of the world.37 Also, the Iranian Government has subsidised fuel, basic foodstuffs, like bread, and some medicine in a classic way to defend domestic disturbances.38 But, as the UN sanctions limit the economic opportunities and the development of the country, the Iranian Government plans to put an end to the subsidies by the end of 2015, which could further fuel domestic challenges.39 The Iranian Government blames the West for all its troubles, presenting it as an attack on Iranian interests, sovereignty and religion supported by Israeli lobbyism in the USA.40 That way, the Iranian leaders can justify the hardship faced by the Iranians and explain why Iran should not give in. This has effectively put a lid on any discussion as the nuclear program is now connected to religion, to national pride and to the internationally recognised right to have a peaceful civilian nuclear program. Effects on stability for the Middle East After the war with Iraq, Iran was faced with a worn-down military capacity and with an enemy neighbour that was not defeated and was even declared to be the winner.41 This motivated Iran to rebuild the armed forces for at least three reasons: an offensive capacity to establish Iran as a regional power that could support regimes in the Middle East and gain influence or at least be recognised as an important state in the region; a deterrence capability against Iraq and various other threats in the Middle East including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA (the latter for being supportive of Iraq and for its unwanted presence in the Gulf); and, perhaps not at least: To counter external interference in Iranian internal affairs. In all these respects, nuclear weapons were regarded by Iran as a game changer – or a force multiplier. Nuclear weapons and the means of delivery could deter any hostile intent toward Iran, strengthening Iran’s place in the Middle East, and even become a means of self-reliance at a fraction of the cost of conventional forces - of course Iran was attracted to nuclear technology.42 Iran is a weak military state with aspirations to become a great regional power and it thus seeks to short circuit the need for conventional forces because of lack of (35)  RT Question More (2012). (36)  Salami (2012). (37)  Salehzadeh (2013), p. 16. (38)  United States of America’s Institute for Peace (2010). (39)  Ibid. (40)  Farhi (2012). (41)  Best (2008), p. 490. (42)  Young (2013), p. 592. 13 money and the sanctions it faces. Iran’s power aspirations can be summed up in two particular areas, namely, ideology and geopolitics. Ideology became important after the Iranian Revolution and boosted the sectarian question in the Middle East, mostly as a vehicle for legitimacy and power. But this exporting of ideology created a geopolitical competition with Saudi Arabia, a competition that picked up speed after the collapse of Iraq which, to some extent, had been able to maintain a status quo between the three states. With only two states competing and only one with a nuclear weapons program, Iran created a security dilemma which Saudi Arabia has a hard time overcoming. Adding to Saudi Arabia’s trouble with gaining international influence, Iraq has changed regime from the Sunni- and Saudi Arabia-supported Saddam Hussein, to the Shia- and Iranian-supported current government, a foreign policy tragedy for Saudi Arabia perhaps more devastating than the Iranian threat of nuclear weapons. An increasingly powerful Shia Muslim population in the Middle East supported by an Iranian nuclear weapons program is the worst case scenario for Saudi Arabia and explains the strategic alliance with the USA - despite domestic opposition - and also explains why Saudi Arabia is the greatest net importer of military equipment in the world.43 The security dilemma really is adding to the destabilisation of the region. With possible inspiration from Pakistan, India and North Korea, Iran has made the nuclear program a question of national pride, helping to counter any possible internal opposition toward it. On top of that, Iran argues that both the USA and Israel have nuclear capacity and that Iran must deter the threat from the West.44 With nuclear weapons, Iran would be the de facto regional superpower, which could nullify Saudi Arabia’s main incentive for building its own nuclear program. Alternatively, this could in fact start nuclear proliferation across the region, which is of course not in the interest of the USA and its allies.45 In the long run though, Iran’s threat of developing nuclear weapons could end up as a stabilising factor if Iran succeeds in coupling nuclear negotiations with the on-going stability process in the Middle East.46 Iran can hope to gain more influence than other regional powers by becoming the most important country to negotiate with - especially for the USA. If Iran succeeds, Iran can enhance its influence, become a trustworthy vehicle for further stability initiatives, and perhaps even see the sanctions lifted. In order to do this, Iran needs to carefully nurture its aspirations for regional power, without being caught in the security dilemma, by using the threat of developing nuclear weapons as coercive diplomacy. However, this could be nothing more than a ‘Sword of Damocles’ if Iran does not convince the USA that it is a responsible state. Even though Iran complies with the IAEA, it cannot be ruled out (43)  The Guardian (2015). (44)  Mabon (2013), p. 208. (45)  Ibid, p. 209. (46)  Waltz (2012). 14 Royal Danish Defence College that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program and can develop a nuclear device including a homemade missile system.47 By using the fact that they may be developing nuclear weapons, but not actually doing so, Iran can have the best of both worlds in the longer term. That said, as the nuclear program is the main reason for the sanctions, Iran has to, in the short term, overcome these sanctions, its political isolation and its lack of development. Most of the world is against Iran having the facilities to build nuclear weapons, which makes the lifting of sanctions unlikely unless Iran can convince the world that it is a responsible and trustworthy state.48 In fact, the nuclear program can actually be seen as a stabilising factor, as Iran’s desire for recognition is likely to influence the security politics of the Iranian Government and make them less confrontational and trustworthier. On the other hand, as the Iranian Government views the security issue and the nuclear program as connected, it has created fear amongst other states in the region and elsewhere that it is developing a secret nuclear weapons program - despite the Iranian Government’s assurances of the opposite. To some extent then, Iran is its own worst enemy on security issues because in pursuing a nuclear energy program, there is an unavoidable underlying but unspoken threat of developing nuclear weapons. Conclusion The analysis using each of Sagan’s three models shows that Iran has a strong incentive to develop a nuclear program. The analysis supports the common superstition that Iran is seeking to develop both a civilian nuclear energy program and a secret nuclear weapons program, which is a destabilising factor in the Middle East. Sagan’s three models point out the motivating factors that play a role - and perhaps even reinforce each other - when the Iranian Government talks about a nuclear power program. However, the Iranian development of nuclear weapons is a two-step process; Iran has undertaken the first step by preparing to but not actually developing a physical weapon. Whether or not Iran will take the next step is a significant question that worries the world. But is it in fact necessary for Iran to take the next step to maximize the country’s security? Perhaps not: if Iran merely threatens to develop nuclear weapons in order to attract outside political attention and become relevant in security talks in the Middle East, it may then be able to completely circumvent the security dilemma - but only if other states trust Iran to behave reliably with respect to the nuclear issue. On the other hand, the development of a nuclear weapons program may in fact reduce the level of Iran’s security because other states are likely to enhance their military capacity as a response. By not developing a nuclear weapons program but only threatening to do so in a indirect, Iran may be able to obtain - or at least the Iranian Government has taken a gamble on – the lifting of the UN sanctions regime and can at the same time gain status as a powerful country in the region. In this way, Iran can become a regional power (47)  Cordesman (2005), p. 137. (48)  Times of Israel (2013). 15 by using the nuclear aspiration as a bargaining chip without spending too much money on actually developing and maintaining a nuclear weapon. More importantly, by using the threat of going nuclear, Iran will have a voice that the USA can hardly ignore and thereby create an opening for getting rid of the sanctions altogether, in spite of following a civilian nuclear path to strengthen national pride. Based on its continuing influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and its strategic location at the Strait of Hormuz, Iran remains a regional power with influence that attracts the West. A further trade-off for the West could be a more reliable Iranian Government, willing to negotiate with the USA about security development in the region and it could thus become a more non-confrontational state, which, in turn, will dampen the effect on the security dilemma. If Iran continues the nuclear program and actually develops a physical device, it is likely to have a voice because of the threat of using it, but it would of course be looked upon with suspicion, with the consequent reduced likelihood of having the sanctions lifted. North Korea set the bad example for Iran of that development. If this path were pursued, it would be harder for Iran to be a great regional power, even though nuclear weapons could have the advantage of quelling domestic troubles through uniting national pride. This path would force Iran to follow the current pattern of supporting anti-Western organisations across the region and it would thus have a destabilising effect. If this were the case, Iran would only have limited political influence on the security situation in the Middle East and still be looked upon with suspicion as belonging to the axis of evil. While not addressed in this brief, Iran is faced with growing internal pressure demanding democracy and development. This could soften Iran’s attitude toward the outside world - if the doves in the Iranian Government prevail. Much is at stake for Iran and, while we wait for the result of recent negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran is still perceived as the most destabilising power in the Middle East, second only to the Islamic State. But Iran has some important aces up its sleeve, which in the long run could secure what Iran wants: Recognition, importance, and development. An actual nuclear weapons program will jeopardise all of that. 16 Royal Danish Defence College Bibliography Barton, Lee V. (ed.) (2006), ’Illegal drugs and Governmental policies’, (New York: Nova Science Publishers). Best, Anthony & Hanhimäki, Jussi & Maiolo, Joseph & Schulze, Kirsten (2008), ‘International History of the Twentieth Century and beyond’, (London: Routledge). 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